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Einhom

in recent years increased their

of employment policy. This dissertation analyses

Commission was
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competence
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competence
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the European

in this field.

This

of the development of

since the early 1990s on the level of the European Union.

The explanation offered

links the literature

on policy analysis and two-level
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thesis argues that the timing

crucially influenced

This process aimed

Member

States

by

and content of Europe -wide employment measures was

a multi-step ratcheting process orchestrated

by

the

Commission.

gradually representing and activating latent interests within the

at

and thereby succeeded

the cluster of countries

in eventually

winning

all

Member

States over to

which supported Europe-wide employment measures.

This argument contrasts with the theoretical predictions made by two of the

dominant approaches
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of European integration: neofunctionalism and
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independent causal iniluence over
policy development to supranational institutions
that are

waking

closely with
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Member

States, fully

their

domestic economic and

agreement on the

details

EU

political interests, are central in the
negotiation

In

aware of
and

of policy developments. The findings of this dissertation

suggest that a simple model of either supranational influence
or national influence does
not fully explain the inclusion of employment

title

into the Treaty

of Amsterdam.
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ot explanations offered in the literature:

employment policy

The second
social

and

set
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of explanations maintains

political

first set

that

of explanations regards the

common economic

Member

dimension due to a generally more

analysis of both sets of explanations,

however show

problem

in

Europe.

States were pressured to add a

critical

public opinion.

Empirical

that the results are counter-indicative

to the generally hypothesized relationship, but instead quantitatively supports the two-

level entrepreneurship

The
change

in

model.

findings of the thesis highlight the forces and factors that determined political

employment

policyjust as

much

as the thesis contributes to an analysis of the

logic

and structure of European integration under the

level

European

polity.

institutional conditions
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

The Question: Explaining the Employment Title

Unemployment

represents one of the most severe problems facing the
European

Union. With the end of the Golden Age, the unemployment rate rose
dramatically during
the three

1990s.

a

major recessions 1974-75, 80-84 and 91-94 and averaged about 10

This

is

almost five-times more than what

it

was

in the 60s.

government would address unemployment by stimulating

and

fiscal instruments.

Or

alternatively, a

But with the

governments are now locked

prevents them from manipulating exchange

into

would

rates, like they

attract severe penalties

in the past,

economy using monetary

EMU

retraining of

and the Growth and

European monetary policies which

the other hand, deficit financing with a social objective

big budget deficit

Typically

government could subsidize the

labor and thereby taking a hit with the deficit.

Stability Pact, the

the

% in the

is

were used

to in the past.

On

not an option either, because a

from the EU. The

result

the scope of available strategies governments could pursue separately

is

of

this is tint

severely limited

by Europeanization.

One would

think that this should be a clarion call for coordinated action on a

Europe -wide employment policy. Yet, what one actually can observe

little

is

that there

progress on the social agenda of the European Union for over two decades.

was

At

every summit in the 70s and 80s the social
agenda was beset by problems of wide -spread
difference of opinion

among

only agreements

were possible

that

the

Member

in this period

agreements, which ultimately proved

to

An

As

employment

ol the legal

states that

denominator

in

1997 represents a departure from

first

this

that countries that

two decades suddenly achieved consensus on

a result of this, for the

title, Title

common

development during the negotiation was

interesting

steadfastly divided for over

agenda.

were lowest

be ineffective.

However, the Treaty of Amsterdam
pattern.

and a lack of consensus. Therefore the

States

the social

time in the history of European integration, an

VIII in the treaty, which contains six articles (125 to
130),

framework of European governance.

employment

is

“a matter of

and the European Union (EU)

to

were

common

Article (2) in the

part

Amsterdam Treaty

concern” and calls for the

“work towards developing

is

Member

States

a co-ordinated strategy for

2

employment.”
accomplish

to

Given

the legal basis

this goal,

and the

employment by now

agenda of the European Union and

is

set

is

of procedures that are institutionalized

firmly established as a priority on the

not likely to diminish in

its

importance

in the

3

foreseeable future.

'On the concept of governance see Cram 2001, Kohler-Koch and Eisig 1999, KohlerKoch, 1996, Mayntz 1998, Rhodes 1996, Rosenau 1992, and Winn 1998.
2

Commission of the European Communities,

1997, Official Journal

C

340.

3

For instance, as pointed out by Martin Rhodes (1997, 22) combating unemployment has
“the greatest challenge for the European Union.”

become

2

Thiee aspects ot the treaty stand

European Union, the

employment on

political

Employment Committee

is

is

First, the first

commitment among

the level of the European

second, a policy procedure

are of

out:

Union

the

is

time

Member

in the history

States to

of the

promoting

formally written into the treaty;

detailed that aims at promoting

employment; and

third a

formally created which monitors and policy
procedure

in the

employment.

The goal of achieving
co-ordination.

employment

the

Starting with the Essen

summit

priority

in

is

supported by a

new

process of

December 1994 and through

subsequent Council summits, a process was launched by which

Member

States eventually

agreed to accept Europe -wide employment guidelines from the
European Commission

and

to

implement these on the respective domestic

been called an
currently

open method of co-ordination.”

document

the implementation of

and thereby expose themselves

Commission and

4

the Council.

to

level.

As

This process has most recently

part of this process,

employment guidelines through annual

list is

States

reports

an examination of their actions by the European

Every year, both European

institutions publish a Joint

....

not included in this

Member

the fact that the Social Protocoll

which was annexed

to the

Maastricht Treaty has been included into the Amsterdam Treaty and will be binding for
all member states of the EU. For a discussion of the Social Protocoll see chapter 4. Fora
description of this procedure see

'

Rhode

For a description of the mechanisms of

1995.

this

process see Commission of the European

Communities, 1999. Platzer 1999, Thomas 1999.

Among many

examples, for instance see the most recent speech by the Director

General, Odile Quentin on 27.10.2000.

3

Economic Report and Employment Recommendations.
efforts are assessed

and

At the core of

In both

documents, the national

critically evaluated.

this dissertation is the

aim of identifying

the factors

and forces

that

caused the timing, the form and the content of
the Europe-wide employment measures.

With

this

research focus, this dissertation addresses the most
fundamental puzzle

confronting those

who

seek to understand European integration, namely

to explain

how

stalemate in the decision-making p-ocess of the European
Union was overcome during
the

Amsterdam Treaty

the

employment chapter

negotiations and

Fundamentally,

flic

agenda

of the

why Member

States ultimately agreed to include

in the final treaty.

Who

poses three basic questions:

it

Euiopean Union?

I

negotiation,

In

the

the

title in

Member

Commission make

the Treaty of

European Commission

the

this dissertation

Amsterdam

is

final

proposed agreement

to

phase of the

a final

outcome?

argues that the inclusion of the

the result of a ratcheting strategy

by

as a two- level entrepreneur succeeded in facilitating the

gradual representation of previously latent interests within the

thereby indirectly pressured the

influence

States during the

does not have a formal vote? During the

response to these questions,

employment
which

how does

it

who

low docs the European Commission manage

exert any influence over the preference formation of the
negotiation, even though

are the actors

Member

Member

States and

States to endorse the Europe- wide

employment

7

measures.

The concerns over unemployment

Latent interests

in this

the sharing of authority.

in

Europe

context are understood to be

Authority

control over other positions.

is

all

at that

interests that

legitimated power, and

In this sense, all

those interests

authority can be said to represent latent interests.

time, gave the

power

who

In particular the

4

do not

is

participate in

understood to be

are excluded from

broad public often

fails

Commission

a position of strength

from which

it

was able

to influence agenda-setting as

well as the preference formation and thereby
critically influence the inclusion of
the
particular

employment

title in

the

Amsterdam

Treaty.

Three resources of the Commission were particularly
crucial

for

its

ability to

influence the outcome ot the multilateral negotiations
as a two- level entrepreneur:
the

Commission successfully

critically influenced the

Union.

utilized

its

First,

formal role as agenda-setter and thereby

placement of employment on the active agenda of the European

Second, through an informal involvement

influenced the preference formation.

in the negotiation, the

Specifically, the

Commission

Commission

successfully

exploited the receptiveness of the various Council Presidencies. Especially
the

cooperation with the Irish Presidency was

exogenous force

vital for the ability

to influence the multilateral negotiations.

of the Commission as an

For, instance, the Irish

Presidency chose to adopt as the main draft proposal of the employment

title

the proposal

submitted by the Commission, and thereby rejected outright the proposal made by the

Council Secretariat. The reason for

Commission’s proposal
States

would

this

choice

as being closer to

find acceptable.

The

was

that the Presidency perceived the

what the respective public

article relating to

employment

in the

in the

Member

Amsterdam

Treaty should be seen by the public as a strong collective commitment on the part of the

Member
this

States to

message was

work towards

a reduction of

unemployment. The Presidency

better achieved with the proposal of the

Commission than with

proposal of the Council. Third, the Commission maintained the consensus

to

have

the

its

interests aggregated, organized

work of Dahrendorf 1959 and

felt that

the

among

the

and represented. This understanding draws on

Schattschneider 1960.

5

Member
the

States

by persuading the Danish Presidency

employment

title until

to

withhold further deliberations of

the British general elections had
completed.

The argument of this

dissertation

emerges out of a structured and focused

narrative of the decision-making process leading
towards the inclusion of the

employment chapter

made by

in the

the literature

Amsterdam

Guided by

Treaty.

the theoretical predictions

on two- level entrepreneurship, the account of this
single-case study

focuses primarily on the resources and strategies employed
by the European Commission

duiing the decision-making process of the Intergovernmental
Conference of 1996/1997.

Causal inference to accomplish the within-case analysis

two research

tools: the process tracing

evidence are employed

is

enhanced by the

utilization of

and the congruence method. Multiple sources of

in the analysis, the

most important of which are personal

interviews conducted in Brussels during the spring of 2001. Furthermore,
extensive use
is

made of primary documents, such

Conclusions, Council resolutions,

EU

and European Parliament documents
proposals, and

Survey data

IGC

positions papers.

sets are used.

as treaties,

directives

European Council Presidency
and regulations, European Commission

(resolutions, communications, decisions, reports,

Additionally, Eurobarometer and Labor Force

Finally, the analysis relies

on secondary documents such a

academic and journalistic work.
This dissertation

is

structured into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides the

theoretical foundation for this dissertation.

subsections.

literature that

happens

The
aim

first

at

This chapter

is

structured into three

subsection reviews the main theoretical arguments provided in the

explaining

in the first place

and

why deadlock

why

in joint-decision

making processes

decisions pertaining to social and

6

employment policy

are particularly difficult to agree

ls that,

while the literature

Member
policy,

is

on

at the

European

One conclusion of this

level.

correct in predicting a certain degree
of conflict

States, especially pertaining to decisions
in the area

what

is

needed

is

a theoretical

chapter

among

the

of social and employment

framework which helps

to understand both the

conditions under which deadlock can be overcome
as well as the role played by the
relevant actors in the decision-making process.

In line with this conclusion, the

section of this chapter outlines the arguments
provided by two of the

approaches

in the

main

Held of European integration (neofunctionalism
and

second

theoretical

liberal

intergovemmentalism) which explain under what conditions and through
which

mechanisms deadlock can be overcome. After
ol

both approaches,

on the theories

ol

this dissertation agrees

a review of the strengths and weaknesses

with scholars

who have

European integration should move heyond

its

argued

that the debate

current limitation of

seeing the decision-making process as being dominated either by
supranational
institutions or

by national governments. The

third

and

last

section of this chapter outlines

an alternative theory of decision-making that combines insights from the work on policy
analysis and two- level entrepreneurship.

this section is that

outcome

ol the process

substantially be influenced by the

manage

among

the

it

is

Member

able to either organize,

States.

Through

policy initiation, mediation and mobilization, does the

to exert a crucial influence

on the

in

of agenda -setting and process- formation can

Commission when

aggregate or represent latent interests

mechanism of

The central theoretical argument developed

final decisions taken

during the multilateral negotiations.

7

a ratcheting

Commission

by the governments

'

C

hapter 3 and 4 provide a historical
evolution of the social dimension

and the employment measures more
and ending
against

1990.

in

specifically, starling will) the Treaty

Both chapters provide

a descriptive

(

it

I

lie

Amsterdam

reaty.

Particular attention

is

Commission were

employment chapter

particularly crucial for

its

this

chapter

and

and thereby allowed

latitude

were capable of representing

represent a

way, the

(

compromise
ommission

s

to

it

position of

all

outcome of

Commission gave

it

draw up policy proposals

crucial domestic interests in the

Additionally, this position allowed the

in the

that three resources

is

ability to influence the

multilatei.il negotiations, hirst, (he institutional location
ol the

gieatei flexibility

was

paid to the resources and strategies employed

by the European Commission. The main conclusion
of
ol the

that

Designed as a single-case study,

focuses on the developments that led to the adoption
of the

I

(1957)

Treaty.

hapler 5 represents (he core of this dissertation.

Amsterdam

Rome

to contribute

towards a greater appreciation of the novelty
of the employment chapter
in

general

and analytical background

which the single case study can then be compared.
This helps

included

of

in

Member

that

States.

Commission

to draft policy proposals that in effect

the positions

among

proposals represent

a

the

Member

postion above the lowest

States.

In this

common

denominator.

Second, the receptiveness

Commission
Slates.

to influence the

ol the

outcome

Council Presidency crucially enabled the

ol the multilateral

negotiations

among

the

Member

Especially the cooperation with the Irish as well as the Dutch Presidencies were

vital lor the ability

negations,

of the Commission as an exogenous force

for instance, the

Irish

Presidency chose

to

,x

to influence the multilateral

adopt as the main draft proposal ol

the

i

employment chapter

ejected the proposal

Third, the

the proposal submitted

made by

in

the

Commission, and thereby

clearly

the Council Secretariat.

Commission can

seen to represent latent domestic

unemployment

by

exert pressure onto

interests.

Member

States

when

it

can be

The representation of the concerns over

Europe, gave the Commission a position
of strength from which

it

was

able to influence the policy-shaping as
well as policy-setting decisions and thereby
critically influence the content

the

Amsterdam

Treaty.

of the employment chapter that was ultimately
included

In the last

phase of the treaty negotiations,

Member

in

States could

not afford to be seen by their respective publics’
as not supporting a Europe -wide
initiative for

more employment. Amidst high

Member

States towards

in all the

Member

much

as the

of unemployment, a commitment of

Economic and Monetary Union, and

States that

Member

levels

States

EMU

had

to

will not create

communicate

more

to the

a strong belief of the public

jobs, the

European Union,

European people

that

it

just as

was

indeed, nevertheless, representing the interests of the European
people. The employment

chapter

became

the crucial item in the

Amsterdam Treaty by which such

a

message could

be conveyed.
This conclusion of

Commission managed
Treaty of

Amsterdam

this

chapter suggests that the process by which the

to influence the inclusion

is

on the European as well
entrepreneurship model

best explained

by

a theoretical

as the domestic level.

is

of the employment chapter into the

As

model

that simultaneously focuses

discussed in chapter 2, a two- level

best equipped to capture both the intervening steps of the

decision-making process as well as the

final

outcome of the

9

negotiation.

C haptcr 6 attempts to strengthen the
argument presented in this dissertation, by

way of analyzing

counter -arguments presented

arguments presented

in the literature for the

in the literature.

The

employment chapter

falsification

of the

indirectly enhances the

plausibility o( the conclusions reached in this
dissertation. Chapter 7 presents the

conclusions of the dissertation.

This introduction will provide a brief review of the
debates on Europeanization

and the particular reasons why policy change, especially

hampered. Next

it

will discuss the

in the social field, is often

competing and rather contradictory predictions

offered by neofunctionalists and intcrgovernmenatalists as to

be accomplished.

On

how

policy appears likely to

the basis of these theoretical debates the research questions
as well

as hypotheses are formulated.

1.1.1

The Europeanisation of Employment Policy

The general phenomenon
the

employment chapter

in the

that

examined

is

in this dissertation is the inclusion

Treaty of Amsterdam which signifies an increase

in the

relevance of employment policy on the agenda of the European Union. Given the
that

employment has become

a priority

fact

of the European Union and a new process of

coordination has been developed several scholars have pointed out that employment
policy

is

now

Europeanized.

In general,

much academic

10

literature is available

of

on the

^

causes and consequences of Europeanisation

some

literature

various policy fields."

emerging on the Europeanisation of employment

is

Common

in

most academic work on Europeanisation

to

analytical dimensions:

First, there are

that explain the process ol

many

is

More

specifically,

policy.

the distinction of two

studies that analyze the factors and forces

Europeanisation of policy areas on the supranational

level.

Second, there are a number of studies that focus on the
consequences of Europeanisation

on domestic

institutions.

Of particular

interest to the research focus

of

this dissertation is

the first dimension.

Scholars

development

and

among

„
authorized rules.”

former approach define Europeanisation “as the emergence
and

European

at the

political, legal

interactions

in the

level

of

distinct structures

of governance, that

of

social institutions associated with problem-solving that
formalize

the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation
of

10
1

lere,

Europeanisation connotes the processes and mechanisms by

which “domestic policy areas become increasingly subject
In this research focus, the

Among

is,

to

European policy making.”'

dependent variables are the processes, the newly created

the vast literature on this topic see for instance Boerzel 2000, Kohler-Koch

Lehmkuhl 1999, Ladrech 1994, Lehmkuhl 2000, Olson 1996, Schmidt
1999, Turner 1996, Cole 2001, Kassim and Menon 1996, Cole and Drake 2000, and
1998, Knill and

Warleigh 2001,

^Cameron 2000, and Johansson 1999.
Risse, Cowles,

and Caporaso 2000.

“Boerzel (1999, 574).

ll

institutional structures

competences

On

on

in specific

the

the supranational level, as well
as the degree to

policy areas are conferred to the

European Union

employment policy has

level, the

shifted both

a result, a novel division of labor

thus being introduced.

spells out

Each

new

power and

influence to the European institutions.

level

Europe-wide employment

targets

and guidelines. The

their efforts in annual National

in

identify specific

its

Member

in its

these into national policies.

Director General of the

DG

targets, the

States have

specific policy

annual Joint

measures

Recommendation. Thus, while the Commission and

employment

Member

As pointed out

in

Employment and

to each

the Council

States are pressured to implement

an interview by Alan Larsson, former
Social Affairs of the European

Commission:
I'he

method

for the co-ordination

form of a convergence process
the preparation of

EMU,

of employment policy takes the

[...]

similar to the one followed for

with the objective to significantly

employment on a lasting basis and to light unemployment.
Unlike for Economic and Monetary Union where the financial

increase

markets would penalize immediately inflationary economies and
therefore strict and objective guarantees had to be introduced, for

employment,

the electorate will be the controlling factor, as
12

single country

Larsson, Brussels, February

is

1

willing to be at the bottom of the class.

1,

is

Action Plans. Again on the basis of proposals

Economic Report and simultaneously recommends
States in

the national level

domestic policy programs and

Irom the Commission, the Council judges the
national efforts

Member

and

As

on the basis of the Commission’s proposal the
Council

obliged themselves to implement these guidelines

document

EU.

process of policy making in the area
of

between the European

year,

which

2001.

12

no

In effect, this

means

that the

European Commission can

ot coordination” as a tool of
assessing and evaluating the

area of

employment

Member

“open method

States' efforts in the

Through the mechanism of “politics of
shame”

policy.

European Commission

utilize the

can, if necessary exert pressure
onto the

Member

then, the

States and

thereby increase compliance with the specific
policy goals of the employment
13

guidelines.

Member

State

This strategy works by exposing to the
public the degree to which a
is

willing to implement the Europe-wide

governments are interested

in maintaining the

unemployment, the nagging voice of

how

honest the

Member

the

employment

image of attempting

Commission

is

States really are in their efforts.

targets.

While

to actively bring

all

down

capable of revealing to the public

As

a consequence,

Member

States are very keen to avoid the embarassing situation
of being seen not complying with
the general effort of reducing

Scholars of the

through which the

EU

domestic discourse,

latter

unemployment.

approach define Europeanisation as

political

and economic dynamics become

a “set

of processes

part of the logic of
4

identities, political structures

and public policies.”'

Here,

Europeanisation connotes the processes and mechanisms by which European
institutionbuilding cause changes

at the

domestic

level.

In this research focus, the

dependent

variables are domestic processes, policies and institutions, which are influenced and

changed by the supranational processes and

13

On

the efficacy of “politics of

institutions.

shame” see Lake 1993.

14

Radaelli (2000, 3).

13

On

the domestic level, the
Europeanisation of

shared sphere of competence

observed on the domestic
ministries cooperate

domestic
this

priorities,

in

level:

the area of

First,

more closely
and

in

in

due

orde

employment policy has created

employment
to the

r to

policy.

Three changes can be

newly created processes,

incorporate the

a

federal

employment guidelines

into

order to draft and write the National
Action Plans, Overall,

has strengthened the position and
prominence of the Ministries of Labor and
Social

Affairs vis-a-vis the Ministries of Finance
and

Second, internal budget

employment

guidelines.

of reducing youth

priorities

The second

Economic

Affairs.

have shifted as a

pillar

result

of the Europe -wide

of the employment strategy spells out the
goal

unemployment and long-term unemployment. Member

increasingly dedicate financial resources towards offering

all

States

youth unemployed and

all

long-term unemployed an employment measure within
a specified time frame.

And
harmonized.
the

finally, the

system of measuring and reporting unemployment

Member

same

States are adopting the

European Commission,

unemployment by
efforts

to

is

being

structural indicators as suggested

by

measure and report developments of employment and

different sectors.

more comparable and more

This has contributed towards making the national
transparent.

For youth unemployed the time-frame
is twelve months.

is

six

months, for adult long-term unemployed

the time- frame

14

1.1.2.

Obstacles

in

the

Way

of Europeanisation

Within the tradition of scholars

who examine

the factors and forces,

which

explain the process of Europeanisation
of policy areas on the supranational level,
Scharpf

(1988, 1991, 1997) provides a set of arguments
as to

why

characterized by difficulties of achieving policy
change.
to the institutional characteristics

making

is

central

two

process

is

often

6

In a nutshell he posits that

due

of the European Community (EC), joint
decision-

severely hampered and therefore deadlock

Specifically

‘

this

institutional conditions

of the

government decisions (EC decisions)

of constituent governments (member

states),

EC

is

often the only outcome.

are responsible for this outcome:
(1)

are directly dependent

and

(2) the

upon

the agreement

agreement of constituent

governments must be unanimous or nearly unanimous. Since the
European Community’s
decisions directly depend upon the unanimous agreement of the
are likely to find themselves in a “joint decision trap.”

pioceed

to

new

consequence of

Member

States, actors

Here, they are unable to either

decisions or to leave the decision-making arena altogether.
this

arrangement

is

that the “central

government

creatively to external demands, or to anticipate future consensus;

determined directly by the immediate

self-interests

of

is

The

not free to respond

its

actions are

member governments”

(Scharpf,

1988, 255).

In his work he applies insights of the debate of interlocking politics in German
federalism (Politikverflechtung) to the European Community. For the debate on German

Benz 1985, Hesse 1978, Johnson 1973, Riker 1964, Scharpf, Reissert, and
Schnabel (1976, 1977, 1978), Wheare 1964.
federalism see
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Building on Scharprs arguments,
several scholars have suggested
that two

important conclusions that can be

European Union:

first,

made about

deadlock on the

outcome of joint decisions

EU

are seen by the

the decision-making process in
the

level

is

likely to the degree to

Member

States either as a loss in

decision competence or as incurring costs
of instrumental adjustment.
policy agreement

the following

made

in the

two cleavages:

which the

power and

Second, any

European Union can be seen as the successful
resolution of
first,

the question of the appropriate level of
authority, and

second the question of the appropriate

legal instalment to bring about the
agreed

on

measure.

This dissertation agrees with scholars

conect

in predicting a certain

who have

degree of conflict

pertaining to decisions in the area of social and
theoretical

framework which helps

to

among

pointed out that while Schaipf
the

Member

employment

policy,

States, especially

what

is

deadlock can be overcome as well as the role played by the relevant
actors

strategies likely to be

1.2

employed by

needed

in the

to specify the resources

and

the various actors.

The Argument: Two-Level Entrepreneurship

Given

the fact that joint-decision

hampered by several

factors,

it

is

understand both the conditions under which

decision-making process. Such a framework would have

making on

the

European Union

level

is

appears to be relevant to examine which theories of

For a discussion of this cleavage for instance see

Newman

16

1993.

is

a

European integration might help

to explain

when, under what conditions, and
through

which mechanisms policy change can
actually be accomplished.

The

central theoretical

argument developed

in this dissertation is that
policy-

shaping and policy-setting decisions
can substantially be influenced by
the European

Commission when

among

the

it

Member

is

able to either organize, aggregate
or represent latent interests

Through

States.

a ratcheting

mechanism of policy

mediation and mobilization, the Commission
manages

initiation,

to exert a crucial

degree of

influence on the final decisions taken by the
governments during the multilateral
negotiations.

This theoretical frame heavily draws on the
insight of work on policy analysis,
especially, the

work of Peterson 1995a, 2001, Peterson and Bomberg
1999

work of Moravcsik (1999) on two-level entrepreneurship.
Such
approaches not only allows one
involved

in the

influence the

to

as well as the

a combination of

analyze both the actors and resources and strategies

policy-shaping and policy-setting phase, but also to assess
the decisive

Commission had on

the choices available to the

Member

States during the

“history-making” decisions.
Policy analysis provides a useful basic analytical framework, due
to

its

distinction

of thiee stages in the process of decision-making: policy-shaping,
policy-setting

history- making decisions.

In a nutshell, Peterson’s central claim

is

that since

of decision-making attracts a different set of actors with varying resources

theorists

who

theoretical

attempt to explain outcomes across

model might be needed

for

all

stages

an analysis of

17

all

may

find that

and

each stage

and

strategies,

more than one

the stages of decision-making.

8

According
theoretical

to Peterson, policy-shaping
decisions are best explained

framework

that is both sensitive to the
political realities within the

States and provides an explanation
level

of the European Union.

how domestic

In particular,

interests get to

be represented on the

a useful theoretical

approach which combines both concerns (Peterson,
2001, 305).

emerge

Member

he suggests the most recent work of

Moravcsik (1999) on supranational entrepreneurship
provides

Policy-setting

by a

after bargaining

S

between the European

institutions.

In this

context, Peterson argues that theoretical frame
that combines a theory of ‘domestic
politics'

of the European Union with an analysis of the

institutional capacity

of

supranational actors to influence the course on which
policies are set would be a helpful
contribution towards an understanding of the process by
which different policy options
aie selected (Peterson, 2001, 300).

where

the

many

level that the

According

dilferent cleavages to

EU’s

which

to Peterson, since

EU

it

is at

the systemic level

politics give rise to intersect

institutions usually provide order

it

is at this

and aggregation.

This dissertation argues that such an approach can be developed by
focusing

simultaneously on two Icy aspects

ol the

Commission:

aggregate and represent latent domestic interests allows
in the policy-setting decisions.

first,

it

the

Commission’s

to influence the

ability to

Member

States

Second, the Commission’s influence over policy-setting

decisions, can be expected to be particularly strong during those times in which the

Commission and

the Presidency of the Council

work

closely together.

Such a

cooperation allows the Commission to relay the latent domestic interests

to the

European

1

The

section below provides a

more

detailed discussion of Moravcsik’s two- level

entrepreneurship model.

18

level,

while

it

allows the Presidency of the
Council to widen

proposals that

it

can draw on

in

its

attempt to mediate

The two-level entrepreneurship model
a useful set of theoretical
predictions

m

the

Amsterdam Treaty can be

scope of possible policy

among governments.

as suggested

by which

its

by Moravcsik (1999) provides

the inclusion of the

employment chapter

analyzed. According to Moravcsik,

two level

entrepreneurs are capable of decisively
influencing the outcome of multilateral
negotiations through persuasion, due to
their ability to organize, aggregate
and represent
latent

domestic

interests.

Organizing, aggregating and representing
latent domestic

interests, gives the supranational
entrepreneur a resource

the policy preferences of the

outcome of the

Member

States

through which

it

and thereby decisively influence the

multilateral negotiations.

This power-resource view implies that twolevel entrepreneurship
effective

when

can influence

a supranational entrepreneur

is

then

capable of utilizing informational and

ideational resources that the principals of a
negotiation,

have previously ignored or would be

is

namely

the national governments,

likely to ignore in the process of decision-making.

Either by credibly claiming to represent these
latent domestic interests or by working

towaids manifesting these

governments

to

move

interests

can the two- level entrepreneur indirectly pressure

in a certain policy direction.

a two- level entrepreneur can help to

overcome deadlock

by having widened the scope of political
effect,

such an intervention

The

may work

in the

towards broadening the

Moravcsik (1999, 272) argues

of such intervention

19

set

Member

that “the exploitation

is

that

decision-making process,

interests represented in the negotiation.

be part of the win-set of the policy preferences of each
nutshell,

effect

by

In

of issues considered

State.

to

Thus, in a

international officials of

asymmetrical control over scarce
information or ideas” provides the
two level
entrepreneur with a

window of opportunity by which

it

can “influence the outcomes of

multilateral negotiation.”

1.2.1 Alternative Theoretical

I

Models

he theoretical framework developed

in this dissertation

suggests the argument

simple model of either supranational influence
or national influence does not

that a

explain the inclusion of

mam

employment chapter

approaches that are

neolunctionalism

and

predominately follows

into the Treaty

dominating the

still

liberal

While

exclusively

governments,

on

the

national

the

by focusing on the

idiosyncrasies ol political leadership, the second
approach

focusing

bargaining

The two

of European integration

field

intergovermentalism.

a supply-side perspective

of Amsterdam.

is

first

skills

limited in

preferences

its

of

fully

are:

approach

and unique
analysis by

the

respective

national needs that supranational policy entrepreneurs
would be able to

fill.

In a nutshell, neofunctionalists attribute

policy

development

to

supranational

independent causal influence over

institutions

that

tiansnational actors and thereby are capable of swaying
contrast, liberal

thcii

intergovernmentalists believe that only

domestic economic and

political

agreement on the

details ol policy

who have argued

that the debate

interests,

developments.

are

working

are

Member
Member

central

closely

States’ decisions.

States, fully

in

the

EU
with

In

aware of

negotiation and

This dissertation agrees with scholars

on the theories of European integration should move

20

beyond
either

its

current limitation of seeing the
decision-making process as being
dominated

by supranational

1.2. 1.1

institutions or

by national governments.

Neofunctionalism

The

early neofunctionalist literature of the
1950s and 1960s believed that

decisions on the European level and thus the
breaking of deadlock was the outcome of
the interaction of sipranational institutions
with a range of subnational political actors.
In

drawing on the interaction of these two elements,

concerned with explaining “how and

how and why

why

that

wholly sovereign,

they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their
neighbors so as to lose

new

between themselves” (Haas 1970, 610). The

deadlock

approach was primarily

nation-states cease to be

the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring
conflicts

this

in regional integration

from one sectoral domain
encouraged and translated

was avoided by

to another, as societal

techniques for resolving

central claim of this literature

the

dynamic process of spill-over

demands

into concrete proposals

by

was

for

European policies were

the supranational institutions, the

19

Commission

in particular.

In this formula, political integration

institutionalized

pattern

Central

institutions.

particular the

of

interest

among

was conceptualized on

politics

was

that

played

the grounds of an

out

within

existing

these institutions were supranational institutions and in

European Commission.

The most

explicit

examination of the role of

19

For an overview of the work
1993,

Cram

in the neofunctionalist

approach see

Battistelli

and Isemia

1996, George 1996, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler- Koch 1996, Pentland 1973.
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supranational

institutions

Scheingold in .970 (92-95).
capabilities.

Maintaining

considerable

Scheingold

the

in

that

five

process was conducted by
Lindberg and

In their study, they discussed
the

the

decision-making
identified

integration

Commission’s

Commission indeed had succeeded

power

crucial

in

the

political

Community
skills

process,

of the

in turn

be legitimated by reference to a

common European

mobilizing supporter and neutralizing
opposition;

(2)

interest

wielding

in

Lindberg

Commission:

articulatio n, entails the capacity to
formulate long-term goals for the

that

coalition -building,

entails

to

entails

the

capacity

to

maximize national

expertise, and political experience in the
organization; (4)

and new powers

package deals,

for the

Community

institutions;

and

and

technical

task expansion, entails the

capacity to convince client groups and
governments of the need for
tasks,

contacts,

the

build

coalitions with client groups and national
bureaucracies; (3) political experience

expertise,

can

that are capable of

capacity to identify problems to be
solved through coordinated action and

technical

and

goal

(1)

Community

and

and

roles

new

finally (5)

policies,

new

brokerage and

entails the capacity to play an active role in
intergovernmental bargaining,

building support for

its

own

proposals and constructing deals which satisfy interests of

all

national governments.

This dissertation agiees with criticisms of neofunctionalism and
also observes that

an understanding of the policy-making process of the European
Union requires an

approach

that

goes beyond being merely descriptive and instead provides

explanation for the interests ol the

European Commission.

Member

States to be influenced

by the

activities

For instance, Moravcsik (1999, 273) challenges

lollowing question (1999, 273):

“Why

a plausible

this

of the

with the

should governments, with millions of diverse and

22

highly trained professional
employees, massive information-gathering
capacity, and longstanding experience with
international negotiation

at

their disposal, ever require
the

services of a handful of
supranational entrepreneurs to
generate and disseminate useful

information and ideas?”
the

is

Thus, while the detailed Ascriptions
of the leadership

Commissions' President as well as the functional

a valuable starting point, what

is

missing from

roles of the

this analysis,

is

Commission

skills

of

as a whole

a clearer insight into the

process by which these characteristics
have helped the Commission to actually
contribute

towards agenda -setting and

1.2. 1.2 Liberal

final decision -selection.

Intergovermentalism

Liberal Intergovemmentalism explains

European Union

is

how and why,

in certain limited cases, the

successful in “pooling national sovereignty through
qualified majority

voting rules” and thereby manages to overcome
deadlock and to achieve the delegation of

sovereign powers to semi-autonomous central institutions”
(Moravcsik, 1993, 509)

According
occur since

to this

it

approach integration occurs, because the

is in

their

own economic

Member

States

wish

it

to

or political self-interest. Thus, decisions and the

successful breaking ot deadlock, on the level of the European
Union are the result of
three

l

elated processes:

(1) behavior of rational

governments, (2) nationally negotiated

policy preferences, and (3) intergovernmental negotiations of various

occunence of deadlock on

the

European Union

level

is

states.

The

determined by the preferences

and the negotiation outcome of national governments. As principal agents national

governments are the only forces

that drive or prevent progress in

23

European cooperation.

The

institutions

whenever

of the

EU

are merely instruments that can
be utilized

their national preferences can
be enhanced

The assumption of rational

state

by such

a

by Member

States

move.

behavior provides liberal intergovemmentalism

with a general framework of analysis,
within which the costs and benefits
of economic

interdependence are the primary determinants
of national preferences. Resolution
of
distributional conflicts

among governments

is

the

outcome of the

relative intensity

of

national preferences, the existence of
alternative coalitions, and the opportunity
for issue
linkages.

The model of rational

state

behavior on the basis of domestically-constrained

preferences implies that international conflict and
co-operation can be modeled as a

process that takes place in two successive stages:
governments

interests, then bargain

among themselves

Metaphorically, these two stages shape
operation.

A

first

define a set of
20

in

an effort

to realize those interests.

demand and supply

functions for international co-

domestic preference formation process identifies the potential
benefits of

policy co-ordination perceived by national governments (demand).
The process of
interstate strategic interaction defines the possible political
responses

system

to pressures

of the

EC

political

from those governments (supply). The interaction of demand and

supply, of preference and strategic opportunities, shapes the foreign
policy behavior of
states

(Moravcsik 1993, 482).
This conceptualization of interest mediation has three implications:

national preferences of the

Member

States are treated as

exogenous

First, the

to the negotiation

For the concept of the ‘two-level' game see Feld 1980, Paarlberg 1997, Patterson 1997,
1993, Putnam 1988, and Zangel 1994; for a “domestic politics” approach see

Moyer

Bulmer 1983.
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process.

By

the time

Member

meet

States

to discuss

any proposals for agreement,

preferences have already been determined
by their respective domestic interests.

way, preferences are being treated as given
and determined much prior
negotiation.

of interaction

Second, actor’s preferences are assumed

to

remain fixed during the process

critics

intergovermentalism provides a rather

European Union, and,
in the literature

at

most

at

who have

the

often:

best an incomplete picture of decision-making

First, several

intergovernmentalists' assumption that

10).

pointed that liberal

Two criticisms

worst, a flawed picture.

to an international baigaining table

which

In this sense, governments act as

level.

“a gate-keeper between the domestic and
international level” (Skjalm 1998,

This dissertation agrees with

in

Third, the national governments serve
as the crucial

between the domestic and the international

repeated

of

and bargaining. Bargains are struck through
compromise, side-payments

validity of actors claims are at stake.

in the

In this

to the process

and package deals, rather than through
processes of persuasion and learning

link

their

Member

in particular are

scholars have pointed out that liberal

States bring unitary national preferences
21

is

rather flawed.

Second,

many

scholars have

pointed out that liberal intergovemmentalism exaggerates the role
of national

governments
scholars

“that

in the

who work

decision-making processes of the European Union. Especially
within the framework of multi-level governance have pointed out

European integration

making influence

is

is

a polity-creating process in

which authority and policy

shared across multiple levels of government sub-national, national

and supranational” (Hooghe and Marks 1997, 22).

For instance see Wallace 1999.
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1.3

Research Design: Questions, Hypothesis,
and Methodology
The observation

that

employment policy

is

increasingly Europeanized raises
the

question which are the forces and
factors that explain the timing,
the form, and the
content of Europe-wide employment
measures.
available

on the influence of macro- and microeconomic

unemployment

in

Europe, there

is

of political science explaining the

economic

While much

realities.

Most of the

literature in

factors

economics

on employment and

only a limited amount of research
available
political

is

in the field

response of the European Union to these

current research in the field of political
science fails to

identity the political factors that have led
to the recent policy changes in the
field of

employment policy on

As pointed

the European level.

out by

Ostrom (1990, 192) “from a framework, one

derives the

questions that need to be asked to clarify the structure
of the situation.” The theoretical

framework used

in this dissertation is

an approach which combines insights from policy

analysis and two-level entrepreneurship.

of a stiuctured

dissertation

emerges out

and focused narrative of the decision-making process leading
towards the

inclusion of the

sti

The argument of this

employment chapter

uctured in so far as

the theoi etical frame.

it

employs

It is

in the

Amsterdam

Treaty.

“

This narrative

is

a set of questions for the analysis that are derived

focused in so

far as

it

from

selectively deals only with those aspects

of the historical case that are relevant to the analysis.

Guided by the

theoretical

22

For a detailed account of the
1979, and George and

of structured and focused analysis see George
1985

utility

McKeown

26

predictions

made by

the literature

on two-level entrepreneurship,
the account of this

single -case study focuses
primarily

on the resources and

strategies

employed by

the

European Commission during the
decision-making process of the
Intergovernmental
^

Conference of

1

996/1997.

Based on the

theoretical frame used in this
dissertation, the single case study

is

guided by the following bundle of
questions:
1.

What

factors

and forces explain the timing, the
form and content of the

European Council’s agenda on Europe
-wide employment measures?
are the actors

whose influence helps

Who

the member-state principals to

overcome deadlock and reach an agreement

to delegate

powers

to

supranational agents?

2.

Precisely under what conditions and through
which mechanisms can

supranational agents encourage the member-state
principals to delegate

powers

to supranational agents?

If the supranational agents

comparative informational and ideational advantage

prominent during

all

phases during which

An abundance

is

this

enjoy a

advantage

phases of policymaking? Or can one find particular
this

advantage has more influence?

of literature

the single case study.

is available on the case study method in general
as well as
For instance see Benett and George 1997b, Cunningham 1997,

Eckstein 1975, Johnson, Joslyn and Reynolds (2001, 144), Lijphart 1971 and 1975 and

Yin 1994.
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.

3.

Overall, what factors explain the
specific policy preferences
with regard to
the

Europe -wide employment measures
of the Commission? By applying

which method do

the supranational agents determine

elements to include

in their policy

do they know which elements

that

which policy

proposals and which one to omit?

were selected

to

be included

How

in the

policy proposal they should strategically
and tactically emphasize or rather

de-emphasize?

Hypothesis and Methodology

1.3.1

Based on these

theoretical

framework provided by policy analysis

as well as the

two-level entrepreneurship model this dissertation
develops and tests the following
hypothesis:

The

inclusion of the

result of a ratcheting strategy

interests in the

Member

employment

title

into the Treaty

of Amsterdam

by which the Commission succeeded

States

is

the

in activating latent

which then pressured previously reluctant governments

endorse the policy preferences of the Commission.
Multiple sources of evidence are employed in the analysis of
testing and

developing

this hypothesis.

The most important source of evidence

is

provided by the

extensive personal interviews conducted in Brussels during the spring
of 2001

Furthermore, comprehensive use

is

made of primary documents, such

European Council Presidency Conclusions, Council

24

resolutions,

EU

24

as treaties,

directives and

.

During an internship with the European Commission in the DG Employment and
Social Affairs, most of the interviews were conducted in the Spring of 2001.
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to

regulations, European

Commission and European Parliament documents

(resolutions,

communications, decisions, reports, proposals,
and IGC positions papers. Additionally,

Eurobarometer and Labor Force Survey data
secondary documents such

Finally, the analysis relies o

academic and journalistic work.

he research design for substantiating the
causal inference, utilizes the following

1

two research
tracing

a

sets are used.

is

tools:

the process tracing

method and

the

congruence method. Process

used to detail the intervening steps by which the
Commission managed to

influence the policy- shaping as well as the policy-setting
phase and ultimately managed
to decisively

shape the interests of the

Member

States to include the

employment chapter

25
in the

Amsterdam

employed by

the

Ireaty.

Particular attention

Commission during

is

the various phases of decision-making.

includes not only a focus on the interaction of the
C ouncil

and governments

ol

Member

paid to the resources and strategies

Commission with

States, but also

the

This

European

an analysis ol the Commissions’

interaction with interest groups.

The congruence method

is

used

to

examine the

provided for the inclusion of the employment chapter
utility

of the congruence method

is

validity of alternative explanations

in the

Treaty of Amsterdam. The

to indirectly strengthen the validity

of analysis, by

disconflrming the plausibility of alternative explanations. George and Bennett

(

1997a)

express this idea

in the

following way: “The congruence method can be employed

single case study

when

the research objective [...] the investigator asks: given the value

ol the

independent variable

in this particular case,

On process tracing and the congruence method
McKeown 1989, Hamel 1993, and Peters 1998.

in a

what prediction(s) can be made from

see George 1979, George and

29

the theory regarding the

outcome of

the

dependent variable? The investigator
uses a

deductive theory or an empirical
generalization to generate a prediction/explanation
for
the

outcome of the dependent

then there

is at least

1.3.2 Alternative

variable. If the

outcome

is

consistent with the prediction.

26
a presumption or possibility of a
causal relationship.”

Explanations

The explanation developed in

this dissertation

provides a contrast to the

explanations tor the development of Europe -wide
employment measures put forward by
the literature so far.

These explanations can be grouped

views that development as a collective solution

to a

the

that

development

EU—specifically, the

integration

as,

categories:

common problem— the

unusually high and increasing levels of unemployment

second views

two

into

in the

The

first

existence of

early-to-mid 1990s. The

paradoxically, a response to public disaffection with

increased skepticism

among

the European publics about

and the erosion of the “permissive consensus”

that

had long supported

integration and increased opposition to the plans, adopted at Maastricht
in 1991, to
to

Economic and Monetary Union by
Both

set

the

move

end of the decade.

of explanations are underpinned by different theoretical predictions. The

explanation that considers the employment chapter as a collective solution to a

problem, can be seen

to follow the theoretical predictions

contrast, the explanation that views the

common

of neofunctionalism. In

employment chapter

as a result of public pressure

26

Since this document

The

article

is

available only in html-format no page

can be accessed

at

numbers were given.

http://www.georgetown.edu/bennett/congric.htm.
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can be considered to follow the
theoretical predictions of

The

1.3. 2.1

in this dissertation.

Solution for

Based on the
the recent

Common

Problem

theoretical assumptions

of neofunctionalism, the presumption

economic development exerts an influence
on member

several scholars

employment
that the

who have

policies

on the European Union

Council was caused by the

that “the

unemployment

fact that all

level.

Member

In general, several scholars
maintain

States

the agenda of the

were struggling

as a

major focus

for

has to be seen against the backdrop of chronic
unemployment

Unemployment has been

a

supposed

when economic recovery

respite, leaders

it,

but

problem

began searching

ol Social Atiairs

in

Lesch (2000,

to

European

lower

their

EU

in the

policy in the 1990s

EU

[...].

Europe since the 1970s. Economic growth was
in the

for other solutions.”

1980s provide only a brief

Additionally, the Dutch Ministry

and Employment has recently mentioned

Biffl (2000, 63),

by

For instance Roberts and Springer (2001,
44) point out

rates.

emergence of employment policy

to solve

states is shared

that

put forward various explanations for
the development of

most recent prominence of employment policy on

icspective

intergovernmentalism.

of these two sets of explanations
strengthens the theoretical model

falsification

developed

liberal

in a

discussion about

9).

2«

Eor a similar explanation of the employment chapter see Aust (2000a, 270) and Kenner
For a critique of this argument from an economic point of view see Vaubel

(2000, 378).
(1998,

6).
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employment
coordination

strategy that “the reason

is

why many EU member

probably to do with the opportunities
that

states

affords.

it

have opted

for central

Central coordination

can act as a platform for recognizing
and identifying collective and
shared problems and
29
also collectively looking for
solutions.”
Furthermore,

the scope

of the problem of high and

fact that recession

rising

and high unemployment

Cameron (2000,

unemployment

in the early 1990s, [and] the

afflicted the entire

Union, would have

suggested that the sources of the problem,
and therefore the key

beyond

16) argues that

to

its

alleviation, lay

30
the realm of national policy at the
level of the Union.”
Therefore,

States had a keen interest in agreeing
on Europe-wide

collectively solve their domestic

To
from the

employment measures,

to

unemployment problem

assess the validity of this explanation, the
following hypothesis will be derived

literature

(1)

Member

The

and empirically

tested:

greater the increase and the higher the level
of domestic

ovei the past few years, the

more supportive

the respective

unemployment

government was

to Europe-

wide employment measures.
In

used..

order to

test the validity

The analysis will proceed

an expected position of the

of

in

this hypothesis, data-sets

two

Member

steps:

first,

the

States in regard to

of Labor Force Survey are

economic data

is

used

to predict

Europe-wide employment

measures during the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/1997. Then the
expected
position

is

compared

to the actual position taken

by the Member States during the

29

Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2000, 206).
30

Cameron

(2000, 16) (1999), Goetschy 1999, Martin 2000, Walwei (1999, 141).
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negotiations.

The proximity

or distance between the
expected position and the actual

position will be indicative for the
falsification of the hypotheses.

1.3. 2. 2 Political

Response

Based on the

to Public Pressure

theoretical assumptions of liberal

intergovernmental^, one

finds

explanations which ascertain that mass
public opinion was crucial in
determining the
timing and content of the recent Europe
-wide employment measures. The
presumption
that public

who have

opinion exerts an influence on

first

level.

u

is

shared by several scholars

In general

two

sets

of explanations can be

differentiated:

maintains that Europe -wide employment measures
were developed due to

indirect domestic pressures.

critical

states

put forward various explanations for the
development of employment policies

on the European Union

The

member

According to

this perspective,

Member

States faced a

more

public opinion due to the “post -Maastricht crisis”
and the ending of the
31

•

permissive consensus”

integration and

As

the public ‘withdrew’

became outspokenly more

skeptical,

its

quiet acquiescence to European

member

states

were pressured

to

add

a social and political dimension to the European integration
project.

According

to the

second explanation,

European-wide employment measures due

Member

States

had an

to direct public pressure.

Europe encountered high and persisting unemployment

rates,

interest in

On

the one hand, as

governments could not

afford not to be seen addressing the issue on the European level.

On

the other hand, the

For a discussion on the “end of permissive consensus” see Reif 993.
1

33

developing

public's skepticism towards a
stronger

employment dimension on

To

public

1

)

the

assess the validity of these

will be derived

(

common currency pressured

The

from the

literature

European Union

two

sets

the

member

level.

of explanations, the following
hypotheses

and empirically

tested:

greater the increase and the larger
the proportion of a

felt that its

states to design a

Member

State’s

country was not benefiting from
European integration, the more

supportive a government was to Europe-wide
employment measures.
(2)

The

greater the increase and the larger
the proportion of a

public opposed to a

common

currency, the

more supportive

the

Member

Member

State’s

was

State

to

Europe -wide employment measures.

These hypotheses and questions are examined
by drawing on Eurobarometer data
sets tor the years 1991

and 1997. Several questions are selected
pertaining

to the various

dimensions of the hypotheses. The hypotheses are
then tested by extrapolating from the
public opinion an expected position of the

Member

position with the actual position taken by the

The proximity

States

Member

and then comparing

that

States during the negotiations.

or distance of both positions will be indicative for
the falsification of the

hypotheses.

1.4

Summary

This dissertation joins a lively academic debate about the nature of the
European

system ot governance as well as the forces and factors

34

that influence the

dynamic of

3

European

integration.

'

employment policy onto
the

By
the

exploring

the

forces

and

agenda of the European Union

academic discussion on the nature
of the

EU

factors

have

that

pushed

this dissertation contributes
to

integration in general and the
logic of

positive and negative integration
in the social policy field
in particular within the
multilevel

system of governance.

The findings of this

dissertation are politically,
theoretically,

and

methodologically relevant. Politically, the
findings of this research are
relevant because
it

shows how exogenous

formal role

is

forces in the form of a supranational
policy entrepreneur,

limited and vastly overshadowed
by

effectively orchestrate a surprising

negotiations.

They

accummulational
facilitates the

States to

its

informal influence,

amount of influence over

is

whose

able to so

outcome of multi-lateral

the

successfully help overcome organizational,
representational and

failures in the intrastate bargaining
process

by

stirring

up

activity

manifestation of previously latent interests and
thereby enables

which

Member

overcome ponderous deadlocks.

Theoretically and methodologically, existing studies
on the influence of the

Commission on
i

the

outcome of multi-lateral negotiations most often do not follow

a

igorous theoretical evaluation. The lack of concrete
theories and decisive empirical

makes

the results of

many of these

studies neither

unambiguously

basis from which to predict policy outcomes in similar
situations.

true nor available as a

The

findings of this

32

Caporaso 1997, Risse-Kappen 1996, Pierson 1996.
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On

positive” versus “negative” integration see Scharpf 1997. For a debate
on the

nature of European Social Policy see

among many

others Greyer 2000, Streeck 1995

1997.
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tests

dissertation

go beyond these

limitations

by carefully building up

a strong theoretical

foundation, based on a combination
of existing heuristic approaches
drawn from policy
analysis as well as

two level

entrepreneurship model. The
hypothesis derived from these

approaches are empirically tested both
with the help of qualitative as
well as quantitative
research methods

Finally, the discussion about

which

this thesis

central topic

is

thereby joins,

of public debate

is

European integration and the European
Model,

not simply restricted to scholars
and experts.

in all

Member

a point of discussion on the level of
the

States of the

Union

itself.

It is

a

European Union, as much as

This dissertation aims

it

at

contributing to an understanding of the
European Union’s public policy efforts that

attempt to reduce unemployment.

An

analytical

any of the policy tools have worked and
contribution but also will be very timely.
additional measures the European

to

what

and empirical research

that

examines

effect will not only be a substantial

Such research could possibly address which

Union may need

to take, in order to attain

goals in the realm of social policy

36

its

stated

if

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES OF POLICY MAKING IN THE
EUROPE UNION:

EXAMINING PATHWAYS OUT OF DEADLOCK

Policy developments in the area of
employment policy
characterized by a unique contrast:

was

a slow and limited progression.

In the early

environment. In

this period,

European

decades of European integration there

to efforts

of

facilitating labor mobility,

among men and women and improving

employment policy was subsumed under

of providing minimalist social policy measures designed
with the aim

enhance the market-making mechanisms of the newly created

Howevei

,

in recent

level are

Following the Treaty of Rome, the policy

competence of the European Union was limited
guaranteeing the equality of wages

at the

decades not only has the scope of

European Union become increasingly widened, but

also a

to facilitate

many

measures of the

European employment policy
in

scholars have pointed out that

37

and

market.

has gradually been developed. In particular, since the Treaty of
Amsterdam

contained a separate employment chapter,

working

the general efforts

common

social policy

the

1997

employment policy now

clearly constitutes a separate
policy field

on the

level

of the

34

r-

European Union.

T^s
in the

uni ^ ue co »trast raises the
question:

How

can one explain the recent change

pace and depth of policy development
on the European level

employment policy leading

to a concrete process

employment measures? What

factors

in the area

of

of coordination of Europe -wide

and forces have pushed employment
policy on the

agenda of the European Union? Which
mechanisms positively contributed

to the

selection of policy decisions with
regard to the policy format and
content?
In

seeking answers to these questions
regarding agenda -setting and decision

selection in the field of

employment

policy, this dissertation aims at
contributing to an

understanding of the dynamics of European
policy-making and of the determinants of
political

change

in policy fields.

The main

theoretical

argument developed

is

the recent

policy dynamic in the field of employment
policy on the European level can best be

understood by an approach that combines insight
from the work on policy analysis and
two-level entrepreneurship.

1995a, 2001, Peterson and

The

Such an approach primarily draws on

Bomberg 1999

still

been

work of Peterson

Moravcsik (1999).

theoretical approach developed in this dissertation
hopes to

existing explanatory approaches ot

are

as well as

the

European

integration.

complement

The two main approaches

that

seen as dominating the field of European integration and these
approaches have

criticized in the literature for their limited applicability to the
policy-making

piocess.

While neo-functionalism and

liberal

intergovemmentalism go some way toward

34

See chapter

3,

on the European

4 and 5 lor a detailed discussion of the evolution of employment policy
level.
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discerning important characteristics of
the European integration process
and point
respectively to “spill-over” processes
and the importance of
in the

bargaining processes,

insights into the

it

Risse-Kappen (1996, 57) maintains
fail to

EU

to explain

in specific policy areas.

that “the traditional notions

capture the essence of

conclusion that runs through the literature

equipped

States’ preferences

has often been pointed out that they
only offer partial

dynamics of decision-making

or supranationalism

Member

broad trends

is

EU

of intergovemmentalism

decision-making.”

that these

in the global

For instance,

A common

“macro- theories” are well

environment, yet

at the

systemic level of

decision-making they loose their explanatory power (for
instance see Hix 1994,

Mossialos 2000).
Building on this conclusion, several scholars of European
integration have
pointed out that these grand theories need to be supplemented
with theories of decision-

making

that

draw on

politics in order to

level.

(Hurell and

insights

from theories of international

Menon

1996, Jachtenfuchs 1995,

on the European Union when he

fit

well with Wessels’ (1997, 270)

writes:

of EU studies should
system

“Looking

theoretical

in joint-decision

is

at these

demand

broad currents of

for further reflection: the focus

look for indicators and factors to explain the evolution of a

in a delimited area

This chapter

main

[...]

EU

Marks 1997, Mayes 1994, 0hrgaard

academic discourse, we might formulate some desiderata

political

and comparative

enhance the understanding of dynamics of policymaking on the

1996, Wallace 1993). This endeavor seems to
lor research

relations

and over a delimited period of time.”

structured into three

argument provided

main

sections.

in the literature that

making processes happens

The

aims

in the first place.

39

at

first

section outlines the

explaining

why

deadlock

This section draws on the

work of

Fritz Schaipf.

In a nutshell, he argues that
deadlock in the decision-making

process of the European Union happens
due to the fact that European institutions
depend

on the agreement among

Member

States.

Member

States are exclusively driven

concerns over material benefits and costs
of a policy decision.

Two

by

their

fiirther aspects

explaining deadlock, are then discussed:
the prospect of losing decision-making
power

and competence and the costs of instrumental
adjustment. Furthermore,
reviews the arguments that apply the logic
of the “joint-decision trap"
pertaining to social and

negative integration

is

employment

policy.

following three reasons

is

examined. Most commonly, the

why

social

to decisions

Again, the work of Scharpf on positive and

presented and then work by other scholars

Scharpf s point of view

this section

who have

literature

extended

mentions the

and employment policy on the European Union

level

are difficult to agree on: the preeminence of
national welfare states, the lack of organized
interests

on the

EU

level,

and the lack of financial resources on the

EU

level.

section concludes with an assessment of criticisms of
Scharpf s argument.

This

The

conclusion of this section agrees with the scholars

who have

decision-making process

characterized a closely linked pattern

in the

European Union

is

pointed out that the

of administrative interaction between supranational and national
institutions.

Furthermore, the supranational institutions have been found

shaping and influencing the policy preferences of the

to

Member

be capable of actively
States

and thereby

minimizing the occurrence of deadlock.

Finally, the changes in decision rules

unanimity

provided the supranational institutions with a

to qualified majority vote has

from

greater degree of capability to influence the agenda -setting and final decision-selection.

Thus,

in

sum,

this section

concludes

that,

while Scharpf

40

is

correct in predicting a certain

degree of conflict

among

the

Member

States, especially pertaining
to decisions in the area

of social and employment policy,
what
to

is

needed

is

a theoretical

framework which helps

understand both the conditions under
which deadlock can be overcome
as well as the

role played

by the relevant actors

would

have

also

in the

to specify the resources

decision-making process. Such a
framework

and

strategies likely to be

employed by

the

various actors.

The second
main

section of this chapter outlines the
arguments provided by

theoretical approaches in the field of

two of the

European integration which explain under

what conditions and through which mechanisms
deadlock can be overcome. These two
appioaches are neofunctionalism and
the

main

liberal

intergovernmentalism. This section reviews

characteristics of both approaches and then
assesses both their strengths and

weaknesses respectively.
influence over

EU

In a nutshell, neofunctionalists
attribute

independent causal

policy development to supranational institutions
that are working

closely with transnational actors and thereby are
capable of swaying
decisions.

fully

In contrast, liberal

intergovemmentalists believe that only

aware of their domestic economic and

integration should

who have

move beyond

its

States’

Member

States,

political interests, are central in the

negotiation and agreement on the details of policy developments.
section agrees with scholars

Member

The conclusion of this

argued that the debate on the theories of European

current limitation of seeing the decision-making

process as being dominated either by supranational institutions or by
national

governments.

In particular

it

agrees with scholars

who have

the theoretical approach depends on the levels of decisions
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suggested that the

made

in the

utility

of

European Union.

The

making

third

and

last

combines

that

entrepreneurship.

section of this chapter outlines
an alternative theory of decision-

from the work on policy analysis
and two-level

insights

The

central theoretical

argument developed

in this section

is

that

policy-shaping and policy-setting decisions
can substantially be influenced by
the

Commission when

among

the

it

Member

is

able to either organize, aggregate
or represent latent interests

Through

States.

a ratcheting

mechanism of policy

initiation,

mediation and mobilization, the Commission
manages to exert a crucial degree of
influence on the final decisions taken by
the governments during the multilateral
negotiations.

This argument

is

developed

in three steps: first,

on policy analysis are presented. Special
attention
1995a, 2001, Peterson and

Bomberg

on two-level entrepreneurship

is

1999.

discussed.

that predicts the

mechanism by which

making process

in the

2.1

The Logic

the

is

key aspects of the

literature

given to the work of Peterson

Second, the most recent work of Moravcsik

And

then finally a causal model

Commission attempts

is

presented

to influence the decision-

European Union.

of the Joint-Decision Trap

The process of European

integration

classical explanation for the occurrence

is

often characterized by deadlock.

of deadloc k

is

A

provided by Fritz Scharpf (1988,

35

1991, 1997).

'

In his

This section

work he

is

divided into four subparts. The

first

part discusses both

applies insights of the debate of interlocking politics in

German

federalism (Politikverjlechtung) to the European Community. For the debate on German
federalism see Benz 1985, Hesse 1978, Johnson 1973, Riker 1964, Scharpf, Reissert,and

Schnabel (1976, 1977, 1978), Wheare 1964.
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the conditions and consequences
of deadlock.

scholars

who have added two

The second

part reviews the

work of

additional aspects in their
explanation for deadlock: the

prospect of losing decision-making
power and competence and the costs
of instrumental
adjustment.

The

third part reviews the

arguments

that

apply the logic of the “joint-

decision trap” to decisions pertaining
to social and employment
policy.

Here, the work of

Scharpf on positive and negative
integration provides the basis on
for scholars
generally mentioned three reasons

Union
ol

social

level are difficult to agree on: the

organized interests on the

level.

why

The

EU

level,

and employment policy on the European

preeminence of national welfare

and the lack of financial resources on
the

section agrees with the scholars

decision-making process

in the

of administrative interaction

European Union

is

who have

between supranational and national

shaping and influencing the policy preferences of
the

to

to qualified

this section

degree of conflict

of social

among

concludes

the

that,

Member

States

and thereby

in decision rules

from

to undei stand both the conditions

by the relevant

agenda

-setting

while Scharpf

is

and

final decision-selection.

correct in predicting a certain

States, especially pertaining to decisions in the area

and employment policy, what

i°le played

institutions.

majority vote has provided the supranational institutions with
a

gieatei degree of capability to influence the

sum,

pointed out that the

be capable of actively

Member

minimizing the occurrence of deadlock. Finally, the changes

in

EU

characterized a closely linked pattern

Furthermore, the supranational institutions have been
found

Thus,

states, the lack

fourth part of this section, discusses
various criticisms of Scharpf s argument.

The conclusion of this

unanimity

who have

is

needed

is

a theoretical

framework which helps

under which deadlock can be overcome as well as the

actors in the decision-making process.
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Such

a

framework

would

also have to specify the resources

and

strategies likely to be

employed by

the

various actors.

In a nutshell, Scharpf argues that
due to the institutional characteristics of
the

European Community (EC),

joint decision

making

is

severely

hampered and

therefore

only suboptimal policy outcomes can be
achieved. Specifically two institutional
conditions of the

(EC

EC

are responsible for this outcome:
(1) central

decisions) are directly dependent

(member

states),

and

nearly unanimous.

(2) the

Since the European Community’s decisions directly
depend upon the

joint decision trap.

government
its

States, actors are likely to find

Here, they are unable to either proceed to

the decision-making arena altogether.

future consensus;

the agreement of constituent governments

agreement of constituent governments must be unanimous
or

unanimous agreement of the Member

central

upon

government decisions

is

new

themselves in a
decisions or to leave

The consequence of this arrangement

is

that the

not free to respond creatively to external demands, or to
anticipate

actions are determined directly by the immediate self-interests
of

member governments”

(Scharpf, 1988, 255).

Given Schaipf s belief

that the

driven by self-interest, predicts that

European Community,

if the

behavior of the

Member

Member

States are exclusively

States will only cooperate

anticipated utility of doing so

is at

on

the level of the

least as great as the

36
.

anticipated utility of non-cooperation.

Substantive policy decisions on the European

For the same argument also see Nash (1950,1996). For counter-arguments which point
to the fact that there are
interest, see the section

many

aspects which factor into the

below on

the “Critique of

Member

States’ definition of

Schaipf s Arguments.”
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Community

level will therefore

depend on the calculated assessment
of

these decisions will have on the
distributive positions of the

unanimity

making

process.

if at least

actors

is

the guiding decision rule,

is

ejects the

Since

In this situation, proposed changes
of policies are only likely to happen
(1) the distributive position

reduced; or (2) those actors whose
distributive position

that policy

States.

actors hold a potential veto in
the decision

all

one of the two conditions are met:

compensated

i

Member

the likely impact

lor the loss.

change

Unless

will not occur.

proposed modification

at least

Any

is

reduced will be

one of these two conditions

single actor

to the policy

who

of none of the

is

met, this means

either prefers the status

quo or

can use his or her veto power and

therefore halt the decision-making process.

The gradual
combination of
the behavior of

pieieiences.

institutional arrange

Member

In a

policy which

is

deterioration of the quality of public policy

is

the consequence of the

ment of the European Community and

States are exclusively driven by their utility

dynamic environment,

in

which conditions change

the fact that

maximizing
all

the time, public

unable to adapt and change simultaneously, will increasingly
become

incapable of solving the very problems for which

systematic deterioration of the ‘goodness of
policy environment” (Scharpf, 1988, 257).

fit’

it

was designed. This

leads to a

between public policy and the relevant

The consequences of this

situation are both

inefficiency and ineffectiveness which manifest themselves in an
“increase of

expenditures beyond the level that would be politically acceptable within a unitary

government
1988, 255).

to the

,

as well as the decline ol the “overall problem-solving capacity” (Scharpf,

Thus,

in the

words of Scharpf, “joint-decision systems are doubly vulnerable

consequences of non-agreement: they

may

be incapable of reaching effective
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agreement and they

may

lose the independent capabilities
for action of their

states” (Scharpf, 1988, 258).

On

the one hand

own

it

s

list

the

work of

blocks

it

its

Thus, joint- decision systems are
inherently incapable

Fritz Scharpf, several scholars

of items that factor into the

Member

have added two more

States’ utility function.

In addition

focus on material benefits and costs of a policy
decision, the following two

items have been identified:

competences, and

(

1

)

the prospect of losing decision-making

(2) the costs of instrumental adjustment.

characteristics of the joint-decision-making
arrangements
effect of both cleavages

I

two ways:

on Scharpf’s Argument

Drawing on

Scharpf

a trap in

themselves into institutional arrangements
of greater policy potential.

2.1.1 Building

aspects to the

is

leads to pathological policy
choices and on the other hand

further institutional evolution.

of transforming

to

In this sense, the jointdecision trap

member

he consequence again

Accoiding

is

is

to

hamper

development and change.

deadlock and ultimately suboptimal policy outcomes.

power and competences through

of gaining or losing decision-making

a specific policy decision determines if IVfember States

are willing to cooperate with each other on the European

comprehensive

institutional

on the European Union, the

the possibility of policy

to seveial authors, the prospect

1998, Hertier 1997).

Given the

power and

As pointed

out by

loss of sovereignty

Wolfgang Wessels

does not

administration.” Also, along similar lines,

governments put a high value on

the

Union

lie in

(

level

(Benz 1992,

Friies

1997, 287), “a

the self-interest of governments and

Keohane (1984, 88) has argued

maintenance of their

own autonomy,

that since

it is

usually

impossible to establish international institutions that exercise authority overstates.”

46

Given

this

preference of

power and competences,
on the European Union
losing decision-making

As pointed

Member
the less

level.

States, the higher the risk

Member

for each

Member

by Sebenius (1992, 333),

out

States are willing to cooperate
with each other

Put in other words, this

power

of loosing decision-making

means

that the higher the risk

of

State, the smaller the possible
‘win-set’.

the risk for deadlock

determined by the “set of

is

possible agreements that are better for
each potential party than the noncooperative
alternatives to an agreement.” This

means

that the smaller the set

of possible agreements,
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.

the larger the risk for deadlock.

Additionally, several scholars have argued
persuasively, that concerns about

decision-making power and competences of the
are

synonymous with concerns about

Menon

1996, 1-10).

Sovereignty

is

Member

state sovereignty

States in the integration process

(Hine 1998,

1-13,

Hussein and

defined by Poggi (1990, 21) through the following

aspects:

The

controlling organization is a state in so far as it is (among
other things) sovereign: that is, it claims, and if necessary is
willing to prove, that it owes to no other power its control
over the
population in question; that it responds to no other organization for
the modalities and the

control on

its

own

outcomes of that

account, activating

unconditionally; does not derive

it

control.

its

own

It

exercises that

resources,

from or share

it

with any other

entity.

As

discussed below, both neofunctionalism as well as liberal intergovernmental ism
view of win -sets. In a nutshell, neofunctionalists believe that the

otter an alternative

scope of possible agreements among the
actions of supranational institutions.

Member

States

is

largely influenced

by the

Liberal intergovemmentalists point to “log-rolling”,

package -deals and trade-offs as a way of expanding the win-sets.
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The focus here

is

on the degree

to

which European integration has an
impact on

the capacities of the state to act
autonomously.
curtailed

The more

by a policy decision on the European
Union

this capacity is likely to

level, the

more

the

Member

be

States

can be expected to not agree to such
a policy change.

Second, a number of scholars have pointed
out

that also

concerns over the costs of

necessary instrumental adjustment deriving
from policy changes caused by joint
decisions, factor into

Member

3

States utility function.

*

The

are expected to occur as a consequence
of decisions taken

the likelihood with

which Member

pointed out by Scharpf (1997,
institutional structures,

national

2), “conflicts are likely to arise

for

likely to the degree to

in the cost

who have

States either as a loss in

the

level, will

reduce

from differences

of adjustment

if

[...]

As

in

one of the other

build on Scharpfs arguments brings to the

two important conclusions:

which

EU

uniform European solutions.”

Thus, the woik of scholars
forefront the following

on the

States are willing to agree to such policy
changes.

and hence differences

models were chosen

degree, to which such costs

first,

deadlock on the

outcome of joint decisions

power and decision competence or

are seen

EU

level

is

by the Member

as incurring costs of

39

instrumental adjustment.

This conclusion

is

summarized by

Heritier (1999, 15)

she points out that “deadlock emerges in multi-level governance

if,

under conditions of

consensual decision-making, individual actors are unwilling to acquiesce
solution, be

it

due

to a loss

For

this

to the

proposed

of benefits, a loss of decisional power, or the costs of

38
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argument see Grande 1995,

Hertier, Knill,

and Mingers, 1996.
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For a discussion of this cleavage for instance see

Newman
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1993.

when

instrumental adjustment" Second
important conclusion
in die

that

European Union can be seen as

had to be resolved:

first,

is

that the policy-making process

outcome of the following two general
cleavages

the

the question of the appropriate
level of authority, and

second the question of the appropriate

legal instrument to bring about
the agreed

on

measure.

The following

section reviews arguments that apply
the logic of the joint-decision

trap to decisions pertaining to social

on positive and negative
pi

and employment policy. Based on Scharpf
s work

integration, tliree further

eeminence of national welfare

states, the lack

arguments are put forward: the

of organized

interests

and the lack of financial resources on the

EU

2.1.2 Negative/Positive Integration

and Social Policy

In the literature

commonly

Some

policy areas are

more

is

EU

level,

level.

on the development of

stated that there

on the

policies

variation in the degree to

on the European Union

which deadlock

is

level,

it

is

overcome:

subject to the influence of supra-national decision-making

than others (for instance see Jachtenfuchs 2001, Majone 1994, Nugent
(1994a, 304),

Pollack (1997,

1

19),

Sbragia 1993).

Hence, what

is

needed

is

an analysis which

capable of specifying the idiosyncrasies of different policy areas and
chai acteristics foster or

European Union

hamper

the

level, especially

the

work of scholars

is

these

development of joint decision-making on the

with regard to social and employment policies. The

presentation of this analysis in this section

Scharpf s argument pertaining

how

is

to positive

is

structured into

two subparts:

and negative integration

is

First,

presented.

Second,

discussed that have outlined the following three additional reasons
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why

social

level: the

EU

level,

A

and employment policy would be

preeminence of national welfare

difficult to

agree on

states, the lack

at the

of organized

European Union
on the

interests

4°
and the lack of financial resources of the
EU.

prominent explanation for the difference

policy areas

is

provided by Fritz Scharpf

positive integration.

In a nutshell,

in the

in his analysis

degree of Europeanization of

of negative integration versus

Scharpf argues that social and employment
policies

are particularly difficult to agree on under
the conditions of joint decision-making
on the

European Union

due

level

to

two

factors: (1) social

and employment policies belong

group of regulatory policies which require intergovernmental
agreeme
development, (2) different levels of economic
conflicts

is

of

interests

that there will

among

interests

the decision-makers.

severely restrained in

its

among Member

in

States lead to

which national policy

problem-solving capacity, while European policy

by the lack of intergovernmental agreement” (Scharpf 1996,
Scharpt arrives

nts for their

The consequence of these two

be an increase of a “competence gap,

at that

to a

is

factors

is

constrained

15).

conclusion by developing his argument in three steps:

First,

he differentiates between two categories of regulatory policies: “product-related”

Note

that this section

is

followed by a critique of both Scharpf s arguments.
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Scharpf s concept has been applied to human rights policies, immigration policies,
environmental policies, and social policy. See Alston and Weiler 1999, Geddes 2001,
Gehring 1998, Maduro (2000, 1999), Ziim 1997. Additionally it should be noted that
Knill

and Lehmkuhl 1999) criticize Scharpf s
of integration, namely “framing

third category

(

distinction

by pointing out that he misses a
However, Risse’s (1999)

integration.”

criticism of this third category seems rather appropriate: analytically the authors
provide enough substance to convincingly distinguish this third category.
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fail to

regulations and “process-related”
regulations.
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While product -related regulations aim

at

eliminating national restraints on trade
and distortions of competition,
process-related
regulations aim at shaping the conditions
under which markets operate.

Second, he

argues that agreements on process-related
regulation depends upon the
intergovernmental

agreements of national

Member

States in the Council of Europe.

In contrast, agreements

on product- related regulations are pushed forward
by the European Court of Justice and
the

European Commission “behind he back of

43

political processes”

(Scharpf 1996,

19).

Finally, he points out that process-related
regulations increase the costs of production
and

hence

pit

Member

other: rich

States with different levels of

economic development against each

and high regulatory Member States tend

while poor and low regulatory

Member

to

demand higher

levels

States prefer non-agreements, that

of regulation,

is

the status

quo.

The consequence of the
institutional

different levels

arrangements of decision-making

of economic development and the
is

that

Member

States will not be able to

agree on social and employment policies on the level of the European Union.
Over the
long-run, while negative integration with

"

This distinction

is

inspired by the

its

market-making mechanisms

will

work of Rehbinder and Steward (1988,

10-13),

Tinbergen 1965.
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Wolfang Streeck (1996, 67) provides an explanation for the role of the Commission
in the process of negative integration when he points out that “the removal

and the Courts

of barriers to cross-border trade and mobility is less threatening to national sovereignty
and less demanding of democratic legimitation than the creation and enforcement of
rights

and obligations of

citizenship, especially the modification of property rights and

the institutionalization of social rights to a

minimum
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level of subsistence.”

continuously be developed, positive
integration with the market correcting
mechanisms
will increasingly fall behind.

In line with

Scharpf s argument

that social policy

is

subject to intergovernmental

agreements, several scholars have outlined
the following three additional
reasons
social

the

and employment policy would be

preeminence of national welfare

level,

and the lack of

number of

make

the

difficult to

states, the lack

financial resources of the

agree on

at the

of organized

why

European Union

interests

EU. These arguments

will

EU

on the
be

level:

First, a

scholars have pointed out that the preeminence
of national welfare states will

development of European

social policies rather difficult

(Banting 1995,

Hantrais 2000, Kersbergen 2000, Leibfried and
Pierson 1995, Majone 1995, Padoan

2001, Scharpf 1997c).
States to give up their

Here the argument

power

is

that the political reluctance

in social affairs is driven

by Member

preserve one of their defining areas of statehood: social
policy

is

a

of the

Member

States’ interest to

main source

to derive

support from citizens and in the process gain legitimacy. For
instance, Leibfried and
Pierson

( 1

995, 2

1 )

argue that a

11

Member

States of the

European Union have

“identified

social policy as a critical instrument for constructing political
legitimacy” and thereby
fight tenaciously

Euiopean

over jurisdictional boundaries.

level will be

viewed by the

Member

Any

social policy agreed at the

States as a competition for support and

legitimacy with the citizen.

Second, several scholars have pointed out that social policy
at the

European Union

level,

is difficult to

agree on

because the social forces which would be interested

in

such

arrangements are rather weak and poorly organized (Rhodes 1995, 1997, Streeck 1996).

While business

interests

have been quite successful

in
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organizing themselves and thereby

having their interests represented

in the

EU

polices, trade unions lack the
organizational

strength as well as the degree of
interest representation.
this literature is that

European Union

And
Union

level

do

As

so.

will not

is

given

unlikely to develop a social agenda.

finally, several scholars

is difficult to

have

have pointed out

EU

develop, since the

in the foreseeable future,

modem

welfare

states.

package’, amounts to less than

that social policy

1.3

on the European

lacks the necessary financial resources
to

Community does

not have, and

anything approaching the financial resources

The EC budget, even
per cent of the total

after approval

GDP

of the

of the ‘Delors

Member

States

and

II

to

4 per cent of the central government spending of these countries
(average

government spending
development of

Tims

employment

in

in

OECD

countries

is

40 per cent of the GDP).” Thus

distributive as well as redistributive policies

sum, there are three argument presented

policies are difficult to develop

is

on the European Union

6),

the

severely hampered.

in the literature

arguments are summarized by Leibfried and Pierson (1999,

when

why

level.

social

states protection

and

These

they point out that

theie are formidable obstacles for such policies: “limited fiscal resources,
jealous

among

in

void of forces that could push for social
policy, the

this

pointed out by Majone (1993, 160-161),
“the

required by

less than

Thus, the argument presented

member

of ‘state-building’ resources, and an unfavourable distribution of power

interest groups.”

2.1.3 Critique of Scharpf’s

Most of the

criticis

Arguments

ms of Scharpf s argument

are directed at the assumptions he

making. The following section reviews the arguments
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that question the validity

is

of these

assumptions.

I,

proceeds

in the

following steps:

out that the policy process in the

number of scholars have pointed

First, a

European Union

characterized

is

by an interlocking of

44

competences.

Administrative structures both on the
supranational as well as the

national level have

demonstrated that

begun

to increasingly.

institutions

Second, a large body of

do matter and

that the institutional

literature

has

arrangements

in

particular are crucial for the process
of decision-making. Institutional
arrangements not

only influence the ability of different
actors

to set the

agenda and contribute towards

decision selection, but more broadly
speaking, structure the political struggles
the relevant actors.

many

Third,

in predicting a certain

in a nutshell, this

framework which helps

overcome
process.

to

EU

level to

subsection concludes

degree of conflict

to decisions in the area

among

the

that,

Member

be taken by qualified
while Scharpf

is

correct

States, especially pertaining

of social and employment policy, what
to

all

scholars have argued that changes in
the rules guiding

decision-making have allowed many decisions
on the
majority vote. Thus,

among

is

needed

is

a theoretical

understand both the conditions under which deadlock
can be

as well as the role played

Such a framework would

by the relevant actors

in the

decision-making

also have to specify the resources and strategies likely

be employed by the various actors. The remaining part of this
chapter then reviews

prominent pathways out of deadlock and then attempts
Central to Scharpl

s

to build

argument about the joint decision

the decision-making process in the

European Union

is

an alternative model.

trap

is

the assumption that

characterized by two aspects: (1)

the supranational institutions are dependent on the consensus

among

the

Member

States

44

For the notion of "interlocking relationship” between the Council and the Commission
see for instance

Armingeon (1997,

96).
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and (2)

that this

However,

alter

consensus has

decades of the European integration
process,

out that these conditions

As

be reached under the decision rules
of unanimity.

to

may no

to the first condition,

many

scholars have pointed

longer be prevalent.

has been pointed out that one can
observe increasingly

it

deepenedand widened areas of policy cooperation
and mechanisms of policy-making
between and among the
Union.

Member

States

and the supranational

institutions

For instance as mentioned by Benz and
Eberlein (1998, 2) “the gloomy picture of

deadlock

sits

oddly with

much

recent empirical research which stresses
the dynamism,

success or even problem-solving capacity of
European policy-making

Thus, these empirical cases point

fields.

is

ciitical for the

European Union

is

Union

may no

longer be prevalent.

not characterized by the dominance of strong
interact with

Member

States

each other and exclude weak supranational

decision-making process. Instead, many scholars have argued
is

in diverse policy

to the possibility that the first condition

existence of the joint-decision trap,

would piedominately
in the

of the European

that the

which

The
which

institutions

European

characteiized by a significant trend toward a mutual ‘interlocking’,
‘engrenage’,
45

and ‘Verflechtung.’

In the

words of Wessels (1992, 238),

EC is characterized by a high a widely
spread degree of ‘fusion’, of ‘interlocking’ of national and EC civil
servants (as well as of politicians and lobbies). This EC pattern of
“the policy cycle of the

administrative and political interaction reflects a trend by which

Member

States ‘pool’ their sovereignties and

EC

competences of the

into a

system

to

mix them with
which the notion of

‘cooperative federalism’ can be applied.
‘cooperative’ thus signals

[...] The term
two closely linked patterns of

administrative interaction: the

way

state administrations

develop

their national policy-making style in a ‘horizontal view’

and the

45

For instance see Bellier (1997,

1

14).

55

way

several national and international
administrations shape
policies in a ‘vertical view.’ These
trends are mutually

common

reinforcing.”

This observation leads to the conclusion
that the process of policy-making
has to
be understood
States are

in light

no longer

of these various interlinkages: policy
domains of the

free

from the influence of supranational decisions
nor are the

supranational institutions entirely captivated
by the preferences of the

each instance of joint decision making.
Instead, policymaking has

outcome of

the

same

logical line,

which underscores

one can point out

Member

The most important

through the Treaty and

its

arrangements which are

Andersen and Eliassen 1993,

insight of this institutionalist viewpoint

States cieated the institutions of the

EU

body of

between the supranational

institutional

crucial in the policy process (Peters 1992, Sbragia
1992,

the

States in

to be seen as the

that there is a large

the fact that these interlinkages

and the national systems of governance represent

Hull 1993).

Member

the institutionalized interactions of both
national and supranational actors.

Along
literature

Member

and delegated authority

subsequent revisions, the institutions have taken a

own. The basic assumption of this

literature is that institutions

although

is that,

to

them

life

do matter, and

of their

that to

understand the policy-making process of the European Union, one must focus on

how

For a discussion of ‘cooperative federalism’ see Kirchner 1992, Wessels 1994. For a
discussion of the arrangement of “pooled sovereignty” see Keohane and Hoffman (1991,
13).

It

should be noted that throughout the history of integration studies a broad variety

of labels have been used to refer to this

instance “pluralistic security

phenomenon.

Among many

others there are for

community” (Deutsch 1957), “regime” (Hoffman 1982,

Wallace 1996), “civitas europae” (Schneider 1995), “regulatory state” (Majone 1994), “a
new style of confederation of old states.” (Elazar 1994), “confederal consociation”
(Chryssochoou 1997), and “condominio” (Schmitter 1996).
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institutional

actors

not

arrangements mediate the

political struggles

among

(Buhner (1994, 355) and 1997, 1998). 47
While the

deny the continued importance of the
Member

institutional

institutionalist perspective

i,

cannot be easily described

that

bargaining” (Pierson and Leibfried
1995,

6).

does

does, however, recognize that

power have become circumscribed,
“embedded

environment

the relevant policy

States, especnlly in decisions
that

detennine the “rule of the game” of the
European Union,
the, influence and

all

in the

As pointed

in a dense,

complex

language of interstate

out by Pierson (1996, 145)

The evolution of EC policy over time may
constrain member
states not

only because institutional arrangements

of course

difficult

consequences

make

a reversal

states discover unanticipated

ol their policy preferences

change [... since] social
and policies drastically increases the
from existing arrangements for member
states. Rather

adaptation to
cost of exit

when member

EC

institutions

than reflecting the benefits for institutionalized
exchange,
continuing integration could easily reflect the

rising costs of “non-

Europe.”

This conclusion

fits

well with Pollack (1997, 107)

functions of supranational institutions

intentions of their

member

institutions themselves.

may

reflect not so

who

much

pointed out that “the

the preferences and

state principals, but rather the preferences

Thus,

it

appears to be particularly

of the supranational

fruitful to

examine

the

efficacy of the ‘stickiness’ of previous decisions and to
analyze the degree to which this

aspect influences the outcome of the policy process, especially
with regard to agendasetting

and

decision-selection.

As argued by

Pierson (1996, 143), “ the rules of the

game

47

For work in the approach of neo- institutionalism among many see Armstrong and
Bulmer 1998, Evans (et al.) 1985, Hall and Taylor 1996, Immergut 1999, Jupille and

Caporaso 1999, March and Olsen (1984, 1989), North 1990, Pierson 1998, Pierson and
Skocpol 2000, Thelen 1999, Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Weaver and Rockman 1993.
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within the

Community were designed

same requirements

that

make

initial

enacted refonns hard to undo, even
to infringe

to inhibit

decision

if

even modest changes of course.
The

making

difficult also

make

those reforms turn out to be
unexpectedly costly or

on member-state sovereignty.”

In this

way, supranational

well be able to actively shape
and influence policy preferences of
the

As

to the

previously

second condition, many scholars have
pointed out

institutions

Member

may

States.

that the rules

guiding

decision-making have changed quite dramatically
(for instance see Falkner 2000).
Starting with the Single

European Act and

1991, a range of issue areas can

now

further continued

by the Maastricht Treaty

be decided by qualified majority vote.
Thus,

in

to the

degree to which decisions which were
previously guided by the rules of unanimity
are

now

replaced with decisions based on qualified
majority rules, the second condition of
48

the joint-decision begins to disappear.
In

sum, ScharpPs analysis of the determinants of
positive and negative integration

correctly predicts the occurrence of conflicts
institutions during the process

decision trap

may no

Blom-Hansen

s

longer be

among Member

States

and supranational

of policy-making. However, the conditions for
a
in place.

Important in this context

is

the insight

joint-

from

(1996, 36) work in which he demonstrates that “joint-decision
traps are

not inherent to joint-decision systems

[...]”

on public policy are contingent upon the
intergovernmental actois with exit

[...]

instead “the effects of joint-decision systems

central government’s ability to threaten

and thus

to

make

a credible threat

of using

“alternative policy-making arenas.” Therefore, the degree to which
the European

48

For
for

argument see Falkner 2000. On the implications of changes of decision- rules
policy-making see Mazey and Richardson 1993.

this

EU
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institutions

States,

needed

can circumvent the unanimous
decision-making arrangements of the

determines the availability of possible
escape routes out of deadlock.
What
is a

theoretical

framework

that helps to understand both
the conditions

which deadlock can be overcome as well
decision-making process. Such

and strategies

2.2

Member

likely to be

a

under

as the role played by the relevant
actors in the

framework would also have

employed by

is

to specify the resources

the various actors.

Prominent Pathways out of Deadlock

Given the

hampered by

fact that joint-decision

several factors,

it

making on

the

European Union

level

is

appears to be relevant to examine which
theories of

European integration might help

to explain

when and under what

conditions deadlock can

be overcome. After decades of scholarly work
on European integration a plethora of
49

approaches and theories have been developed.

neofunctionalism and

Two

of the most dominant theories,
$

liberal

intergovemmentalism are examined here.

questions guide the discussion of these two approaches:

approach offer clues as

to

In

°

The following

which way does each

why, and under which conditions stalemate during the

49

For a discussion ot different theories of European integration, among many see
Caporaso and Keeler 1995, Cram 1997, Gestohl 2000, Leonardi 1995, McCormick 1999,

Mutimer 1994, Rosamond
5°

A

1999.

complete review of both approaches

is

beyond

the scope this investigation.

This

on those aspects which illuminate the theoretical distinctions
relevant for analyzing the development of Europe-wide employment policy.
dissertation focuses only
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decision-making process

may

approach as being crucial
This section

first

in

be avoided?

What

factors

and forces are identified by each

driving the process of European
integration forward?

reviews the main characteristics of
each approach and then

assesses both their strengths and
weaknesses respectively.
attribute

independent causal influence over

institutions that are

swaying Member
only

Member

theories of

policy development to supranational

working closely with transnational actors
and thereby are capable of

States’ decisions.

States, fully

central in the negotiation

conclusion of

EU

In a nutshell, neofunctionalists

aware of

In contrast, liberal

their

domestic economic and

and agreement on the

this section agrees

intergovemmentalists believe that

with scholars

details

of policy developments. The

who have

European integration should move beyond

political interests, are

its

argued that the debate on the
current limitation of seeing the

decision-making process as being dominated either by
supranational
national governments.

2001

)

w h°

In particular

have suggested that the

levels of decisions

made

in the

it

agrees with Peterson and

utility

institutions or

by

Bomberg (1995a, 1995b,

of the theoretical approach depends on the

European Union:

for policy-shaping

and policy-setting

decisions a theoretical model that predicts the influence of
a two- level entrepreneur has
the greatest potential.

liberal

The

final “history

intergovernmentalism.

making” decisions might

Therefore, building on the work of Moravcsik (1999) on

two-level entrepreneurship, an alternative model

2.2.1

best be explained by

is

developed.

Neofunctionalism

The

early neofunctionalist literature of the 1950s and 1960s believed that

decisions on the European level and thus the breaking of deadlock was the outcome of

60

the interaction of supranational
5
institutions with a range of
subnational political actors.
hi

drawing on the interaction of these
two elements,

with explaining

"how and why

this

approach

is

'

primarily concerned

nation-states cease to be wholly
sovereign,

how and why

they voluntarily mingle, merge
and mix with their neighbors so as
to lose the factual
attributes

of sovereignty while acquiring new
techniques for resolving conflicts
between

themselves” (Haas 1970, 610). The central
claim of this
regional integration

domain

is

literature is that

deadlock

in

avoided by the dynamic process of
spillover from one sectoral

to another, as societal

demands

translated into concrete proposals

for

European policies were encouraged and

by the supranational

institutions, the

Commission

in

52

particular.

In this formula, political integration
is

conceptualized on the grounds of an

institutionalized pattern of interest politics that

Central

among

is

played out within existing

institutions.

these institutions are supranational institutions
and in particular the

European Commission. Governments of the Member
States are allocated a somewhat
passive role: they are seen to

creatively lesponsive

while

in

governments

fulfill

the ambitions of various parts of society to
be

in the process.

rest the ultimate

In this context, neofunctionalists point out that

power

to

make

policy decisions, given the

The oi igins ot this approach can be seen in efforts of providing a sympathetic
critique
of functionalism. For works in functionalism see in particular Mitranyl966.
For a
discussion of functionalism see Zellentin 1992.
52

For an overview of the work in the neofunctionalist approach see Battistelli and
Isemia
Cram 1996, George 1996, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler- Koch 1996, Pentland 1973.

1993,
53

.

This expression

is

from Harrison (1974,

80).
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heterogeneity of their interests in certain
issue areas, unilateral evasion
or recalcitrance

may

prove unprofitable

if

sets a

it

precedence for other governments. Thus,
governments

are seen as being motivated to
yield to the pressures of converging
supranational and

subnational interests.

maxims of
and

may no

As

recently pointed out by Schmitter
(1996, 5) one of the

neo- functionalist approach

is

the realization that “states are not
the exclusive

longer be the predominant actors in the
regional/intemational system.”

The outcome

of the interactions of these forces

is

a gradual

of shared competences between the supranational
and the national

widening of the scope

process of political integration

is

expectations and political activities toward a

political integration is a

new

persuaded to

centre,

the pre-existing national states.

new

This

defined by Haas (1958, 16) as a “process
whereby

political actors in several distinct national
settings are

demand jurisdiction over

institutions.

political

whose

shift their loyalties,

institutions possess or

The end

result

community, superimposed over

of a process of

the pre-existing

ones.”

Central to the neofunctionalists understanding of the dynamics
of integration
the concept of spillover.

The

literature

on spillover distinguishes

functional spillover, political-spillover, and cultivated spillover/
spillover postulates a gradual accumulation of political
as the national states transfer “authority-legitimacy.”

power

three kinds of spillover:

Overall, the concept of

at the

According

is

supranational level,

to the logic

of this

54

For

this line

The

text here follows

of argument see Mattli (1999, 24-25).

55

three types of spillovers.

George’s (1991, 23) suggestion of strictly distinguishing those
For a similar conception of spillover see Choi (1995,

Mutimer (1989), and Tranholm-Mikkelsen

1991.
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7-8),

mechanism,

initial

steps toward integration

would be triggered by endogenous
economic

developments. Political dynamics following
these developments would lead

to further

co-operation. Governments place their
decisions on the opinions of technocrats.

Technocrats make economic plans
to the

complexity of

modem

at the

regional level that follows inevitable
reactions

economies. These same complexities are

longer term, to trap governments

in

a

likely, in the

web of unintended consequences spun by

their

previous commitments.

The

logic of functional spillover predicts that
since social and

economic actors

are

motivated by the advantages of collective action,
they develop expectations and demands
lor

common

policies,

which the empowered

institutions could then transform into a

permanent integrative impulse by meeting these expectations
which further encourages
shift of activities

and

loyalties to the

begin to press for integration

due

to the effects

in

two

European
situations:

( 1 )

According

own

sector and

development. As coordinated policies
uncoordinated policies

in another,

would

in

to

Haas, these actors

either they find their sector

of non- integration of others sectors or

integration outside their

domains through

level.

a

hampered

(2) they observe a successful

like to stay

on par with the overall

one area demonstrated the inadequacy of

common

action

would spread

to

new

functional

a process of spill-over.

Political Spillover occurs

when

the existence of supranational organizations sets
57

in

motion a self-reinforcing process of

56

,

Also see Lindberg (1971,
57

institution- building.

10).

^

For example see Haas (1958, 17) and Lindberg (1971,

63

9).

Nye

(1971, 202) describes

the distinctive feature of
this kind of spillover
in the following way:
“Problems are

deliberately linked together into
package deals, not on the basis
of technological

necessity but on the basis of
political and ideological
projections and political
possibilities."

Thus, to a large extent,

between nation-states leads

political spillover

to the formation

happens because integration

of coalitions by various transnational

groupings. These coalitions consist
of interest groups, national
representatives and
supranational institutions attempt to
influence the policy agenda

own

in

order to promote their

interest.

The

logic of cultivated spillover
predicts that “international institutions

maximize

decision-making” by means of providing
the crucial service of mediator
and thereby
“yield the greatest

1961, 369).

amount of process toward

the goal of political

Classical diplomatic negotiations
without such a mediator, rarely

beyond the minimum common denominator.
Here
position of the least cooperative partner.
foi

theiefoie,

will to

is to

otter solutions

will be

6),

further

determined by the

common

and not only involve the
interest.

As

“the prime role of the Commission,

which involve the upgrading of common

ot the integration process will to

perform

outcome

may move

of the difference, but also the upgrading of the

summarized by Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991,

outcome

the

move

In contrast, if mediatory services
are provided,

instance by the Commission, negotiations

splitting

community” (Haas,

some degree be dependent on

this function.”

64

interest.

its

The

ability

and

The Role of the Commission

2.2.1.1

Much of the
the

Commission

only help the

the Policy-Making Process

old as well as recent
neofunctionalist

to directly

Member

the

shape the preferences of the

States to

outcome of multilateral

Commission within

in

Member

overcome deadlock, but also

negotiations.

EU

work focuses on

and thereby

and thereby not

to decisively

Based on observations of

policy process, the role of the

central in the policyshaping phase

States

the ability of

determine the

the activities of the

Commission

is

seen as being

critically influences the
policy-setting

has thus important implications for
the choices available to

Member

and

States during the

history-making decisions of IGC.

However,

the literature detailing the influence
of the

descriptive and merely

manages

members
as an

the

to exert

of the

lists

the various roles

Commission

is

rather

by which the Commission supposedly

such an influence or the various characteristics
particularly

Commission

had.

For instance, one often finds reference

agenda -setter” (Pollack 1994) and “broker of

Commission has learned

to

maximize

its

room

interests”

for

member

“matured as a bureaucracy” (Christiansen 1996),

it

to the fact that

(Mazey and Richardson),

maneuver

while attempting to avoid direct conflict with the

influential

states.

in the policy process

As

the

Commission has

has learned to act as a “purposeful

58
It should be noted that while
there was a decline in scholarly interest in
neofunctionalist analysis during the 70s and early 80s (especially
among
neofunctionalists), neofunctionalism has reemerged in the late

1980s and 1990s. For a
of neofunctionalism see Groom 1978, Haas (1971, 1975, 1976). For
recent work
of neofunctionalists see for example see Burley and Mattli
(1993), Coombes 1970,
Christiansen 1997, Cini 1996, Edwards and Spence 1997, Jensen
2000, Peters 1992,
Niemann 1998, Nugent (1994, 1999), and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997a, 1998,’
critique

1999).

Several case studies have demonstrated the importance of the Commission in
the
For instance see Fuchs 1994, Sandholz 1992, Schmidt 1997a.

policy making process.
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opportunist:”

to the

knowing

that its

means of achieving”

its

seen as being able to expand
states to rain

activities

in.

it

is

to

expand

competence

its

(Cram 1993 and 1997,

goal.

its

As pointed

can be to lock the

purpose

competences

out by

member

Cram

in

5

187).

areas where

it

is

’

it

"is fairly flexible as

The Commission

difficult for

is

member

(1999, 49), “the long-term effects of
these

states into

commitments

that they

might not

initially

60

,

nave chosen themselves.”
Institutionally, the

Commission

is

seen as being able to play these roles
due to

its

function as guardian of the Treaties and
defender of the general interest. This formal
role

° f the Commission

is

seen t0 b e

its

most important

tool

entrepreneur and influence the policymaking
process.

Commission’s

right of initiative

in the Treaty, either

considers

it

empowers

it

to

by which

it

can act as a policy

6
'

Most importantly,

make proposals on

the

the matters contained

because the Treaty expressly so provides or because
the Commission

necessary.

This power of

initiative is exclusive in respect

of Community

matters, the principle being that the Council takes
decisions only on a proposal from the

Commission, so

that there

Wise and Gibb (1993,
the readiness of the

more than

is

a coherent

16), since “the

Commission

framework

for all initiatives.

Community’s

In the

legislative capacity

to formulate policy proposals [...] the

is

words of

dependent on

Commission

is

a supranational civil service, playing an overt political role in
setting goals for

59

Hot further discussion on the organizational strategy of ’purposeful
opportunism’ see
Klein and O’Higgins 1985.
60

For a similar point see Schmidt (1996, 8) and Usher (1994, 149).

For the description of the Commission as a policy entrepreneur see Sandholtz and
(1989, 96).

Zysman

66

the

Community.” Along

similar lines, Lindberg
(1963, 71) argues that the

plays a significant integrative
role

when he

Commission

points out that:

The Commission bases

fZrr
that the

its proposals on a
judgment of what the
are llkd y t0 aCCept This
has not meant in practice

Commission uhas proposed

acceptable, but that

the

minimum which was

proposals were designed to
accommodate
enough from each national position to
win support or
its

acquiescence, albeit grudging.”

However,
to the

it

62

should be noted, that in the cases that
such an influence

Commission, the Commission did not have

means

at its disposal.

leader as well as

its

Instead, the

executive leadership

a formal voting rights or coercive

Commission’s influence

is

attributed to

capacity of manipulating ideas and information.

emphasizing the importance of leadership, Cox

may

prove to be the most

attributed

is

its

role as a

For instance

states (1996, 317), “the quality

critical single

of

determinant of the growth

in

scope and authority of international organization.”
Neofunctionalists, in this context, provide a detailed

Commission which allow
explicit

95).

list

to

wield power informally over

of such characteristics

is

power

Commission’s

Commission indeed had succeeded

in the

Community

political skills ol the

Member

skills

States.

in

roles

and

capabilities.

of the

The most
in

1970 (92-

Maintaining

wielding considerable decision-making

process, Lindberg and Scheingold identified five crucial

Commission:

(1)

should be noted that Scheingold

(

locus on the European Court of Justice
position to play a creative role
detailed provisions

of political

provided by Lindberg and Scheingold

In their study, they discussed the

that the

It

it

list

when

it

goal articulation entails the capacity
,

to

fonnulate

1965, 21) arrives at a similar conclusion in his
when he points that the “Court is in a strong
is

dealing with an unforeseen ambiguity in the

which make up the body of the

treaty.”

67

long-tern, goals for the

common European

Community

interest

and

that

can

in turn

that are capable

be legitimated by reference
to a

of mobilizing supporter and
neutralizing

opposition; (2) coalition-building,
entails the capacity to identify
problems to be solved

through coordinated action and to
build coalitions with client
groups and national
bureaucracies; (3 political experience
)

maximize national

end

technical expertise, entails the
capacity to

contacts, technical expertise, and
political experience in the

organization; (4) task expansio n,
entails the capacity to convince
client groups and

governments of the need
institutions;

and

for

finally (5)

new

policies,

new

tasks,

and new powers for the Community

brokerage and package deals,

entails the capacity to play an

active role in intergovernmental
bargaining, building support for

its

own

proposals and

constructing deals which satisfy interests
of all national governments. Along similar
lines,

Puchala (1988, 205) has argued

engineer links

among

that bureaucrats

who

“can, and do, deliberately

tasks and sectors in efforts to enhance
their

push toward the complete

political unification

of countries

to

Commission, due

to the exceptional skill set

authority and to

which they are committed.”

Furthermore, several studies have maintained that
these
available to the

own

political skills are

of the President of the

63

European Commission.

What Cox

international organization”

Delois

influence over

is

central

i

ole to the C

often applied to the analysis of the influence Jacques

Member

outcomes. For instance, in an

(1996, 321) has termed “the great- man theory of

States policy preferences and ultimately the negotiation

article

ommission

in

published in 1989 Sandholtz and Zysman ascribe a

developing the single market

initiative.

In this article

63

For instance see Endo 1999, Nugent 1994, Ross 1994, Schmidt 2001, and Vahl 1992.
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Sandh0ltZ and

Zysman

ar® ue that ,h <=

Commission’s function

fundamental. Perceiving structural changes
in the world

inadequacy
leadership

ol national responses, the

when proposing

from transnational

(

1989, 128), leadership

was

Commission successfully exercised

was

the

political

Market and mobilizing support

Thus, as pointed out by Sandholtz and
Zysman

crucial in creating “a

constructing a set of bargains that

2. 2.

economy and recognizing

the completion of the Internal

industrial interests.

as policy entrepreneur

embody

common European

interest

and then

that understanding.”^

Strengths of Neofunctionalism

1.2

I

be most important contribution of neofunctionalism
to the study of policy-

making on

the level of the

European Union can be seen

in the fact that

neofunctionalism

successfully combines the characteristics and dynamics of
policy collaboration as
piedicted by lunctionalists with an analysis of the role of
supranational institutions
their

attempt of balancing diverse interests

main point of departure

making

is

to the extent that

of interest.

it

in a

in

mixed-actor setting. Neofunctionalists

the recognition of the essentially political nature of policy-

contributes to the allocation of resources and the satisfaction

Accordingly, the understanding ol the process of policy-making

is

an

important contribution to the study of the dynamics of European integration.

Policy-making,

is

seen as being shaped and influenced by the interplay of group

interests in the political system,

flic

staking of claims and

demands

in return for
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For

a similar

assessment of the role of the Commission see Ross 1994.

exchanges of

According

political loyalties reinforces
the authority

to neofunctionalists, this
pattern

to the international setting.

of political activity can be directly
transferred

Thus, in the European Union,
governments, interests groups,

bureaucracies and eventually broader
political
in a

of the system as a whole.

elites will

combine and pursue

their goals

constellation comparable with domestic
politics and will increasingly transfer
their

loyalties

from the national arena

to the supranational arena

cross-sectoral policy links and the recruiting
skills of the
in particular the

(1983, 17)

European Commission. This

when

line

due

new

to the

combined

forces of

supranational institutions,

of argument

is

summarized by Webb

she points out that neofunctionalists most
important contribution to the

study of European integration

policy-making and,

is

the "emphasis

on the

in particular, the investigation

producing mechanisms [which] broke new ground

distinctive features

of Community

of specific bargaining and consensusin the systematic study

of the policy-

making process.”

Critique of Neofunctionalism

2. 2. 1.3

Most sharply

criticized

by intergovemmentalists

is

the neofunctionalists
’

of the supranational institutions as engines

and

facilitators

picture

of European integration,

encoui aging societal demands, structuring the agenda, and brokering
deals. Early

intergovemmentalist scholars, grounded
conflict,

the

in

EEC

and power
s

politics, posit that

in classical realist

conceptions of anarchy,

governments had not and were not

likely to

endow

supranational institutions with powers that would grant them an expansive role

European

politics.
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-

In a classic article, Stanley

Hoffmann formulated

in

1966 what

is

generally

regarded as the most influential
critique of early neofunctionalist
scholarship. Writing
the height of French president
Charles de Gaulle's

“empty<hair”

progress on European integration in
the mid-1960s,
a self-propelling integration
process engineered

highly unrealistic.

Hoffman (1966, 863)

“my own

conclusion

Hoffmann

policy,

at

which blocked

points out that the belief in

by the supranational

institutions

was

writes,

sad and simple. The nation state
is still
could have succeeded if, on the one
hand, these nations had not been
caught in the whirlpool of
different concerns, as a result of
both profoundly
here.

[...]

is

Political unification

different internal

concerns, as a result both ot profoundly
different internal
circumstances and of outside legacies, and if,
on the other hand,
they had been able or obliged to
concentrate on ‘community
building to the exclusion of all problems
situated either outside
their area or within each one of them.”

According

to

Hoffman, national governments are unlikely

European

institutions in areas

remained

in control

of key importance

to confer

to the national interest,

powers

to the

and effectively

of the integration process. Thus, according to Hoffmann
(1966, 909),

the authority of the supranational institutions
remains “limited, conditional, dependent,

and reversible,” with

little

hope of change.

In the

words of Wallace, “the success of the

neo-functional approach dependedupon national governments
not noticing

the gradual draining

away of their

66

66
in

in effect

lifeblood to Brussels.”

For a discussion on the “empty-chair” policy see Dinan(1999, 46-50),
(1967), Teasdale (1995, 104-1 10), Wood and Yesilada (1996, 38-46).

Quoted

-

Scharpf (1988, 266).
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Newhouse

Ill

a recent criticism

of neofunctionalism, Moravcsik
(1999, 272) classifies the

neofunctionalists predictions of
international cooperation as a
“supply-side approach”

and challenges the

"Why

theorists

of this approach with the following
question (1999, 273):

should governments, with millions
of diverse and highly trained
professional

employees, massive information-gathering
capacity, and long-standing
experience with
international negotiation at their disposal,
ever require the services of a handful
of

supranational entrepreneurs to generate
and disseminate useful information
and ideas?”

Thus, Moravcsik (1993, 514) takes issue
with the neofunctionalist claim that
the
supranational institutions enjoy substantial
autonomy within their delegated powers,

lixamining the most important functions
delegated to the
find

any scope for independent

institutions,

Moravcsik does not

7

initiative/

This dissertation agrees with this criticism
and also observes that an

understanding of the policy-making process of the
European Union requires an approach
that

goes beyond being merely descriptive. While the
detailed descriptions of the

leadership skills oi the Commissions’ President
as well as the functional roles of the
C

ommission

as a

whole

is

a valuable starting point,

a clearer insight into the process

Commission

demand-side approach

is

missing from

this analysis, is

by which these characteristics have helped the

to actually contribute

The claim of this

what

towards agenda -setting and

dissertation

is

final decision-selection.

that such an insight can be gained through a

ol international cooperation,

which

is

sensitive to the intrastate

67
F-or a similar assessment of the limitations of supranational
institutions see Garrett
1992, Garrett and Weingast 1993, Milward 1992, Moravcsik (1991, 1995, 1997, 1998,
1999), Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999, Taylor 1983.
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dynamics of

interest rep-esentation.

points to the

window of opportunity

acting as a twolevel entrepreneur.

and represents

latent interests in the

In a nutshell, the theoretical
frame developed
that the

In

States.

role as a

Member

sufficient pressure onto the
respective

Member

its

Commission

is

able to create for

twolevel entrepreneur,

i,

itself,

below
by

aggregates

States and thereby indirectly
exerts

governments

to

shape the policy preferences of
the

Through a ratcheting mechanism
described below,

the

Commission

gradually and indirectly influences
the issues to be placed onto the
agenda of the

European Union as well as

the choices available to the

Member states

in the final

decision-selection.

Additionally,

many

scholars have pointed out that
neofunctionalism provided

flawed predictions about the increasing
evolution of supranational authority
based both

on the logic of spillover and the
level.

transfer of loyalties of national elites
to the supranational

For instance as Wessels (1997,
273) has pointed

of view

we would have

out,

expected to find “a linear growth,

from a neoftinctionalist point

i.e.

a rather

smooth process

‘upwards’ to some soil of final state of a
‘federal union.” Wessels underscores
his

argument by providing the figure
piedictions.

However,

a

(1)

below

as a

way of demonstrating

number of scholars have pointed out

empirically flawed and theoretically not well founded.
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that

neofunctionalist

such automaticity was

Figure

2.2.2 Liberal

(

I

)

Neofunctionalist Prediction of the dynamic
of European integration

Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) explains
the

European Union

is

how and why,

in certain limited cases,

successful in “pooling national sovereignty
through qualified

majority voting rules” and thereby manages to
overcome deadlock and to achieve the
delegation ol “sovereign powers to semi -autonomous
central institutions” (Moravcsik,

1993, 509). According to this approach integration
occurs, because the

wish

it

to

occur since

it

is

in their

own economic

Member

States

68

or political self-interest.

Thus,

decisions and the successful breaking of deadlock, on the
level of the European Union are
the result of three related processes:

68

„

(1) behavior

of rational governments,

.

tor instance see

Hoffman

1963.

74

(2) nationally

negotiated policy preferences,
and (3, inlergoveimuenlal
negotiations of vanous

The occurrence of deadlock
on

the

European Union

level

is

determined by the

preferences and the negotiation
outcome of national governments.
national governments are
the only forces

cooperation.

Member

The

States

institutions

whenever

of the

EU

state

As

principal agents

which dnve or prevent
progress

in

European

are merely instruments
that can be utilized by

their national preferences
can be

The assumption of rational

states.

behavior provides

enhanced by such
liberal

a

move.

intergovemmentalism

W.th a general framework of
analysis, within which the
costs and benefits of economic

interdependence are the primary
detenninants of national preferences.
Resolution of
distributional conflicts

among governments

is

the

outcome of the

relative intensity

of

national preferences, the existence
of alternative coalitions, and the
opportunity for issue

linkages.

The model of

rational state behavior

on the basis of domestically-constrained

preferences implies that international
conflict and cooperation can
be modeled as a
process that takes place in two successive
stages: governments
interests, then bargain

among themselves

Metaphorically, these two stages shape
operation.

A

in

an effort

first

define a set of

to realize those interests.®

demand and supply

functions for international

co

domestic preference formation process
identifies the potential benefits of

policy coordination perceived by national
governments (demand). The process of
interstate strategic interaction defines the
possible political responses

of the

EC

political

For the concept of the ‘two level’ game see Feld
1980, Paarlberg 1997, Patterson 1997
1993, Putnam 1988, and Zangel 1994; for a “domestic
politics” approach see

Moyer

Bulmer 1983.
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“

SyStem

PreSSUreS fr0m ' h0Se °
g Vemmen,s (supply).

The

interaction

of demand and

supply, of preference and
strategic opportunities,
shapes the foreign policy
behavior of
states

(Moravcsik 1993, 482).
This conceptualization of
interest mediation has
three implications:

national preferences of the

process.

By

the time

Member

Member

States are treated as

States

meet

to discuss

exogenous

any proposals

First, the

to the negotiation

for

agreement, their

preferences have already been
determined by their respective
domestic interests. In

way, preferences are being
treated as given and
determined much prior
gotiation.

of interaction

Second, actor

s

to the process

link

of

preferences are assumed to
remain fixed during the process

and bargaining. Bargains are
struck through compromise,
side-payments

and package deals, rather than
through processes of persuasion
and learning
validity

this

of actors claims are

at stake.

in

which the

Third, the national governments
serve as the crucial

between the domestic and the international

level.

In this sense,

governments act as

a gate-keeper between the
domestic and international level”
(Skjalm 1998, 10).

2.2.2. 1

Strengths of Liberal Intergovernmental^

L.beral intergovernmental ism represents
an improvement on realist accounts
of
international politics because

assuming
concerns

it

gives a major role to domestic politics.

that state’s preferences

in the international

can exclusively be derived from

state’s security

system, the image of domestic politics as
the driving force

of state’s preferences represents a fresh
perspective with which
preference formation.

Instead of

As Moravcsik

(1993, 481)

makes

76

clear,

to

examine the sources of

“an understanding of

domestic politics
interaction

,s

among

a preconditton for,
not a supplement to,
the analysis of the
strategic

states.”

In the intergovernmental

national politicians

preferences.

national

embody

decision-making processes
of the European Union,

state interests

In this context,

and thereby

Moravcsik argues

governments are viewed as
vanring

omestic social groups.

in

In this sense, state

pressures nested within each

state.

reflect

domestic policy

that (1993, 481),
-foreign policy goals

response to shifting pressure
from

decision-makers respond to
political

Thus, the fifteen state
executives bargaining

European arena are complemented
by

of

in the

fifteen separate state
arenas that provide the sole

channel for domestic political
interests to the European

level.

2.2.2 2 Critique of Liberal
Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism
has been praised by

some

scholars for

its

value in

explaining the logic of European
integration and simultaneously
has been heavily
criticized

by others

for the limited value

mechanisms of policy-making
in the literature:

in the

it

provides

when one

attempts to explain the

European Union.” Four criticism
are often repeated

First, several scholars

have pointed out

that liberal

70

sh° uld be noted that Wincott has
criticized Moravcsik for being
ambiguous in the
According to Wincott, (1995, 600) “it is
not clear whether heads
government are embedded in domestic and
transnational civil society
[.
] or whether
has its impactj more weakiy ° niy via
the transmissi ° n
of
It

attribution of causality

2“^

‘

’

For a critique of liberal intergovernmentalism
for instance see Foster 1998.
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intergovernmental^- assumption
to

an international bargaining
table

Member

that

States bring unita^
national preferences
72

is

rather flawed.

For instance, Jacobson
(1996, 93)

has pointed on, that "the
heyday of models that depict
the state as a unitary
rational actor,
billiard ball, or black

box apparently

is

drawing

to a close." Along
similar lutes, Pollack

(2001, 226) argues that the
model of preference formation
which liberal

mtergovemmentalism employs “ignores

the

endogenous

[•and thereby ignores] one of the
fundamental

Along the same

logic,

partial.

of

EU

membership

73
features of the integration
process.”

Lewis (2000, 266) has argued

formation “remains incomplete
and

effects

that this

In particular,

image of preference

models of

EU

decision-making

need to allow for the possibility
where sociality and the density of
the normative

environments can affect bargaining
outcomes by constructing
the

first

Member
the

place.

Here the argument

is that liberal

State preferences are shaped

Member

by

interests

and

identities in

intergovemmentalism ignores

that

factors other than domestic
politics. Thus,

States are bargaining at the Council
table,

it is

when

not possible to separate their

domestic policy preferences from their
identity as members of the
European Union. As
pointed out by Cloutier (1999,
27), the “identity as a
preference formation by the

member

state,

member

even before domestic

attempt to change or shape those
preferences.” Along similar

French minister of European Affairs strengthened
“I

believe the

more one

is

nationalist, the

slate

this

more one

is

For instance see Wallace 1999.
For a similar argument also see Sandholtz 1993.
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precedes any policy

polilical influences

lines,

Bosson, a former

argument when he pointed out

that

European. In tomorrow’s world.

there

no chance of being a major
power

is

through Europe.

Member
a

Thus according

to the

States policy preferences
are

member of the European Union,

bargaining

at the

Couneil

options available to each

Second,

many

(‘grand'), free

and respected without
working

arguments presented by various
scholars.

firs,

generated from the

Member

State's identity as

prior to any response to
domestic pressure or

This identity both constraints
and shapes the policy

table.

??

Member

State.

scholars have pointed out that
liberal intergovemmentalism

exaggerates the role of national
governments

in the

decision-making processes of the

European Union. Especially scholars
who work within

the

governance have pointed out “that European
integration

is

which authority and policy making influence

is

framework of

multi-level

a polity-creating process in

shared across multiple levels of

government sub-national, national and supranational”
(Hooghe and Marks 1997,

Even though

these scholars

still

believe that

Member

States play an important role in
the

decision-making process, they quite vigorously
point out again and again,

74

^

Quoted

in

Wise and Gibb (1993,

22).

that

Member

36).

7
'

It should also be noted that
Lewis (1998, 484) goes even further
he points out that most of the intergovernmental
agreements

in this argument when
were actually worked out
“the Coreper is not just an influential

ui mg meetings of the Coreper. He
argues that
gioup of diplomats, but an institutional mechanism
where

membership

into their ‘self-

collective rationality based

and collectively

at the

EU

interest calculation.

notion of

membei
be found

why

it

The permanent

EU

States internalize

representatives share a

on the dual responsibility
level.”

the hbeial intergovemmentalists’

too restrictive since

Member

1

Additionally,

view on domestic sources of preference formation

explain

fails to

to deliver the goods both at home
Corbey (1995, 261) has pointed out that

why

is

in the

process of integration requires some
similar preferences emerge more or less simultaneously in
most of the

states
at the

and therefore

it

would “seems unlikely

domestic level.”
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that the source

of convergence can

States are far

According
instead

is

from being the most important
actors

to these scholars,
decision -making

shared by actors

m

the policy-making
process.

not monopolized by
state executives, but

is

a, different ievels
(for

instance see Egeberg and
Tronda, 1997.

Grande 1996, Hooghe 1998,
Kohler-Koch 1996, Marks
(1993, 1996), Marks and
Hooghe
2000, Scharpf 1994). For instance
Hooghe and Marks (1997,
23) point out that
“supranational institutions

-

above

all,

the

European Commission

[...]

have independent

influence in policymaking that
cannot be derived solely from
their role as agents of
state
executives.

actors.”

will

I

State executives

may

play an important role, but
so too do European- level

lence an appropriate understanding
of the forces and factors of
policymaking

always have

to look

beyond

the preferences of the

Member

States and will have to

lake into account the preferences,
strategies and resources of
supranational and

subnational actors.

Thud,
always

it

free to

the assumption of liberal
intergovemmentalism that

make any

decision

is

Member

States are

rather flawed according to several
scholars.

has been pointed out that the changes

consequences, which can create gaps

in

in

decision rules

Member

may have

Instead

unintended

States control and can create

opportunities for supranational and
transnational actors to have autonomous
influence on
policy making.

in

Member

states

policy preferences in the

EU

may

unintentionally cede control by locking
themselves
?6

Treaties,

and so

tie

the hands of future actors.

A

better

understanding of these dynamics can only be gained
by analyzing policy processes over

It

should be noted that there

emphasizes the ways

in

which

is

a large

body of

initial institutional

literature

on path dependence which

or policy decisions -even suboptimal

ones

- can become
self-reinforcing over time. Among many for instance see
David 1994,
Dinutrakopoulos 2001, Krasner 1989, Pierson (1993,
2000), Zysman 1983.

80

time.

For instance Pierson (1996,
126) argues that “when European
integration

examined over time, the gaps

in

member-state control appear

far

is

more prominent than

they do in intergovernmental
accounts.” Addttionally Majone
(1989, 98) has argued that
the “results of institutional

change cannot be evaluated with
reference

to discrete, isolated

decisions, but must be assessed in
terms of sequences of interdependent
decisions taken

by a

variety

reality

of actors over time.”

In this sense, liberal

of decision-making on the European
Union

of a time period.

Many

intergovemmentalism

level,

by merely focusing on too short

important decisions, preceding the
intergovernmental bargains,

thereby drop outside of the frame of
analysis. Along similar

argued that “those

aware

that

who become engaged

each decision

distorts the

is

in a

lines,

Vickers (1965, 15) has

course of decision-making soon

conditioned not only by the concrete situation

taken but also by the sequence of past
decisions; and that their
influence future decisions.” Building on this
argument,

new

in

become

wlich

it

is

decisions in turn will

Mazey and Richardson

(1997.

118) have pointed out that "focusing on the behavior
of the set of policy actors taking the
final

decision

may be

misleading.

One needs

to

know why

are they deciding at

all

and

from which options they choose.”
Finally, as pointed out

realist prediction

these views

by Wessels (1997) the

of the dynamic

cf

liberal

European integration

stress that the geopolitical revolution,

is

intergovemmentalist and
empirically rather flawed:

and the subsequent radical

tiansformations ot the political context, leaves west European integration
a child of the

Cold War.” The predicted

trajectory of this theory

is

81

displayed in figure

(2).

A

Figure (2) LI prediction of the dynamic
of European integration.

Thus according
European integration

to Wessels, these theories

project.

emphasize the disintegration of the

The outcome of this

system which very much looks

trajectory will eventually be a political

like the traditional nation-state system.

precisely the increased trend of integration in the
early 1990s

Economic and Monetary Union), and
the integration project (enlargement),

(i.e.

However,

Single Market and

the continued efforts of deepening and widening

make

it

empirically difficult to observe such a

trajectory.
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2.2.3 Critique of
Neofunctionalist

As pointed
Sti "

-

Intergovernmental^ Dichotomy

out recently by Aspinwall
and Schneider (2000,
2), “sharp divisions

Characlerize the theoret

“'

debate on regional collaboration."
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After decades of

scholarly disputes, the
disagreements prevail over the
relative importance of

supranational institutions vis-a-vis
national actors in the policy
nuking process and the
factors

and

which are capable of explaining
the overcoming of deadlock.
Neofttnc.ionalism

liberal

intergovernmental™

rivaling interpretations.

the fact that there

the question

is

However,

two contending approaches
which seem

the critique of these

a general weakness in the

of the supranational and national

and how they manage
European

are

level.

As

to illuminate internal

way

two approaches above, point

to

these traditional approaches
address

institutions' role in

mechanism

to

European integration

policy-making on the

pointed out by Branch and Ohrgaard
(1999, 125) “the supranational-

intergovernmental dichotomy traditionally
manifests
particular actors in

to offer

EU

policy-making

at the

itself

by ascribing

expense of all other

a

key

role to

actors, as in the case

of

the liberal intergovemmentalist
emphasis on domestic interest groups and
national

governments

at the

expense of the EU’s supranational

institutions.”

This observation highlights the fact that
recent work in the tradition of

neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism are

still

rather absolute in their conceptions

of autonomy and influence. These two strands
of scholarship represent two fixed and

Several other scholars have stressed the persistence
of this cleavage in European
For instance see Caporaso (1999, 163), Church
(1996, 27), Cowles 1995,

studies.

Dehousse 2000, Hooghe and Marks (2001,
(2001, 173) and Wallace (2000,

145), Kelstrup 1998, Puchala 1999

5).
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Schmidt

competing positions respecttvely
on the supranational and
national
.o

push integration ahead or

to the possibility

to

slow

down. This makes

i,

of variation of influence

Whereas neofunetionalists view

a, different

the institutions as

and as possessing an independent
capacity

intergovernmental regard them
to

'

capacity

then, neither sensitive
nor

phases

open

in the policy cycle.

endowed with

to acceierate

institutions

substantia,

autonomy

and deepen European

integration,

as obedient servants only
Mfiliing functions delegated

them by national governments,
with

little

or

no capacity

to

move

the integration

piocess beyond what governments
wish.

These two conceptions appear

to be

mutually exclusive

formulations, as both claim to have
general applicability.

exclusive in practice, if
influence

in fact

may

me

in their theoretical

Yet they

may

not be mutually

recognizes that the degree of
supranational or national

vaty from one phase of
policymaking

to the other.

With

this

distinction in mind, supranational
influence or national influence
can then be seen as

being a variable which can take
on either high values (“engines of
integration") or low
values (“obedient servants”),
depending on the issue-areas, the
policyphases, and the
time.

Along

mistaken

to look for

determined
stages.

similar lines, Richardson (1996b.
28) has pointed out that “it might be

at a

one model of the

number of levels and

Different models of analysis

at different

EU
[...]

may

policy process.

Within the

EU

policy can be

the policy process goes through a

be useful

at different levels

number of

within the

EU

and

stages of the policy process.”

This perspective, encourages one to enrich
the
theories ot policy

making

in order to

hopefully

field

of European integration with

move beyond

the theoretical gridlock of

these competing conceptions and toward a
neutral theoretical language that
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is

capable of

accoum.ng

for var.ation in
supranational

and national influence

decision-makiug process.
Particularly useful
Peterson
that there

(

1

995a,

is

1

995b, 200

a need

1

in this context
appears to

and Peterson and Bomberg

)

differentiate levels

in different

( 1

the

EU,

liberal

of analysis of decisions
made

For decisions that invoive
the changing of the

intergovemmentalism appears

to assess the influence
the

Member

to

States have

he the

wo*

of

999). Both scholars
suggest

Union. This differentiation
should be based on the
kind of decisions
actors involved.

phases of the

in the

made

European

as well as the

institutional structure

of

be the most appropriate
theory available

on the

final

outcome. However,

for

decisions that involve
agenda-setting and decision-selection,
a mesolevel theory of
decision

insights

making would be most

appropriate.

Such a theory would

rely heavily

from policy analysis and
supranational entrepreneurship.
Thus,

such an approach allows one

to

examine

the influence

of supranational

on the

in a nutshell,

institutions

on

policy- setting, policy-shaping
and finally decision-selection.

2.3 Alternative

Pathways out

of Deadlock:

Combining Policy Analysis and

Supranational Entrepreneurship

In the

dichotomy,
theoretical

attempt of moving beyond the
neofunctionalists and intergovermentalist

this dissertation

argues that a combined approach might
be most useful.

framework developed here simultaneously draws
on

the insight

policy analysis and supranational
entrepreneurship. The following section
into three subsections.

lor the

The

first

The

from work on
is

structured

subsection discusses the contribution of policy
analysis

examination of decision-making.

In particular the

1995b, and 2001) and Peterson and Bomberg

is

utilized.
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work of Peterson (1995a,

The second subsection connects

the

work on policy

analysis with the recent

Moravcsik (1999) on tw.leve.
entrepreneurship™ The
detailed

work of

third subsection develops
a

model of policy entrepreneurship.
This model ultimately provides

more

the theoretical

frame inside of which the precise
mechanism by which a two-level
entrepreneur
influenced the policy-shaping and
policy-setting decisions can be
analyzed and thereby

provides a contribution towards a better
understanding of the dynamics that
finally led to
the adoption of the

2.3.1 Policy

employment chapter

in the Treaty

of Amsterdam.

Analysis

Policy analysis literature pertaining
to the European Union

becoming available
that policy analysis

in the past several years.

is

One main

concerned with examining

defined and constructed and

how

how

is

understanding in the

issues

literature is

and problems come

specific policy proposals get placed

government, and ultimately get adopted.

increasingly

to

be

on the agenda of

79

One prominent approach

conceptualizes the policy process as a process that

is

segmented

in

policy analysis

in various stages:

8
agenda -setting, policy formulation and legitimation,
implementation and evaluation.

For a critique of Moravcsik see Young 1999.
79

Foi instance see Birkland 2001,

Dunn 1986, Haas and Springer 1998, Heritier 1993,
Weimer and Vining 1999, Windhoff-Heritier 1987.

Pal 2001, Sabatier 1999, Stone 1997,
8°
It

should be noted that these stages are viewed as a heuristic device that helps
gain a

better understanding of the policy process.
for the following stage.

Each stage
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is

not necessarily a precondition

For each stage, policy analysis examines both
the

making

set

of actors involved

in the decision-

as well as the resources and strategies they
employ.

For policy analysis
Peterson and

in the

European Union, Peterson (1995a, 1995b,
2001) and

Bomberg (1999) have suggested

their analysis is the distinction

a useful analytical framework.

Central to

of three analytical stages of decision-making: policy-

shaping, policy-setting and hi story- making decisions.
These three stages are
differentiated, “based

decisions

made and

on identifiable patters of decision-making”

the actors

which were most dominant

in this

that is the type

of

kind of decision”

81

(Peterson 1995, 70).

The following

other

titles for

these stages can also be found in the
82
^

literature: “agenda-setting”,

“preference formation” and “interest resolution.”

In a nutshell, their central claim is that since

attracts a different set

of actors with varying resources and

attempt to explain outcomes across

model might be needed

The

first

each stage of decision-making

all

for an analysis

level of analysis

is

stages

of

all

may

find that

strategies, theorists

more than one

who

theoretical

the stages of decision-making.

the sub-systemic level.

This

is

the level at

which

policy-shaping decisions are made. These are the decisions about what policy will look

and what policy options

like

It

will be considered.

In the

words of Peterson (2001, 295)

should be noted that Peterson and Bomberg (1999) intend to use the framework of
own words, they do “not intend to imply that

analysis only as heuristic device. In their

only one type of decision
are

demarcated by

is

ever taken

at

each level of governance, or that these levels

neat, dividing lines.”

82
'

This dissertation will use these

setting’

titles

interchangably.

For a discussion of “agenda-

seeBaumgartner and Jones 1993, Baumgartner and Jones 91, Cobb and Elder

1983, Kingdon 1995, Peters 1994, Tsebelis 1994, Tsebelis and Garrett 1998, Tsebelis and

Kreppel 1998, and Schneider.
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policy-shaping” decisions
determine

Wthe EU does what

it

decides to do, or which

pohcy op tio „s Win be
considered.” Many of
these policy-shaptng
decisions

are taken
>ong before fonna,
decisions are taken on
the pohcy-sett.ng
ievek These poiicyshaping

decstons concent the

The most important

VuncUona^s,

detaiis

of poiicy opttons and
preoccupy

a diverse

range of actors.

actors in these decisions
are the respective civil
servants

in the reievan,

DCs

of the European Conan,
ss, on which dea,
with the

specific policy issue as
well as affected interest
groups and policy experts.

According to Peterson
(2001, 305), the most recent
work of Moravcsik (1999)
on
supranational entrepreneurship
provides a useful theoretical
approach for explaining , he

process by which policy shaping
decistons are reached.
.he

Commission

from

its

“

this

approach, the ability of

to decisively influence
the policyshaping
decisions,

is

seen to result

superior ability to coordinate
and manipulate information
and ideas held by

domestic groups.

Because of

Commission can no. only

its

set the

in their policy preferences
in the
tins capability

ability to aggregate the
interests

agenda of the EU, but also influence
the Member States
policyshaping and policy-setting
decisions. Ultimately,

allows the Commission to
decisively influence the

decisions of the

Member

At the second

of domestic groups, the

final

“historymaking”

States.

level

of analysis, the systemic

made. These decisions determine
what the
(2001, 294), these decisions are “taken

and actually chooses a policy

-

EU

when

level, policysetting decisions
are

actually does.

the

EU

According

to Peterson

reaches a 'policy decision point'

a course of action (or inaction)

-

in the

Union's defined

The section below provides a more detailed
discussion of Moravcsik ’s two- level
entrepreneurship model.
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(...)

field

of

convene," Mos,

ntst, lotions

the

policy setting decisions
emerge after bargaining
between the

Tins system of shared
powers of decision-making

“community method" (Devust
1999,

Council disposes. Thus, the
key actors

in

is

characterized by

which the Commission
proposes and the

in this

process are the European
Commission,

counci, of Ministers and the
Committee of Pennanen,
Representatives. Between
these
actors policy-setting
decisions occur.

According

to Peterson

and Bomberg

a theoretical

frame that combines a theoty
of

•domestic politics- of the European
Union with an analysis of the
institutional capacity of
supranational actors to influence
the course on which
policies are set would be
a helpful
contribution towards an
understanding of the process by
which different policy options

are selected (Peterson,
2001, 300,. In Peterson's
level

where

the

many

at this level [that] the

different cleavages to

EU’s

own

which

EU

words, since

i,

is a,

“the systemic

politics give rite to intersect

institutions usually provide
order

and aggregation.

[it is]

In his

conclusion, Peterson (200!,
303) calls for the development of an
institutionalist theoty of

systemic decision-making.
This dissertation argues that such
an approach can be developed
by focusing

simultaneously on two key aspects of
the Commission:

first,

aggregate and represent latent domestic
interests allows

it

in the policy-setting decisions.

the

Commission’s

to influence the

ability to

Member

States

Second, the Commission’s influence
over policy-setting

decisions, can be expected to be
particularly strong during those times
in which the

Commission and

the Presidency of the Council

work

closely together.

Such cooperation

allows the Commission to relay the latent
domestic interests to the European
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level,

while

it

allows the Presidency
of the Council to
widen

that

can draw on

1,

A. the

in its

attempt to mediate

third level of analysis

example of the kind of
decsions

its

scope of possible
policy proposals

among governments.

the super-systemic
.eve,.

is

Here the most prominent

taken, are decisions
tha, tnvolve treaty
reviston,

During treaty revises,
“history-making., decsions
change the
the

European Union and they
transcend

the

EU,

institution,, structure

of

policy process.

These super-systemic
decisions addittonally
include those that arise
from the conclusions of
European Council
meetings as

i,

detennines the

heads of states that meet

a, the

“preoccupy the highest

As

ministers.

of the EU. The key
actors

bargaining table

words of Peterson (2001,
294)

hi the

that

pr, or, ties

dunng

the choices

po.it, cal levels in

the

in these decisions are

European Council meetings,

made during such meetings

Europe; that

is,

are choices

national cab, nets and
prmre

such, they usually are
negotiated outcomes of
intergovernmental

bargaining.

According

to Peterson

>he theoretical approach
that

history-making

"‘'’a'

U

is

and Peterson and Bomberg,

most useful

is

decisions were reached.

liberal

intergovernmental™

for explaining the
process

by which the

For instance Peterson 2001
(

our best theor for explaining
y
the process of bargaining

,

at the

297 ) points out
super-systemic

84

level.”

Drawing on
theoretical

the insight of the

framework of this

work of Peterson and Peterson and
Bomberg

dissertation

aims

at

combining the

insights

the

of policy

04

For the same argument see Sbragia
1993.
neo functionalism is most useful in

It should be noted
that Peterson armies
argues, that
those kind of analysis that try to
explain how the'

E ° declsl0 n - makin 8 Ganges, such as a
voting
vodnuor
oi the
thT!S
co-decision procedure involving the
European
,
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shift

of qualified majority
J
Y

Parliament.

is

analysis with the recent

work of Moravcsik
(1999) „„ twtxlevel
entrepreneurship. Such

a

cotnh, nation of approaches
not only allows one to
analyze both the actors
and resources

and

strategies involved in
the Policy-shaping

the decisive influence
the

and policy-set.
,„g phase, bn, also

Commission had on

the choices available
to the

assess

Member

States

during the “history-making”
decisions.

2.3.2 Two-level

Entrepreneurship

In a recent article,

Moravcsik (1999) makes a
valuable contribution

attempts of going beyond the
neofuncionalist-intergovemmentalist

Analyzing the

critical role the

Commission

is

theoy

that focuses

on

attentive to the

dynamics of state-socie.y

that “a

twolevel

relations, rather than a
theory

interstate bargaining
coordination problems, explains
the (intermittent

rare) variation in the
effectiveness

following section

is

of supranational entrepreneurship

in the

which Moravcsik argues have

is

to

Third a causal model

EC.” The

presented.

Second, a

set

of circumstances are given,

be present for supranational
entrepreneurs to exert
is

their

provided through which the influence
of supranational

entrepreneurs can be predicted.

Drawing on

and

structured into three subparts:
First Moravcsik’s
understanding of

supranational entrepreneurship

influence.

dichotomy.

capable of playing during
policyshaping

and policy-setting decisions,
Moravcsik (1999, 270) points out
bargaining

to the

the vast literature on entrepreneurship,
Moravcsik (1999, 217)

conceptualizes policy entrepreneurship
as an effort by supranational institutions
to
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“induce authoritative political
85
decisions that would
otherwise no, occur.”
The most
important way by which
supranational entrepreneurs
achieve such an influence
is through
persuasion, that

is

through the manipulation
of ideas and information.
According

to

Moravcsik, supranational
entrepreneurs are capable of
decisively influencing the
outcome

of multilateral negotiations
through persuasion, due

to their ability to
aggregate

and

represent latent domestic
interests. Aggregating
and representing latent
domestic
interests, gives the
supranational entrepreneur a
resource

the policy preferences of
the

outcome of the

Member

through which

i,

can influence

States and thereby decisively
influence the

multilateral negotiations.

This predicted causal influence
a twolevel

entrepreneur can have on
policy-shaping, policy-setting and
historymaking decisions
represented in Figure

Figure

(3):

is

(3).

Causal process of influence of Twolevel
Entrepreneurship

For additional references on policy entrepreneurs
see Cox and Jacobson 1973, Bums
i0nna and ShepsIe 1989 Nu ent 1995 Lewis
1984, Roberts and King 1991, Young
§

mco

’

>
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This power-resource
view implies that
twolevel entrepreneurship
effective

when

a supranational
entrepreneur

,s

hither

by credibly claiming

then

capab.e ofu,.li z i ng
infomiationaI and

ideational resources that
the principals of;a
negotiation,

have previously ignored
or would be likely

is

namely

the national

to ignore in the
process

to represent these
latent

governments

of decision-making.

domestic interests or by
working
i

towards manifesting these
interests can the two-level
entiepreneur indirectly
pressure

governments
a

move

in a

cenain policy direction.
The effect of such intervention

two, eve, entrepreneur can help

by having Widened the
scope of
effect,

such an intervention

overcome deadlock

decision-making process,

political interests represented
in the negotiation.

may work towards broadening

be par, of the win-se, of the
policy preferences of each
nutshell,

in the

is that

Moravcsik ,1999, 272) argues

the set of issues
considered to

Member

.ha, “the exploitation

by

State.

Thus,

in a

international officials of

asymmetrical control over scarce
information or ideas" provides
the twolevel
entrepreneur with a

window of opportunity by which

can "influence the outcomes
of

it

multilateral negotiation.”

According

to

Moravcsik (1999, 283), a two- level
entrepreneur can exert such an

influence over policy-shaping,
policjcsetting and history making
decisions due to the

occurrence of any one of the following
three kinds intrastate coor dination
problems:
organization, representation, and
aggregation failures of domestic interests.

assumption behind

this

view

is

The

a pluralist understanding of
domestic politics in which

domestic interests are presented to
government, which,

in turn,

aggregate and represent

those interests. Domestic and
transnational social interests remain
latent
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if

these interests

either fail

organize, get aggregated
or ge, represented.
In , his case> lhe

entrepreneur can overcome
these intrastate failures
and either organize,
aggregate or
lepiesent these interests.

The
to influence

interested

firs,

coordinate problenr

Member

States

is

tha, gives a

organizat.on failure.

and potentially powerful

twolevel entrepreneur the
oppotfun.ty
This hind of failure
arise when

social groups fail to
organize, leaving
domestic actors

and their governments
untfonned about desirable
international agreements.
Theories of
collective action suggest
tha,

groups to

ideitify

resolve disputes

The

i,

is

often costly for potentially
allied individuals and

one another, define

common

among heterogeneous

costs tend to be highest

where

interests,

political goals, coordinate
their activifies

and overcome incentives

to free ride

potential supporters are
geographically dispersed,

extremely numerous, substantially
heterogeneous, unaware of
potential substantive
gains,
or inconsistent with existing
institutions and cleavages.

The second coordination problem

when

arises

may

needed

to

aggregation failure. This kind
of failure

bureaucratic and parliamentary
procedures block the emergence
of coherent

national position out of
states

is

demands represented

to disparate parts

of the

state.

As

a whole,

possess the technical information,
experience, and interest group
contacts

promote cooperation, yet no single

set

of officials has access

to

them

all,

leaving national leaders unaware
of proposals they would othenvise
support. This

scenario most likely arises where
issues are unprecedented or
constitute a package deal

under the administratively fragmented
control of many

The
arises

when

third coordination

problem

is

ministries.

representation failures.

This kind of failure

biases in domestic governmental
institutions underrepresent social
groups

94

favoring cooperation.
This

opposed

si, nation is

to cooperation
traditionally

most hkeiy to occur when
concentrated groups

monopolize relations with
key domestic

bureaucracies and thereby
block consideration
of pohces that the
accept

if

informed or pressured by the

are likely to be disrupted
only

representation failure arises

by potential

retaliation

fill,

range of

g„ vemment migh(

Such

interests.

classic "iron triangles"

by strong pressure from
above and/or below.

when

national leaders are inhibited
from

form powerftt, domestic

interests but

A

variant

on

making proposals

would accept a proposal

tha,

permitted them to “scapegoat”
a supranational actor.

Concluding on the

effects

of these three

failures,

Moravcsik (1999, 284) points

out that the two-level
entrepreneurship "approach
suggests that a

opportunity" for supranational
officials opens

if [...] if there are
failures

representation, and aggregation."
In such situations, the
a two-level entrepreneur
rather effectively due
relatively small sized
organization, the

more

efficiently than a

its

of organization,

Commission can play

ability to ac,

on two aspects:

“Commission may manage

the role

of

First, as a

disparate issues far

domestic government” (Moravcsik,
1999, 284). Second, the lack

of direct democratic oversight
over supranational
interest

“window of

officials,

which insulates them from

group pressure and regulatory capture.
Together, these two aspects allow
ihe

Commission

to organize, aggregate

and represent domestic

interests

and thereby not only

influence policy-shaping, policy-selling
decisions but also critically influence
die

outcome of the history-making decisions
taken during

95

the multilateral negotiations.

2.3.3 Influence of the
Entrepreneur during
Decision-Making

According to Moravcsik
supranational entrepreneur
mobilization.

is

(

.999, 272), the causa,

mechanic of persuasion by

structured into three
stages: initiation,
mediation and

general, ihese three stages
parallel the stages

discussed in policy analysis
as well as confirmed
by Peterson
Peterson and
.uken, the

Bomberg

Commission

the

(1999).

During the phase

in

of decision-making
(

1

995a, ,995b, 200.) and

which policyshaping decisions
are

actively panic, pates in
the initiation of the
policy debate.

Here
launches a discussion by
highlighting problems,
advancing workable proposals,
and
underscoring potential material
benefits. During the
phase in which policysetting
decisions are taken, the

proposing

new

Commission intervenes

in

ongoing

interstate negotiations

options or compromises
with the goal of mediation

During the phase

in

by

among governments.

which the historymaking
decisions are taken, the
Commission

attempts to influence the
final vote taken by the
governments by mobilizing
domestic
social support for a
particular agreement.

While Moravcsik provides a
valuable contribution

making

in the

incomplete.

European Union,

The main aspect

this dissertation

that

is still

influence of the different actors
across
clearer understanding

what

all

missing

to the analysis

argues that his analysis

is

is still

an analysis of the activities and

stages of decision-making.

different resources

of decision-

Also lacking

is

a

and strategies the Commission
employs

at

each stage ol the decision-making
process.
This dissertation addresses these
concerns by focusing simultaneously
both on the
different set of actors across

strategies they employ.

On

all

stages of decision-making as well
as the resources and

the basis of the analysis of the
different stages of decision-
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i,

31 t,M

"

employment

.he result of a ratcheting
strategy by

ernrepreneur succeeded
interests within the

States

the Ttea, y of Amsterdam

which the European
Commission

in facilitating the

Member

title in

as a policy

gradual representation
of previously latent

and thereby

indirectly pressured the

Member

States to

endorse the Europe-wide
employment measures. The
concents over unemployment
in

Europe

at .ha, time,

gave the Commission

a position

of strength from which

it

was

able to

inlluence agenda-setting as
well as the preference
formation and thereby critically
influence the inclusion of the
particular

Two

title in

the

Amsterdam

resources of the Commission
were particularly crucial for

inlluence the

the

employment

outcome of the

Commission successfully

its

Treaty.

ability to

multilateral negotiations as
a twolevel entrepreneur:
utilized

its

Commission was capable of influencing

First,

formal role as agenda-setter.
Second, the
the preference formation
stage by exploiting the

recpetiveness of the Presidency of
the European Council.

During agenda-setting, the
Commission mainly did two things:

Commission

selected the issues to be considered
by the European Union.

outlined policy areas of common
concern. In the context of the
precisely this goal

was achieved with

Employment. White Paper was a
that politically

acceptable to

first,

paved the way

Member

States.

crucial

for the

As

White Paper and Opinions have

the

the

Here

employment

it

mainly

title,

White Book on Growth, Competitveness
and

document

for setting the

agenda

Europe-wide employment measures

for a debate

to

be

pointed out by Youri Devuyst, the
“Commission's

effectively helped to set the tone for

debates and, consequently, for the EU’s
adaptation process
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European Council

at this level.

[...]

For

example, the Delors
White Pacer
Paper of locn
1993 o
the ^
Comm.ssion had called
repeatedly for a
ordinated

Community

strategy

on employment .”*

The second thing , he
Commission did dunng agenda
-setting was

pohcy preferences of the
Member
cluslers around the

main

States

and amange them

issues concerned.

tHat

as the results

of this,
s

i,

of countries

fonnulated an

belonging

by the

this

initial draft

its

of elite interviews does

gaze

in fact indicate tha,
the

requirements:

support

cluster.

among

(after their access, on,.

to the

above favorable

Then

Here

i,

skfilfirlly

refined

in the

as well as

next step, the Commission

its

draft proposal

that

which did no, belong

meet two
were

to or adversely received

belonging to the favorable
then

cluster.

made

The

likely to find

to the favorable

Second, tactically ^emphasizes
those elements of the proposal

is

proposal

such a favorable cluster
did

emphasize those elements of the
proposal

latent interests in the
countries

diatt proposal that

can be

remaining countries namely
the countries that do no,
belong to the

cluster.

First,

be antithetical

that

favorable Custer.

and was represented by the
portions taken by Denmark
and Belgium

shifted

fonn

of the employment chapter,
the analysis ofprimaty
documents as well

Sweden and Austr.a

to

to identify a cluster

—

the basts

rePreSemed
In the case

exist

On

such a way as

initiative ultimately
desired

This allowed the
Commission

called the favorable
cluster.

in

to analyze the

Countries were grouped
by their degree of

predisposed favorability
towards the policy

Comm, ss, on.

co-

6

tha,

were

likely

by the governments of the countries
not

result

of this exerc.se was

public.

Devuyst (1998, 616).
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a refined version

of the

DUri "E ‘ he Preferen

of influence. Here,
Stares indirectly

i,

“

Commission exerted

predominant tned

,0 shape

tire

a critical degree

policy preferences of
rhe

by providing the receptive
Council Presidency,
especially the

Presidency, with a
synthesized compromise
solution for the
employment

compromise represented
countries .ha,

the

demanded

a poltcy

package

that

was acceptable both

Irish

This

title.

to the

Member

group of

stronger measures in the
area of employment
policy as well as

group of countries tat
demanded only modes, changes.
The cooperation with the

Irish

Presidency was

vital for the ability

of the Commission as an
exogenous force

to

influence the multilateral
negotiations. For instance,
the Irish Presidency
chose to adopt
as the

main

draft proposal

of the employment

Commission, and thereby rejected

The reason

for this choice

as being closer to

The

was

outright the proposal

that the

as a strong collective

employment

in the

commitment on

made by

by

the

the Council Secretanat.

Presidency perceived the
Commission's proposal

wha, the respective public

article relating to

the proposal submitted

title

in the

Member

States

would

find aeceptable.

Amsterdam Treaty should be seen by

the part of the

reduction of unemployment.
The Presidency

Member

felt .ha, this

States to

the public

work towards

message was

a

better achieved

with the proposal of the Commission
than with the proposal of the
Council.

During the

final stage, the interest
resolution stage, tile

focused on preserving the consensus
result

among

the

Member

Commission mainly

States.

Here, the accumulated

of all these policy movements provided
the Presidency of the Council
with an

assurance of unanimous support for
a finalized treaty proposal. With

Commission concluded
that the draft

of

this

this portion

process and

recommended

to the Presidency

of the treaty should be finalized
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this

assurance, the

of the Council

in preparation for a vote.

Tac, cooperation between
role in the final success

the

Co mmiss on and
,

of the Commission's

chapter, the fact that the

Commission was

the Presidency
„p

efforts.

„

^^

the ease of the

^

^

emp.oymen,

able to conn, on the
cooperation of the Dutch

Presidency does indicate that
both the Commission
as wel, as the Council
relied heavily
on each other in the final
stage of the decision-making
process. For instance,
after the

main

draft

of the employment chapter
was completed by the end
of 1996,

presidency kept the

this

government and thereby

item off

its

indicates

which actors were most

shows

of favorable countries.

the different stages of
decision-making, and

influential a,

which

although the Commission did no.
have a formal vote
treaty negotiations,

It

achieved

this

it

Dutch

agenda, until the British
election led to a change
of

fortified the cluster

Visually, figure (4) below,

the

stage.

It is

remarkable

to

in the final deliberations

note tha,

of the

nevertheless decisively influenced
the outcome of the
negotiations.

exogenous influence largely due

to the fact that

influenced agenda-setting and
preference formation.

Figure (4) The Actors in the Stages of
Decision-Making
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it

had a decisive

2.4.3.1

Strength of Two-Level
Entrepreneurship Model
Wh.le

qualities

,t

,s

the case that the
two-level entrepreneurship

mentioned

in interstate theories,
successful

conceptualized as resulting
from asymmetries

among

model draws on some

entrepreneurship

is

no,

the distribution of
infonnation and ideas

in

unitary states, but from
a superior ability to
coordinate and manipulate

information and ideas held by
domestic social groups and
government

Supranational entrepreneurs
intervene to overcome
biases

in the

transnational coordination
of information and ideas in
such a
interests that

represented.

would otherwise remain
underrepresented by

officials.

domestic and

way

that tmportan, latent

national leaders, then

become

Precisely from the capacity
to organtze, aggregate
or represent latent

domestic interests does the
Commission derive

its

ability to influence
policy-shaping,

policy-setting decisions as well
as the final decisions taken
governments during
multilateral negotiations.

This approach goes beyond
supply-side logic of neofunctionalism,
since
capable to explain

why Member

States might be willing

and interested

in

it

is

being

influenced by a two-level entrepreneur.
This approach also goes beyond
the limitation of
liberal

intergovernmental™, since

constraints

on

it

efficient negotiation as

relaxes the unitary state assumption
and treats the

imposed by

intrastate collective action failure.

Supranational actors wield influence due
to a superior ability to overcome
domestic and
transnational coordination problems.

This theoretical frame

is

used

to analyze the factors

and forces

that

have

contributed towards the inclusion of the
employment chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The

central claim developed in this dissertation

is

that a close

101

examination of the multi-

lateral neg0tiatiOnS
tha *

Amsterdam

employment chapter

reveal the fact that
the European

outcome.

due

CUlminated

this instance, the

to the fact tha,

i,

managed

Commission

Commission was successfu,
to

in the

significantly influenced
lhe

as a

two, eve, entrepeneur

success*,,, exp,oi, two
strengths. The

exploitation of the
dynamics of a multi-step
ratcheting process tha,

building up support

was

the support

among

the ,ate„t interests
within the

of the Presidency of the
Counci,,

combination of these two
allowed the Commission

firs,

aimed

States.

was

the

a, active,,

The second

,nsh Presidency

in the firs, half

in the

of 1997. The

to steer the relevant
policy debates as

well as to mobilize
transnational domestic
support for

2.4

Member

in particu.ar the

second half of 1996 as wel,
as the Dutch Presidency

this

Treat, of

its

policy preferences
whenever

was found necessary.

Summary
Tins chapter has provided an
overview of the bodies of research
that provide an

explanation for deadlock

been applied

in join, -decision

to the policy area

making arrangements. This
research has then

of social and employment
policy. Additionally,

this

chapter provided an overview
of two theories that outline the
factors and forces that
explain

how

deadlock

is

overcome. This review demonstrates

that integration theoty

and large conceptualizes the
decision-making process of policy-making

Union as

either driven predominately

Thus,

in

in the

by supranational actors or by national

European

actors.

order to better understand the
factors and forces which influenced
the

timing, the form and the content
of the Europe -wide
dissertation proposes to use a
theoretical frame

employment measures,

this

which combines elements from policy
102

by

analysis and two-leve,
entrepreneurship. ,n a nutshell,
the theoretical
frame developed

below points
itself,

to the

window of opportunity

that the

by acting as a twolevel
entrepreneur.

aggregates and represents
latent interests

Commission

In its role as a

in the

Member

of the

Member

States.

Through

Commission gradually and

a ratcheting

able

create for

twolevel entrepreneur

States

exerts sufficient pressure
onto the respective
governments

is

i,

and thereby indirectly

shape the policy preferences

mechanism described below,

the

indirectly influences the
issues to be placed onto
the agenda

of the European Union as
well as the choices avatlab.e
decision-selection.
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to the

Member

states

the final

CHAPTER 3

historical development of
community

COMPETENCES IN THE AREA OF SOCIAL

AND

EMPLOYMENT POLIYC: 1951-1980

As

discussed

in the

previous chapter, the development
of social and employment

policy on the level of the
European Union

characterized by two cleavages:
the question

is

of the appropriate level of
authority and the question of
the appropriate
used by the European

institutions.

A

legal

measures

detailed analysis of the historical
evolution of social

and employment policy on the
European Union

level demonstrates the

changing policy

capacity of the supranational
institutions as well as the changing
utilization of legal

measures.

The puipose of this chapter

as well as the following chapter

descriptive and analytical background
against

compared. This helps

employment chapter
overview

is

to contribute

that

is to

provide a

which the single case study can then be

towards a greater appreciation of the
novelty of the

was included

in the

Amsterdam

Treaty.

This historical

structured into four phases:
(1) 1951-1970 an early phase of social policy

limited to fostering the functioning of
the market, (2) 1971-1980 a phase of
optimism and

104

great zeal, (3) 1981-1990
a phase of stagnation,
and (4) 1991 to piesent
a phase of

mixed

87

,,

efforts.

The
1

95

1-

current chapter examines
the

firs,

980. Chapter four focuses
on the time period

1

examines die time period .99,
historical

to the present.

overview of the main
developments

social policy,

logical

on the Member

States’

98

to

1

flrs, par,

after the

and the European

of

Paris.

The

Programme

in

last part

integration, social policy
efforts

in the coal

and

level.

of this chapter gives a
the area

mandate

of

The second pan provides

is

Member

io participate in the

that

level

the

during the early phase of
European

Slates

efforts

were central

to

of creating a
to

common

making make policy

institutions

were given only

policymaking process. Thus,

liberal

be the theoretical model most
applicable as an

explanation for the particular policy
outcome.

As

predicted by liberal

7“

r Phases largely follow the
distinction as suggested by Gold
1993, Kowalsky
,5 9 ) and Vogel-Polsky 1991. Some
scholars have suggested three phases:
en mini (
9, 13ff), Schulte (1995), other scholars
differentiate merely two phases'
Kleinhenz (1986, 22) and Mosley (1990,
149). A common criticism of this
work is that
18
ldC C nd thCreby d0CS n0t Capture
important characteristics of
the evolution of social and
employment policy

n
(

Sr T

?

a

examines the development of
the

were subsumed under the

steel sector.

mtergovemmentalism appears

87

990, and chapter live

Second World War in

shaping and policysetting decisions,
while .he Community
legal

1

the time period from

1974.

The main conclusion of this
chapter

limned

is

pan analyzes developments
following

third

adoption of the Treaty of
Rome, while the
Social Action

The

1

that

overview of the main
agreements and documents on
the European

stalling with the Treaty

market

two phases,

!

on the European Union
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level.

a

intergovernmental jsm the
greatest relative influence
over the
large

3.1

made by

the different

governments involved

European and National Context

in the

final decisions

were by and

decision-making process.

of Social Policy

The economic experience of
the Second World
War

as well as the political
reality

during between 1919 and
1939 laid the comer stone
for the European
House and thereby
constituted a tremendous
influence over

its vis, on,

shape and

size.

As

the fitanie struggle

of Ihe war was over, and
amidst the widespread feeling
of relief and exhaustion,
there

was

also a

growing sense

that a significant

watershed

in

the histoty of the
continent had

been reached. The ending
of the war was viewed as
heralding the beginning
of a
in

which Europe could

According

start afresh

to these visionaries

i,

new

era

with a different political
and economic order.

would haw

to

be an order

in

which the

tired doctrines

of

nationalism, political sovereignty
and economic autarky upon
which the old system of the

continent had been built would
have to be exchanged with
political

some kind of European

union or federation that would
effectively achieve some level
of harmony among
88

the

European

nations.

However,

the

emergence of the Cold War subsequently
divided

two armed camps and decisively
separated them by what Churchill
curtainf If integration was to occur,

it

the continent into

called “the iron

would come as two separate developments:
one

in

88

™pre ed ^ actlvists of the Resistance movement against
Na^m^twf,
zism. Foi this argument see ?
for instance Urwin (1991, 7-12).
For a
t

general discussion

thc historical evolution

of the European Union among many see
Gillingham 1991, McAllister 1997, Pond
(1999).
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for instance

)

.he west influenced

by

Andean presence.

Under these circumstances

Ore other in the easi
under Soviei auspices.

the desire for peace

and stabihty was expressed
on

the

national level of the
European countries as well
as in the founding
treaties for the

European

integration.

On

the national level, rapid

relative class

economic growth, widely
popular regimes and

peace characterized the two
decades following the war.
During these years,

a postwar settlement
between the political panics in

and labor forged a new class
compromise
and

The

labor.

wage

gains,

state

At the same time, the

in

an era of unprecedented
growth

the

of the

state

persuaded organized labor to
moderate

wage

increases, stable prices

outcome of the

expanded considerably

by influencing the bargaining
process of both

of Keynesian macroeconomic
policies and

was

role

autonomy, and control of the
workplace

including automatic

state

ushered

representatives of capital

8

political stability. ’

.he realm of regulating the
market

and

that

power and

political

in

and

its

demands

capital

for substantial

exchange for substantial benefits

full

a consolidation

employment.

A

combination

and expansion of the welfare

and economic climate of

this

time.” As pointed

out by several scholars, this
arrangement allowed for the development
of nationally
differentiated welfare systems.”

Alber (1988, 451) provides a useful
definition of the

welfare state in the following description:

89

For

a discussion

of the post-war settlement see Bomstein
1984, Kesselman

1997, Streeck 1998.

(et al

90

Ruggie (1982, 1983, 1998) has

“embedded
91

A

also called this arrangement of

economic order

liberalism.”

differentiation of welfare state into three types
(liberal, social democratic

107

in

and

cL
0

h

^

n0my ““
ohSsZ seek:rpromote
chances

'

that

to

*

he

zr: r

ess or

ome

the security

distrZtion
and equality of citizens

o.der to foster
Unsocial integration of highly
mobilized
industrial societies.

Thus, the national development
of the welfare stale can be
seen as a deliberate
political

erven, ion into the functioning
of the market forces. This
conceptualization

well captured

-pohttcal

in

by Marshall (1975,

power

to supersede,

15)

when he

describes social policy as
the use of

supplement or modify operations
of the economic system

order to achieve results which
the economic system
would no, achieve on

(...)

in

doing so

is

In tins sense, the

is

its

own, and

guided by values other than those
determined by open market forces.”

decades following the war secured
and extended the realm of
social

citizenship.

for the European Union, Lange
(1992, 229-230) has proposed the
following
definition ofsocial policy as
containing “all those policies

member

states that provide or

to actual, potential or

corporatist)

is

would provide

former participants

[...] for

the

EC

and

rights, opportunities, benefits,

in the labor

its

or protections

market,”

provided by Esping- Andersen 1990.

92 „

bora simdar understanding ofsocial policy
see Briggs 1961, Leibfried, and Pierson
1992, Spicker 1995, Titmuss 1974, Goma
1996.

93

For a discussion of social citizenship rights
on the European
( 1993,
153-156) and Streeck 1996, 1997.

lolland

108

level see Feist

2001

W

Around 1950 most western
European
responsibility and a socia!
security system
the four basic risks

of

life:

countries had extended
their public

was

old age, illness,

in

place which protected
people agains,

unemployment

aind

disablement (exceptions

94
were Greece, Spain and
Portugal).

3.2

Development of European Social
Policy during 1951 - 1970
In contrast to this

integration

expansion of social citizenship,
the process of European

was mainly concerned with

contracts and free

eivil citizenship rights

movements of labor. As many

beginning the European Community
has been
than to correcting them.

in

scope and incoherent

In this

arrangement

the establishment of the

Thus

benefits.

the

Steel C bmmunity

it

more geared towards making
markets
communities' social dimension has

industrial goals

and has thus been both

in content.

was assumed

common

that the

economic prosperity

market would inevitably lead

main contributions of the founding

(EC SC) and

in

scholars have poinled out, from
the

In line with this effort, the

always been subordinated to
economic and

narrow

far

such the right to enter

the

treaties

to

resulting from

enhanced

social

of the European Coal and

European Economic Community (EEC) towards

goal ol enhancing well-being were
achieved through indirect measures:

it

the

was expected

94
rVie

° f tHe development of welfare states

Schmidt" 988

in

Europe see Flora 1986,

1

95

For

this

argument see Bouget 1998, Acker 1994, Genschel
1998, Harrop 1996
SChmid 1994, j0USSen 20()0 M ° Sley 1990, Scharpf 199

XtZ^r

’
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7,

Spicker

that

an increase

in .he

wealth of each

Member

State

economic arrangements created
on the European

men

would

level.

In

result

mm,

from the proper

each

Member States was

able to decide independently
through domestic policies
on the appropriateness of
the

redistribution

Affairs

of the economic wealth

between the years

1

973

to

1

*

who was

Shanks,

Director-General for Social

976, explained the rationale
for this approach in
the

following tenns: “The
underlying assumption behind
the Treaty was .ha,

remove
would

all artificial

in

optimum

obstacles to the free

movement of labour, goods and

rate

to this logic the

need

to write specific social
provisions into the

and employment policy was
concerned.

new competences

social

the

97

treaty

of

to the

Rome

and employment

European

j^For

emerging European

left

Member

States did no, see a

institutions.

far as

need

to

confer

Thus, while the treaty of Paris

both represent the foundation of
the legal frame of European
policy, they also demonstrate
the limited legal

of this assumption see Collins (1983,

x-x

in

unhampered. Hence as

mandate given

to

institutions.

a discussion

Quoted

capital, this

of economic growth, and thus
an optimum social system.””

Treaty was not evident. The
market would be best

and the

one could

time ensure the optimum
allocation of resources
throughout the Community, the

Thus according

social

if

Kenner (1995,

6).
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98),

Hervey (1998,

6),

Mazey

3.2.1 Treaty of Paris

The Treaty of Paris
stee,

(April 18, 1951)

Community (ECSC) came

institution, the

into force

High Authority, took up

committed the High Authority

which established the European
Coal and

on July 23, ,952. The
duties on

its

to the dual goal

August

firs,

10, 1952.

firs,

"

The

treaty basis

of promoting economic
prosperity as well

as contributing to an
increase in the standard of
living across Europe.

n,n through the treaty: The

Community

theme emphasizes

that the

Two

broad themes

achievement of a rational

productive system must be balanced
by the need to safeguard the
continuity of

employment. This
states that

common

the general

market

standard of living
the

documented

right at the beginning

one of the objectives of establishing
a

harmony with
of a

priority is

(...)

in the

common

economy of the Member
to

market

States

which

It

is

improvement

“to contribute, in

and through the establishment

is

to

rising

9 ''

States.”

The second major theme

in the treaty is that

promote improved working conditions and

towards an improvement of "the standard
of living for workers
tor

is

economic expansion, growth of
employment and a

Member

aim of the Community

of the Treaty. Article 2

responsible, so as to

make

in

to

work

each of the industries

possible their harmonization while
the

00
is

being maintained.”'

The terms High Authority and European
Commission
Tieaty Establishing the European Economic

are used interchangeably.

Community

Article 3e of the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel

Community

The High Authority was
given

the task of accomplishing
these goals specifically

through the following
provisions:
•

studies and consultations

facilitate the

redeployment of workers
made

redundant by market
development or technical change
and to assess the
possibilities for

improving workers’ living
standards and working

conditions (Articles 46-48).
pi

omoting research

into occupational safety
(Article 55)

guaranteeing adequate wages
for workers

in the

Community

industries

(Article 68)

establishing free

movement of workers

whilst safeguarding their

entitlement to social security
(Article 49).

Thus, with the signature of the
Treaty of Paris, the Community
became
responsible for contributing to
economic expansion, to the development
of employment

and the improvement of the standard
of living

in participating countries,
for establishing

conditions suitable for the rational
distribution of production, high
productivity,

safeguarding the continuity of
employment and avoiding serious disturbances

economies of the Member

States.

Therefore, the treaty provided the
foundation for the

beginning of a system of controlled
competition

community was seen

to

new

coal and steel industries

in

which the welfare of the general

be enhanced by the larger market as
well as the subsequent

increase in efficiency of production.

helped to adjust to the

in the

In this system, individual producers

would be

circumstances and the interests of individual
workers

would be safeguarded

in various

ways.

in the

1

Nevertheless, as

many

the meaty

was

which the

treaty aspired to.

to

enable

scholars have pointed
out, one of the major
weakness of

the lack of specific
procedures for the
implementation of the goals
to

For instance no instructions
were given

to contribute d.rectly
to a r.sing standard

,,

end working conditions.
Thus, these goals

to

large

to

which these goals were transformed

measure on the willingness of
the

powers

to

pursue such ends with

governments

institutions

16), “the

responsible,

3.2.1

.

namely

States in the

rematn

depended

to a

the willingness of national

of the Community. As pointed
out by
that, in

so far as definite action

is

a great deal to those agents
traditionally

national governments and the
industries themselves.”

Community

One example

left

hving

of the Community to use
their general

conclusion must therefore be

necessary to pursue such aims,
the treaty

better

of specific polices.

into concrete policies

rea, interest as much as on

to cooperate with the
institutions

Collms (1975,

a concrete basis

High Authority

promote

some degree were expected

merely asp, rations rather than
serve the iunct.on as

The degree

of living or

to the

Efforts against

in

Unemployment

which the Community indeed

development of

social policy can be

tried to cooperate

found

system of protection against unemployment.
However,

in the efforts

this

of developing a

example also

interlocking relationship between the
High Authority and the

Member

with the

Member

illustrates the

States: the

scope

of activity for the High Authority as well
as the prospect of success of the
agreed upon
project to a large degree depended on the
willingness of the

with the

Community

institution.

Member

States to cooperate

Thus, the involvement of the High Authority in

this

policy area entirely was guided
by the willingness and
interest of the

Member

States to

cooperate.

The
were raised

effort

of addressing unemployment
can be seen as

at that

time about the possible
consequences of the

a response to

common

concerns that

market.

One of

the concerns raised by the
enactment of the Treaty of Paris
related to the question of

whether employment prospects would
be improved or limited by the
establishment of

common
mines

in

market for

steel

and

coal.

In particular

i,

Belgium and France would be
compelled

was
to

a

anticipated that high-cost coal

reduce their labor force or

in

the

worst possible outcome might even
be forced to cease production
altogether. This fear

was based on
the

the realization that Belgian and
French average pithead prices were
twice

amount of those charged

the introduction of the

in

common

West Gennany. Any major readaptation
market was thus expected to have

Belgium and France. Studies of comparative
costs suggested
workers would have to become redundant

in

that

to

resulting from

be shouldered by

perhaps 30 thousand

Belgium, and about 50 thousand

in

101

France.

With regard
precise and detailed.

means

specified

to

problems of unemployment the provisions of the

These provisions are

which should be used

harmonization of the conditions of

life.

to

in fact in contrast to the

treaty

were quite

vagueness of the

improve the standard of living or the

The

treaty clearly accepted that “the impact of

such adjustments should not be borne by the workers
and their cost should be jointly
financed.

Specifically Article 23 of the Treaty of Paris provided the

101

For these estimates see Zawadzki (1953, 165).

High Authority

With the possibility for
certain actions

of the

common

was allowed

if

firms were

damaged

as a result of the
completion

market. At the requests
of governments concerned,
the High Authority

to grant aid

from the social

fttnd

towards the creation of new
jobs for

redundant workers. Additional
forms of grant aid were avatlable
to
the

provisos of Ante, e

56.

These workers had

contract for a, leas one year
and

who had

to

to

ECSC

workers under

have been covered by an
opemended

be concerned by one of the
following four

standard situations: (I) early
retirement (pre-retirement
pensions, severance pay,

allowances equivalent to benefits

in kind,

pre -retirement al.owances,
,2)

unemployment

(tideover allowances, severance
pay allowances to benefits in kind),
(3) internal

redeployment (compensating allowances
for

loss

of pay, mobility allowance),
and

(4)

external redeployment
(compensating allowances for loss of
pay, mobility allowance.

mobility allowances, severance
pay, allowances equivalent to
benefits

2

in kind).'"

Applications for readaptation aid
under the provisions of the treaty,
however,

made

a

slow

start.

It

was

not until

March 1954

that the

decision to contribute towards a
readaption scheme.
first

scheme an application from

the French

find other types

102

of work

in this region.

The

to

work

project

its first

The High Authonty accepted

government

of five thousand miners from the
Centre-Midi

High Authority took

to

as

its

provide aid for the relocation

in the coal fields

was conceived

'

of Lorraine or to

as a three year-project

Ar-MAdditionally
similar provisions were written into Article
58: This provision allowed
the High Authonty to exceptionally
grant special production quotas to fimis might
be in
danger of having to lay off workers.
103

The following account

is

largely based

on Collins (1975,

115

40).

between the C„„„nu„i ty
and

the

French government. Even
though the project was

carefuNy prepared by
conducting numerous stud.es
and examinations of the
possibie

employment

situation

•o be a failure.

Lorraine, the

While the

firs,

outcome of the project was
common, y considered

departures of miners took
p,ace in

May of

1054, by ,960
only 600 on, of the 5,000
miners scheduled to be
transferred had actually
relocated.

The reasons

for this failure

project provided the

were considered

High Authority with

to

be complex. Nevertheless,
the

the important lesson that

schemes

jobs on the spot are inherently
more promising than projects
which aim
relocations of the

work

force.

unemployment suggested
the

The

the

reluctance of the miners to
leave, even

High Authority the need

importance of job creation. Thus,
the

die scope

of the High Authority's

at

new approach

activities.

to provide

massive
a, the price

of

to refocus its priorities
to reflect

implied a definite broadening
of

Whilst the Treaty of Paris gave

it

only

limited opportunity to help
in job creation, the realization
of the need for massive

redevelopment of the regions of heavy
industry created the basis on
which the High
Autho.ity could place

its

political

claim for expanding

its

scope of activities.

Nevertheless, this claim would only
be politically relevant as far as
inteiested in

drawing on the resources of the Community.
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This represents 294 million dollars

at that time.

Member

States were

3. 2. 1.2

Implications on Decision-Making

It

Member
whhrn

can be concluded that
the
Pn,-;
a a
6 Treatv
lreat y nf
of Pans
did not supersede the
role of the
Sra.es in the promotion
of

the domesrie field.

Homan we, fare. The wei hr
of res P o„s, bll i,
8

y sri,, ,a y
While, .he High A.„hori,
y was given .he legal bas.s to make
a

small, bo, definite,
eon.ribofion through the
help
aid 10 impr0ve hea " h

“d

of.be agreed upon projects

i.

gave

in

readapta.ion programs and

-er.be, ess, both
critically

depended on ,he

the scope

willing

of

,|

,.s

and .he success

K

Member

S.a.es

to cooperate.

Along the same
consult, to study

and

lines,

i,

can be pointed oo,

to publish results

organizations to use the material.

.ha, the right

was dependent upon

The dependence

of ,he High Authority

the willingness of other

for action

on

Member

States

and other

organizations suggests that a
function of the High Authority
was to act in an indirect

manner, being supporiive of the
work of

Member

States

and other

social institutions,

rather than adopting a primary
role.

Thus, the dynamics of policy-shaping
and policy-setting decisions

phase of policy development was
clearly dominated by the

Member

in this early

States.

Given

observation, one can conclude that
liberal intergovemmentalism
appears to be the
theoretical

model most applicable as an explanation

provisions included in the Treaty
of Paris.

for the particular social policy

this

3.2.2 Treaty of

When

Rome

the Treaty establishing
the European

Republic of Germany,

italy,

Luxembourg an,

Economic Community (EEC)
was

the Netherlands

- in

effect

committed

themselves most importantly
to the creation of
an economic union. The
assumption
behind the Treaty was tha,
the removal ofobstac.es
to the free

movement odabor, goods,

services and capital,

wh,ch

in turn,

would inexorably

wotdd

disadvantaged.

throughout the

a„ socio-economic groups
and therefore benefit the
socially

uplift

Thus, Article 2

Community

commuous and

lead to higher growth
and rising living standards

a

EEC

proclaimed the Community's
task "to promote

harmonious development of
economic

balanced expansion, an increased

standard of living and closer
relations between
In ibis treaty sixteen

of the 248

a, tides

its

activities, a

stability,

and accelerated

Member

States."

were

raising

of the

explicitly devoted to social
policy.

These provisions spread over
two groups of articles: one
relating to the free
movement of

workcis (At Ildus 48
(Articles

1

17 to 128).

lo 51)

and the other concerning
general elements of social policy

The emphasis

in the firs,

group of articles was on the “abolition
of

any discrimination based on
nationality between workers
of the

employment, remuneration and other
working conditions”
group ol Articles
t

ommumty

The

is

40

(Article 48).

specifies that the institutional

States as regards

Notable

mechanism

in this

for

decisions were based on the normal
mechanisms which involve a

treaty

of

Rome was

eX cIS
U

that Article

Member

preceded by the Treaty of Paris creating
the Coal and Steal
A|S0 S 8,Kd in 11,57
European Atomic
'

I

18

c

bmmission proposal, consultation
of the European

Social

Committee and,

lastly a decision

Parliaament

by the Council

in the

and the Economic and

form of regulation or

directive.

Among

the

a, tides in

the second group.
Article

1

17 of the treaty

demands “an

accelerated raising of the
standard of living" and an
“improvement" and “harmonization

..Hiving and working conditions."
Article
receive equal pay for equal

common

social security

work” and

1

19 prescribed that

Article

1

2

1

was concerned with implementing

measures for migrant workers.
Articles 123-128

arrangements for operating the
European Social Fund. The
the

“men and women should

employment and re-employment of
workers

occupational mobility within the

EEC

ESF was

set out specific

intended to

easier and to encourage
geographical and

by providing assistance with the
cost of vocational

retraining and resettlement
allowances.'"'' Notable in this
group of articles

is

118 required the Commission to
merely promote “close cooperation
between
states in the field

,

of occupational accidents and diseases,
occupational

At most

it

development of social and employment policy
was severely

was

able to

make

studies, deliver opinions,

106

For

this

member

by delivering opinions and arranging
consultations.” Thus the Commission’s

ability to influence the

limited.

that Article

of employment, labour law, and working
conditions, vocational

training, social security,
prevention

hygiene

make

argument see Sutter 1997, Hantrais 1995.

and arrange consultations.

3.2.2.1

Factors influencing the
Social Policy Measures
The

fact that social
policy

was

to

be included in the
original

trealy, can be
ed by two lactois. (I)
the pohey recommendation
of the influential Spaak

P

imiltec and (2) the policy
preferences of French
government. Together these
two
factors influeired the
policyshaping and policysetting
deetsions and thus the

theoretical

predictions

made by

liberal

intergovernmental™

best exp, an, the

outcome of the

decision-making process.

3. 2.2.1. 1

The Spaak Committee

As

to the influence

"llreoretical inspiration

of the Spaak Committee,
Barnard (1996) has pointed
on,

which

led the

founding fathers to draw a

map of social

that

rights

within the borders of economic
efficiency was provided by
the Spaak Report of
1956.

This Report was

made on

Spaak Committee

that

April 21, 1956 and

was established

at the

was

the

outcome of deliberations

Messina conference

in

six

Member

Socahst
States

EEC

987^84

and an expert group of the ILO
and thereby was

^

107

see Kdsters

member of

a

The Committee comprised of the
Foreign Minister of the

party.

of the

in the

June 1955 under the

chairmanship of M. Paul Henri
Spaak, then Belgian Foreign
Minister and
the Belgian

IW

For a similar

“*«t of

the role of the

Committee

).

108

C

omite Jntergouvememental cree par la
Conference de Messine, 1956.
us provided m Camps
1956. The quotes from

the report

the report are taken

A summary of

fro™

960 297 ‘ 458)
of the historical events leading
lowaids
io^flMhetrtn''
the setting up tins committee see
Haas 1958, Robertson 1959, Zurcher 1958.
0

^,','

'

'

120

characterized by
leport

he

its

intergovernmental working
methods,

09

While the main tenets of
the
were based on the conclusions
of the report provided
by the group of experts
from

ILO, ultimately, the
policy-shaping and policysetting
decisions were taken by
the
'

Member

States.

'°

The High Authority

did not play a crucial
role in the decision-making

process.

The group of experts from
policy law

basis

was not necessary

ILO concluded

the

to achieve integration.

of an analysis of labor costs"

that

major interventions

in social

This conclusion was reached
on the

1

The arguments

put forward in the repotl
of the

experts differentiated between
the general level of labor
costs and the differences

between the

inter-industrial pattern of labor
cost.

labor costs, the report finds
that differences in

differences in productivity. Thus,
the report

European standards

for such labor costs.

authority should be given to the
costs.

This kind of cost was

left to

wages and

saw no need

Hence,

Community

With regard

of

social costs broadly reflect

for intervention to create

in this area

level to

to the general level

it

recommended

harmonize the general

that

level

no
of labor

the market forces.

109

The group
a

of experts from the

Pr° f

'

ILO was composed of Prof. Maurice Bye Prof.
R
Meinh °' d Prof Bertil 0hlin P '° P p asquale
Sarceno, Prof.
’

Ve rdoom.

'

Petrus

>

10

1

pubHshed its fmdin 8s 111 the following report:
International
TbllrO?
Labour
Office 1956. The main points of this
report are also summarized in the following
article: International Labour Review
(1956, 99-123).
I

11

For an analysis of the arguments presented
here see Nielsen and Szyszczak
7), Barnard (2000, 2).

121

(
v

1997

’

w„h
presented.

regard to the inter-industrial
patten, of labor cost, a
different argument

Here

the

group of experts argue

Community measures

to intervene with the

subject to exceptions,
ly low

wages or

unfair competitive advantage.
the

Thus

is

that there is indeed
justification for

market forces. Since panieular
industries are

social costs, ,1ns

wage

pattern piaees

the report of the group
of experts

C ommunity should adopt
minimalist measures of
intervention

them

a,

recommends

an

that

in particular in the

following areas: wages, methods
of financing social security,
working time and overtime

premium

rates.

Yet,

i,

recommendation about

The

should be noted that the group
of experts

make no

the legal tool best used to
bring about these treasures.

sections of the Spaak report

which

dealt with social provisions,
heavily

on the conclusion of the report
of the experts. Along the

line

drew

of recommending

minimalist measures of intervention,
the Spaak report also envisioned
a “gradual

coalescence of social policies” as one
of the key factors necessary to
provide the

common

"
market with

a firm foundation.

was intended

to achieve

The Report approaches
It

The gradual assimilation of soeial and

two purposes:

competition and second was to

caution.

'

the first

was

facilitate the free

the

problem of

to

remove

distortions

movement of labor

distortions

labor legislation

in a

from

common

market.

from competition with great

points out that legislative and administrative
measures other than those of an

openly discriminatory kind and those openly
supporting certain industries or enterprises,

may

in fact falsify “the conditions

of competition between national economies as
a whole

Quote from Kahn- Freud (1960, 299).

122

or certain of their
branches..oust be taken

In

correct or e„

hne with

m i„a,e the

disadvantage certain branches
of acivtty.

mentioned working conditions
of

this puipose, the
report

effect

suggtsted that action

of specific distorts
which advantage or

Among

the factors

iabor, such as the
relation

of dtstortion, the repod

between the wages of men

and women, the systems
of working time, overtime
and paid holidays. The
Repon

conceded

that:

“even

if the

existing disparities did
not cause distortions,

necessary for the governments
to

make

a special

would be

effon to hannonize
progressively the

existing systems with regard
to: the principle of
equality of

length of the nonnal working

i,

men and women's

week beyond which working time

is

wages, the

payable and the rates

4
of overtime pay, and the length
of paid vacations.”"

With the regard

to the free

movement of labor,

aims of the Community must
be the
also

free circulation no, only

of the “factors of production
themselves,

report goes

on

to point out that this goal

complex technical
conducive

criteria, but instead

to the free

in

14

The

by seeking general economic
conditions which are
conditions are identified as

economic

activity in

underdeveloped

of legal framework which allows workers

any country of the Community, and

to

apply for

third, the prohibition

ibid at 299.

1

5

could best be achieved not by
developing

particularly relevant: First, the
development of

employment

of goods and services, bu,

of capital and of men.”"

that is

movement of workers. Three

areas, second, the creation

the report specifies that
one of the

_

Quote from Barnard (1996, 323).
115

see Kahn-Freud (1960, 298-299).
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of wage

discrimination

among

nationals and immigration
workers.

fulfillment of these three
conditions

were expected

The synergetic

enhance the

to

free

effect of the

moment of

workers.

The

repori concludes that the
active harmonizing of
social policy should
only be

conducted where these

efforis either

achteved the avoidance of
dtstorttons to competition

or facilitated the removal
of obstacles to the migration
of labor.
,hat ’

“

equalizati0n

common

market,

s°

-

is,

The

report points out

from being a condition
precedent of the operation
of the

on the contraiy,

its

result.

Hence

it is

useless to fry

somehow

modify by decree the fundamental
conditions of an economy which
anse from
resources,

its

commonly

common

level

of productivity, the significance
of public burdens. Part of
what

itself,

of the economic forces which

between those interested
policy legislation

merely

which

to

was seen

leads.”"'’

as an unnecessary

and any proposed

facilitating the

it

On

it

releases,

the basis of this understanding,
social

component of the goal of European

legislation in that field should
be minimalist in character,

smooth functioning of the market forces." 7

Quote from Kahn- Freud

f
For

the

is

and of the contacts

M6 _
117

natural

called harmonization can
therefore only be the result
of the frmc.ioning of the

market

integration

its

to

same

(

1960, 300).

analysis of the Spaak Report see Barnard
and Deakin 1996.
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3.2.2.12

The French Government

As

a result of this theoretical
framework, the French
government

was able

argue successfully that an
economic union without the
introduction of social policy

would lead
„

n eres,

a dis,onion of market
forces which

„

wotdd he

the detriment the

economic

118

of France.

Given the

and therefore equal pay

for

fact that the

men and women,

French constitution guarantees
equal rights
not having a social agenda
was feared as

putting France at a
competitive dtsadvantage relative
to the other

Member

States.

As

pointed ou, by Barnard
(1996, 324), -consequently,
France argued that an elimination
of
gross distortions of competition
was not enough, and that
assimilate the entire labour and
social legislation of the
parity of

wages and

minimum

level

social costs.”

of governmental interference

Correspondingly, the

wage

differentials

be regulated by

However, Germany

were a

EEC

law.

result

would be necessary

Member

a. that

in the area

German government countered

it

to

States, so as to achieve
a

time was committed

a

of wages and paces.

the French case

by arguing

that

of the operation of market forces
and should not therefore

A “compromise”

solution

was eventually reached whereby

Treaty included a short section on
social policy but did not stipulate

how most

the

of these

provisions should be implemented.

Thus, in the early social policy provisions
the

outcome of the

efforts

of the Member

States.

in the

Treaty of

Rome

can be seen as

The Spaak Committee was

the

forum

118

oi a

discussion of the French position

at that

time see Joussen (2000, 192).

119
(

(1982, 53),
,

Meehan

^

0f
S com romise see blisters
P
( 1 982, 375), Masberg and Pintz
(1993, 67), Streeck (1994, 153).
,
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in

which the Member States
both expressed
shape the

final

outcome of the

report

their interests

which provided

and used

their preferences

the basis for the Treaty
of

Rome.

Additionally, the French
de.egahon was successful to
argue in favor of social
provisions

on equal pay among men and
women. The
tamer limited. As a
to

ve* young

role

of the High Authority

a, that

time was

institution hardly participated
in the decisions
pertaining

agenda-setting and policy-setting.

3.2.2. 1 .3

Reaction of the Commission

The European Commission
ways:

first,

by broadening the

applying Article 118.

Commission was

In the

to interpret

report issued in 1959, the

interpretation

outcome

the

the legal provisions of Article

in

the Treaty of

Rome

in

two

of Article 117, and second by
systematically

wake of the Treaty of Rome,

Commission

provide for “the equalization
of labor” not to

interpreted the

clarified that

1

one had

first

strategy of the

17 in a broader frame.

to read Article

1

In a

17 to

an upward direction of the living
and working conditions

“imply a leveling on

a theoretical average standard
of living, as this

would, lor example force those countries
with the most advanced economic
and social

development

to hold

up their social evolution

till

less fortunate countries

have managed

120

to catch up.

Instead, Article

1

17

had

to be read as

program which asked

the

supranational institutions to promote social
progress for the peoples of the Community.

Hence, the automatism of the

Common

Market was permitted

to

have a

free play as long

120
SSi ° n

nofn°Tn?i
(1960,302).

° f the Eur°P ean Economic Community, 1959b,
quoted

126

in

Kahn- Freud

as

i.

produces an e ua,i Za tl „„
q
of working conditions

leads to a deterioration
in the conditions of
the

community

action

Affairs group,

summarized by

is

when he mentions

although the function,
„g of the
progress,

it

Petrilli

in

more advanced members.
This need

that “the signatories

Common

the Treaty thus considered
that

Market was a necessary condition
of social

could not be a sufficient
condition for such progress.

which are

essential to the proper
functioning

pomted ou, by Kahn- Freud
(1960,
.0 interpret Article

(...)

of the

are

In fact, the

two complementary

Common

Market." Thus, as

303), given this deliberate attempt

17 as broadly as possible
this “penrrits

I

for

(1959, <>7), the Chairman of
the Social

approximation for social as much
as for economic ends
factors

an upward direction.
Corrective

by the Commission

and indeed demands

conscious action not only to
promote migration and to remove
distortions of competition,
but also to

beyond

promote

that

social progress,

envisaged

The second

in the

[

and thus

this] constitutes a

program which goes

Spaak Report.”

strategy of the

Commission was

to extensively

use

all

provided by Article 118. Most importantly,
the Commission has used the
its

activity

the possibilities

article to

on several objectives: streamlining and
harmonizing labor market

focus

statistics

and systems of reporting, and disseminating
as widely as possible studies on
employment-related topics, such as the

free

movement of

labor, vocational training, equal

pay, and occupational hazards. For instance,
as early as 1959, the Commission
facilitated

meetings between the

market experts

in

DG

for Social Affairs, the Statistical
Service

order to study employment patterns in the

and national labor

Member

States.

After a

meeting which was held on January 7th and g h
1959, the Commission summarized the

127

conclusion by pointing out
that the
out in two stages.

The

first

employment during recent
s.Uumon with

nil

experts approved [...a]
project that

would consist of a thorough
analysis of the trend

years,

which would make

it

in

and to place

The purpose of the second

main trends of employment,
and

carried

possible to analyze the
present

the precision of which
the available statistics
allow

against the background of
recent developnrents.
to hi ing out the

would be

par,

i,

would be

as far as possible, to
forecast the future
c

situation.’

3.2.3 Implications

on Decision-Making

h should be noted

that the legal basis for the

development of soeial provisions

dependent on unanimity as well as
on a generous interpretation of
Articles 100 and 235
Article 100 lit

provides for the approximation
of laws

agrees on the matter by an
unanimous vote.
directives

121

may

On

if the

Council of Ministers

the basis of this legal provision
only

be issued and they must be “directly
effect the establishment or

r

Commissiou of the European Community
(1959a, 32). Additionally in this context
one should point out that the most important
initiative to be mentioned is the
setting-up of
ie Eui opean Employment
Observatory much later in the development
of the European
Union. This institution brings together
and links with the Commission several
networks
indeP endentl y collect and disseminate
information pertaining to employment
statistics, hoi a documentation
on the Observatory see OJ C328, 30 12 1989
The
following networks are brought together by
the Observatory: Mutual Information
System
on Employment Policy (M1SEP) which

comprises representatives of the national
administration and of the Commission, Network
of Employment Coordinators (NEC)

w nch comprises national officials, and the Employment
Monitoring System (SYSDEM)
which consists ol national experts in the area
of labor market and employment. With the
information from the Observatory, the
Commission frequently publishes reports on

employment

forecasts for each sector.
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functioning of the

Common

Market." Article 235

EEC

specifies that the following
three

conditions must be me, in
order to nigger this area
of legislative competence:
There must
be (I) a need for Community
action, ,2) in order to
obtain one of the objectives

of the

Treaty

in the

course of the

necessary powers.

Common

Market

Again, Article 235

,3) to

which the Treaty has no,
provided the

subject to unanimous voting.

is

Quite obviously, the treaty
basis confines the
development of social policy
these areas in

take action.

free

and

which

all

In the early

movement of labor,

women and

try to

a

Member

States agree

that the

Community should

decades of the Community, the
areas included were mainly
the
social security

few programs of

measures for migrant workers, equal
pay

for

men

132

the Social Fund.

use the limited treaty basis as

coordinating efforts

unanimously

to

among Member

much

as possible,

States,

Although, the Commission would
its

influence

was

limited to

conducting studies and disseminating

information.

The process of decision-making

that lead to Treaty

dominated by the actions of the Member

Committee
the final

as well as the French

liberal

Both the influence of the Spaak

government on the policy-shaping, polic^setting
and

outcome of the Treaty of Rome

suggested by

States.

of Rome was clearly

are best predicted

by the

theoretical frame

intergovemmentalism.

122

C

1

Comici! Resolutions OJ C2/1980, OJ C62/1982 as
amended OJ C18/1983 and OJ
amended OJ C 33/1984.

28/ 1 982 as

1

129

3.3

Development of European
Social Policy during
1971-1980
Many

scholars have

limited progress:

poimed ou ,

development of Europe-wide

employment policy was achieved.
widen

its

^

scope of integration were

governments were reluctant
the

that (he

European Community as

to

a

E fforts

politically

l0

„ 7|

penod Qf

|9(j0

policies in the area

^

a per]od Qf

of social and

deepen , he European
Community a „d

margined

develop such measures

.

in this

period as national

Analyzing the development
of

whole, Middlemas
(1995, considers the years 1973

1983 as “the stagnant decade.”

3.3.1 Social

The

Action Programme of 1974

first

major attempt

area of social policy

initiative

was

to

expand the scope of Community’s
competences

the Social Action

Programme of

1974.

On

the basis

from the European Commission,
the heads of governments
issued

communique

at the

in the

of an

a

,972 Parts summit which asserted
that as much importance
was

to

be

attached to “vigorous action in
the social field as to the
achievement of the economic and

monetary union

management

[...] it is

in the

economic and

asked the Commission

123

essential to ensure the increased
involvement of labour

to

social decisions

draw up an

action

of the Community.”'

programme by

I

in Nielsen

V

taa'leul)

24

The Council

January, 1974 "providing

For instance see Berie (1993,
56) Kreile 1989, and Schneider (1992,

Quoted

and

18).

and Szyszczak (1997, 25). For a discussion
of the relevance of the
TOnt
S ° C ai aCtion
P r0 8rarame see Bottcher(l990,
'

149),

(199 (U3)
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lor concrete

measures and the necpscan,
necessary rco
resources, particularly

in the

framework of the

Social Fund.”

In line with this

mandate the Co, omission
adopted

Action Programme on April
for the

Promotion of

full

18,

and

,973.“ The document

better

a draft proposal for
a Social

contained a senes of
suggestions

employment, the amelioration
of working conditions

and of living conditions and
the assurance of

the pan, c, pa, ion of
the social

panners

and economtc decision taken
within the Community.
Quite boldly the document
announces that the “Social
Action Programme is regarded
by the Commission as the
social

basis for a

Community

implementation of the

social policy

firs,

[...].

wha,

...

to all

Member

involved, in fact,

phase of European Social Union."

Union, was seen to arise
primarily on, of the

“common

is

fact that

States" were “best solved

is

the

'

“

The need

for such a

those problems which
were

on a Community

basis rather than in

127

Thus
responsibilities

efficient

the

Commission's strategy was

argue that the limited transfer
of

and functions previously held by
Member

way of solving of the

sense, the

to

current

economic and

main argument employed by

activity as an “added- value”
to

the

Member

Ibid,

paragraph 9

would allow

problems

1973.

4.

(a), p. 6.
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in

to present

States' efforts to address the

Commission of the European Communities,
paragraph

social

Commission was

unemployment.

Ibid,

States

for a

Europe, In

Community

problem of

more
this

The Commissions’ proposal
was formally submitted
1

to the

Council on October

28

25. 1973.

The Council of Ministers
adopted

overall, this

primarily

programme

identified

some 40

this

proposal on 21 January
1974.

priority

three areas: the attainment
of full

and

measures and provtded for
action

better

employment; the improvement

and upward harmonization
of living and working
conditions; the increased
involvement
of

management and

workers

in the

competence

labor in

economic and

organization of their firms.

in the

area of social policy

social decisions

of the Community and of

The Council’s view of Community

a, that

time was presented

in cautious terms,

foreshadowing the concept of
subsidarity:

[The

Council] Considers that the
Community social policy has an
individual role to play and
should make an essential
contribution to
achieving of the aforementioned
objectives

Community measures

by means of

or the definition by the

Community of

objectives for national social
policies, without however
seeking a
standard solution to all social
problems or attempting to transfer
to

Community

level

any responsibilities which are
assumed more

effectively at other levels.

The

resolution from the Council of
Ministers ‘concerning a social action

programme’ noted

should result

in

that

economic expansion was not

an improvement of the quality of

This was clearly a reaction to the

“oil crises”

to

life.

be seen as an end

'

This sentiment represents a

of 1973-1979.

Official Journal of the

European Communities, (1974,

Official Journal of the

European Communities, 1974, Cl 3/1.
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in itself, but

C

13/1, 2).

new

consensus on the need for
working towards the
development of a more
comprehensive

EC

social policy.

3.3.1.1

Factors influencing the Social
Action Programme
Three developments most
crucially contributed

to this

new consensus and

subsequently tc the development
of the Social Action Programme.

Of the

first oil

price shock, as profits
soared and full

dtfficult to attain, the

Community and

opened the window of opportunity

the

'

Firs,, in the

in

Second, key

Community needed
European

as a goal appeared

the

to address the old debate

and social regulation.'

Europe was

on the balance between

a

‘human

integration.

There was a wide-spread
consensus that

in a crisis.

political individuals in the

European integration
development

face’ to solicit

Member

more

States arguedthat the

political support

European

of the trade unions

Especially Willy Brandt, then Chancellor
of

West Germany

will

will only be socially

and

politically acceptable if

economic

be accompanied by an active programme
of social reform.

131

discussion ot the factors leading to the
development of the Social Action
see Mazey, 1989.

Programme
132

n
For

this

more

governments of the Member States
which

and Stcco Mansholt, who was President
of the European Commission, both
argued

01 a

wake

32

laissez-faire

economic model

for the

3

economic model became increasingly
questioned. This created

pressure on the European

economic

employment

'

argument see Lodge (1978, 120) and Shanks 1977.
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that

Third, the Social Action
leaction of the European

Programme can be seen

Commission

monetary union. After the
summit

in

to early efforts

as a politically
well-crafted

of creating an economic
and

The Hague had authorized
Luxembourg's Prune

Minister Pierre Wenter to
write a report on monetary
union, the Commission
used the

new momentum
debate the

in the

call for the

17, 1971 the

economic realm of European

development of

Commission

issued a

social policy

to

“Now

that the

economic and monetary union,

documents more
that the success

integration

and

Commission’s action can be
capitalize

upon

new

the rhetoric of the

very

will be jeopardised if

states.

It

light."'

The Hague 1969 and

Commission of

the

Commission

is

36

Hrbek and Wessels (1984,

European Communities, (1971,

put forward by

Cram

In this sense, the

[had) learned to

quickly learned to couch

ibid

This argument

The

economic and monetary

Paris in 1972.”

Foi a discussion of this point see

(1997, 37).
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7).

social

forward the realization

proposals in the language of economic
and monetaiy union favoured
at

sentence

resolutely on the road

do not take place simultaneously .”' 35

member

firs,

34

new

light brings

interpreted that by then “the

On March

level.'

economic realm and

social policy appears in a

of the integration “process

social integration

in the

in the

Community has embarked

specifically points out that this

33

on the European

document which already

emphasized the connection between
developments
policy by pointing out:

integration to re-introduce
into the

52).

a, the

its

Summits held

The documents
opportunities for

identifies three goals as

employment which aim

.second, an increase in
social justice

wealth as well as an improvement
.he quality of living

which aim

by several scholars,

this

development of the

a,

a,

guaranteeing

which aim

in the

paramount:

first social

an improvement of working
conditions. As pointed on,

action

programme.

In effect the

on the European

c
For

Social Action

Programme

political

time .'

represents an example in which
the

economic and monetary union,

renewed concern over

Commission was instrumental

argument

by

37
at the right

window of opportunity: maximizing on

further integration in

this

later

Commission both

level created

social

in setting the

for instance see

Maurer (1993,

agenda

139).

135

the

Commission

current debates which

Commission was

and employment policy.

thereby achieved an important agreement
on the supranational

137

in

on Decision-Making

to attach to those debates a

sense, the

of incomes and

standard of living, and
third, an improvement

for social policy

has used rather skillfully a

demanded

and bene, employment;

a, fairer distribution

pressure as well as provided
important policy ideas

The

full

enhancement of

proposal of the Commission
was crucial for the

enhanced the momentum

3.3.2 Implications

First, the

In this

for the social debates

level.

able

and

However, one has
Which resulted from

this,

be

was

Community's objective on

realistic that in

rather limited in

the training policy

,

he end the Soc

,

a|

Action
'

its

the overall impact.

38

The

remained unfulfilled jus, as
much as the

coordination of national labor
market polteies never materia,
ized. Equally, the
goals of

improving the living and working
conditions and increasing
worker participation were
never achieved due to
resistance by employers and
national governments.

"

Among

the

proposals most heavily criticized
were: the Vrendling directive
on information and
consultation of workers and the
Fifth Directive on

Company Law which aimed

a,

increasing worker participation.
These proposals were perceived
by business as aiming
a‘

UPWard hann ° nization of Enropean

therefore fought with

Social Action

growing

labor standards at the highest
level, and were

tenacity.

Programme remained

In the

limited in

end no progress was achieved
and the
its

impact.

This political impasse was
especially detrimental to any
progress

in the social

policy field on the European
level due to the institutional
weakness of the Commission.

The EC

Treaties in the area of social policy
at that time

were

rather general in content

and thereby provided no concrete
measures. This gave the Commission
only
legal basis

As

on which
a

it

could propose

consequence

goals of the Social Action

of this

Community

a limited

action.

weakness, the Commission could work
towards the

Programme only through

the tools of directives or
regulations

For a discussion on the economic and political
circumstances which hampered the
adoption of the recommendations of the
Action Programme see Taylor (1996, 23ff).
1

39

On

the limited impact ol the Social Action

Programme

605).
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see Addison and Siebert (1991,

and positive ac.ion
•he directives

any

proves.

tools have their inherent
weakness.

and regulations, unanimous
support of all

social policy , 0 be
adopted

Member

Both

States a, that time,

of the

Member

programmes were

state

for

is

of veto and stalemate.

no, legally

States and employers organ,
zations.

appears lo be the theoretical
approach that

3.4

was required

States

most notably the United
Kingdom, bu, also Germany,
the

bindhg upon

the governments

Thus, also during this historical

Phase of the evolution of social
and employment policy,

making

h e case of

by the Council. Given the
preferences of a handful of
key

requirement of unanimity became
tantamount with a
Additionally, positive action

Member

,

libera,

intergovenunentalism

best equipped to explain
the decision-

process.

Summary
This chapter has provided a
historical overview of the main
developments

area of social and

employment policy on

Second World War.

the

In particular focusing

European

level following the

on the Treaty of Pans,

Action Programme, the goal of this chapter
was

Rome

in the

end of the

and the Social

to analyze both the factors

which

influenced the social policy measures
contained in these agreements as well as
to
highlight the implications of these
agreements on the two cleavages identified

at the

beginning of the chapter, namely the
question over the appropriate level of authority
for

developing and implementing social policy
and the debate on the need

to interfere with

the market forces.

As
the

this

chapter has demonstrated, during the early
phase of European integration,

competences of the European

institutions in the area

137

of social and employment policy

was very linked. The

Rework created in the treattes by

lega,

,

he

Member

„„ ly

States

conferred limited capacities
to the European
Commission. Also, the prevailing
understanding

was one

in

a, the

which

i,

time was .hat the best
“social policy" the

would allow

Community could pursue

the market forces to
generate sufficient wealth
and

prosperity which would then
automatically lead to an overall
increase in the general
welfare.

As

Cram

(1997, 31), an “accurate
characterisation of this period

newly established Commisston
of the European Union was
attempting

.ha, the

Its

pointed ou, by

relationship vis-a-vis the
Council of the Ministers. In the
social field,”

to define

Cram

-

is

(1997,

35, continues to point out that “Being
a ‘purposeful opportunist’,
the Commission’s

approach

to social policy

ideologica I.

have been

may most

The Commission’s

less a sign

of

its

states

were unwilling

its

tor the social dimension, the

to social progress than a

competence

to support a

activities in the social field, but

more pragmatic

in this field.

When

means by which
it

became

less

may

it

clear that the

broad interpretation of the Commission's

would continue

to issue

Commission sought

ambiguous statements of support

to justify the extension

of

by emphasizing the social aspects of
economic integration.” “As member

been

than

early high-profile support for
the social dimension

commitment

sought to expand the scope of

member

usefully be characterized as

equivocal about the role of the Commission

in

economic

its

activities

states

have

integration and the

completion of the internal market, the symbolic
references made by the Commission

economic

rationalizations for

lange ot activities

its

actions in the social field have allowed

in the social field

it

to

engage

to

in a

which would otherwise have been impossible.”(p.35)
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CHAPTER 4

RELAUNCHED MOMENTUM: SOCIAL

AND

EMPLOYMENT POLICY BETWEEN 1981-1990

In the early

in the

80 s, economic and social policy
development received a new impetus

European Union. Subsequently the
question regarding the appropriate

authority of policy-shaping and
policy-setting decisions were
readdressed.

of finding answers, the European
Union extended
realm of economic policy but also

in the

its

on creating

fi-ee

a Social

Europe

of

In the process

scope of influence, especially

in the

realm of social and employment
policy.

Additionally, the debates surrounding
the single market added
initiatives

level

for mitigating the potential

new momertum

to

consequences of the

play of the market forces. The
European Commission, supported by
several key

Member
initiative.

social,

States, seized the opportunity

It

warned

that the internal

provided by the agreement on the market

market without a social dimension would
exacerbate

economic and regional divisions within

dumping,

that is the

expenditure

states.

the

EU,

particularly

movement of capital and jobs away from high

by encouraging

social

taxation and welfare

Jacques Delors, then President of the European
Commission,

presented his vision of the social dimension
as a
skillfully crafted a political strategy to
bring

vital

about

element of the single market and

this vision.
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The pupose of ,hi» chapter

provide a descriptive and
analytical background

is

ofihe development of
social and employment
policy during the time
period of ,981
1990.

study that will be
conducted

providing this
that

to

This description of policy
development provides a
background for the single
case

backhand,

was included

in the

Of particular

in the

following chapter, tha,

is

chapter

greater appreciation of the
novelty of the

Amsterdam Treaty can be

5.

By way of

employment chapter

achieved.

interest is to analyze in
this chapter here are
the factors that

influenced the policy-setting
as well as policy-shaping
decisions reached a, the level
of
the

European Union. Special

Commission,
Europe and

in particular

attention

is

paid to the crucial role
played by the European

Jacques Odors’ vision of a
rejuvenated economic and
social

his skillful strategy, as
well as the importance

of the Presidencies of the

Council.

The

first

economic and

par,

of this chapter describes Delors
vision and strategy

social Europe.

The second

par, then provides both a
description

Single European Act as well
as an analysis of the factors
that influenced

The

third

and

last part

look more closely

at

the Charter of

conclusion of

Delors,

this

chapter

was veiy important

is

that the

in setting the

European Commission,

agenda

for the

scholars

who have

in

1989.

Given

development.

its

development. The

in particular

Jacques

European Union and thereby

crucially influenced the policy-shaping
decisions taken during the

Strasbourg meeting

its

of the

Fundamental Social Rights,

again also with an interest of
understanding the factors that shaped

mam

for a rejuvenated

IGC and

the

this observation, this dissertation
agrees with

suggested that the policy outcome of the

with the theoietical tools of neofunctionalism.

140

IGC can

best be explained

acques Delors Vision

of a Rejuvenated

Economic and

Social Europe

Mirny scholars have
pointed cm, that the leadership
Jacques Delors provided
as
Piesidenl of the lunopcan
C ommission was crucial lor
the timing and the
direction of

economic and

social policy

PartiCU,ar- b °' h HiS

change

.ha, took place in the
late

P ° litiCal

80 s

in the

European Union

- «, skillful crafting of political strategies

helped to present the need
for strengthening the soc

ial

dimension as a necessary

contponen, for the success of,
he single market. Given

this fact, neofunctionalis,

explanations that emphasize
the relevance of technical
and cultivated spillover,
seem to
be best equipped to explain
the social measures
included
h> 1984, at the
Fontainebleau

in

the Single European
Act.
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Council of Ministers under the
French Presidency.

Jacques Delors was appointed
as Commission President.
Delors started his tenure as
President of the

Commission

f rench technocrat

in

January of 1985.

and former minister with close

He had

a political

background as a

links to the Mitterrand

government and

had worked both for the Banque
de France and the Catholic trade
union confederation
(Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs
Chretiens).

From

the beginning of his

tenure, he articulated his vision
to foster the development of
strong supranational
institutions both in the

economic and

opening speech on January

14"' to

political

the

and

social dimension.

For instance

European Parliament, he stressed

that his

in his

aim was

140

hoi l,1 's argument see Drake
1995, 2000, Dyson and Featerstone 1999, Endo
1999
Rometsch 1999, Ross, 1995, Ginsburg 1997,

For a discussion on Delors see Grant 1994.
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.o establish no,

•his

simply an economic and
financial union, bu, also

a 'social Europe.'

sense his twin goals for
his tenure with the
Commission was to promote a
single

market as well as a stronger
social dimension on the
European Union
In

order to develop a feasible
strategy to accomplish

immediately upon starting

accompanied by

his tenure, toured the
capitals

his fttture chief

level.

this vision,

of the

Member

Delors

States,

of staff, Pascal Lamy. Most
prominently he suggested

four possible ideas as
agenda priorities for the

Community:

(1)

monetary union, (2)

defense cooperation,
(3, institutional reform, and
,4, the completion of the
internal
market.

Member

While the

firs,

three options

were received with some skepticism
among

States, the last option
received

143

unanimous support.

governments made Delors aware of the
positive climate
market and thereby influenced him

the

to select this

The feedback from

for the completion

goal as his

of the

the

internal

first priority.

142
T7

for the whole speech see Commission
of the European Communities,
(1985b,
143

c
ti6S

220^ Colchester
Cnlihlf and
220),

and thC

Buchanan (1990,

SeleCti ° n

° f the sin § le market

1
1

).

Delors (1994

pp. 28-29).
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Parallel to Delors efforts,

it should be noted
that Jerome Vignon, Delors’
advisor
wide range of consultations with businessmen
and officials on behalf of
Delors. For instance in December
1984, Vignon arranged a seminar with
European
dushialis s on the completion of the
internal market. For

rgamzed

see

a

Endo (1999 134) and Grant (1994,

a discussion of these details

66). Additionally,

between 1984 and 1985 several
key business leaders urged the heads of
state to develop a single market.
For instance
Wisse Dekker, the head of Philips in one of his
publications (1984) strongly promoted the
EUr
° thCr publications t0 b e mentioned in this context is one
om Fiat (1985) and one from Ford (1985). References from
Dinan (1994, 155). For a
discussion of the significance of these business
leaders on the single market see Pelkmans
and Beuter 1986, and Sandholz and Zysman
1989.

T
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„

Thus, after an
priorities

initial

on the goal of

he employment

phase of orientation

foster,

that

manages

situation in Europe.

position, Delors placed
his

Concretely,

12,

when Delors presented

the

,985 to the European
Parliament, he

economic growth and employment
could be achieved only
as long

to exploit the potential

of

development of social measures.'

4.2.

new

g econo,nic growth while achieving the
inrprovenrent of

Commissions’ Programme of 1985
on March
argued

in his

a large

common

market as well as

as Europe

fosters the

45

The Single European Act
The Single European Act

a rejuvenated

economic and

represents the successful efforts
of Delors to bring about

social Europe.

The

treaty revisions link the

efforts with subsequent reform
initiatives in the social

economic reform

dimension of the European

146

The

treaty revisions

were based on Delors vision of bringing
about a

single

market and improving the relevant
decision-making procedures by increasing
the use of
qualified majority voting and
strengthening the democratic control
of the European

Parliament (introduction of the legislative
cooperation procedure between the
European

Parliament and the Council). As a
side-effect to the political reform
efforts reform

145

Commission of the European Communities, 1985c. Also
6,

1985, 5) (March 11/12, 1985,

see

Agence Europe (March

1).

146

For the treaty provisions of the Single European
Act see Commission of the European

Communities 1986b
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initiatives in the area

making

of soda, poiicy clearly
benefited from

changes

in decision-

rules.

F° r
«0

,„ c

"le reViSed

Anide

pursuing upward harmonization

the health,

in the areas

'

*• mem ber

created a mandate for the

at

European

Commission

level.”

And

committed themselves

legislation in this area

in the Council.

to

states

of “the working environment,
as regards

and safety of the workers.’'
Community

adopted by means of qualified
majority

and labour

ll8a

now

Additionally, Article

1

could be

18b

“develop the dialogue between
management

finally.

A, tide

1

30a committed the community

‘the strengthening of economic
and social cohesion - in
particular through the
measure of
Structural funds.

Nevertheless, Article 100a
(2), which introduced the
possibility of

Qualified Majority Voting,
explicitly precluded the
use of this procedure for
measures
relating to the “rights

and

interests

of employed persons." As

pointed on, correetly, this in
effect “left social policy
subject

member

points out that “the

voting in the Council

[...

SEA

and

it

introduced a

thereby] enhanced the

an end to the de facto unanimity voting
rule

was concluded

in

Commission,

is

the veto of

any individual

in

summarized by Endo (1999,

much wider

general and to complete the internal
market by 1992

the

(1997, 316)

state.”

Thus, the impact of the Single
European Act

when he

Hyman

129),

use of qualified majority

Community’s capacity

in particular,

place since the

and

[it]

to act in

effectively put

Luxembourg Compromise

1966.” According to Noel
(1989, 96), a former Secretary General of
just half a year after the

Luxembourg Council which passed

European Act, around 100 decisions were already
taken on the
qualified majority voting rules.

Additionally

Howe,

basis of the

a minister in the

144

the Single

newly adopted

government of

Margaret Thatcher, admitted

that

he had miscalculated
the impact of the

SEA when

pointed on, that “there
was one consequence of the
Single European Ac,
tha,
certainly no, fully
anticipated,

Compromise." Pu,

in other

qualified majority vote.

Thus
provide

new

the health

,0

namely

had

on the socalled ,966
Luxembourg

words, with an increase
in decisions reached
through

Member

summarize

the impact

I

he

States effectively reduce
their individual veto
power.

the impact of the

SEA

one can point ou,

that the

SEA

did

opportunities for a broaden,
ng of the scope of socia, policy, particularly

and safety

and

field

i,

thereby facilitated a process
by which “several

in

new

policy sectors which belong
to the core of state
sovereignty [were] Europeanized.”' 47

However,

a, the

same time

Programme which

it

represents a retreat from the
ambitious goals of the Action

stated that “vigorous action

was needed]

[...

improvement of living and working
conditions so as
whtle the improvement
important change

is

to

being maintained.” Thus, the

in the priorities

make

SEA

order to attain the

in

possible their harmonization

represented a subtle but

of Community social policy:

No

longer was

harmonization the goal of European
social policy, but instead the
attainment of minimal
standards was the

Policy (1994, 29).
shitted

new

aim.

This shift in priorities

is

noted

in the

White Paper on Social

Since the adoption of the Single
European Act, the emphasis has

from harmonisation

to the

adoption of

minimum

standards.”

This raises the question what factors
and forces have influenced the Single

European Act both

in its

Commission pursue and

timing as well as
politically

which

its

content.

steps did

it

In particular

which strategy did

take to influence the final outcome?

147

see Horeth (1999, 252). For a similar
argument see Betten (1989, 108) and Davies

(1996, 96).

145

the

4.2.1

Factors influenced the
adoption of the Single
European Act
Dinan (1997, 189)

especially

1986

its

stated that

“most observers agree

that the

Commission, and

President, piayed a pivotal
role in the events and
negotiations .ha, ied

treaty rev, s, on.

Tire C

ommission had

tot polled

its

the

‘1992’ proposal
out of thin air

bu, had cleverly played
the role of 'policy
entrepreneur,' identifying
a

demand

(completion of the singie
market) and delivering a
product (the White Paper)."
Aiso

Lodge (1985b, 210, comes

to a similar

analyzed the factors which
contributed

Commission’s influence can

conclusion

when she

to the adoption

states, that after

having

of the Singie European
Ac, “the

clearly be seen.”

Moreover, Grant (1994, 70) argues

that in the single

market

initiative,

Deiors

“had spotted the strategic
significance of a project which
would gather support from
nearly

all

shades of the political spectrum

ambitious goal on
pressures

the

its

would then

European

the political

Once

the

Community had such an

agenda, the pressure for constitutional
refonn would grow.” These
inevitably lead to

institutions.

and

[...].

social

new debates on

the possible re-arrangements
of

Intermingled with this concern would
then be the question of

Union. Along similar

lines

Cram

(1997, 40) stated that the

negotiations over the Single European
Act and the future direction the

provide the

window of opportunity which

offensive on the social dimension.”

The

the

fact that the

opportunities provided are clearly expressed
that “the creation

Commission required

in the

to

EU

was

to

launch a renewed

Commission was ready

to seize the

words of Deiors when he points out

of a vast economic area, based on the
market and business co-operation,

146

*S

inconceivable

legislation.

Our

-

I

would say unattainable

-

without some harmonisation
of social

ultimate aim must be the
48
creation of a European
social area”'

Overall, the Commission's
interest in developing a
stronger social dimension
on
'

he EUr° Pean eVel WaS
pUrSued
'

Commission aimed
second stage,

it

a,

^ a three-stage strategy:

aimed

at

committing the

which would both increase

its

to the strategy

the single market initiative
as a

of a

own

that the "tactic

States for the

stage, the

Member
i,

States to an Intergovernmental

aimed

firs,

a,

achieving changes

stage, the

technicality

Along similar

in decision-rules

Commission aimed

of the overall economic

lines

at presenting

efforts instead

Wise and Gibb (1993, 62) have

adopted by the Commission to gain
support from the

Member

White Paper was shrewd. By presenting
the 300 proposals as purely

technical matters to be executed
in order to

fulfill

Council meetings, the Commission
created a
support of all twelve

member

states.”

the ideas proposed

political situation

The authors continue

to

by successive

whereby

it

gained the

argue that the significance

of the consequences of the Single
Market were clearly underestimated by the
States: "It

in the

to participate in the
decision-making process.

of the

mere

politically contentious issue.

argued

first

capacity to influence
polic^shaping decisions as well

European Parliament's capacity
With regards

the

reaching an agreement on the
need for a single market.
Then

Conference. In the third and finally
stage,

as the

in

would be

fair to

without fully realizing the

Commission of

the

assume

full

that

many Member

economic and

States signed the 1987

Member

SEA
49

political

consequences of doing so.”'

European Communities, (1986a, point

1.2.7).

See Wise and Gibbs (1993, 95). For a similar
argument see Bieber, Dehousse, Pinder
147

The

responsibility for developing
the proposals for
an internal market

was

assigned to Commissioner
Lord Cockfield, Thatcher's
trade secretary nnti,
appointed to
Ihe

Commission

^

°" ' he

On

in ,985.

"

June 14-, 1985, he
presented the Commission's
White

C° mpletim °f,he

remaining physical, technical
and

with

fiscal ba,Tiers

<

297 measures

the free

end people within the
Community rather quickly.
1

its

1„ ,„e

remove

movement of goods,

all

services

words of Lord Cockfield

994, 48) the Commission
pursued the following strategy:

My

fills

aim throughout had been

While Paper with

persons, services, capital)

the

became

to put the

emphasis

White Paper

to the

Heads of

for establishing the four

the basis for

freedoms (goods,

economic measures contained

in

the

Single European Act and
ensured that the priority for the
subsequent role of the European

Union would continue
mechanisms. Again,

to

be the elimination of nation-specific
restraints on market

in the

words of Cockfield (1994, 55) “when
the White Paper

appeared, there were no rivals to attract
attention, the White Paper took
centre stage
indeed

it

was

the only player on stage.
[...]

We

succeeded

and Weiler 1988.
150

Commission of the European Communities,

1985a.

148

in selling

it

well."

"*

SeCOnd

^ °“
thC

C

Immcd and immediate measures
sueh
by and

large he

expected

political

“» aimed at secutmg an agreement on

"

as the holding

of an IGC. This agreement
would

viewed by the Member
States as rather
inconsequential and was
thereby

be politically relatively
uncontroversial. This mean,
that once sufficient

momentum had emerged

for an

IGC,

i,

was

rather difficult for

Member

States

not to agree to one
proposal or another.

While the momentum
1980s ensured
ol the

that

to complete the internal
market

built

up

diversity

to translate these
principles into practice.

of opinion as

to

what

the United

political

market

was able

which

it

Member

enough

after the

alerted the

it

States agreed with the

full

European

Commission,

the success of the

political

momentum

White Paper was

Member

behind reform

issued, the

efforts.

Commission issued another document

States that the internal

market could only be achieved

Endo

if

(1999, 137) mentions

Delors successfully argued that roughly
“three out of four proposals anticipated

the forthcoming

tin

necessary political and institutional
reform, the Commission

appropriate institutional reforms would
be taken in advance.
that

legislation

merely as a step towards enhancing

of the European economy. Thus by
linking

initiative to

lo create

Soon

m

Union. While most

Kingdom and Denmark regarded

free-trading conditions

internal

the early

The European Commission

presented the logic of an integrated
market as a step inextricably
linked to

economic and

in

heads of states by and large
could easily agree on the
implementation

White Paper, there was a
considerable

was needed

had

White Paper, would necessitate unanimity
decisions by

in

the Council.”

To

dlustrate the potential lor negative
repercussions due to this arrangement, Delors

maintained that

it

had taken the Council of Ministers
15 years

to agree

on

legislation that

finally

allowed architects

The urgency

for institutional

out just before the Milan

Parliament because

doing nothing

I

refonn

summit

is

States to

work anywhere

captured in the words of Delors,

that “in January

I

was cautious

Community.

in the

in

my

when he

pointed

remarks to

did not want the institutional question to be used as an alibi for

now,

-

Member

in the

months

after six

in the thick

the institutional question cannot be avoided

[...]

I

of things,

was

less

I

am now

of the opinion that

convinced of this six month

151

ago;

now

I

am

absolutely sure.”

with this realization, the Commission pushed to see two institutional

In line

problems solved:

First, there

should be a settlement on the decision-making process,

i.e.

concerning qualified majority decisions. In the words of Delors, such a settlement would
be very important for the Community as a whole

between the Commission and the Council,

in

in order to

minimize “the gray area

which projects he forgotten

for years

on

152

end.”

According

to the

Commission’s proposals, majority voting should be

within the Council of Ministers, except

number of cases

Member

States expressively wish to preserve their vital interests.

According

to the

would allow

1

for.

Thus, the

Commission

in the

a

new

Second, the Parliament

decision-making processes of the Community.
co-decision procedure should be developed which

the Parliament to participate the legislative matters with the Council of

Transcript of Press Conference by Jacques Delors, Brussels 26.6.1985. Quoted in

Endo (1999,

137).

I5
“

cases explicitly provided

requiring unanimity rule should be reduced to those few cases where

should be granted a larger role

'

in

the rule

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (June

10/11, 1985, 3).
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Ministers for ,, the

feWs of competence which
have been

and excluded from national
sovereignty.
.n the third

on global

and

gi ve„

over to the Community

153

last stage then, the
Cotnnrission ainred a

institutional revisions
during the

IGC.

more concrete agreenten,

In this context, the
potentially

conflictual social provisions
were presented as a matter
of procedure rather than
of

substance.

As pointed

ou,

by Cram (1997, 40) 'one
impottam reason

Of connic. over the issue
of social policy during the
profile

political area.

As pointed

Customs Union had

to

as a

a

means

a single market

market -

I

new dynamic

a

in

economic

that does not interest

me -

priorities see

argument see Cram (1997,
Grant (1994, 70).

This objective

French radio

wouldn’t have come here

For a discussion of these

in

much

and

as the

integration

was

clearly

formidable opportunity by the
Commission to also bring about more

of Delors when he admitted on

Quoted

for furthering integration
in the social

precede Economic Integration,
so Economic Integration
has to

integration in the social and
political realm.

this

the rather low-

encouraged on procedural,

it

out in the White Paper
(1985, 55), “jus, as

precede European Unity.- Thus,
the

observed as

was

54

The White Paper was seen

For

negotiations

approach adopted by the
Commission and the focus

rather than substantive
issues.”'

single

SEA

for the relative lack

in

in

1

993

1985.

but to

well expressed in the words

that “if this

We are

make

is

not here to just to

a political union.

Agence Europe (June

40).

job was about making

27, 1985, 3).

make

a

The
PUrSU e d

and

follow, „g section
analyzes .note concrete,
y the exact steps the Contntission

m ° rdCr

Ihtrd stage

° aCWeVe

l

i,S

S ' ra

^y.

Particular attention

is pair, to

of the Commissionsstrategy. After an
unsuccessful summit

and a semi-successful
summit
successful during the

reforms.

P ° lit,Cal

in

Mi, an, Delors three-stage

Luxembourg summit

s , ra , egy

win the adoption of

in

the second

Dublin

^

the institutional

Delors strategy was supported
by the work of a highly
respected Committee

which also strongly recommended
referred to as

Spaak

the supported

most importantly
importantly the

Committee, the

II

efforts

create a political

institutional

changes (Dooge Committee
or also

Committee) and the European
Parliament aind most importantly
Italian

and Luxembourg Presidency.
The Dooge

of the Emropean Parliament
and the Council Presidents
helped

momentum which

in the

end swayed the reluctant

Member

to

Stales to

agiee to the institutional
reform proposals.

4.2. 1.1

Summit

An

in

Dublin

important committee which contributed
towards the preparation of the
Dublin

summit was

the

Dooge Committee. The Committee
was

created at the Fontainebleau

Council meeting on June 25-6
1984. The task of the Committee
was

,0 translate a

wide

range of existing views on the
nature of European integration
into politically acceptable
terms which would lead to significant
political reform.
representatives of the

Member

Stales

It

and was chaired by

152

was composed of personal
the Irish

James Dooge who was

leader

the

of .he

Irish

Senate and fanner foreign
minister.'* „ was generally

new committee was

to operate, as the

Spaak

routine administrative
frameworks of either the
existence, the

Committee published two major

,

Committee had done, outs.de

Community

or national leve.s.

reports both of

the

in

ma in

political

December .985 and one

text

of both

reports, the

final re P o,1

entity which would enable
the Community

interest just as

much

as

economic

interests.
'

recommended
institutional

that an

IGC

to the

before the Milan summit

Committee spelled on,

For

in

During

its

Dublin

1985.

the goal of fo.muIa.ing
»a true

to represent political

this

the

which were drafted by

Maurice Faure, the French
Representative: one interim
report just pnor

summit

^

and

social

purpose the Committee strongly

should be called which would
have to aim

a,

creating

reforms which should strengthen
the role both of the European
Commission

and the European Parliament.'

59

156

The

Doodge Committee cons.sted of the following
members: Frans Andriessen
emission), Jean Dondehnger (Luxembourg),
James Doodge (Ireland), Maurice Faure
(France), Mauro Fern (Italy), Fernand
Herman (Belgium), Otto Moller (Denmark)
Ionnis
Papanton.ou (Greece), Malcom Rifkin
(United Kingdom), Carlo Ripa di
Meana
(Commission) Jurgen Ruhfus (Germany), and
Wilhelm van Ekelen (Netherlands) The
compos, t, on of the Committee is listed
Council of the European Communities
1985 For
the organization of the Committee
see Meenan 1985.
the

’

For the text of the first report see
Agence Europe (December 2, 1984). It should
be
noted that Maurice Faure was nominated
by Francois Mitterand as a representative for
France.

Ibid, p. 2.
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v
For instance see Agence Europe (November

(November

16, 1984, 1)

(November 23 1985
’

24, 1984, 3).

153

’

31
J)

’

Apan from

he

Politically

.his

m „s,

conclusion in .he main
,ex. of ,he reports,
,he foo.no.es con,
ained

important message:

„ was

.here ,ha, the d.ssen.ing

Member

S,a,es

voiced .heir reservations.
In the words of Keatinge
and Murphy (1987,
224) "the
parts of the report
proved to be .he foo.no.es,
which
generally

lo the

visible the obstacles

success of the Genscher
-Colombo [reform] initiative"' 60

Mos, strongly opposed
countries: the United

would only lead

to

any

institutional

reforms

at that

time were three

Kingdom, Denmark and Greece.
On many occasions

government pointed on,
this

made

critical

to

that there

was no need

for

any

the British

institutional modifications,
since

an erosion of the sovereignty
of the

Member

States.

For instance,

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom, attacked
the idea of
institutional

Avignon

in

Common
its

reforms which should lead

November

Market)

shadow and

to

1984.

In her

to political

union

a speech she delivered
in

in

speech she considered unity
(for instance

in a

be the substance of European
integration, while union
would only be

therefore concluded:

“work

for substance rather than
talk

of the

161

shadow.”
that

no

Along

institutional

would be opposed

the

lines,

Geoffrey Howe, Britain's foreign
secre.aty suggested

reform was necessary.

to

Instead he proposed that any
government that

an internal-market law should make
a 'gentlemen's agreement'

abstain from supporting

place since the

same

it,

rather than

change the

Luxembourg compromise.

institutional decisions structures
in

In effect

Howe

urged

Member States

160

For a discussion of the Genscher
-Colombo
161

A
Agence
Europe (December

For

this

initiative see

Bonvicini 1987.

3/4, 1984, 1).

proposal see Agence Europe, (June 10/11,
1985,

154

1).

to

to

make
in

greater USe ° f

A 1iCle
'

EC

,48(3) 0f

which already allows

for abstentions

decisions which require
unanimity.

Addilionally

Denmark war

also not convinced that
political reform

necessary. According to
Keatinge and

he described as that of a

Murphy (,987. 233-234).

•strict constitutionalist.'

was

‘.he Danish view
could

Opposition to change was
put

in the

context of the treaties,
which were regarded as adequate
as a legal basis but
which had
no, been implemented.

position,

his

“Government supports

was

move

was

rather similar to the
British

that the political

effort

is

a better Europe functioning
better” he does “not
believe

towards institutional reform.”

instance the Greece

little

large the Danish position

for mstance, the Danish
Foreign Minister, Ellemann-jensen
pointed out while

necessary to

the

By and

Additionally, the position
of Greece

reform of the Community
proposed would be inappropriate.
For

was concerned

while economic integration

that

is

moving ahead,

put into eliminating the
economic and social imbalances
which characterize

Community.

Especially, the Greece pointed
out tha, a redistribution of
resources to

poorer regions would be necessary.
in the institutional structure

„

it

As

long this was not achieved,
any further changes

of the Community would only lead

to aggravating these

164

uillerences further.

Thus, despite the unified message
of the Dooge report, the representatives
of three

Member

State reserved their right to voice
criticism over the reform proposals
and

cautioned the heads of state not

Quoted

in

to enter into

Agence Europe (May

Agence Europe (January

any binding resolution during the Dublin

25, 1985, 3).

19, 1985, 3).
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summit. This division

split the

Dooge committee

into

two camps:

the majority of

countries which desired
institutional reforms and a
minority of countries
which were
cautious about any changes
at the present. This
led to a paradoxical
situation: even

'hough the majority of
countries desired

roups and
Irish

institutional

institutions supported the
conclusions

presidency were

tied.

Given

the split

Overall, however, the effect
of the
‘

he tommission

reform.

The Commission

-

In several

be able to decide

all

the

make

Dooge

report, the

Member States and

institutional

reports

was

hands of the
the unanimity

reform a low

priority.

to strengthen the
position

of

strongly favored institutional
and decision-making

documents released

immediate amendment of three

of the Dooge

among

requirement, the Irish government
decided to

reform and a large
number of

prior to the summit, the

articles in the

Commission proposed

the

Treaty of Rome, so that the
Council would

single-market laws by majority-vote.
Overall, the Commission's

viewpoint was very similar to the
majority view point of the Dooge
Committee.
Despite the majority opinion of
the

Member

States

and

recommendation, the Dublin summit,
however, was not able
conclusion on the issue of political
union.

In the final

to

the

Commission's strong

come

to a binding

conclusion released, merely eight

165

Additionally, several groups and
institutions supported the Dooge
report For
he Pres, den, of the European Parliament,
Pierre Pllimlin'senta personal letter
to all heads of state urging them
to take the conclusions of the
Dooge Committee in
ag,ee n a IGC WhlCh W0Uld be
welcomed by public opinion as “a historic
A
Stnr/” Agence
r°
gesture.
Europe,
(December 3/4, 1984, 6). Furthermore, the Trade
Union
ns, nee,

Confederation (ETUC ) expressed in a meeting
on December 4th with the President of the
Euiopean Council, Garret Fitzgerald who is also
the Irish Prime Minister, that Europe
is
in need of political reform.
(Agence Europe, December 5, 1984, 9). Also,
the Council of
European Municipalities adopted a political statement
in which it says that it is placing
great hopes in the intergovernmental
conference proposed by the interim report and
which should be held “very soon.”
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lines

make

a salutary reference
to the resolve

Overa,,. the Irish
government

was

of the Member States

careful jus,

use

its

consider the issue

Presidency

solicit

opinions on

the matter, without trying
to bring about a
decision.

m

contras, to the Irish
government, the Italian

government which was

Presidency next, announced
right after the Dublin
summit that
teaching “binding political
conclusions”

following year

was

in

interested in

Milan ,1985,

a, the

From

to take the

was committed

Italy

to

next summit, scheduled
for June the

early on, the Italian

government signaled

working closely with the
European Commission

in order to

make

tha,

its

Presidency a success.

4.2. 1.2

Summit

4. 2. 1.2.1

Building

In the

Milan

in

run-up

Up Support

to the

Milan summit key figures of European

give further impetus to bring
about institutional reforms.

For instance, Pierre Pflimlin,

President of the European Parliament,
pointed out that “Europe

condemned

to choose.

principle of unanimity

There

will be

Delors,

1

made

The

institutions function badly.

which

is

already used

in the

5,

1984,

1).
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Quoted

in

Agence Europe (January

the crossroads

The Council

is

and

paralyzed by the

167

to

be initiated.”

“The major debate on what

66

Agence Europe (December

is at

preparatory work at officials’ level.

no spontaneous progress. Progress has
the following statement:

institutions tried to

25, 1985, 3).
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is

to

Also, Jacques

become of the

i,

institutions

council.

of Europe must, whatever
the circumstances, be
,he centra, point oftbe
Mi, an

For

its

pan, the Commission

is

ready for

ibis

major debate. „ has made
Us

careful preparations.”

The Prime Minister of Italy,
Bettino
emphasized

in a

speech

in late

Community transformed
financial

autonomy and

February 1985

lhat Italy

would

like to

when he

see “the

into a true political entity
with an institutional structure,

a wider range of powers.”
For this purpose, the Italian

government would intend
in

Craxi, agreed with Dolors

to

“work

as hard as

it

can so that during the European
Council

Milan, an agreement on calling
an intergovernmental conference
with a mandate to

negotiate a draft Treaty on
European Union can be reached.”

Thus,

in the end, in

addition to pressure of various
political organizations, the
most important factor which

influenced the decision to hold an
I

IOC was

the cooperation between the
Italian

lesidency and the European Commission.

One

ol the additional organizations

was the “Committee

lor Action

goal lor the

instrumental for the formation of this
Committee.

Committee was

1

rx

to further action

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (June

of the Community

Quoted

in

Agence Europe, (February

6,

1985,

in

development of

3).

23, 1985,

3).
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the Foreign Minister of

Belgium

158

at

‘™

The

Max

explicit

three related areas: (1)

69

Leo Tindemans was

reform

Dublin summit. Both Leo Tindcmans and

the creation of a genuinely unified
internal market, (2) the

168

institutional

on Europe” which was formed, by two
prominent

political figures jus, briefly after
the failed

Kohnstammer were

which strongly favored

the time.

a policy

of

economic expansion and effons

io

combai employment, and

pragmatic manner of
decision-making procedures

n ommunity.

,3) the

in the institutions

lmprovemcnt

,

of the

171

.

and

The

political

implicit goal

was

reform and then “translate

order to “avoid the usual
log-jams

to find a

this

consensus on the question
of economic

consensus into pressure on
governments”

the Counci, of Ministers."'

in

72

Both of the

initiators

for tins lobby

group took the idea from Jean
Monne, who had announced the
creat.on of
the “Committee for the
United States of Eure
rope” on October 13, 1955
and chaired this
173

Committee

until

lioth

1975.

Ttndemans and Kohnstammer had
served on

Kohnstammer even
for the

as vice-chairman.

the previous committee,

The formation of this committee
was remarkable

scope of actors involved: both
leaders of national parties
(government and

opposition) as well as representatives
of the social partners were
members of

committee. The

first

series

21 were attended by a

total

of meetings took place

at

Rambouillet on December 20 and

of 70 members. Also present

at the first

Jacques Delors and Francois Mitterand,
the President of France.
influence of this

although there

role

m

is

Committee Gazzo has pointed out
(1985,
no kind of organic

link, the

this

1) “it

Committee’s work

On

meeting were
the potential

goes without saying,

that

will broadly

the

of sometimes anticipating, sometimes
accompanying and supporting

for a description of these goals see
Agence Europe (December

assume

initiatives taken

19, 1984,

1).

172

for

this

argument see Agence Europe (January

9, 1985,

1).

173

c
for a detailed discussion on the history and
the
1994, Winand (1995, 2001). and Yondorf 1965

activities

159

of the group see Duchene

^

'

he EUr° Pean

C ° mmiSSi0n ” ^
'

Connnit.ee adopted a statement

to

in

I,l

™8 a meting

which

i,

in

Bonn on June

6/7 ,

,

„ 85 the
,

urged the Commission
and the heads of state

agree on holding an
Intergovernmental Conference.

'

'

Moreover, the European Trade
Union Confederation urged
the heads of state

to

adopt the institutional
reforms as proposed by the
Commission in order to puli out
of the

Obvious paralysis which
characterizes the way the
Community
statement “The

EEC

has no choice bu, to

a,

the Crossroad.-

make

ETUC

in

.

usna

work.

points out that -.he European

progress and strengthen

its

its

Community

ability to lake action
in order to

Ugh. unemployment effectively
and lake up the economic,
,

institutions

social, technological

and

176
,

,

cialluigc.

F°r these goals

to

be achieved, institutional
reforms are

necessary condition.

Finally, business associations
expressed their interest in
institutional reform of the

Huropean Communities. For instance

^

174

C

omment

in

the

Agence Europe (January

European League

for

Economic Cooperation

9, 1985).

175

Among others, the meeting was attended by Etienne
Davignon (Belgium), Georges
ebunne (Belgium- former Chairman of
the European Trade Union
Conference)
Fernand Herman (MEP), Guy Spitacls
(Belgian Minister of State and
Chairman of
Sounhsi Patly), Mart,,, Bangemann
(German Minister of Industry), Rainer Barzel,

Ernst
Dreher, Hans-Joachim Vogel,
Halligan, Umberto Agnelli
h° Agnelli, Jean Dondeltnger (Luxembourg
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Conner

Btet ((President ol
'

ETUC),

’

den

Uyl <PreSidcm of Confederation of
0p
p?2Tw
mTf
antes), Win,
Kok m
(Dutch v'°
Finance Minister), Piet Bukman (Chairman
of
li

)

,'7

Socialist

I

opuku

ally),

Edward Heath (former

the European
Prime Minister), David Steel (Member of
Social and Liberal Democratic Party)
and Gaston

British

Par uu^ent and former leader of British
(C han man of European Movement

Thom

European
-

).

oi

ommission). For a
a mote comprehensive
C

list
list

at the time and former President
of the
of these members see Agence Europe (June
3/4
of members see Agence Europ (March
6, 1987,

176

See Agence Europe (June 24/25, 1985a,

12).
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,

1985

4).

adopted

a reso.udot, for the

Milan summit, n which
,

future of Europe, if

making powers.”

Mi, an „ ne faded

It

market would only be
of improving

its

political

agree™,

i(s

„ deep

on the Con,

^
nity

,

feasible, if the

Community would

for

and the Strategy of the

decision .

internal

give itself the necessaty
tneans

Italian

Government

the eve of the Milan
summit, despite these strong
statements of support,

commentators pointed ou,

“Wha,

will

that “utter uncertainty
continues to reign as to the

summit.'™

happen

in

1

a lead article

Milan?"

answers and merely pointed ou.

in

^

Delors

of Agence Europe, Gazzo
(1985,

a. that

1)

time was unable to provide
any

an interview with the French
magazine

U

Poinr.

“No

80

predictions can be made.”

This sense of uncertainty was
increased further when, the United
Kingdom, just

days before the summit, expressed
strong resistance
the unanimity rule

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (June

See Agence Europe (June

in

to

any proposals

and thereby deprive Member States
of their

20, 1985, 4).

See Agence Europe (June 21,
1985,

Quoted

^

decision-making capabilities.

possible results- of the

asked:

expressed

urged the heads of state
that the achievement
of a genuine

4.2.1.2 2 Uncertainty

On

,o reach

it

12, 1985, 1).

Agence Europe (June

See Agence Europe (June

1).

13,

26, 1985,

1985,

1).

1).
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'

veto.

that

would change

8
'

Given

the

understanding in the tninds
of the participants of the
sunttni, that any C a„
foran
Intergovernmental Conference
would have to be supported
by

Milan summit opened on
the morning of June
28

at

all

10:45 in the

Member

States, the

mood of unpredictability

and uncertainty.
Despite the presumed
uncertainty of the outcome
of the Milan summit,
howev
there

was one element which was
beyond doubt:

Craxt,

was

fully supporting the

determined

to get the

heads of

the Italian

Commission’s proposal

stale to

some unusual measures.

mind can be found

made
a

A

for institutional refonn

hint

Member

of what strategy the

in a statement Guilio
Andreotti, the Italian

few days before the summit:
“The decision

to

States, this

Italian

After the

first

*

unanimous

the Danish

that

amend

the existing

8~

day of the summit on June 28 th
1985

it

was obvious

to the Italian

no unanimous decision would be
possible on holding an IGC.
Although,

government hid softened

and Greece continued

in

Committee jus,

verdict.”

its

stance and

forward by the Commission and taken
up by the

Quoted

in

produce a new treaty does no,

,

government

government had

Affairs

necessarily have to be unanimously
adopted, whereas a decision to
treaty does require a

would surely

Foreign Affairs Minister,

members of the Chamber of Deputies
of the Foreign

to the

and was

agree on holding an
Intergovernmental

Conference. Given the
constellation of interests of the
require

Prime Minister, Bettino

to insist

on minimal

Agence Europe (June

now

agreed with the proposals put

Italian presidency, the

institutional changes.

24/25, 1985,

3).

162

United Kingdom

According

to these

two

governments, these changes
cou.d he achieved h si,np
ly amending
y
these governments

Given

still

the treaties.

Thus

183
did not see a need to
call for an IGC.

the entrenched position
of the

UK and Greece an attempt to hold

a regular

vote would have clearl
y defeated an y a hope for winning
a mandate for an IGC.
This
situation ultimately left
the Italian

up

its

the

Commission,

ambition or

it

government with onl two
options:
y

it

could either give

could find recourse in
unusual measures. After
consultations with

the Italian

govemmeit took Delors proposal

proceed

in

two

stages:

reach agreement on limited
immediate measures (such as
the holdtng of an ,GC>
and
.hen agree on global
institutional revtsions
afterwards (such as the
concrete measures to
firs,

be worked out during the
IGC). Delors suggested .ha,
Article 236 and 148, could
be used

which would allow the Presidency
of the Council precisely

to these limited

measures: on the basis of
majority vote, the Presidency
could

call for a vote

immediate

on holding

184

an IGC.

While unanimity votes are
necessary

for treaty

amendments,

this article

allows majority voting on
decision pertaining to calling
for an IGC. With the
cunning
use of this treaty basis,
unprecedented in the his.oty of European
integration, Delors and
Ctaxt

States.

knew

that they

With

this

would be able

move

to

muster enough support from

a majority

of Member

they were able to ensure that
the reform proposal, as expressed

own words of Craxi, would

“escape the guillotine of unanimity.”

Foi a discussion of these positions
see

Agence Europe (June

185

29, 1985, 3ff).

184

Agence Europe (June

30, 1985, 2). Also see

Dinan (1997,

189).

185
ru-

Ibid, 7.

For a discussion of the procedure of

this

vote also see Lodge (1985a, 206),

163

in

In line with this
knowledge, Craxi

opened .he second day of
the Milan summit by

calhng for a vote on holding
an ,GC. Subsequently,
through the positive
outcome of this
vote, Craxi was able
to conun., the Member
States to an IGC during
which the question
Of institutional reform

was

outcome

Delors

to

decisive pan, by

when

making

i,

central.

A

article in

Agence Europe

fully attributed this

wntes that “the proposal
presented by Delors htmself
played

the debate inevitable

and

ai,

owing

clarification

provoked between the Heads of
government arguments which

for

which moreover

some were

186

unexpected.”
Bntain,

Denmark and Greece were outraged
about

Thatcher claimed that she was
a victim of a

trap,

the

mm of events:

Margaret

Poul Schluter, the Danish
prime

minister complained of rape and
Andreas Papandreou, the Greek
Prime Minister, spoke
1

87

of a “mini coup d'etat”
voted for the

IGC and

During the

But seven

final press

Treaty.

We

not possible.

finally

results

won

.

.]

Agence Europe

The way

is

it.

[...]

Today's decision was a

that

“we have taken

difficult one, after a

because of political will and the
possibilities offered
a general consensus

now open

(July 4, 1985,

Ibid, 9. Foi a reference

for

of the sununit when he pointed out

would have preferred
[.

way

France and Gennany

conference Craxi expressed a great
sense of achievement

an important and necessary decision

which was

States, including

thereby decisively paved the

and satisfaction with the

battle

Member

for

in the

and unanimity though these were

European unity

in the

economic,

social.

5).

of Thatcher’s quote see Agence Europe (November
27, 1985.

164

a

Europe of

reel, oologies,

cultural, institutional,
political cooperation

this represents a
significant step

4.2. 1.2. 3

Summit

Immediately
fact .ha,

IGC

an

in

fields, all

188

forward;

Luxembourg

after the

wii, he held

Milan conclusions Britain was
quick
does

still

any decision. At the end of
the day,
each and eveiy

and security

Member

State.

no,

mean

tha,

Me tuber

treaty revisions will

still

Delors, responded to these

to point out that the

States can he compelled
to

have to be supported by

comments by emphasizing

nupo, lance of institutional
reform for the success of the
single market, in a speech

European Parliament he vigorously
expounded
Milan was done
development,

a

in a

that the proposal he

had pu, forward

the

in the

in

“pure and intransien, manner: the
single market must be an
overall

package, and not a drugstore from
which each party obtains just wha,
he

189

During a conference of the European
Parliament’s
went even further and alleged

that

some Member
1

supermarket without paying any price."

of markets, they refused

to consider

any

States

Socialist

“wanted

to

Group, Delors

make Europe

90

While they were saying “yes"
political

nevertheless remarkable that in the end,
the

is

189

(July 10, 1985, 4).

19 °

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (October

5,

1985,

openings

Member

Luxembourg summit which took

,

Agence Europe

to the

and social reforms necessary.

Despite the entrenched opposition to
any treaty revisions by some
it

into a

5).

165

States,

place

December 2
The

treaty

and

3

,

1985 agreed on the a draft
treaty for the Single
European Act.

amend™, s were

r
force

subsequent

ratified

by a„ Member

,,

1987

hat 85 PerCen ‘ ° f ‘ he
P,0Visi0nS

staff.

and came

This outcome can clearly
be seen as a success
of the strategy

.

used and the resources
mobi.ized by the Commission.
'

States

191

° f the

Even though Gran, ,1994,

this still represents

Sil ’8'e

comext

,

Mors

claimed

European Ac, were written
by him and

75), believes tha, the

and enonnous influence

this

60

70 percent

for an institution

is

his

a fairer figure,

which does no, have

a

formal vote in the final
decision-making.
In trying to assess the
factors

achieve

its

and forces which enabled
the Commission

goal of the Sin gl e European

Ac,

the strategy and resources
available to the

Luxembourg Presidency

to support the

to

three elements stand ou,
in pari.cular:

Commission, second

First,

the willingness of the

European Commission, and

third, the strong

support of the European Parliament
for economic and political
reform.

As

to the first aspect, the

convinced the
pursued

in

Member

Commission was able

to

develop a strategy by which

States of the need for political
reform that

would have

to

it

be

conjunction with economic reform.
According to Grant (1994, 72) Delors

portrayed the European Union as
faced with two options:

reforms or decline economically
and
without the single market

initiative

politically.

initiate

economic and

Delors was successful

in

political

arguing that

and the implementation of the
necessary

institutional

It should be noted
that the following three Member
States did miss the earlier deadline
of ratifying the treaty by February
17, 1986 as stipulated by the IGC:
Ireland Denmark
and Gieece. Ireland and Denmark were
delayed by the procedure of a referendum
and

2

, 006^4
concluded
the

2

16 laS ‘

C0U " ,ry

‘ or
‘I
ratification
process.

‘° ra,ify

and thereb T waited

166

un,il

bolh countries had

reforms, Europe would
no, only

fal,

behind

its

competitors economically,
but would also

be po, ideally paralyzed
and crippled. The .mage
of Europe's demise
the

mind of the decision-makers
Additionally, the

in the las.

phase of the Luxembourg
summit.

Commission made ample use
of its opportunity

the Intergovernmental
Conference: together with the

delegation to table any
proposals and
delegation touching on nearly

proposals.

1,

Member

was

the

firs,

more proposals than any other

total

of 30 proposals

to the

States submitted between
three

and four

participated in the ministerial-level
meetings called by the

Luxembourg Presidency. Thus, according
of the Commission,

i,

chapters of the Treaty refonn
discussed. According to

all

Prestdency, while most

Formally,

to participate in

European Parliament

in total tabled far

Corbett (1987, 244), the
Commission submitted a

Luxembourg

was very much on

“its position

to

papers were

Rometsch (1999,

at

1

14)

due

to the activities

the center of the negotiations .”"’

2

Immediately after Luxembourg had
taken over the Presidency of
the European
Council,

it

formed a Working group headed by
Jean Dondelinger, Luxembourg's
Foreign

Minister as well as a

member of the Dcoge Committee. The
Committee was

given the

task of discussing draft proposals
of participants and ultimately preparing
a final treaty

proposal.

Already on July 22" J 1985, both the
Commission and the Parliament submitted
,

their position papers to the

Commission submitted
on increased

flexibility

Dode linger Committee.

three

more

texts:

Additionally, in

one on the creation of the

on decision-making linked

to the internal

192

Original quote in German.

167

mid-September the

internal market,

market which

one

recommended

rhe adoptron maj„r
ity voting rules

'n addition to these
proposals,

baling

to internal

and one on

the

delegations

that further proposals

win be submitted

powers of the European
Parliament and the
Commission. These proposals
to the

Dondelinger Committee just
prior

its

meeting on

194

i

*

announced

93

the Conncii, and one
technology

cohesion and solidarity,
one on coordination
of financial instruments

were formally submitted

Octoher

i,

in

,985.

According

welcomed

to information available

Agence Europe,

these proposals and did
no, present their

own

-several

proposals saying

they are ready to use
93
those of the Commission
as a basis for their
work”'
With the

exception of the proposals from
the Parliament and one
proposal sub, pitted by the

German

delegation a, the end of
September, by October (f. ,985
the proposals submitted

by the Commission were the
only position papers received
by the Dondelinger Group.
Thus, Commission no, only
acted
sub, pitted a

Commission

much

larger

much

faster than

any other delegation, bu,

number of proposals than any

other delegation.

to substantially influence
the policy debate

i,

196

also

This allowed the

which took place

inside the

Dondelinger Group.

As
was

to the

second factor that influenced the
adoption of the Single European
Act,

crucial that the

Luxembourg government completely
agreed with

Agence Europe (September

18,

1985,

3).

194

Agence Europe (October
195

2,

A
Agence
Europe (September

1985,

19,

3).

1985,

3).

196

Agence Europe (October

7/8, 1985,

1

).
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the

Commissions

it

-I- the

freaty revisions
should be

omic reform and
.he

Council, program

emphasize

conduced within one

political reform.

for the

,GC, of the four aspects
of

that the Presidency
very

EEC

treaty to

much

supported the

Presidency aimed

at

its

in

proposal one was to
strongly

Commission,

point of view that

This conference should
simultaneously

enable the single market
measures

included institutional reforms

8 ,e framework. combining

When the Luxembourg
Presidency announced

only one conference
should he convened.
revtse the

s i„

be implemented as well
as

order to father political
cooperation.

incorporating the proposed

new

provisions

in

this sense, the

one single

199

h

omework.

Several

Member

States, in particular
again the United

Greece, favored minimal
changes to pave the

way

2
pertaining to the decision
rules in the Council.

”

decision of the Presidency in
a very positive way.

en pointed out that the

for the single

Kingdom and

market and no changes

The Commission reacted

to the

The Commission, spokesman
Mr.

L ommission welcomes the
unicity of the Conference,
an

197

n0te d '!“
Ihcte
there should be
h! single
,
198

XI ie
1

!

l

K
!

proposal of tl,e European Parliament
emphasized that
economic and political reform.

for

.1

other three aspects included: to
improve the Council decision-making
procedures
Izing quallfled majonty voting
rules; to strengthen the

y l
implementing power; and
•

illS0

framework

Commission’s

to

enhance the powers of the European
Parliament. Fora

eience of this list see Agence Europe
(July 25, 1985,
European Communities (1985d, point 1.1,10),
ie

3) as well as

Commission of the

199

For a discussion ol this point see
Agence Europe (July 26, 1985,
200 o

See Agence Europe (July 22/23,
1985,

3).
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I).

orientation in line with
wha, PresideM

Community

De

,

ors advocated

when

^

^^^

separation between the
eeonomie element and the
20
political element"

'

Also the Parliament
supported the same point
202
of view as the
Commission
For
instanee, Aherio Spinelli,
the Chainnan of the
Committee on Institutional
Affairs,
.

emphasized
lire

Member

that the

Parliament essentially has
three weapons by
which

States to paralyze the

Community:

firs,, i,

i,

could threaten

could re^se to adopt a
budget,

second „ could table a censure
motion which would force
the Commission
third

it

could refuse to give

its

to resign

and

opinion on legislative
proposals deliberated by the

Council. Each of these three
measures separately, and certainly
any combination of them

would bring about a serious

crisis

of the Community.

the Parliament "will resort
to this tribunal

know can

be formidable ”

The Parliaments’
government announced
c-uropean

power which

necessaty, Spinelli maintains,

it

has and which Governments

203

position

that

i,

was considerably strengthened
when

would

ratify a

new Treaty only

if

it

Italian

were accepted by the

204

Parliament.

In the

words of Corbett (1987, 242-243)
"the

veto any package not acceptable
to the
the final stages

Quoted

If

in

of the negotiations.

Agence Europe

(...)

EP

Italian threat to

turned this into one of the trickiest
points

This too can be seen as an attempt

(July 24, 1985,

to

push

5).

202

For a more detailed discussion of the
position of the EP see Schmuck 1987.
203

Foi Spinelli

s

comments

see

Agence Europe (September

204

For

this detail see

Corbett (1987, 241).
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9/10, 1985,

1).

a

in

particular

government

on .he single market

further along , he
pa«h

of reform.” While
agreement was reached

initiative rather quickly,
the

agreement on

political

refonn was

considerably helped through
the actions of the
European Parliament.
Partly

Commission

by taking these

that the

threats seriously, but
also partly

by agreeing with the

European Parliament should
play a larger

role in the

Communities

decision making, the President
of the European Council,
Mr. Poos, the Prime
Minister of

Luxembourg, pointed „u,

that -a, all costs, the
wishes of the Parliament
should no, be

205

ignored.”

Concretely, the President

made

possible tha, a delegation
from the

Parliament was able to attend
each Ministerial session of
the Conference. This
participation, allowed the
Parliament to
at

make

position

its

known

each Conference session.
Additionally, and more
importantly

sessions should be delivered
to the Parliament
vote on

before heads of governments

it,

in

time so that

would even have had

it

directly to the Ministers
so, the

work of the

would be able

to take a

the opportunity to discuss

the proposal.

In the

dra^^ treaty

basis of

run-up to the summit, both the
proposals of the Commission as
well as the

P r °P° sal of the European Parliament were essential
building-block on the

which decisions were

finally reached.

Intergovernmental Conference completed

its

On December

work

to

“Single European Act” which contained
a European

Cooperation aspect. Several compromises
were

17, 1985, the

reform the

Community

treaties

by adopting a

aspect and a Political

crafted: First, the objective

of a broadly

defined internal market by 1992 was
accepted, given that the 1992 deadline
would not

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (September

1

1,

1985,

3).
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create

any automatic

Article 100

legal effects.

was revised

to

Second, with regard

to

unanimity rule or majority

rule:

allow majority voting,
but only pertaining

to measures of
harmonization which were
seen as necessary for the
successful completion
of the single

market.

Addit.onally, a

compromise

of the European Par, lament.

sola, ton

the end. the

was found on

Member

the question of
participahon

States agreed to extend
compulsory

consultation between the
Council and the Parliament
to

new

policy issues> and

mQre

importantly, to establish a
system of “cooperation" to
involve Parliament fully
legislative process, notably
for
States, including the

Denmark remained
Danish delegation

most of the single market
program. While

United Kingdom and Greece
were agreeable to the

the only country

still

signaled drat

which voiced strong

Denmark would

4.2.2 Implications for the
Decision-Making

reservations.

all

final

the

Member
outcome,

Nevertheless, the

be willing ,o ratify the treaty.

Process

Despite the fact that the European
Commission had no formal role

in the final

decision-making process of the
Intergovernmental Conference, many scholars
agree
the influence

it

was

still

able to exert on the final

this observation, the predictions

the decision-making process

made by

seem

outcome was

quite considerable.

neoftinctionalist scholars about the

to best suited to explain the

that

Given

dynamics of

outcome of the Single

European Act.

The

factors that helped the

Commission

to participate in the

policyshaping and

policy-setting decisions are two-fold: on the
one hand Delors very actively produced a
laige

number documents and

position papers in which he not only repeated
his vision of a

economically and socially rejuvenated Europe, but
also managed

172

to give a reality to this

vision through a carefully crated three-stage strategy: in the

aimed
stage,

at

reaching an agreement on the need for a single market. Then

aimed

it

at

committing the

the third and finally stage,

both increase

its

own

it

Member

aimed

at

Commission

in the

second

States to an Intergovernmental Conference. In

achieving changes in decision-rules which would

to participate in the

decision-making process. The most

important factor that helped the Commission to achieve

its

vision and realize

the willingness of the Council Presidencies to cooperate.

Italian

the

capacity to influence policy-shaping decisions as well as the

European Parliament’s capacity

was

first stage,

and Luxembourg governments was

vital for the

its

The support from

strategy

the

success of the efforts that Delors

pursued.

Community Charter

4.3

of

Fundamental Social Rights

The debates surrounding
the debates

on

a Social Europe.

the single market created increased

The importance of the increased

market was pointed out by Delors on
the

May

European Trade Union Confederation

12,

in

1988

when he

momentum

behind

integration of the single

said during a Congress of

Stockholm, “the social dimension of

building Europe” which was “both a condition and a goal for further progress in Europe

[...]

now

requires us to

make

the

most of the opportunities opened up

in the field

by the

206

Single European Act.”

Along

similar lines Andriessen (1986, 15) then Vice-President

of the Commission, stated that the “Commission

206

Quote

in

is

determined

to take

Commission of the European Communities, (1988d,

173

advantage of what

point 1.1.1).

Ihe Single

207

Ac, has to

Commtssion

in its

social dimension.

offer.”

momentum was

This

carried further

by the Delors'

continued efforts to tmpiemen,
the single market as
wel, as further the

The Commission's

efforts

were most importantly
supported by

the

Beigian government which held
the Presidency of the
European Council during the

firs,

half of the year 1987.

The Commission
European Council on
Council debated

At

the

this

May 30\ ,989.”

in

to the

June the same year, the Social
Affairs

Madrid only eleven of

Charter should be agreed on

Commission

i,

proposal and was most heavily
criticized by the British
delegation.

European Council

a Social

finished a draft of the Social
Charter and submitted

at the

the twelve

European Union

finally presented the formal
proposal, the

Member

level.

head of

state

States declare that

When

the

of the British

government, Margaret Thatcher, considers
the charter as a "backlash into
Marxtsm.”

During the meeting

in

Strasbourg on 8-9 December
1989, the heads of all

with the exception of the United
Kingdom, adopted the

Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.

The preamble

Community

Member

Charter of the

09

to the Charter stated resolutely
that “the

attached to the social aspects as to the
economic aspects and

same importance must be

[...]

therefore, they

must be

207

Quoted

in

Cram

(1997, 40-41).

208

Commission of the European Communities 1989b.
209
>r
1

^ie C ° nC ^ US *° n

Strasbourg

States,

Summit

see

Agence Europe (December

989)

174

10,

m a balanced manner.

P

Robens and Springer pom,

industrial relations

On

EU authorities.

was merely symbolic

in

Despite these encouraging
words of the preamble.

ou, that “the flaw in the
chatter

provide rights for employee.”
against national or

210

the basis of the chafer,
no

A,so abundant

more than

in the

i,

does no, actually

emp.oyee may Cam,

literature agrees, tha,
the

of the European Union or
the member
'

documen

2

states.

'

word of

In the

'

of scholars have identified
several weaknesses of the
Charter:
is

non-binding on

its

This means that the Charter

much

effect

considered to be no,

is

can ever be expected from

much more

Commission any new

one finds the observation

as -no
213
it.

than a solemn declaration,

leaving decisions on implementation
procedures entirely to individual
in the literature

First,

signatories

words of Combes and Rees
(1991, 271) can be characterized

a statement of principle”,
no,

Second, also

that the Charter

member

states.

does no, give the

2 4
'

or expanded legislative mandate.

The Community

is

explicitly

210

Commission of the European Communities
a
*1

Silvia 1991.
991

?Foi

1990.

Te3gUe 1989a TeagUe and Grahl 1991
Rhodes 1991
European
F
’

’

a detailed discussion of the
system of supervision of the

Social Charter see

Hams

1991.

212

Commission of the European Communities
(1990,
213

For

this

rights

2

several scholars have
emphasized that since the Charter

and thereby

tha,

character and had no
consequences for social policy
and

2
Delors, the charter embodied
an “aspiration.”

A number

is

argument see

Mohn

(1992,

6).

214

See Berie (1993, 69) and Vogel-Polsky
(1991, 43).
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3).

>

reminded

to act

within the limits of

its

powers,” and the Preamble
states that “the

implementation of the Charter
must no, entail an extension
to the
as defined

effect can be expected

number

Community s powers

by the Treaties.- Third,
several seholars have
pointed on,
from the Charter due

to the

that no,

much of an

vagueness and generality
of a large

215

of

its

clauses.

For instance, clause 10
on social protection simply
says that

every worker should have
a right to adequate
social protection,

while the unprotected

‘must be able to receive
sufficient resources and
social assistance in
keeping with their
particular situation."
Additionally, clause 24 states
that retired workers

must be able

to

enjoy "a decent standard of
living." Ohvtously, the
combination of the non-binding
character of the Charter with
the absence of a legal
basis
elastic notions

interpretations

in

of adequacy, sufficiency and
decency, open the possibility

and varying degrees of
implementation

Commission

reports assessing

its

to issue proposals to

is

.ha,

it

for diverging

States.

again continued the

implement the charter as well

as annual

implementation. In compliance with
this responsibility, after
the

adoption of the Social Charter, the
Commission proposed 47

Action Programme.

Member

in the

Perhaps the only tangible effect
the Charter has had
authority of the

addition to the extremely

"

initiatives in a

new

Social

Seventeen of these items were directives
and these primarily dealt

with health and safety matters.
Others were no, legally binding
recommendations
area of social policy (examples).

For

this

Bu, due

to the

in the

unanimity rule required and the negative

argument see Daubler (1990, 67) and Seidel
(1990,

216

See Commission of the European
Communities, 1989a.
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167).

posincn of the United
Kingdom, vet^ few soc

,

a|

_

s

were adopted

^^

completion of the internal
market. As pointed out
by Dowling (1996, 599).
h

n!tX
r«?
g
roice

I*

a

d ,lK

r

9 S ° Cial

AC

i0n

Pro
these two documents
uL”
quicklv took
,

I...J

‘

~

had

t iifP
.1
own. By the 1990s the
Charter and the ^989 SocTa,
Aei.on
Ptogramme had catapulted the
previously obscure EU
worker

rUm ° r
important

Along similar

lines,

Kowalsky (1999, 136) pointed
out

Social Charter were primarily

arguments which pointed

economic progress,

'°

(2)

°" e ° f B ~ ssels

priorities.

that effects

™*«

of the debate of the

reintroduce into the political
debate again two important

to the fact that there

can he “(1, no social progress
without

no sustainable economic growth
without

social cohesion.”

interdependence of social and
economic policy was a central
principle
Paris and as will be discussed
in the next chapter,

developed by the Commission

’

•

in

the

was

in the

This

Treaty of

also an important argument

mid 1990s. Additionally, Keller
(1995, 4

|

|)

has

pointed out .ha, politically, the
Social Charter represents “an
important milestone along
the path of developing a social
Europe.”

This observation raises the question
what factors and forces have influenced
the
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights. In particular, which
strategy did
the

Commission pursue and

politically

which steps did

outcome?

177

it

take to influence the final

4.3.1

Factors influencing the
adoption of the Charter on
Fundamental
Social Rights

The

strategy of the

the idea as possible.

nrst

Phase

i,

aimed

Commission

to

achieve the Social Charter
mainly had three

Second, again the Commission
aimed

a,

a, a

twos, age

strategy: in the

achieving a solemn declaration
from the Heads of State
committing

themselves to the implementation
of the goals of the Charter.
In the second phase,
the

Commission could then

Agam,
the

spell on,

more

concrete, y

wha, exactly these goals should

the cooperation with the
Presidency of the European
Council

was very

entail.

critical for

achievement of the strategy of the
European Commission.

As

c hairman

to the firs,

01 the

component of the Commission's

Ec0nomic and

Social

strategy, Delors sen, a
letter to the

Committee (ESC) on November

10,

1988 and

thereby formally requested the
opinion of the Committee on the
possibilities of creating a

cohesive social European agenda.

Community Charter
practices

is

its

in

'

7

The

not an easy task.

It

letter

points out that “the elaboration
of such a

requires a thorough

and frank confrontation between partners

Commission believed
reflect

2

that the

opinion

at the

a document.

national
2

in

economic and

ESC’s composition would make

on the possible content of such

knowledge of

it

beginning of January. As pointed out by
Falkner (1994, 225)

to present

this

The letter was reprinted in Commission of the
European Communities (1990
Agence Europe (November 1, 1988, 6).

218
Ibid, 6.
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The

best able to discuss and

The Committee was asked

1

'*

social life.”

move

80) and

on .he pan of the

ESC

Common represented a so far “unprecedented

to actively participate
in the

shaping of

responded with some delay
on February

community

social rights, the proposals

EU

.egislatio.

22"-, 1988,

made

in this

opportunity for the

Even though

by issuing

its

the

opinion on basic

opinion were largely no,
tak e„ up

wever, instead ot the taking
the elements of the
proposal of the ECS, the

document approved by

the heads of state

Committee

was vety Cose

to the

.

final

document prepared by

the

219

European Commission.
In

order to succeed in getting
a declaration from the
heads of state, the

Commission

critically

had

to rely

on the support from the Presidency
of the European

Council. Again, the Belgian
government which started the Presidency
started January

1987 was willing
to

work very

tenure.

In

to give this

kind of support. The intention
of the Belgian government

closely with the European

Commission was expressed vety

early during

its

an interview on January d", Leo
Tindemans, Belgians Foreign Affairs

Minister pointed out that “Belgium
will await the Commission's
proposals;
responsibility will be to ensure that
the meetings

Council of Ministers decides. Only

if the

it

its

chairs progresses correctly, so
that the

Commission

is

not up to the task will the

220
Belgian government be led to formulate
suggestions.”

219

For

this point see
61

ofAe ECS

again

Dowling (1996, 598). Also Kowalsky
(1999, 136) pointed out that
Commission has 50 far not caIled 011 the active participation

16nCe

^

220

Quoted

1«

in

Agence Europe (January

6,

1987,

3).
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m

his speech to .he
Parliament

Presidency's Programme,
Tindemans

on January

“holding the presidency

to forget or

In

mid-February,

even more

is

[...]

22"“, ,987, in

explicit

which he presented

when he

the

points out that

plays a sometimes
essential rde

in

shove aside.”

Delors presented the
Commission's programme for 1987
to the

222

European Parliament.

In his presentation

he stressed one overarching

creating the essential conditions
to implement the Single
European
essentia, conditions he identified:

the

new Cities of

economic
process.

policies

the

the adaption

of the common

Ac, Among

the

agricultural policy to

European market, second, stronger
emphasis on Community

which aim

at structural

reforms, and third, reform of
the budget

Additionally, Delors outlined that
the following two measures
should be taken

10 strengthen the Single

social

first,

priority:

and economic

Market: developing a single currency
and involving the actors' of

life in

a cooperative

Parallel to presenting the

growth strategy.

Commission’s programme

to the

European Parliament,

Delors also submitted a communication
to European Council with the

Success of the Single Act -

Quoted

in

A new

programme

“Making

a

Frontier” (also referred to as the
Delors plan) which

Agence Europe (January

Foi details ot the

title

23, 1987, 3).

see Agpnce Europe (February 19, 1987, 5-8).
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spelied ou, the

same g oa.s and pnonties

Presidency received

for the Conttnttnity.

this docuntent, he,„
g

immediately responded posidvely

to

i,

“

After the Be|glan

convinced ahon, the
arguntents presented,

and potnted

,

ha,

this

was

a

,,

comp, ex and

ambitious plan which cannot
224
be broken up by isolating
one aspect or another.
Additionally, the President
of the European Council,

Wlfned

Martens, also the Prime

Minister of Belgium, pointed
ou, tha, Europe must
“develop towards a true
political
225

union.”

clearly, the Belgian
presidency
the

tire

Commission

1

)

achieve

this goal.

Two

examples, confirm

this

to

work

closely with

determination:

First,

Belgian Presidency prepared a
report for the General
Affairs Council on the
Delors

plan.

(

to

was very much committed

In its

3t>page long report, the Belgian
presidency emphasized the
following points:

the Delors plan should be
maintained as a whole;
(2) the implementation of the Single

Act should be a priority without
opening any new debates on
cohesion or the
structural funds in this context;

and

(3) a

minimum body of social

role

of the

provisions should be

226

created.

This

move

not only gua ranteed that the
Delors plan

would remain on

the

223

For the complete

text

of the document see Agence Europe
(February 20 1987 15-18)
'

987

'

(February 26!
224
5).

For the reaction of the Belgian Presidency
see Agence Europe (February
25, 1987b,

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (February

26, 1987b, 3).

226

For a discussion of this report see Agence
Europe (April 25, 1987, 5) and
C ommission of the European Communities
(1988e, 61-62).

agenda of the European
Council, but also
for the

that the debate

was framed

in a favorable

way

Commission.

Second, during the General
Affairs Council the
Belgian Presidency
managed to
find a consensus among
the delegates whtch by
and large left the Delors
plan unchanged.

By

majority vote

Kingdom - gave

all

Member

States, with the
exception

their approval to the
guidelines

achieved by rather choosing

to

of one - namely the
United

of the Delors plan. This
outcome was

main, a, n the tex, with

its

substantta, content instead

searching for a unanimous
agreement, which would have
resulted

changed and weakened

4.3.1.1 Criticism of

Parallel to the

the single market,

of

in a substantially

text.

Lack of Social Dimension

Commissions’

numerous

efforts

institutions

and

of implementing the measures
political

to bring about

groups voiced them concern
over

possible consequences of the
single market. These criticisms
helped to strengthen the

Commission’s agenda. Most commonly
voiced was

the fear that the

lead to an increase in social
and political polarization in Europe.

European Parliament raised
the Single

the following

European Act: “are the measures proposed

ensure that the large internal market

and

two questions during

social cohesion? If not,

is

completed

must we face the

in

in the

a

common

market will

For instance the

committee hearing on

Delors plan sufficient to

tandem with increasing economic

possibility that the unified

economic area

227
a

1987°5)

d SCUSSIOn ° f thlS
'

strate gy

of

Belgian Presidency see Agence Europe
(July

182

2,

^ C °mPle,ed WlK "
elimination of

all

made

Httrope."

his

are

frontiers could
aggravate rather than attenuate

Additionally,

Chainttan,

Member States

Guy

Spitaels, Belgian
Minister

a wide-ranging speech

s.il,

such ,ha, the
228

them?"

of State and Socialist
Party

on April 27, 1987 with

speech he criticized the
recent European

the

theme "unjamming

initiatives as

being too

much

focused on creatmg a singie
market and improving the
effectiveness of Community

mechanisms. Instead wha,
would be needed

a

is

on the following three themes:
employment and
defense.

programme of action which would

social justice, the cuitura,
model, and

Spitaels stressed that “all
political leaders

government who question them
on fundamental
and armament,

all

focus

must give concrete

issues:

replies to the

employment, soc, a, protection,

of which have a European
dimension. Without a programme

perceptible to public opinion,

how can

voters be led or be asked
to

show support

or even

229

,

enthusiasm?”

Along similar

lines,

ETUC

emphasized

in

numerous

press releases that while

it

supports the basic approach of
the Delors plan, further
action would be necessaty
to bring

about a European social area.

23

"
I,

implemented without further action
consequences

lor regions

warns

that as long as the single

market would be

in the social area, inevitably
there will

be negative

which are economically weak. Through
the use of the concept

228

Agence Europe

(April 4, 1987, 11).

229

Quoted

in

Agenge Europe

(April 29, 1987a, 5).

230

For instance see Agence Europe (April
29, 1987b,
1,

1988).
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14),

June 29/30, 1987a,

9),

(March

"socia,

dumping”,

ETUC

marke, could be used

more

‘laissez-faire'

ETUC argued

to

aniculated the fear

weaken

social protection

liberalization in the sing
,e

of workers competing

for jobs in a

European environment created
by the single market,
fn

that an unregulated
single

national shackles

economic

on

capital investment

this

context

market could encourage
companies, freed

movements

to relocate

ftOil!

from countries which

provided high wages, wide
social secunty provisions
and good working condttions
to
countries where income
expectations are lower, social
provisions are far less
protective
23

and environmental

'

legislation less restrictive.

terms of immediate concrete
policy proposals

In

macro-economic

policies aiming to

policies aiming to

overcome

ETUC

called for the adoption
„f

promote growth and employment
as well as

structural inequalities.

Additionally,

creation of European citizenship
rights which would guarantee
to

economic, social and

political rights

wherever they reside within

terms of developing a
medium-term strategy,

up

on the

a report

social

Secretary General of

~

it

demands asked

is

M

a large

ETUC, Mr.

T 7employment
7
:

l60) Se

demanded
citizens

the

of Europe
232

the

the

Community.

Commission
In the

to

In

draw

words of the

Hinterscheid, the current principles
of the single market

body of literature

(

all

consequences of the single trained
market.

231

There

i,

industrial

available

on

“

the concept

“ S° Cial dUmP ng aS 3
'

of “social dumping ” For
S
co,npet,rn based

He understands that, within the EU and as the
market program advances, “standards of
social protection might be depressed
or
at least kept from nstng,
by increased competition after 1992 from
States with
substantially lower standards". For
similar definitions and empirical work
on social
" e “ 995 Aspingwali l996
Ermisch 1991, Falkner 1993, Kleinhenz
1990 ’ Sdm, " Z<l990 103 >‘ S,eil
'994,Taylor-Gooby 1997, Teague
1989b,
practices.

internal

'

'

‘

^sogSoO.

‘

232

For

this

demand

see

Agence Europe (May

12,

1988, 14).
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-if

pU.

into practice give
rise to a race to

would be those employers
who were

abandon

best a, a,ranging the
hours,

had the work contracts
which were the most

off,

social protection

and

salarial costs.

economy and employment on

regulations, in

flexible,

This downwards

which the winners

who

laid

and the cheapest

spiral, this

a week-to-week basis
could only

most workers
in

terms of

way of tmnagtng

the

damage healthy

competition based on technological
innovation, a dynamic trade
policy and a far-seeing

employment policy

in quantitative

and qualitative terms.”

Several scholars have
potnted out that
lack

of a stronger

social

ETUC

dimension were no, due

develop one, but rather due

to the opposition

233

understood that the reasons
for the

to the

Commission’s reluctance

of the British government for
such

234

measures.

Accordingly,

specifically at the British

As such

i,

saw

in the

were targeted

it

a helpful alliance to

push

for further

235

generally.

developments

in

strengthened the position of the
Commission vis-a-vis the

States.

A Memorandum
May

criticism of the social market

government as well as the European
Council more

Commission

the social arena as well as

Member

ETUC’s main

issued by the Belgian Presidency
of the European Council on

27, 1987, proposed that the

soctal standards

Community should be

which would provide the

authorized to develop “minimal

social partners with a stable and

common

base

233

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (June

policy position of

ETUC

29/30, 1987b, 9). For a detailed discussion
of the
see Seidel (1989, 158). Brusis
(1989, 16).

234

For

this

argument see Rometsch (1999,

For

this

argument see Breit (1988,

105),

and Kopke (1988, 48).

235
57), Vetter (1988, 121
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and 126)

from which they could
negotiate
internal market.

AcC ord,„ g

in

order to guarantee a
real social dimension
for the

to the proposal, the
following social
guarantees are

no

longer negotiable:
(1) concerning industrial
relations: trade union
freedom and the right
.0 organize and to
engage in collective
bargaining and prior
information and the
consultation of workers in
case of technological
innovations or impoifan,
changes in the

company: and
worker

to

negotiated

(2) concerning

employment and working

conditions: the right of
any

be covered by a collective
bargaining or professional
agreements, whatever

employment

contrae, and the right
to be represented in
the collective

bargaining; the ngh, for
workers employed
securtty benefits

and

to protection

whatever their work regime,
nght of any worker

to fair

the various fonns of
atypical

work

to social

concerning the hours of work;
the right of workers,

to protection

measures

in the field

of health and

safety, the

remuneration to ensure for him
and his family a decent

standard of living, (for this
detail see Ross,
1995a, 368).

4.3.1.2

Response

As

of the

Commission

a response to these critical
voices, the

Commission created an

interdepartemental working party at
the beginning of the year
1988. The working party

was given

the task to study the social
implications of the

recommend accompanying measures

Quoted

in

this

Agence Europe (May

that should

common

market and

be taken. The overall goal of the

27, 1987, 6).

186

economic and the

S ocia, aspects

of the interna, market.

thCn thC C0mmiSSI0ner
of thc

’

DG 011

On

February 24.

„ 88 M a„ue,

Social Affairs and

Employment, Education
and Training, announced
the following three
objectives which would
font, the basis of
social policy that should
be pursued by the

Community

in the

following years:
(1)

implementing measures which
promote freedom of movement

among

for persons

which should

other things enable the
recognition ofcenifica.es and
qualifications; ,2) analyzing

the possible impact „l
the single internal
market on

employment and working
conditions

as well as assessing the
possible risk of social
dumping; and ,3) identifying
the socia,

changes

that will

be brought about or speeded
up by the completion of the
larger market.

such as legal measures on
the European, sectorial
and regional

Then

in

May

Europe” dedicated
the

of the same year, the Commission
issued

to the “social aspects

work of scholars which were asked

this report

market

is

stand out:

First, the repor,

absolutely necessary

if

we

of the

2

”

levels.

a special edition

internal market.”

The

,0 study the issue in depth.

report

of “Social

was based on

Two main

findings of

boldly states that “the social
dimension of the large

are not to loose the supporl
of the workers and

238
,

unions.”

Second, the report recommends the
establishment of fundamental social

rights to mitigate

some of

the possible negative consequences
of the internal market.

237

Commission of the European Communities
( 1988b, point 12
Europe (January 23, 1988,
7), (February 25, 1988, 7).
238

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (May

6,

1988, 9).
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'

1)

'

Also see Aeenre
8

Building on .he findings
of .he s.udy,

in

Sep, ember

Commissioner Marin

presen, ed a report on ,he
..Social Dimension
of ,he fn.emal Marker.
This repod was
!a,er

adop.ed by ,he Commission
as a forma,
communicafion and cons.im.ed
,he program

Of action that the
Commission proposed

™i„

conclusions stand on,

emphasize

tha, the social

facilitate the free

in .he

,o

implement between 1988
and 1993.

repod and the communication:

Firs,,

239

Three

bo.h documents

dimension of the Community
should mostly impodant.y

movement of labor. For

this

propose actions were
proposed which

eliminate obstacles to ,he
free movement, such
as extending the freedom
of the worker
also ,0 parents, children

and dependants and
implementing

a

system of recognition of

diplomas of higher education
and professional qualifications.
Second, both repods point
OU, that social hamonization
through legal measures will

be the appropdate tool to

address the cutren, economic
problems as well as social
inequalities. Instead social

cohesion

is

best achieved through
decentralized policy measures,
such as encouraging

education and professional training.
Third, the report concludes
are the

reports

most important actors in bringing
about changes

recommend,

institutions

that the social dialogue

tha, the social partners

in social policies.

Thus, the

should be fostered both by European

and national governments

By and

large, the Charter

on Fundamental Social Rights
was based on

the

conclusions of this report. During
the French Presidency of the
European Council

in

1989, the final details of the Charter
were worked out. Again, the French
government

239

Commission of the European Communities,
(1988a, point 1.1.1), also see Agence
Europe (September 7, 1988,
5), (September 8, 1988, 5-6). Also see
Social Europe
Sondeiheft 1988 and the Social Dimension
of the Internal Market, Commission
Communication, September 1988 - also called the
Marin Report
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deeded

to adopt

most of the Commission's
proposals, instead rf

as ,0 increase the
hkelihood of a positive
vote of the British

predictable prior ,o ,he
Counci, nreeiing in Strasbourg
on
States agreed to sign the
Chafer, with the British

^^^

govern,. As was

Ma y

govern,

,

30. 19S9, eleven

he „„ ly

Mem ber

^

already

Member
State that

icfused to be part of the
agreement.

According

Margaret Thatcher (1993,
750), “the Social Charter
was quite

sintply a socialist charter

predominately by

aimed

at

- devised

socialist

member

b y socialists in the

states [...)

we

Community document

on Decision-Making

The Community Charter of
Fundamental
the

did no, teed a

introducing the Delors brand
of socialism by the back
door.”

4.3.2 Implications

which

Commission and favoured

Commission has used

rather skillfully a

on current criticisms of the lack of
a

Commission was

Social Rights represents
an example in

social

window of opportunity: maximizing

dimension of the single market, the

able to respond by presenting
a detailed proposal which
outlined

general social measures which
the heads of states were asked
to sign as an agreement.

Tins observation suggests

that the theoretical predictions

about the dynamics of decision-making,
best

Fundamental Rights was agreed

at

involving as

credibility; second,

it

many
aimed

the process by

neofunetionalism

which

the Charter of

on.

Again the strategy pursued by
aimed

fit

made by

the

Commission had

three components:

first, it

actors as possible, so as to gain greater
political cloud and
at

gaining a political commitment from the

legarding the C harter, and third and

finally,

it

aimed

at

189

Member

States

presenting the exact policy details

” 3 S0C al aCti °" Pr08
'

'

amme

^

made. Few changes were
made b y

aflCT

the

o^ina, agreement on

Member

State governments

forward by the Commisston.
Most important,,, agam in

he

Belgian as

we„

the Charter

had been

the proposals

this context

was

pu ,

the support by

as French governments
both of which had the
Presidency of the

European Council.

4.4

The Social Protocol of the
Treaty
The

and

10,

initiative

of Maastricht

of the Intergovernmental
Conference

1991 goes back to a

common

in

Maastricht on

December?

proposal of both Chancellor
Helmut Kohl and

President Francois Mitterrand
on April 18, 1990 to the
President of the European
ctl,

Charles Haughey.

In this letter both heads

deepening and widening of the
European Union. The

of government recommended
the

letter specifies that
“in the light

of

far-reaching changes in Europe
and in view of the completion
of the Single Market and
the realization

of Economic and Monetary Union
we consider

the political construction of
the
relations as a

Europe of the Twelve

whole among the Member-States

into

it

necessary

in belief , ha,

i,

is

Kohl and Mitterrand proposed

that the

an intergovernmental conference on

“European Council should

Political

Union” The

See Agence Europe, No. 5238 (April
20, 1990,
run-up to Maastricht see Compston

p.6).

(2001, 113).

241

Quoted

in:

Wessels (1991,

time to transform

European Union and vest

24
with the necessary means of
action as envisaged by the Single
Act.”

10.

190

accelerate

this

Union

'

In effect, both

initiate preparations for

particular objective of such a

For a detailed discussion of the

conference should be the
red,, ion of ,he democratic
U " ,ty an<l C° herenCe
bC WeCn " ,e aCti0ns
of the
'

political field,

and

last

more

deficit,

T «c'lve

in the

bu, no. leas,, ,he
developmen, of a

efficient institutions,

economic, monetary and

common

foreign

and security

policy

,n

,Une l990>

in

Dublin The Euro
P“» Council decided
’

one on Economic and
MoneUuy Union, and the one
on
opened

a, ,he

European Council meeting

several scholars, the

Commission

a, the

in

Rome

in

Political

December

,„

convene two IGCs,

Union. Both IGCs were
,990.

discussions of the Political
Union.
the participation

was

"

of the Commission

quite different: while the

in

mainly that Delors had invested
a

Union.

its

influence on the negotiations
of the

244

The reason

lo,

cited for this limited
influence are

of time and energy on developing
an agenda
to

for the

develop a stance on

For instance Rometsch
(1999, 173) quotes an interview with
Francois

Lamoureux, who was Deputy Head of
the Cabinet of Delors,
out that the

Commission was unable

to participate

on

in

which Lamoureux points

the debates

of the

Political

Union,

242

See Mazzucelli (1997,
243

64).

_
For

this

,l,a,

greatly influenced the
course of the

economic and monetary union, while
completely neglecting
Political

,„ the

“both parts of the Intergovernmental
Conference

Commission

Union were vety limited.”

much

For instance Rometsch
(1999, 173) has argued

negotiations of the economic
and monetary union,
Political

,o

time was mainly focused
on the development of

proposals for the economic
and monetary union and did
no, contribute
2

According

argument see Edwards and Pijpers (1997, 7
).

244

For the same argument see Curtin
(1993,

17),

Wiener and Neunreither (2000,

191

3).

since „ was conceptual,
y no, sufficiently prepared. In the

Rometsch, Lamoureux points
out

Commission
Political

to link the debates

tha, this lack

same

in, e,view

with

of preparation did no,
allow the

on Economic and Monetary
Unton with the debates
on

Union. ,n effect for the
Commission, the Intergovernmental
Conference was

spin into two arenas: one

in

which

i,

played a large role and
one

in

which

i,

was

no,

more

than a spectator.

Furthermore, several scholars
have pointed on, that the
limited proposals that
the

Commission made

member

states.

a defender

in the area

of political union were not
well received by most
of

For instance Wester
(1992, 214) has pointed on,

of Community

interest

found

itself several

times

in

that “the

the

Commission, as

a minority position, often

only supported by small
countries such as Belgium and
the Netherlands or a
federalist
country such as Italy.”
Throughout the negotiations Dolors
was not able to sufficiently
reline the position

of the Commission and thus,
by the end of the negotiations
Delors

“would become more and more

isolated

form the other

partners,

which increasingly

245
considered such an approach to be
unrealistic.”

While

the

political union,

instance in a

its

Commission sided with

German government on

“EMU

and

released at the beginning of February
1991, the
political

this

Commission

union alike aim to give the Community
a new

245

For

the issue of

actions in this area were mainly
confined to declarative statements. For

memorandum

pointed out that

the

argument see Wester (1992, 213).
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capacity for act, on

[...,

the advance towards

Both are aspects c.oseiy

European union.”

,i„ k e d

followed up on the proposal
and confirmed

was reached

December

that

movement:

its

in

Dublin, the European
Council

commitment

to Political

Union. The

two new intergovernmental
conferences should take
place on

,4 and ,5, ,990 in

Rome: one on

the Political Un.on,
the other

Economic and Mone.aiy Union.
Germany signaled from

commitment

the satne

246

At the next summit meeting
on April 28, 1990

dec, Sion

one and

to the creation

and implementation of

on the

the outset a veiy strong

institutional

refonns for the Political

Union, while France was
mostly concerned about
refonns towards an Economic
and
.

.247

,

onetary Union.

As

a matter

of

fact.

Kohl was only then willing

economic and monetary reform,
as long as

Gennany

Union was

willing to

Chancellor Kohl

248
steps toward political
reform were taken.

indicated from the outset
of the negotiations that the
strengthening and

the Political

Gennany was

to negotiate

a necessary condition that

make concessions

in particular

demanded

in

the

greater

needed

to

be

fulfilled before

domain of the Economic Union.

powers

for the

248

European Parliament than

246

See the European Commission
Memorandum on the draft treaty on Eurooean
?
Economic and Monetary Union, in:
Agence Europe (February
1,

1991

).

247

Andrews (1993,

109).

For an analysis of this point see
Wooley 1994.
249

For instance see “Kohl

auf Junktim

will

den Durchbruch zur Politischen Union”
and “Kohl beharrt
1991). “Die ungewollte Politische Union ”

Handelsblatt (May 2
Suddeutsche Zeitung (July 7, 1991).

1 ,

193

mos, other

Com™* ieaders were wj||mg

,

o

„

-

^

„

^

on strengthening the
competencies and powers of the
European Parliament
vis4-vis the
European Council. According
to the competencies
established by pas, treaties
the
European Parliament was
effectively excluded on

all

decisions reached in the
European

Council that were based on
the voting procedure
of simple majority or
unanimity.

European Parliament only
participated

in the

decision

making process

in

25
'

The

those areas that

were decided on qualified
majority vote by the European
Council. The objective
of

Helmut Kohl,

thus

was

to extend co-decision
procedures in areas such as
transeuropean

networks, environment and
social policy. The strategy
thereby was to extend
qualified
majority voting procedures to
areas outside of the already
established

Germany submitted

articles.

a proposal to the Council
on the Political Union in
which

it

favored the reform of unanimous
voting procedure to “enhanced
qualified majorityvoting procedure (“verstaerkte
qualifizierte Mehrheit”). This
proposal represented two of

Germany's most important

objectives: (I)

it

fulfilled

Germany's

strengthening and deepening of
the Political Union; and
(2)

wotry about the erosion of

by what might turn out

to

its

it

high social policy standards and

interest in the

addressed Germany's
its

reluctance to be bound

be insufficient European social
legislation.

252

250

Foi a discussion of the position
of

Germany

see Story (1997, 26).

251

For an analyses of legislative competencies
between European Parliament and
Euiopean Council see Fntzler and Unser
(1998, 44),

McCormick (1996

157) Corbett

1994, Viola (1997, 117).
252

Additionally,
1

reaty text.

Germany

insisted

on the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle

194

in the

e

Most other member

states

agreed with

Germany

procedure of the European
Council shot, id be extended

49 10 °a
’

'

'

18a an “ l27
'

"

'

K

PaS1 SOcial
'

„,a, the

unanimous voting

policy areas outside
of Artie,

P oii «y Jurisdiction among member

states

had

been both hampered and
obstructed because of the
veto power of one
single member
253
state.

Mostly, Great Britain had
vetoed several social policy

Social Charter in 1989.

agree with the

German

compromise was

initiatives,

Nevertheless, while Belgium,
and France
proposal,

Denmark and Spain

dralied which turned out

showed

such as the
reluctance to

indicated their outright
refusal.

be a slight variation of the
original

A

German

254

proposal.

follows:

The

Based on Article 148

The number of votes

the qualified majority
vote

for countries

large countries (Britain,
France,

votes (Spain).

was

would thereby proceed

to be weighted roughly

Germany and

Italy)

as

by population.

were given ten votes and

eight

The smaller countries (Belgium,
Greece, Netherlands, Portugal)
were

given five votes. The smallest
countries (Denmark, Ireland)
were given proportionally

west votes, namely

253

thtce.

And Luxembourg was

merely given two votes. The

total

xi
The

following countries endorsed the
extension of qualified majority voting
in their
proposals submitted to the Council:
Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Denmark
and France
254

fcnha
ed
alified majority volin g” differs
from qualified majority voting namely
h number
"b
the
of votes necessaty for any proposal to
pass. In enhanced qualified
^o ky
vote 66 votes out of 76 are considered
sufficient for a proposal to pass, in
qualified
majority vole 54 votes are sufficient
(which means 23 votes would be needed
to block)
Assuming that Germany might be interested in
blocking Council proposals at some
point
German Pr° P0Sal W0U d l,ave been far more Iikc|
<° maintain German
y
interest Since Germany has ten
interest.
votes in the voting procedure of the
Council, it would
have to have found only one more member
countiy to support its point of view. Under
quahiicd majority voting rules a countiy who
wants to block proposals has to muster a
01
VOtCS F0 a diSCUSSi ° n ° f the votin
^ mles see Schulz ( 996, 67), Scharpf
99( 19)
in
m

,

T

m

w?r
'

'

|

‘

1

0
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of votes

in the

Couneil would therefore sum up
to 76 votes. For a
qualified majority

decision 54 votes would be
necessaiy. Translated into
possible interest constellations
this

means,

that large countries

would always have

the Council's policy proposals.

would need

to

find another country as
an ally to veto

Most importantly, smaller

form veto alliances

if

countries with similar interests

they wanted to block the
passage of social policy

proposals.

Thus, three observations about the
compromise solution are important to
note.
Fust,

Gennany was

Political

successful

Union. Even though

majority vote,'

compromise

it

won

still

in

it

introducing institutional change in
the discussion on the

had

to

back down on

the concession

its

proposal of 'enhanced qualified

of qualified majority

solution ultimately allows the
various

member

vote.

Second, the

states to retain the possibility

of vetoing social policy proposals, which
they might view as contrary

to their national

255
interests.

the

member

so that

this

Third, the insistence of Gennany on
progress in the Political Union required
states to

work

Gennany would be

compromise.

the various

some compromise on decision making

satisfied.

The agreement on

members

states to

The most notable

of the

allow the European Union to enhance

Instead the Social Protocol

rules in the Council

the Social Protocol symbolizes

In this sense, the Protocol is not an
expression

social policy legislation.

.

out

its

was an item on

political will

of

capacity to pass

the bargaining table

difference to the voting procedure before the Social Protocol

is

member states after the implementation of the Protocol will need sufficient votes
of
other member states to block proposals. Thus, in the
arrangement of “pooled sovereignty”
that

national governments continue to play a dominant role in
the decision making process,
at the same time individual states can no longer
block social policy initiatives

while

agieed upon by a qualified majority of member states; for reference
of sovereignty” see Keohane and Hoffman (1991, 13).
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to the

term “pooling

Which, after

i,

was agreed

on, allowed France and
ftaly

Monetary and Econonnc Union

front

Germany and

dem and more

a, .owed

supper, „f

Spain to demand the
creation

of the Cohesion Fund.
Overall, France piayed a
dual strategy a, Maastricht.

deepening of Economic and
Monetary Union.

Second,

i,

First,

insisted

increase of social policy
competencies of the European
Council.
to the

industrial policy

and suggested

The proposal asked

that Article

1

The proposal submitted

France agreed with

Italy tha, the

area of social protection.

would make

Spam

for qualified majority
voting „„

18a should be amended so
that

include harmonization of
working conditions across the

member states.

it

would

Additionally,

Community should be given more
competencies

Both France and

Italy

proposed the creation of a new

the integration of persons
excluded from the labor market

in

the

article

25
its

goal.

threatened to veto any social policy
proposals and political or economic

reform proposals unless the

256

on substantial

Council on Political Union
supporied the extension of
Community's competencies

both in industrial and social
policies.

that

France demanded the

final

„
For an analysis of France’s

Treaty would specify a clear
commitment to the

interest in

1997, Feldstein 1997, and Obstfeld 1997.

Economic and Monetary Union see Cameron

257

For a discussion of the proposals
submitted to the Council see Schulz,
1996. pp 75Denmark s proposal suggested a comprehensive
improvement of the working
*
conditions with the goal of harmonization
across member states, establishment
consu tati on and information rights of workers,
and right of workers to social protection
Additionally, Spam suggested in a proposal
that harmonization of social policy
should be
achieved
several stages. Each stage should be
decided independently by the European
Council based on unanimous voting procedure.
The implementation of the content of the
stages should be worked out in directives
which should be subject to qualified majority
.

1

m
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creation of cohesion herds
to help poorer
European
transition to

Irish

EMU. The

and Greek

A

was

reiterated

make

a final

by the Portuguese,

leaders.

The

solution

was found

for Spain that took

i
its

most important

President of the European
Council proposed that a

103dl should be included
to 31

this issue

to

258

compromise

tnto account.

Spanish position on

Community countries

December 1993

a

in the

new

Treaty which specified that
"the Council

interests

article

(...)

(An.

create prior

cohesion fund to contribute
financially to the realization
of

projects in the areas of environment
and transeuropean networks.”
Thus, in effect, the

Spanish vote for both the
the

Political

Economic Union, of which

the

Union, of which the Social
Protocol was par,

Economic and Monetary Union
was

bought through promising financial
compensation.

par, of,

of,

and

was

^

258

See “EG- Regierungsverhandlungen
iiber die angestrebte Politische
Union,
emeinsamkeiten und Konflikte.”
Handelsblatt, May
6,

1991.
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For

this point see,

in the past

Addison and Siebert (1994, 18). In fact,
the potter countries have
received economic transfers from their
richer fellow member states
when

’

accepting potentially costly

new steps toward integration. Such transfers
constitute side
poor countries, linked to the agreements
of their governments to
cooperate wuh progress on integration
potentially harmful to their political
interests The
e 0t Slde payments 111 Promoting
integration has been explored by Gary
Marks. In his
° f the
PtanCe by the peripheral countries of the
Single European Act and
the
e WWtl°P
White Paper, Marks argues that “the challenge
for innovators has thus been to find
ways of paying off recalcitrant member states
by combining issues in such a way that
every member state benefits (...). The
politics of unanimity voting is one of
creating
bundles of issues to distribute potential gains
so that no voter wishes to block the
payments

to the

JT

legislation.”

What explained so well the cooperation of the poorer
countries with regard to the
appears equally well to illustrate their agreement
to the Political

SEA

and Economic Union of

the Maastricht treaty.

In fact, the revised treaty calls for both an
increase in the existing

structural funds

and the creation of a new “cohesion fund” to assist
the poorer countries
with programs for environment and infrastructure
development. For this point see Marks
198

Grea, Britain entered the
Maastricht negotiations
with vety different
.mentions
that the other

.he

member

states.

It

did not see any need
to change the social
competencies of

European Community. And
most importantly

position on reforms of the
Pohtiea,

From

i,

was no, wi„i ng , 0
compromise

its

Union or reforms on Eeonomtc
and Monetaty Unton,

the outset of the
negotiations leading

the Maastricht treaty,
the British Prime

Minister John Major
emphasized his opposition to
any mclusion of a Socia.
Chapter in

he

Maastricht Treaty.

Chapter

While

al,

Member

in the meaty, the Brit.sh
strategy

negotiations of the second day
of the
President,

Ruud Lubbers,

European Commission,

Bntam

to opt out

Major rejected
"’a'

‘

failed.

tncluding a Socia,

stalemate.

12, 1991), the

Throughout the
Council's

Major and

the other

Jacques Delors, then President
of the

break the deadlock with a
proposal tha, would allow

of particular social laws and
then,

all

f the British

was one of veto and

an agreement acceptable

Each time he

tried to

were interested

summit (December

tried to reach

eleven political leaders.'

States

if

i,

wished, to opt back

in.

But

vaneties of opt-out. Meanwhile,
Lubbers considered the possibilities

would not ac «P'

^ opt-out, because of negative connotations, Major

might buy the idea of eleven countries
“opting-in”
diplomatically clever

move

26
to the social chapter.

finally solved the stalemate.

*

This

Rather than watering

down

the

1992.
260

Pr
d
°f
Eur °P ean Co ™.il in 1991 was held by
Luxembourg followed
"’u
by Netherlands; Luxembourg’s
Prime Minister Jacques Santer was the
President of the
1 f° r
fi
P3rt ° f the year followed by Netherlands Prime
“?
Minister
n
RnlTr'i
Ruud
Lubbers
the president for the second half.

bvMl

r r7

T

?
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See Grant (1994, 201).

199

on

Poll!, cal

the Treaty

Policy.

rules

The

social chapter

and called an “agreement”
and was annexed

to the

Treaty stated that the
Eleven would

of the “agreement” and
authorized the

institutions

and procedures

Lubbers remarked.

“We

law subjects

to

do

so. “I

did the best

The Social Protocol
social

out.

was excised from

to Protocol

was subsequently was signed
by eleven governments.

I,

appendix

Union, leaving Britain

hope

make

Member

that can be passed

body of

No. 14 on Social

A

protocol in an

social policy according

States to use the

in no, too long time
the

the

Community

UK wil, join again.”

262

we could"

two key innovations:

sets ou,

the

by

First,

i,

expands the number of

a qualified majority
vote.

While the pre-

Maastricht treaty had restricted
the qualified majority
voting mechanism to health
and
safety topics, the Social
Protocol

expanded

this

voting mechanism to issues
invoicing

health and safety, working
conditions, worker information
and consultation, sexual

equality and the integration
263
of persons excluded from the
labor market.
Nevertheless,
it

should be pointed ou, that
Article 2(3) of the Social
Protocol specifies that unanimous

voting rules

employment

still

apply to issues concerned with
social security and social
protection,

contract terminations, collective
bargaining, immigration from
countries

262

fcSrlf
/"A

<l997 l94)

,mmediate| y after 'he las, British election
the new
H ime Minister Tony Blair, announced
that he was willing to sign the
Social Protocol
This ended the Bnttsh “opt-out”.
Additionally, i, allowed', he
'

'

,0

mC

^

“-

member

0ra,e ,hC S0C '“'

263

see Art. 2( 1 ).

200

spates duringdreir

^ea,y

ou,ide .he EU, and

financial contributions
for pr„ motion

of employment andjob

creation.

Second, the Social Protocol
grams

a legislative role to the
social partners (chiefly
the

association representing
employers:

Employers d'Europe (UN1CE, and

Union des Confederations de
Plndustrie

the associations
representing trade onions:

Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC). In a provision unique
Protocol allows the social
partners to jointly

proposals as well as

i,

4.5

in al,

recommend changes

allows the social partners
to

collective agreement has been
reached.

Member

des

e.

make

its

own

of
to

EU

European

law, the Social

pending social

proposals after a

Additionally, the Social Protocol
allows the

States to delegate the
implementation of social policy to
the social partners.

Summary
The purpose of this chapter was

to

examine the

factors

and forces

that

have

contributed towards the change in
pace and depth of policy development
on the European
level

m the area of social

and employment policy. Special
attention was paid

emcial role played by the European
Commission,
rejuvenated economic and social Europe
and his

importance of the Presidencies of the Council.

in particular

to the

Jacques Delors’ vision of a

skillful strategy, as well as the

A

closer examination of the

Intergovernmental Conference which led to the
Single European Act, the policy debates

which

led to the Charter of

Fundamental Social Rights as well as the Maastricht

demonstrated the important role played by the
European Commission

I

treaty

in setting the

agenda tor the European Union and thereby
crucially influencing the policy-shaping
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decisions taken by the
heads of

state.

The dynamic of such an
influence

by the theoretical predictions
made by neofunctionalism.

202

is

best explained

CHAPTER 5

NEW COMMUNITY POLICY STYLE
1991

m

the

of increasing unemployment
Ihe

I'-eaty

field.

Member
draft

Commission

States in the area of

European Commission
to successfully

Member

employment, bu,

States.

it

i,

is

structured into

and forces have contributed

European Union.

to this

managed

to

expand

add employment policy as
a new

ultimately included in the

also gives the

In this sense, the

two

finally

much

Amsterdam

criticize the

empioymen, chapter
as

it

represents a

the ability to

new

represents a

policy style.

The

first

section asks which factors

focus and

new

policy style of Ihe

demonstrates

how

sections.

new policy

In a nutshell this chapter

Commission

can use to both evaluate and

policy focus of the European
Union just as

This chapter

of the European

develop policy targets and
guidelines for the

to

employment recommendations which

policy efforts of the

new

rates, the

The employment chapter which
was

no, only allows the

priorities

break the deadlock in this
area, in the midst of a
trend

agenda of the European Union
and

policy

TO PRESENT

mid-1990s empioymen, policy
became one of the

Union. After decades of trying

AND FOCUS:

the Post-Maastricht crisis

has shaped the policy focus and policy
style of the European Commission.
In particular,
a detailed analysis

of the consequences of the following four

203

factors

is

presented: the

British opt-out

of the Social Protocol,
the

ratification difficulties

the subsidiarity debate,
and increasing levels of

The Green and White Paper
of Social Policy

of the Maastricht
Treaty

unemployment during

the early 1990s.

are presented as
examples of this

new

policy

focus and style.

The second
'he

Commission

section of, his chapter
analyzes the strategy and
resources utilized by

in its effort

area of employment policy.

of breaking the deadlock among
the Member

The argument developed

elements of the European
employment chapter

Amsterdam Treaty were
argument presented

momentum

run-up of the

it

managed

to preserve the

ability to influence the

location ol the

to

Commission gives

States.

proposals that

States.

to prepare the

consensus among the

and

it

that are

employed

Community agenda,

Member

to

keep

finally in the last

States.

negotiations: First, the institutional

greater flexibility and latitude and
thereby allows

capable of representing latent interests

Additionally, this position allows the

in effect

strategies

identified as being particularly
crucial for

outcome of multilateral

draw up policy proposals

Member

Commission. The

concerning the issue of employment
policy and then

1GC

demonstrates that the

finally included in the

in this chapter outlines
the specific resources

Three resources of the Commission
are
its

were

carefully prepared and drafted
by the

by the Commission through
which
the

that

in this section

States in the

represent a synthesized

Commission

compromise

it

in the

to draft policy

position

among

the

Member

Second, the receptiveness of the Council
Presidency crucially determines the

degiee to which the Commission has an
influence on the outcome of the multilateral
negotiations

Member

among

States

the

when

it

Member

States.

Third, the

Commission can

can be seen to represent latent domestic

204

exert pressure onto

interests.

The

representation of the concents
over

posttion of strength front
which

,,

unemployment

was ab.e

in

Europe, gave the
Commission a

to influence the
policy-shaping as we., as

policy-setting decisions and
thereby critically influence
the content of the

chapter that was ultimately
included

in the

Amsterdam

Thts conclusion of this
chapter suggests that

Commission managed
Treaty of Amsterdam

to influence the inclusion

is

entrepreneurship model

is

that simultaneously
focuses

discussed in chapter 2, a two,
eve.

final

outcome of the

negotiation.

Aspects of the Post-Maastricht Debate

Many

scholars have pointed out that
the post- Maastricht debates
represent a

turning point in the European
Union.

both on the

common

Member

It is

States as well as the

being seen has having had a
significant effect

European Commission.

lessen learned from this crisis for
both the

Commission

is

that the

European Union would have

degree of representation of the publics’

interests.

greater political vulnerability in issues
in which

domestic

style

model

into the

best equipped to capture
both the intervening steps
of the

decision-making process as well
as the

5.1

process by which the

of the employment chapter

As

level.

Treaty.

tin

best explained by a
theoretical

on the European as well as the
domestic

employment

interests.

For the Commission

and focus. Issues by which

would be pushed more

it

would be

to the forefront.

early 1990s, the issue of

this

it

Member

In a nutshell, the

States as well as the

to try harder to achieve a greater

For the

Member

States this implied a

could be seen as not representing by

implied a process of redefining

its

policy

certain to represent the publics’ interests

Given the economic development during

unemployment was

identified as
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the

one such important concern.

For .he
progress

in

Member

States the post-Maastricht
crisis

European integration would
have

focused on the demands of

its

to

citizens al large.

“the political debates in
several

Member

mean, primarily

that further

be done more cautiously
as well as more

As

poinled out by Griinhagen
(2001, 10),

States about the relevance
of the

Union

to the

ordinary citizens following
the Maastricht ratification
crisis had the seemingly
paradoxical effect of simultaneously
dispelling most of the
for a

new round of treaty reform

closer to

its

F °r

while leading them to

thC

C0mmissi0n

was

’

the P ost - Maastricht debate

strengthened Union

was

a time of crisis during

which

called for concerning the policy
issues as well as the policy

instruments that were utilized to bring
about a forward

For instance NtDonagh (1998,
81) has observed

emphasis has taken place everywhere

in the

adapting

its

momentum

to a Social

that in the early 1990s “a

Europe.

change

in

European Union. The change can be
said

represent an important manifestation
of democracy.”
is

call for a

States' enthusiasm

citizen.”

a redefinition

than ever

Member

to

The European Commission more

policy focus and policy style to the
very issues of “what voters

264

want

to hear.”

In this sense, the early 90s represent
a

focus of the European Commission.
as

much

a time of rethinking

^

watershed

This time of a

and recalibrating

its

in the

crisis

strategy.

policy style and policy

was

for the

For instance

Commission just

Wendon

345) has pointed out that “the period between 1992 and 1995
was a particularly

264

Quote from McDonagh (1998,

81).

265

For

this

argument see also Rometsch (1999, 209).
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(1998,

difficult

„

one for the

officials in

DG V

undermine the chances of

as a

further

that (1997, 57) “in the
1990s, the

new

strategy.

number of factors converged

EU

social policy expansion."

my

Commission

In a nutshell, this

on the goal of achieving

simply have been forced to
adopt a

new

strategy

was

to focus the

Four factors
States

Commission’s

a representation of domestic
interests that

remain underrepresented by the policy
actions of the

Member

Also Cram has argued

This time a heavy emphasis has
been placed upon the process
of

consultation.”

the

that appeared,

in particular

Member

would otherwise

States.

can be identified as having contributed

and the European Commission:

activities

to the

(1) the British opt-out

changes

in

conveyed a

sense of uncertainty to policymakers
in particular within the European
Commission; (2)
the French

and Danish referenda on Maastricht together
represented what Ross called

national populism”

which

signified a

change

in the political climate in Europe,
(3) the

Maastricht clauses on subsidiarity severely limited
the scope of supranational institutions
for possible policy proposals,

Commission

and

(4) high levels

of unemployment were seen by the

as an opportunity of developing a policy

program

that

bring the activities of European Union to the
concerns of the public
In the

would have

wake of these developments,

to be characterized

carefully selected in such a

by two

way

the

new

at large.

policy approach of the Commission

aspects: First, policy issues

that their focus

would hopefully

would be

resonance and support among the European population

would have

to

be

likely to increase positive

at large.

Second, policy

instruments would have to be selected which favored benchmarking and
coordination

over harmonization or convergence. In a nutshell, a

was needed. The following

new

policy focus and policy style

section gives a detailed analysis of these three factors.
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Additionally,

making

it

in the

demonstrates the impact these factors
had on the process of
decision-

European Union.

5.1.1 British

Opt-Out of the Social Protocol

Tlte op. -out clause

on the Social Protocol

in the

devastating failure for the European
Commission.

had invested a

lot

endgame of the

of time and

negotiations

it

Maastricht Treaty was seen as a

While the European Commission

effort in getting the social
partners to agree, yet in the

failed to

muster sufficient support from

all

the

Member

267

Even
to

opt- in

the value of the achievement

on paper of getting eleven Member

States

on the Social Protocol ultimately appeared
questionable. Uncertainty with

regard to the legal and political
implications of

this

arrangement prevailed more

in the

perception of the officials of the European
Commission than a sense of achievement.
In the

example

academic debate

at the time, the

ot a ‘Europe of variable geometries’.

essence ot

this

arrangement

in the description

opt-out arrangement was seen as an

Streeck (1994, 164)

summed up

the

of Europe as a “confederation whose

geometry varies between policy areas [and which] could
be metaphorically characterized

For a detailed discussion of the Social Protocol and the Maastricht
Treaty see Chapter

267

For a detailed analysis of the negotiations leading towards the Social
Protocol see
Falkner 1998, Ross 1995, Schulz 1996.
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as a

cafeteria state’,

authority

[...]

The

whose

constituents r<eserve the right to
‘opt

on an item-by-item

out clause signaled to the
integration project.

268

DG

were clearly

Employment and

Commission

As pointed

out by

felt

Social Affairs.

inside

of the

Politically, the opt-

the danger of the unraveling
of the entire

Rhodes (1993, 300),

pursuit of social policy reform
along the Protocol track
el forts

or ‘opt out’ of this

basis.”

practical implications of this
uncertainty

European Commission and the

in’

[...

for the

Commission,

was seen

the

as undermining]

its

to ensure a united, cohesive
approach to integration and set precedents
for

variable geometry”

which could defeat

the entire object of the Treaty on

European

269

Union.”

This assessment of the effect of the opt-out
clause on the Commission was

confirmed by Barbara Nohlen, the current Assistant

Employment and
interview that for
to us.

We

were

consequence,

268

Social Affairs of the European
Commission,

DG

left in

we

to the Director

fell

Employment and

that

we had

when

Social Affairs “the opt-out

limbo, unsure what to

make

General

in the

she pointed

came

DG

in

an

as a real shock

out of the Social Protocol.

As

a

270
to recalibrate

our strategy.”

.

discussion of the legal and political uncertainty ol the opt-out
clause see
Barnard 1992, Bercusson and Dijk 1995, Dowiling 1993, Everling
1992, Falkner 1996,
Fitzpatrick 1992, Geyer 1996, Lipietz 1996, Watson 1993, Whiteford
1993. Based on the
oi

tt

EEC t urtin (1993) concludes that the Social Agreement
not controversial and instead should be viewed as an integral
part of the treaty.
analysis of Ai tide 239

Rhodes 1993.
270

personal interview with Barbara Nohlen

in

Brussels on February 27, 2001.
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is

legally

5.1.2 Ratification Difficulties

Equa " y problematic
Social Affairs

to

was

for th =

the fae, that the ratification
of the Maastricht

be complicated and cumbersome.

media, however, due

7,

(

DC Employment and

1991) treaty, turned on,

27
'

From being

to the public's reaction
to

unreadable fiasco by the press.

on February

European Commission and the

When

it,

the treaty

initially

the treaty

portrayed as a success by the

was soon considered

was formally signed by

as an

the heads of state

1992, few foresaw the complicated
ratification process. At the
beginning

of June, the Danish voters narrowly
rejected the treaty

in a national

referendumand

thereby triggered a larger public
debate against Maastricht which
Ihreatened the
ratification process in a

number of countries.

“Danish veto represented

number of

political

and

a

huge setback

legal

”2
As pointed

for the

Community and

to

to the

Rome

Duff (1997,

presented

Treaty be approved by

all

EC

member

law required

states.”

create sufficient incentives for such a vole,
a special exemption clause

^ or a general discussion

272

with a

of the ratification

difficulties see Franklin

that

Thus, for the treaty

suivivc a positive vote from the Danish
voters would have to be secured.

McLaren

it

107), the

problems. Technically, the Danish vote
meant that the

Maastricht Treaty could not go into effect
as planned since

amendments

out by

In order to

was agreed on

al

Marsh and

1994.

.

While in May ol 1992 the Folketing had approved the Treaty
by 130 to 25, the
referendum which was held in June showed that the political
elite had seriously
misjudged the public mood, as 50.7 percent voted against the
Treaty. For a discussion of
the ratification problems see Nielsen 1992, Siune
1993, Tartwijk-Novey ( 1995, 14ff),
Thune 1992, Worre 1995. Also see Agence Europe (June 4, 1992,
3) and Financial Times
(June 4, 1992,

1).
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the

Edinburgh summit

time held on 18

May

in

December

1992. Subsequently,

second referendum,

in a

this

1993, a majority of Danish
voters (56.8 peicent)
finally agreed to

the specifications of the
treaty.

Along similar
referendum the day

lines, President

after the ftrs,

Francois Mit.erand in
France called for a

Danish referendum, and
subsequently the Treaty wa:

accepted merely by a narrow
margin: only 51 per cen,
voted

September 1992. Also,
equally contested.

in the

United Kingdom and

In these countries there

was

in

in

favor of the Treaty

Germany

a clear

in

the ratification were

hck of popular support

for the

273

Maastricht Treaty.

was unleashed with

As pointed

ou, by

the Danish rejection

Kowalsky

( 1

in

which

it

1

98), a “Maastricht-Shock”

and the slim outcome of the
French votum. As

consequence of these events, the
Community believed

maknig

999,

i,

had entered a phase of policy

could only propose very limited
social and

political proposals

and

74
should mostly refrain from legislative
proposals.”'

5.1.3

The Subsidiarity Debate

Furthermore, the political debate on
‘subsidiarity’ can be seen as a testimony
of

Member

75

States’ fears

of excessive centralization.'

Many

scholars have pointed out that

273

See Luif 1995.
274

Translation from German.
275

For the political relevance and an historical
overview of the concept of subsidiarity
see Adonis 1991, Berg 1993, Dehousse
1998a, Follesdal 1999, Inman 1994 Kersbergen
and Verbeek 1994, Rubinfeld 1998, Schima
1994, Scott, Peterson and Millar 1994.

a

.he rise of .he concept
in ,he late 80s

reaming

decis, on-mating

attributed the intensity

On

that

of

fiscal

power and competences.

this debate to a

day he delivered a speech

.ha, in “ten years hence,

and social

alarm bells

in a

was motivated by Member

the

276

A

number of scholars have

grave ms, ate Delors

Pari, amen, in

80 percent of our economic

legislation as well, will
be

made on June

,

European

States’ interest in

legislation,

States.

.

which he pointed on,
and perhaps even our

of Community origin.-

number of governments of
Member

I988

277

This remark raised

In particular in the

Margaret Thatcher, ihen Prime
Minister, directly responded
to Delors

in

UK

her famous ami-

Brussels speech in Bruges in
September 1988.
In the debates following
Thatcher's passionate speech,
the issue

was

utilized to problematize the
question of the appropriaie
allocation

pierogatives and the use of political
authority within the EU.

commentators have pointed out
order, unless a central unit

is

that

more

powers or tasks are

In general

many

to rest with the sub-units
of that

common

agenda

is

can perform more efficiently and
effectively than the

it

of decision-making

278
effective in achieving certain
specified goals.

consequence of this principle, the scope of
the
tasks that

of subsidiarity

to

a

be limited to those

Member

States.

F°i a discussion on the historical
development of the concept see Hueglin
S

Kuklis 2000.

As

1

994

In the

’

277

Quoted

in

Endo (1999,

173).

278

The following

of the EUT are seen as the legal basis of the principle
of
second paragraph (3b) ECT, in conjunction with Article
2 (B) last
paragraph, and the 12th recital in the preamble to
the EUT. See European Parliament,
2000.
European Parliament Fact Sheets: Subsidiarity.”
articles

subsidiarity: Article 5,

http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/l_ 2 _ 2 _en.htm
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European come*,
being overruled
ot influence

in

this is intended to
simultaneously

common

reduce the risk for

Member Saies

of

decisions as well as to keep
policy issues outside of
the realm

of the European Union.

The scope of Community

action post- Maastricht

is

set out in Article

requires that

the

Community

3b

EC

which

“

shall

act within the limits of
the powers conferred
Treaty and of the objectives
assigned to it
n areas which do not fall
within its exclusive
ommumty shall take action, in accordance competence the
with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in
so far as the objectives of
the proposed
aetron canno, be sufficiently
achieved by

upon

,t

by

this

the

Member Strand

can therefore, by reason of the
scale or effects of the
proposed
action, be better achieved
by the

Community.

As

the

wording of Article 3b

principle has the effect

EEC makes

clear the application of the
subsidiarity

of limiting the extension of the scope
community

legislation

and

thereby preventing the Union institutions
from moving into new areas, while
preserving
the level of

competence

The conclusions

the

Union

institutions

of the Edinburgh

have already achieved.

European Council noted

that the

279
implementation of Article 3b should follow a
number of guidelines.
These guidelines

piovide that subsidiarity

is

a condition for any

Community

action and the Council must

be satisfied both that the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved

by Member

States alone and they can be better achieved

must produce “clear

See Annex
in

Edinburgh,

EC Bulletin.

1

1

benefits.” Harmonization legislation should
only be introduced

to Part

1-12

by Community action which

A of the

December

Conclusions of the Presidency

1992.

at the

European Council

Commission of the European Communities 1992

No, 12/92, pp.25-26.
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Where necessary
sethng

Co

minimum

achieve the Treaty,
objectives and
consideration shouid be
given to
standards no, jus, in
those
areas where specified
by the Treaty.

Additionally, any decision
in favor of
Community action shouid
take into account
transnational aspects such
as the need to avoid
d, s, onion of
competition and to strengthen

economic and

social cohesion.

Finally, in tenns

of preferences of policy
measures the

Council conclusion decisively
spells ou, a preference
of
regulation

when

it

“soft laws” over
detailed

declares that:

w

~

>

^

uuttuvcj)
direc,i ''“ anoiiia
should oe pre

preferred to
gu ations and framework
directives to detailed
measures.
>ures. Nonin mg measures
such as recommendations
should be
where appropriate. Consideration
.

Vhere^H^

should be given
appropriate to the use of
voluntary codes of conduct
[and
1
preference in choosing the
type of Community action
should
be
given to

encourage cooperation between
Member

States

coordinating national action
or complementing,
supplementing
supporting such action.

<

Thus, as pointed out by several
scholars, the Edinburgh
conclusion represent a

“change

now.
in a

In the

bad

basis."

in the direction” in

which

social policy

words of Kowalsky (1999,

light

and new

activities

had

of the Community would
proceed from

160), pas, activities in this policy
area were seen

to be justified within the
boundaries set

Thus, the impression was created
that for the most pan

Community had

acted outside

is

legal

by the

treaty

in the past, the

purview and therefore had

to

be limited both in

scope ot activities as well as measures
available. With the Edinburgh
conclusions, the
"future perimeter of

community

action considerably shrunk and
a shift of policy tools

280

Council Conclusion, 1992, points

5

and

6.

214

.

00 k place from decisions

and from framework
directives

to

281

.

,

,o directives

recommendation.”

The European Commission
has attempted,

in a

communication

to the

European

Parliament and the Council
in 1993, to give
a more legal and
technical view of the
.

,

concept of subsidiarity.
«o define those

282

The general aim of the twenty
page Communication

is, first,

competencies with which the
Community has been enfrusted by the

Treaty of Rome, the Single
European Ae, and Maastnchi,
second,
mst'lutions should apply the
principle and, finally, to
principle of proponionality
in order to prevent the

make

outline

how

the

EC

specific provision for the

Community from exceeding

the

means

necessary to obtain the specific
objectives within their
competence. The solution

proposed

is

an inter-institutional Agreement,
between the Commission, the
Parliament

and the Council, designed
principle promotes

Community
Thus
is

more

to preserve the institutional
balance

effective action at

Community

and ensure

that the

level rather than bringing
all

action to a halt.

as far as the impact of the
subsidiarity principle on

Community

social policy

concerned, the treaty provisions and
the Council’s subsequent
clarification increased

the pressure

on the European Commission

practice, as Santer told the

means

in

this

that policy

change

its

policy focus and style. In

January 1995 during his inaugural speech,
subsidiarity

“less action, but better action.”

Commission

For

EP

to

Concretely, this pressure has suggested to
the

measures which were either directives or

argument see Kowalsky (1999,

“soft

law” would be

160).

Commission of the European Communities,

1993,

215

COM

(93) 545 final.

morre acceptable

to

Member

regulation either with the

Thus

new

the effect

5.1.4

targets

was

character, zed by

pressure the

too,

of detailed

social standards

Commission

into adopting

,

framework agreements which
specified

and goals.

Unemployment and Employment
Trends
Smce

which used the

aim of achieving harmonization
or minimum

of the subsidiarity debate
was

policy style which

common

States than policy
nteasntes

the end of the

Golden Age,

the

in

Europe

unemployment

rate in

Europe has increased

283

dramatically.

Especially, the recession starting
in the beginning of
the 1990s brought

slow economic growth and high
lhe neg0,iati0nS f0r ,he

ratification

9.9

%

nnlhon

of the treaty

for all

men

compared

to

in the

women

1990.

At

of unemployment.

Amsterdam Tre

members of
and

rates

Member

^

was

the

European Union.

are unemployed.

a time

characterized by the process
of

States, the aggregate
2

"

1998, the year that followed

unemployment

This means tha,

at that

rate

stood

a,

time about 17

These numbers represent a dramatic
increase

unemployment was

7.7

%, which

represented 12 million

people without work.

283

For a discussion of the characteristics of the
Golden Aize see Glyn 1990, Goldthrope

1984, and Tsoukalis 1997.
284

see Eurostat, 1998.
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In general .he

by the
rate

fact that

it

upward

drift

markedly jumped

was pushed up

of Europeamwide unemployment
in three

major

As can be

steps.

rate

seen

characterized

is

in figure
( 5)j

dispropotlionally in the major
recessions of 1974-75,

the

1980-84, and

1991-1994.

While the unemployment

rate

was

2.7

%

1974

in

it

similar increase can be observed
between the years 1980

1994 which recorded a
respectively.

A

rise

of unemployment from

6.1

%

striking aspect of these different
recessions

jumped
to

%

in

A

1975.

1984 and the years 1991-

to 10.5

is

to 4.2

%

that the

and 8.6

%

to

1

1

.

3

,

economic recovety

following the macro-economic shocks,
did not push the rate of
unemployment below the
level

it

had been prior

to the respective recession.

As

a consequence, a socket of high

285
and persisting unemployment was
gradually accumulating over time.

285

beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the
causes of these cyclical shock
effects as well as the reason for the
persistenc e of high unemployment after
each
It is

lecession.

pam

There

is

extensive literature by economists and
political scientists

who

attempt

phenomenon. For a detailed discussion of the
macro-economic shocks see
n„“
H Wyplosz 1997, and
Burda and
L.ndbeck 1993, For mainstream economists who argue
that unemployment in Europe is
caused by market rigidity,

t

strong unions, job protection
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Another aspect of the
aggregate picture of
European

employment rate.* Chamc,
eristic of
JOb

'° SSeS dl rinS

-

a

'

a,

dunng

^

‘

development

*

hree

of nine miiiion jobs were
this period,

its

lost

dunng

is

booking
the

tha,

a, the

labor

markets

Europe experlenced

As

a

consonance of

tnrope decreased from about
64
having nsen to roughly
63

%

this

a „e, Job

deve.opment, the emp.oytnen,

% in the mid-70s to below 60 % in the

in the late

|99g

^^

*^

only ,7 million new
Jobs were ereated which
adds „p

growth of 8 miiiion.

80s and early 90s

i,

^

p enod from 1973

major recession ,

the

is

rate in

mid-80s and

has dropped

after

down

60

288

%•

During the year .999 the
employment

around 155 million

EU

rate in

Europe was 62

% which

means

that

289

citizens

had a job.

"eberi

BCan 1994
'

the trad, non

of Keynesianism see Marglin
and Bhaduri
Boga, 1998, Comps, on 1997,
Krugman,994, Moussis

99

.997

^
w”'

M 1^™'A Md

V^ Xden

'

1

0
.995,

286

For a discussion of the employment
growth performance see Teague
1994

.
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As can be seen

in figure (6) these job losses
were particularly heavy in Germany
Finland, and Sweden. Also note
that in all figures countries
are Abbreviated by the
following letters: Belgium: B,
Denmark: DK, Germany: D Greece- G Smi
R Ireland: IR, Italy: I, Luxembourg: L,
Netherlands: NL, Austria: A.' PortugalP
S
Finland: FI, Sweden: S, United
Ita y,

7c

7

Kingdom: UK.

288

see European Commission, 1999.
Employment Performance in the Member StatesaB * 0ffice for
0fficia ™'ica,ion

Eumj^an^Communft^^p.

T'

Uaa*

'

of the

289

see Eurostat, 2000a.

News

Release. No. 56/2000, 16 May.

http.//europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat.
the

Luxembourg: Office

European Communities.
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for the Official Publication of

.

Despi.e

the

similar

impact

of the

macroeconomic shock on

countries, one should take note
of the fact that

greatly

in

regard

unemployment
First, a

In this

(5.1),

to

rate in

their

unemployment

1998, the

member

group one finds Luxembourg
(5.1)

countries in which the

and

states

group of countries had unemployment

Denmark

member

of the European Union vaty

employment

much below

Netherlands

and the United Kingdom

unemp loyment

European

rates”"

For

the

can be differentiated into three
groups:

rates

(2.8), the

states

all

(6.3).

rate is slightly

the

EU

average of 10%.

(4,0), Austria (4.7), Portugal

Second, there

below the

EU

is

average.

a group of

Here Ireland

290
It should be added that
the unemployment rates among regions
vaiy quite considerably. At the low end
one finds Centro

in different countries

(Portugal) with 2.1

%

unemployment, Aaland (Finland) with 2,6, and Zeeland
(Netherlands) with 3.4. At the
very high end are Campania (Italy) with
24,9, Extremadura (Spain) 28,8 and Andalucia
(Spam) with 29.9. For these numbers see Eurostat, 1999.
“EU Regional Unemployment
Ranges from 2.1% to 29.9%.” News Release. No.93/99.
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/eurostat/compres/en/ 0 1 99/6 1101 99a.htm.
1
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Sweden

(7.8),

And

Belgium

,8.3),

finally, there is a

(9.5),

Greece (.1,6) and Germany

average, such as Finland
(11.4), France

Also, looking

,9.4,

group of countries which
has unemployment

the

a,

rate,

rates

above the

EU

one can find great variat.ons
among

the

(1 1.7), Italy 12.2)

employment

can be inc.nded.

and Spain (18.8).

292

European countries.

Kingdom

(71.4),

In ,998, the rate

Sweden

was above 70

(70.3) and Austria (70.1).

It

%

in

was above 60

countries: Portugal (68.9),
Netherlands (68.3), Finland
(65.1),
(60.8),

Luxembourg

below 60

(60.5),

and Ireland

(60.5).

in

1997 to 4.9

% in

1998.

improvement compared

s, mat, on

to

1997 (48 %).

(61.5), France

(50.2).

in total

numbers from

5.2

%) and

more

in

in fact

it

1998 (49

%) showed no

represented a worsening

Therefore, as of yet, there has
been no

29

percentages of the unemployment rate are taken
from European Commission,
Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publication of the’
European Communities. For a discussion variations
among member states see Sapsford
Bradley and Millington 1998.

loon
1999.

'T
Employment in Europe.

292

For a discussion of the

institutional causes

of this variation see Scharpf 1997e.

293

see European Commission, 1999.

%

At the same time, the share of
the

rate.

for a year or

to the previous year (49

compared

following

This decline, however, has
been less strong

than the overall decline of the
unemployment

unemployed who had been out of work

% for the

Gem, any

% Belgium (57.5), Greece (56.5), Italy (51.8), and Spain

of the labor force

(79.2), United

Several countries had
employment rates

For long-term unemployed one
can obsetve a decline

of the

Denmark

Employment

in

Europe

220

,

p.22.

tendency for the increased

rate

of net job creation

to

greatly benefit the
long-term

~

unemployed.

Two

conclusions can be

made on

s.tua.ion in Europe: Firs.,
Europe's
factors.

.he basis of.be brief
sketch of .he labor
market

unemployment problem was caused
by various

particular relevant are
short-term

perststence effects.

quickly.

Several countries coped
better than others and
recovered more

These countries experienced higher

particularly high for

macroeconomic shocks and long-term

levels

of employment. Unemployment

women, young people and people
who

is

have been out of the labor

market for more than one year.

A

second conclusion

a clear impact

on the issues

.ha,

.ha,

can be drawn

were considered

Thts dissertation agrees with several
scholars
perception that

common

\

employment was

popular demand

Bemdt

for an

that the increase

of unemployment had

to be important for

who have

Community

action.

pointed out that the public's

measures were needed, clearly influenced
the agenda of the

European Union. For instance
issue of

is

Griller (et ah, 2000, 527),
observes that the fact "that the

adcfed to the

upgrading

agenda of the 1996-97 IGC

in the fight against

is

largely

unemployment.”

Keller expressed the view that “the
Europe -wide

due

to

Additionally,

employment measures were

2" 5
caused by a mix of political pressure good
intentions and time constraints.”

Asa

294

the

work

same observation can be made for the unemployed who
have been looking
more than two years. The situation of this group also has

for

for

been worsening.

295

Keller (1999a, 14) and (199b, 145).
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consequence, given

this

Member

coming

5.1.5

States into

kind of domestic pressure,
the Commission was
able to pressure
to

an agreement

in this

policy area.

Adaptations of the Commission's
Policy Focus and

Style:

The Green

Paper on Social Policy

The Green Paper on
that clearly

1993,

it

demonstrated

Social Policy represents the

this

new

shift in

first

piece of policy blueprint

policy focus and policy style.
Published

in

states boldly:

The aim is not the harmonization of
national systems, but a
framework for efforts to strengthen social
protection systems and
enable Community legislation on
social policy to fit into a
dynamic
policy framework based on common
objectives.
between the

Consistency

activity

and

on minimum standards are
essential principles of action by
the Union in a field where
national
legislation

systems will converge but remain autonomous.

Thus, the self-ascribed role of the European
Commission and the

Employment and

DG

Social Affairs should be one of fostering
discussion, exchange of

experiences and consensus in order to prepare the
European Union for the

political,

economic and technological challenges ahead.

The Green Paper
explicit connection

is

also relevant in terms of

between a strengthened

the integration process.

It

states that the

economic and monetary union

social

its

policy focus by making a very

dimension and greater acceptability of

“achievement of the Single Market and of

will be at risk if the general population,

Commission of the European Communities, (1993

222

COM

and notably the

(93) 551, 44).

working population, does no,
take
dimension should be used
the high levels

policies”

goes on

par, in

2
,

he venture.”

to

this sense>

,

he socja

deliver ,o citizens wha,
they are most interested

of unemployment, a new
“look

would have

”

become

the lit* between

at

a priority of the European

to point on, that the
best

way

,

Giv

in.

economic and

social

.” 8
Union

achieve such acceptability

The Green Paper
is

through an optimal

balance of economic flexibility
and social security. Thus
a high level of
employment

would be a necessary condition

for

such an acceptability.

Additionally, the Green Paper
evaluated the causes of
unemployment in Europe

and suggested appropriate solutions.
For instance the Green Paper
points ou,
is

widely accepted

tha, “ a

mix of macroeconomic and

[...simultaneously] a rather

more

labour market and social policy

measures were identified as
patfly caused

by cyclical

is

radical

what

structural policies

approach aiming

is

at

is

tha, while

now

moving towards

needed,

active

required.”* Thus, active labor
market

the solution for

unemployment

factors, but also partly

by

skills

in

Europe which was seen as

gaps and structural

factors.

The

debate “social policy as a productive
factor” was utilized as an analytical
frame inside of

which the analysis of the unemployment
problem with

the suggested solutions

were

coupled.

Thus, in

effect, the

Green Paper on Social Policy and

the

White Paper on Social

Policy emphasize that the role of social
policy has to shift from income and status

Ibid, p.

59

298
'I

vl

ibid, p.

299

6

^

Green Paper, 1993,

p.

i,

18
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maintenance towards investment

in

human

capital through
education

and

training,

especially by prepa. i.tg and
encouraging unemployed
people to contribute
activity.

Active labor market policies
are assumed

encouraging individuals

Comm, ss, on

to take

to the

lead to greater socia.
cohesion

up paid employment.
As a conscience of this

launched vety few legislative
proposes

Of the Commission for inaction

is

documented

in

a, the time.

The

Paper on Social Policy indicates
clearly

for a

major new programme of

As summarized by Ginsburg

that the

shift, the

political decision

that the

Commission has concluded

legislation in the

3

coming period”

“White
tha, there

"

(1997, 24)

The White Paper on

Social Policy certainly also
marks something
from the 1980s model of Social
Europe as an increasingly
§ Y
harmonized European Social Model
towards a looser entity
founded essentially only on shared
liberal democratic values
and
an internal market. The White
paper suggests social policy
convergence which respects diversity’
as the new norm. It is
therefore conceded that common
policy objectives can be reached
by different routes. Given the diversity
of economic development
and resources of the member states
it is also

of a

shift

recognized that policy
should focus on the ‘establishment
of a framework of basic
minimum standards.' This is quite some way
from the high quality
welfare system implied in the Delors
vision of Social Europe
reflecting an almost Beveridgean
emphasis on social minimum.

300

rr

Quoted

in

Agence Europe (September

by

remarks made by Flynn
during a speech

C onfederation of British
Industry (CBI), where he
pointed out

no need

economic

24, 1994, 6).
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is

5.1.6 Implications for
the Decision

As

consequence of the

a

Commission

“ S P °" Cy f0CUS and POliCy
role

DG

in

ebruary 200

he EUr° Pean

be seen

tssues that

Ci ' iZenS

Looking Studies Unit

[...] that

As
the

was

,W0

fei, that

i,

had

to

readjust

• clearer emphasis was
needed on the

As

Patrick Venturing a
fonner

Social Affairs, mentioned
during an interview in
to

show

ident.fied

a*

by early

to

Social Affairs

serving the cittzens.

Employment and

in the fact that

problem.

in

of the post- Maas, rich,
debate, the

Employment and

“Europe needed

1 ,

One of the
‘

different aspects

Style in

of the European Union

Counselor

'°

DO

as wei, as the

Making Process

that

it

was

there for the citizens"”

2

from early on as being
capable of appealing

unemployment. The recognit.on
of this aspect can

May

i993, Delors directed his
advisors and the Forward

launch a detailed study focusing
on Europe’s unemployment

potnted out by Endo (1999,
195),

Community looked

this policy “shift
reflected Delors' anxiety

too technocratic and irrelevant
to citizens' concerns.

By

picking up on this massive social
problem with over 17 million jobless
people, Delors

hoped

to

narrow the gap between the
Community

institutions

and the ordinaty

citizens.'

Second, the opt-out and the ratification
crises of the Maastricht treaty
also made
the

Commission

all

too aware of

its

limitations

rethinking of the available policy
tools.

and thereby encouraged a process
of

Internal debates in the

Commission brought

30
ft is worth noting that Patrick
Venturini fonnerly was a researcher
Confederation Fran9a.se Democratique due

Travail

(CFDT)

at the

as well as a close advisor of

Jacques Delors on social affairs between
1987 and 1995. Currently he
General of the Economic and Social Committee.

is

the Secretary

302

Personal interview with Patrick Venturini in
Brussels on February

225

19,

2001.

f0

™ ^ argUmeMS
ard

,ha ‘ ' he

confine i.self.o initiatives
that co „ |d

be considered useful as
well as a non-zerosum
gain

in light

of

Member

States

303

A new

interests.

policy style

was advocated which
should emphasize merely

the

coordination of the employment
policies as well as
highlight the economic
merits of

ployment and
the

of

DG

social policy.

Employment and

In this sense this
crisis,

Social Affairs to concentrate

benchmarks and recommendations

for

compelled the Commission
and
its

economic and

policy style on the
development

structural reforms

of labor

markets.

An

early sign of a significant
change in the policy style and
policy focus of

Employment and

Social Affairs

appointment as Commissioner

was given by Padraig Flynn,
once he

at

the beginning of 1993.

DG

started his

In his first interview

with the

Financial Times he pointed out
that the prescriptive and
detailed approach to the
social

dimension as championed by
In the interview

his predecessor

regulation, he pointed out that the

3

"

Commission should only

lay

insisted that “the details should
be

legislation passes through national
legislatures, the flexibility

303
this

course.

Instead of achieving social
policy goals through

down

a framework of

standards without getting involved in
the details, which should be

employers and unions. He

For

its

he emphasized that “we've reached
a hiatus, a natural kind of
hiatus,

with the social action programme.”

minimum

Ms. Vasso Papandreou, had run

argument see Endo (1999, 191)

304

Financial Times (January 29, 1993,

2).

305
ibid
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left to

worked out when
305

must be

there.”

the

This emphasis on

minimum

^ Member

policy targets whiIe
leaving
,

.0

choose the policy tools by
which they could achieve
these

departure from the previous
policy style of
.he efforts of

DG

of labor market

Employment and

institutions.

DO

targets,

Employment and

Social Affairs in the
pas,

This standardized approach

was a

^^

rather radical

Social Affairs.

aimed

a, ,he

Much of

hannonization

problem solving

predominately utilized detailed
relations and legal pocedures.
As discussed

Chapter
in the

3

and 4 of

numerous examples of this policy

area of health and safety a,
the

and measures

DG

this dissertation,

Employment and

common

place,

Social Affairs, Jean

policy

was

policy style developed by

DG

wake of the senes of crisis, now
predominately

idealized the

tools

DG

were known as 'DG

Our aim was

to create a

306

Employment and
utilizes “soft”

In the

Social Affairs in the

fonns of regulation,

process of

its

workings,

it

307

learning from Europe.”

style, the old overall goals for
the

Member

legalistic.

and the logic of “best practice."

maxim of “Europe

“We

of the

style

Degimbe, former Director Genera,
of

standard in Europe through
regulation.”

benchmarking

working time and working
condttions

Social Affairs potn.ed ou,
in an interview:

Our conception of social

The new

can be found

reduce barriers to labor
mobility. Commenting on
the policy

to

Employment and

Regulation.

work

style

With

a

Commission remain unchanged:

new
to

policy focus and

convince the

States of the importance of the
single legal framework. That this
challenge

306

Peisonal interview with Jean

Degimbe

in Brussels

on February 21, 2001.

307

see Teague (1999a, 1999b). Kenner
1999, Majone 1993, Radaelli 1998. Larsson 2000.

nttp.//europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/speeches/2000_en.htm
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continues to be on the agenda
of the Commission and
would even increase

during ,he time leading up
to the Intergovernmental
Conference
clearly expressed in a

objective

all

to

is

in

Union and

states. [••]

representatives of

A

The

State

the

to achieve this will

in

the Treaty of

new

this

adopted by the European Commission.

Amsterdam

On

On

employment chapter

policy focus as well as the

the one hand, in the

believes to be addressing an issue
that

citizens at large.

be the conference of

in 1996.”

particular content as well as
the timing of the

Community

is

the other hand, the policy tools
adopted in the

Treaty.

the particular elements agreed in
the

Then

a cursory overview

is

new

the

employment chapter

The following pages
the

Amsterdnn

provided on the impact of the employment
chapter.

treaty that calls tor the coordination of

employment

the

European Council agreed on

policies within the

European Communities, (1993d

228

COM

a

economic policies

308

the

policy

employment chapter

Employment Chapter of

During the Amsterdam summit (June
1997),

Commission of

in the

of utmost importance

con-espond to the new policy style of
coordinating policy goals.
detail

of all

3°8

governments

Treaty of Amsterdam was influenced
by
style

will benefit

will therefore enjoy,
as far as is possible, the
support

The Employment Chapter

5.2

1993 which stated that
“the Commission’s
principal

major opportunity

Member

importance

1996/1997, was

promote the development of
a European Social Policy
which

citizens of the

member

document

in

in

(93) 600 final, 9-10).

se,

by the Economic and
Mouetaiy Union. Three
aspects of

foe .be first time in
.be histoty of the
.he

Member

States to promoting

European Union, the po
„ tica|

employment on

the level of the

formally wntten into the
treaty, (2) a policy
procedure

employment, and

(3) a

309

,be treaty stand
out

Employment Committee

is

.

^
(|

European Union

detaiied that

a,

ms

at

,

is

promoting

formally created which
monitors and

is

policy procedure in the are
of employment.

As

to

the firs, aspect. Article
(2) of the

comnutmen, on

the par, of the

Common, ty

nployment policy by ptoviding
and

that "the

Community

shall

that

as we,, as the

employment

promote

treaty represents

[...] a

a

is

Member

common

cohesion

Communities

and solidarity among

activities with a

view

Member

to the

strong political

States to

promote

of the Community

high level of employment
and of social

protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality
of
social

task

a

States”

purposes

life,

In

and economic and

Article

3,

where the

se. ou, in Article 2 are
listed, “the

promotion of coordination between
employment policies of the Member
States with

View

,0

enhancing

their

effectiveness

by

developing

a

coordinated

strategy

a

for

employment” was added.
Second, a

new

and the Community

employment and

coordination procedure formally specifies
shall

[...]

work towards developing

how

the

“Member

States

a coordinated strategy for

particularly for promoting a skilled,
trained and adaptable workforce

309

not induded in this

list is

the fact that the Social Protocoil which

was annexed

to the

aastncht Tieaty has been included into the
Amsterdam Treaty and will be binding for
all member states of the EU.
For a discussion of the Social Protocoll see chapter
4 For a
description of this procedure see Rhode 1995,
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^

'

ab0Ur markC,S re

new Employment
126 the

Member

common

— “—
*

Chapter, Tide
states

V,„

'

'

n8

‘

he

MembCT

Sta * es

Add, .tonally, Articles 127
outlines
of employment
supporting and,

paragraph of the

by
if

encouraging

0 130)

.

In Article

to the

Counci, of Ministers,

’

Council”

this provtsion

alms

notions towards muhta,
adaptation.
that the

“Community

cooperation

,„ the fo, mu, a, ion

of

"

shall contribute to
a high level

between

article specifies that
“the objective

3

the

Member

States

and

by

Furthermore, the second

a high bve,

of employment

shal,

and implementation of
Community policies

activities.”

The

precise

mechanism through which

should be brought about
the

,

is

their action in this
respect within the

necessa,y complementing
their action."

be taken into cons, deration

and

Thts procedure

agreed to “regard
promoting employment
policy as an area of

concern- and “to
coordinate

red reC,

10

tha, contains six
anic.es <125

Wtthou, transferring any
specific powers
3t

'

is

specified in Art.cb ,28 and
,30.

Commission, the Council

Community” and
account

in their

“shall

the policy goals in the
area

“shall each year consider
the

draw up guidelines which

employment

policies.”

the

Based on

employment

Member

its

a proposal

from

situation in the

States shall take into

^ Subsequently, each Member

“the principle measures taken
to implement

of employment

employment policy

in

State must report

the light

of

the

310

quote of Art. 125, TEC.
31

tlS
0r h n ° ting * hat this article is similar
!
!
on tthe Member
States economic policies, laid

J

to the

wording of the relevant provisions

down

in Art. 99,

312

Art. 128,

TEC

230

TEC.

Council's guidelines for

employment The Council

shall “carry

implementation of the employment
policies of the
guidelines for employment.”

Member

States, “if

i,

3

"

considers

i,

The Council may

Member

also

an examination of the
States

Ugh, of the

in

make recommendations

3 4
appropriate in the light of
that examination.”

to the

'

A joint

annual report by the Council
and the Commission to he
European Council, on the

employment

situation in the

Community and

the implementation of
the guidelines closes

the circle of activities by
serving as the relevant input
for the annual

employment policy

conclusions of the European Council.

While

i,

leyond the scope of

is

this dissertation to assess
the precise

employment chapter on both Community

Member

m

No

field.

economic

the

Amsterdam

longer

is

that a

was needed

Treaty,

to

Instead

the

First,

well

as

institutions

to

European

coordinated strategy

in

the

which

with the inclusion of the
employment

employment policy now

employment considered

policies.

acknowledged

States

as

States, a cursory look at this
question suggest that there are
five areas

have changed with the employment
chapter.
chapter

institutions

impact of the

constitutes a separate policy

be simply the automatic outcome
of sound

Union

and

among European

the

Member

institutions

accomplish commonly agreed on employment

States

and the Member
315

targets.

313
ibid

314
ibid

see Laeufer 1999. For a discussion of the Articles
see Kasten and Soskice 2000
Biagi (1998, 327), Barnard and Deakin (1998,
13).
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have

Second, the coordinating
convince, ori i„a,,
g

Labour Market Committee
and since .be

was established with
h ° WeVer

1,1

since

i,

hardly

Employmen,

COmmiUee h3S

’

ever changes

in the

i,

the

e

"

draft

Employmen, Committee. Under

this

*»

3

no longer

new amangement,

and large adopted by the Council.
The strengthened
particularly striking in the
ease of the

is

of some

members
are

Member
in the

the

effect

in regard to the

analytical.

the

6
in the past, the

revisit the decision

of the

Commission's proposal

is

by

of the Commission's influence

States can be quite harsh
and critical.

merely cosmetic and not

'

Unlike

.

employmen, recommendations,
which

Employmen, Committee

targets.

Employmen, Repot, and

Commission

COREPER

employment

of the European
Commission,

of the Join,

receives from the

Council or the

Employmen , and

refotm cubed .be
Employment Connnu.ee

.he intention of facilitating
the coordination
of

guidelines that

working group

.as.

y called the

in the

ease

Most changes suggested by

employmen, recommendations

For instance

las,

year,

when

given

the

opportunity to edit the recommendations,
several representatives merely
changed the

phrase “structural labor market
problems” to the slightly more benign
version of "labor

market problems.” But apart from
cosmetic amendments, the Employment
Committee by
and large follows the lead of the
Commission.
Third, the

employment chapter has increased

Commission, especially
of the

employment

Commission was

am

1

2001

the

targets

DG

Employment and

grateful to Paul

Social Affairs, to influence the content

on the European Union

particularly clear in the

first set

McGrade mentioned

the overall capacity of the European

level.

This influence of the European

of guidelines accepted by the European

this point in

.
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an interview on January 30,

1

C0UnCl1 SUmmit

" LUXemb °Urg '" 7

otijec'ives suggested

TK

-

'

,

four pillar

by the Commission,
were

suture

entirely adopted

by the

Employability, entrepreneurship,
adaptability and e ua,
q
opportunities
°"' y

ChmSe

of

employ

Member

Sta , es:

3'7
.

Apparently the

SU88eS,ed by
minister feamClaude
fttncker, then the

CounctPs

Pres, dent,

According

was

that the

sequence of policy
objectives should be
changed.

A, Ian Larsson, then
Director General of

,o

Affairs, the original
proposal of the
,

,

Commission had

DG

Employment and

Social

listed entrepreneurship
prtor

318

.

employability.

Fourth, a

‘

he

VieW

dl ‘ rin8

number of observers
interviews

measurable impact on

'

,hat

Member

as well as Social Affairs
Attaches have expressed

,he

States.

interview on February
26, 2001 that the

European

Employment

For instance, Michel

Strategy

has

had

Tillieut recalled

Luxembourg government

in

in

1997 agreed

transpose the entire set of
European Employment guidelines
into national law.

a

an

to

Along

similar lines, the Portuguese
Social Affairs Attache
mentioned that the existence
of a

European Employment Strategy
has strengthened
domestic

the position

interest groups, especially the
social partners.

getttng criticized by the

that a greater

° th Karl

in the

Refetring

recommendations

the

imminent

risk

of

Porftrio Silva mentioned

degree of cooperation as well as
more concessions from both sides of
the

social partners

317

Commission

of the government vis-a-vis

were achieved

^

-mm expiessed
-001

in recent

rounds of negotiations

in Portugal, partly

due

ani L5nnroth

this point in

This he mentioned

in

011 February 6, 2001 and
Allan Larsson on February
an interview in Brussels.

an interview during February 200
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1

1

to

the

fact

that

the

Portuguese government
could refer to the
European employment

guidelines.

F,fth ’

Wh

‘

‘

he Pr0CCSS ° f defi '™
8

Ch the " haVC '°

results

^

,ranSP ° Se

guidelines a, the

im ° " a,i0nal 0li
P

on the employment situation

Springer (2001, 47) have
argued that

in

the

^ -‘on -e

Mentber

States.

community

|eve|

expected render positive

For instance Roberis
and

:

Perhaps the two most
important aspects of the
Employment
targetS and wha < mi ght
be called the
°f
arshall Plan strategy.
MarshalTpitm
Targets worked very well
in preparing for
the Economic

and Monetary Union when
member

states hadfo
bring thetr economies
into line with agreedon
criteria
, Many
Y
economists have concluded
that this exercise was
useful in

t,k
,

en^^^ZL^IS^les

so

5.2.1

many

uouoies

parts of the world.

Factors Influencing the Adoption
of the Employment Chapter
This section analyses the factors
and forces

towards the employment chapter.

in greater detail that

have contributed

Specifically, the subsequent
sections demonstrate the

resources and strategies employed
by the Commission through which

prepare

the

Community

agenda,

employment policy and then
consensus among the

contention

among

the

finally

Member

mechanism employed by

the

Member

to

keep the
in

States.

the

Of

it

momentum eoneeming

last

run-up of the

particular interest

Commission by which
States

234

it

was able

IGC
is

managed
the

issue

to

of

preserve

the

0 demonstrate

the

to

to resolve the lines

of

In the preparations
leading

towards the

employment policy became more
and more
be a separate employment

“ tle WOUld be SUffiCient

title,

(2)

'

IGC

five

main

ctystallixed: (I)

issues with relevance
to

whether or not there
should

or if an employment
chapter within an already
existing

Wha

'

ki " d

“Active

the

employment

title

or chapter

should be given, (3, which
procedures should be created
to implement these
objeclives;
(4)

whether or no, there should be

a separate

Employment Committee which
could

possibly ovetsee the proper
implementation of these procedures;
(5) whether or not
additional incentive measures

Regarding the

first

would be needed.

element, there was the issue
whether or no, the

should be amended to include
new provisions
discussed

in

greater detail below,

in the

some Member

would be necessary, while some
Member

area of employment.

States argued that no

new
As

new

treaty

will be

provisions

States were in favor of creating
provisions

which would represent a strong
commitment

for policy coordination

on the Community

level.

The second
be written into

issue

was

that if

such a provision would be developed,
should these

a separate chapter entirely
dedicated to the issue

these provisions should merely be

would be agreed on, then

titles in

the question

was

of employment, or

an already existing chapter.
if

such a

title

if

If the latter option

should be included with the

chapter on social policy or economic
policy.

The

third issue

should be given.

was

the question about the particular
objective the treaty articles

Some Member

States

were

employment”, while others were not willing

in

favor of the objective of “full

to agree

on any objectives beyond

increased level of employment.”

235

Fourth, a

number of actors argued

that a

Employment Policy Committee
shouid

be created in order to
monitor and influence the
policy agendas of the
.he area of

employment pohcy. Again,

number of Member

a

Member

States in

States disagreed
with such a

point of view.

Fmally, there was the
question

if

the

Commission should be provided
with

“incentive measures" to bring
about the goal of the

some Member

States were in favor of

it,

employment

in parttcular

chapter.

Again, while

Gennany and Spam were

rather

vehemently opposed.
This section of the dissertation
discusses three resources of
the Commission as
betng particularly crucial

in

helping ,o foster the
agreement on employment
chapter:

First, the institutional
location

and thereby allows
interests in the

i,

to

Member

of the Commission gives

draw up policy proposals which
States.

Member

States.

greater flexibility and
latitude

are capable of representing
latent

Additionally, this position allows
the

draft policy proposals that
in effect represent a

the

it

Commission to

synthesis compromise

position

among

Second, the receptiveness of the
Council Presidency crucially

determines the degree to which the
Commission has an influence on the
outcome of the
multilateral negotiations

among

the

Member

States.

Third, the

Commission can

manifested interest organizations as
channels to put pressure onto

236

Member

utilize

States.

5.2.2 Preparing toe

Agenda: The White Paper
on Growth,
Competitiveness

and Employment

Following the Publication
of the Green Paper on
Social Policy, the
Commission
continued to shift its policy
focus away from traditional
'worker rights’' and
towards
focus which emphasized
an increase of
competitiveness of the
European

Dowling (1996, 605, recognizes

moving

this shift

economy

of policy focus when he
points ou,

tha, ..by

the social Europe
spotlight from workers’
rights to economic
success, the

Compeutiveness White Paper breaks

fresh ground."

line

with th

,

s

focus the
.

^

Paper provided an analysis
of the causes of unemployment
and possible solutions and
-hereby continued to keep
the issue of

employ, poiiey on

the

agenda of the Europea,

Union.

The White Paper acknowledged

employment

situation

and

for that

Europe's economic problems.
specified that

the top

of the

"it is

pugtose provided a rich and
multifaceted analysis of
Right at the beginning of the
document, the Preamble

imperative to give a

political

analysis of the

^

the importance of efforts
to improve the

new impulse

for keeping

agenda of the European Union.”

unemployment problem was

that

employment

firmly at

32
"

One

important argument

Europe was economically

falling

in the

behind

319
It

b beyond the scope of this paper

to

summarize even

just the

analysis.

main points of this

Therefore, this chapter will only
provide those aspects that are relevant to
the
discussion of employment policy.
320

c

European Commission, 1993a, COM(93) 700
final.
See
European Communities (1993b, point
2.44) and 1993c.
1
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also

Commission of the

her competitors due to
a lack of structural
adjustments.

As

pointed out in the White

Paper:

1311

11

]^'

, tec ln '°S* ca h
*

scrcird

AUh'

and^ntem^nTl^nv^onmenr

competitors, with the result
that vulnerability to
cyclical downturns
and external shocks remained
high.

The White Paper

largely proposed

problems of the European economy:

improvement of education and

two

First,

it

sets

of solutions

for the structural

called for action in the
following areas:

training systems, increased
flexibility of

work

organization, reduction of indirect
labor costs, efficient use of
public funds, and training
for unskilled

young

people.

Second, the document spells out
the plan

investment program to renew the
infrastructure
jobs and

and

make European

less costly infrastructure.

flexibility.

the creation of an

fifteen million jobs

Both

sets

the summit.

a

called Trans

of solutions were received
in the

EU

efficient

barriers to

European Networks (TENs),

enormous investment fund.
in the

create

more

At the same time, governments should
remove

would be created

immediate policy action

massive

EU. The program would

more competitive by providing them
with

The success of the program,

depended on

foi

firms

in the

for a

If the

proposal was followed,

between 1994 and 2000.

differently: the five policy areas identified

White Paper where again repeated and confirmed

Heads of states agreed

that there

should be a coordinated policy effort

238

in

in the

f0l ' 0Wta8

P °' iCy arMS:

(

°

opportunities for

tite

labour foree by

pronto, ing investment in
vocational training.
,2) increasing the employment-

intensiveness of grow,
h,

in particular

Reducing non-wage labour
policy by

moving from

costs.

(4,

by:

a passive to

more

flexible organization

of work. (3)

Improving the effectiveness
of labour-market

an active labour market
policy, and (5) improving

measures to help groups which
are particularly hard
Thus, the issue areas identified

in the

hi.

by unemployment.

322

White Paper had a clear impact
on

the

Council conclusion of the Essen
summit. For instance Sciatra
(2000, 212) has argued
that the “leading ideas
voiced at the

directly connected to

some of the

in

December

Green Paper,

the

the previously identified policy
areas.

blueprint

new

In this

summit provide just as much
continuity between
White Paper of Social Policy and

on Growth, Competitiveness and
Employment as well as a blueprint

out that the

1994, are

principles set out in the Delors
White Paper.”

sense, the conclusions of the
Essen
ideas presented in the

Essen European Council

the

White Paper

for policy action in

32
’

Several Social Affairs Attaches
have pointed

policy tool created in the Essen
summit was cmcial to provide the policy

of the White Paper with a mechanism by
which

it

could be transfonned into

324

policy action.

322

Foi a discussion of the Essen

summit see Radke and Stoermann (1998,

709).

323

European Council, 1994b. See also Commission
of the European Communities
(1994, point

1.3).

324
I

am

the

grateful foi this point tor instance to Paul van

personal interview on January 31, 2001.
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Leuwe who mentioned

this in a

By combining
goals, .he

'° mal<e

women

'

Commission managed

he fi8h ' a8amS ' Unempl

to

commi.

.he

°^“ “*>

.he paramoun. .ash of
,he

EU

Member

e Cfuality of

And

S.a.es in ,he

Enropean Counci,

opponents

for

fmally the Counc „ asked
,

Social Affairs Council and
.he

.0 .he

ECOFIN

Counc.ls

,o

“report annually to the
European Council on further
progress on the

This

new

of the Member
that the

se,

States.

Member

of solutions, by and large had
Already the

firs,

a

to the reluctance

progress repotf on the policy
in ,995 indicated

States had no, giyen full
support to the required projects
and tha, several
32
"

Funding continued

and 1999, and financing

in 1997.

difficulties

to

be a problem. In

to revise the financial

were discussed

Despite funding problems, a number
of projects

in a

number of

in the transportation,

communication, and energy sectors and the
amount of fiinding available

for

increased significantly between 1996
and 1997 with the

ECU

see

S.a.es ,o

employment

mixed tmpac, due

October 1996, the Council could not
reach an agreement on how

meetings

Member

EU

committing

them
402.9

Foi a discussion of the conclusions of
the various Council summits see For
example
Casey 1993, Symes 1998, Thomas 1999.

326

Commission of
of the

in

Treaty.

priority projects faced fiinding
challenges.

situation for 1998

^

policy tool of multi-annual
reports was later adopted
in the

employment chapter of the Amsterdam
The second

men and

keep track of employment
.rends

Council on further progress.
Thus the Essen conclusion
urges

marker

^^

policy goals with a
feasible policy
process of how

the European Communities, (1995, 138-139).
Also see Commission
European Communities, 1996.
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miUi0n

”

1997

,0 he,p

have pointed out

Despite a„ these efforts, a
number of critics

that the

Overall, the

programs have not had a
significant impact on job

creation.

White Paper on Growth and
Competitiveness and Employment

represented an important milestone
in the Commission's
strategy of getting
employment

policy accepted by the
the

Member

States as an important field
for

White Paper the Commission
managed

of unemployment, bu, also was
able

were considered

to

to no. only provtde a
definition

be a viable solution to the
problem of unemployment.

on the support of the Presidency of

White Paper:

the Council.

First, the

Community should add employment

section details both the process by
which the
as well as the resources

Commission of
For

this

the

employed along

it

among

policy onto

its

Commission managed

and Springer (1997,

241

factors in

able

a large

group of

agenda. The following
to prepare the

the way.

for instance Roberts

Two

Commission was

European Communities, (1997, 155-158).

argument see

of the problem

Second, the Commission worked

through the Group of European
Socialists to foster a consensus
actors that the

With

action.

suggest a set of policy tools that
subsequently

particular contributed to the
adoption of the
to rely

Community

45).

agenda

5.2.2.1

Factors Influencing the
Adoption of the White
Paper
The beginnings of the White
Paper can be seen

Cab, net and the

DG V to wo* closely together to

goal of .nereasing

«ha, the ••classical

employment growth

in

February he told the European
Parliament

penl- and suggested

that the

of the Delors

pronto, e stn,ctarai refonns
with the

Europe.

models of growth are no.

in the efforts

In February

32

sufficient

that “the

of 1993, Delors indicated

produce jobs.”

’

mid-

vety idea of a united
Europe

Community needed new

initiatives

is in

which aimed both

promoting active labor market
measures as well as fostering
the dialogue with

a,

the social

330

partners.

In

March of the same

of putting a new economic

European Council. In

year, the

initiative

May

Commission

floated for the

firs,

time the idea

on the agenda of the Copenhagen
meeting of the

of 1993, Delors directed his
long-range planning

unit, the

Cellule de Prospective headed
by Jerome Vignon, to prepare a
detailed study of the

problem of European unemployment.

And
of various

in

member

get the issue of

Given

that

May

and June, Delors began

state

-

in particular the

the

lobbying campaign with the
governments

French as well as the German
government

unemployment included on

Denmark, which held

a

the agenda of the

-

to

Copenhagen meeting.

six-month rotating presidency of the
Council, was

responsible for the preparation of the agenda,
he concentrated his attention on Poul
Nyrup

Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, who

in

mid-June circulated a

letter to his

fellow

329

For

this point see

Financial Times February
,

5,

1993,

5.

330
tor this quote see Official

Journal of the European Parliament, (February

12 )
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10, 1993,

leaders indicating that one
of the principal foci tfthe

unemployment and

that the discussion

Copenhagen meeting would
be

would be introduced by
Delors.

Delors used his opportumty
to speak

wen. As Pointed on, by Sven
Swenson

in

in the

forum of the European
Council

rather

an intetview in Februaty
2001: "Delors only

presented two graphs and tigures
which suggested that structural
problems were the mt
main

cause of Europe’s unemployment
problem"
percent of the working age
population

Sharp contrast to about 70
percent
percent in Japan.

number of jobless
tins

was

in the

He argued

in

US

employment

and the

His analysis focused on the
individuals

was much

EFT A

tha,

in

eunently

less than

60

Europe, which stood

in

countries as well as over
75

fact that after

each cyclical downturn, the

larger than prior to the

economic

crisis.

From

observation he drew the conclusion
that unemployment was
primarily a structural

problem caused by the lack of

flexibility in the

job market as well as the
deteriorating

competitiveness of European firms. Thus,
while economic growth would
be
indispensable for the creation of jobs,
such a development would
nevertheless not be
sufficient to cure the Europe's
structural

problems which lay

at

the heart of the

332

unemployment problem.
necessary

strategy.

mandate

in

He convinced Member

which the Union would have

States that a

to outline a

new medium-term development

The heads of states agreed with Delors and
thereby provided him with
to draft

mentioned

such a paper by the end of the year.

in a

personal interview with Swenson on February
15, 2001.

332

see

White Paper was

Agence Europe (June

24, 1993).
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a

S.2.2.2 Collaboration
with the Belgian
Council

In July 1993,

on the

firs,

Presidency

day when Belgtum took

the rotating

pres dency rf
Council, the Belgian
government and the Commission
had a meeting ,o discuss
the

agenda

for the following six
months.

given priority

in

the

Both sides agreed

that the

coming months. Equally
imponan, was

,

^

White Paper should be

the agreement reached
on

selecting the appropriate
level in the Council
that should deal with
the White Paper.

Upon

insistence of Delors and
supported

by the Belgian Prime Minister
Jean-Luc

Dehaene, the Belgian Finance
Minister, Philippe Maystadt,
eventually agreed

White Paper should
that since the

final version

first

mandate

be submitted to the heads
of state.

to elaborate the

3

”

By

of the Paper should not be
evaluated by the Finance
Ministers

convincing the Belgian Presidency
of

bypass the Ecofin Council. As
feasibility

it

of the proposals made

Pi esidency,

Delors argued

Paper was given by the
European Council, the

Council, but instead should be
evaluated by the heads of state
Council.

effect,

that the

in the next

this strategy,

in

an Ecofin

European

Delors was later able

to

turned out, this was absolutely
crucial for the political
in the Paper.

Thus from

the outset of the Belgian

334
Delors had the strong political
support from Dehaene.

This section draws on the work of
Endo (1999, 196

ff).

334

c
Endo
has pointed out that Dehaenes’ interest
in
lom politically altruistic, but instead, “Dehaene’s

self-interest

economy

White Paper (1999, 198) was far
keenness on the Paper was a healthy
was one of a few leaders about to execute a
far-reaching austerity
the

He
own

in his

country. It was clear that a rigorous national
plan for Belgium could
not be realistically be implemented unless
accompanied by a Europe-wide strategy on

growth, competitiveness and job creation. Thus,
the Belgian presidency had
o pnontization, the channels through which
to

as the will to

work with

do so.”
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a clear sense

the Delors presidency as well

5.2.2.3 Mobilization of

Commission’s

>n order to utilize
the politics,

h S POl,, Cai ° alS
8
‘

'

'

De

'

m ° biii2ed

0rS

window of opportunity provtded
by
working groups were created

issue given.

mandate
inte

Resources

that has

been given t0 him
and

™' -urces of the

the mandate.

to contribute

headed by a Commissioner
or two.

Internal

Intemaiiy

,

Commission

„ a£hieve
l0 use lhe

he Commission, nine

towards the White Paper.
Each group was

335

Each working group pu,
forward

a repot,

institutionally

was iocated

in

the office of the

group included Christopher
Boyd, a Dolors’ cabinet
member

and Jerome Vignon, then
Director of

affairs

5.2.2.4 Mobilizing the

Group

Parallel to these debates

Employment and
for the

335

the

Commission’s Secretary
General.

Accordingly, the chair of the
core group was David
Wihiamson. Other members

monetary

on

Coordination of these reports
was given to the so-called
‘core-group’ which

A

According

to

Endo

charge of economic and

Forward Looking Studies

Uni,.

of European Socialists

on the European Council, the
Director General of DG

Social Affairs, Allan Larsson

Commission’s proposal

the

in

in this

for the

was

instnimental in mobilizing support

employment chapter

in the

Amsterdam

Treaty.

999, 234) the groups were organized under
the following
(supervised by Henning Christophersen),
(2) Solidary
n
(Le ° n Brittan)’ ( 3 ) R ^arch a "d
Development
rAntnnf
J
110 Rubertl)
(4) Trans -European Network (Martin
Bangeman), (5) Information
[

headings

( 1 )

( 1

Economy and

EMU

hTw,^° ^
’

.

(6) Edacatl0n and Trainin (Ruberti),
§
(7) Labor Market Policy
(Padiag Flynn), (8) Accomplishing the Single
Market (Raniero Vanni

New Model

D’Archirafi), (9)

Development, including environment and restructuring
of taxation
(Yannis Paleokiassas and Christiane Scrivener).
of

245

one of his

mam

both ,n the

Member

avenues
S. a ,es

and on

Party of European
Socialists
the debates ins.de the

Member

States.

the levei

Group

in the

of the European Union.

European

European Commission and

As pomted

at

while he was Ftname Minister

which

the

in the

outlined

IGC was

adopted

9,

,993.

Initiative, a

As pan of his work, he

his vision for

employment

States as well as

among

336

DG

Employment and

Social Affairs

working group
drafted a

the Essen

which they pointed out

.ha,

the

inside of the Party of

document “Put Europe

an “Employment Union”
and the ways

The next year before

a declaration in

he

being developed.

could be achieved. The document
was adopted by the PES

on December

,

provided . lmk

Swedish government, Allan
Larsson was

Chainnan of the European
Employment

Work- which

Member

the

Before being appointed
Director General of

Socialists (PES).

Pari, amen,

Insti.u.ionai.y

out by Ladrech
(1997, ,7) the Sociahs,
network sough, to

influence the multiple points

European

^
^

gather support was
through the socja|

a, its

conference

to

which

in

it

in Brussels

summit, the PES leaders jointly

“Europe lacks an effective

337

policy.”

One important element

that

was common both

in the

papers of the

Commission’s White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment
reference to an

“employment system." While Jerome Vignon,

PES and
is

the

the

the head of the Forward

Studies Unit, pointed out in a recent
interview that he was the one

who

coined

this

phrase, several other participants have
attributed this concept to Allan
Larsson. Despite

quoted

in

Johansson (1999,

89).

337

see Johansson (1999, 89).
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.fference of opinion,

‘

he

W ° rk

d °" e

m

PES 3nd

Jerome Vignon, on

'™'

work

'

hey

for the

5.2.2.5

Cabme '

t,K

Initiative.

alS ° C ° n,r,bUted ,0

is

a considerable
overlap of ideas
belween

° f “'X**1

J*nsson

this

meetings of the working
group on the

While they were exposed

“»

(1999) explains

hy drawing on

the ideas discussed
in this
their experience in
their

Commission.

Bypassing the Ecofin Council

During the
particular

most

clear that there

a regular basis
attended the

European Employment
f0

it is

last

phase of drafting the White
Paper

two elements

the

Commission was planning

controversial.- First, the idea

it

became apparent

include

of work-sharing was severely

in the

that in

Paper would be

criticized

by the vast

338

majority of Finance Ministers.

For instance JeamClaude
Junker, the Finance Minister

of Luxembourg, argued that
work-sharing would send a “negative,

defeatist signal” to

339

Euiope

s

woikeis.

Nevertheless, drawing on the positive
experience of the

Netherlands, Vignon continued to argue
that work-sharing should
remain a central pari of
the Paper.

In particular he emphasized that
solidarity between those in and
out of

work

should be established through shorter
working hours and sharing jobs among a
wider
population.

This section draws on the work of Endo

1

999.

See Financial Times (November, 24 1993,
2)
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Second, the ,dea of increased
public expendiiure
was received rafter
negative,,
by the Finance Ministers.
A, the end of October,
during an Ecoiin
Councii,
their

.espouse was overwhelmingly
negative

and job creation through
investments

Delors’ initiative to
boost econonttc growth

in infrastructural
projects.

Anticipating the reaction
of the Finance Ministers,
De,ors pursued the
foliowing
strategy: First, he dehberateiy
toned

down

sotne pans of his *af,
paper.

reference to work-sharing was
completely dropped. According

Delors remarked during a
cabinet meeting that since
viable

“however

intellectually

conec,

might

[it

be],

Endo (1999,200).

this idea will be
politically no.

we

a reference to a 2-3 percent
reduction in interest rates

support from the

For instance the

should abandon

it.”

was dropped, most

Additionally,

likely to solicit

German government.

Second, with the support of the
Belgian government the
Commission managed
delay the presentation of the White
Paper
.0

to

to a date as late as
possible.

avoid submitting the Paper to the
Ecofin Council under

submit the White Paper directly

to the

heads of

state.

all

The aim here was

circumstances and instead

Thus,

when

the Finance

Ministers gathered four days before
the European Council summit,
they

received a proper document.
state

more

Paper.

The

said “there

diflicult, the

Accordingly,

in

order to

no way

still

had not

a decision by the heads of

Finance Ministers moved to block the
adoption of the White

British Chancellor Clark voiced
the

is

make

to

that

mood of the

heads of government are going

248

Finance Ministers when he

to leave this city [of Brussels]

haV ” 8

' hiS

0 '’ 3 maSSi

detailed proposals put

first to

™b

—^ P~e

the finance ministers

of the

without there having
been

EU”

Finally, 2d hours after
the Eeonfin Council
a„ dj us,

34 °

two days before

Council summit, the
Commission emulated the
long-awaited White Paper

government. The Commisston
knew

that

i,

was able

the

European

the heads of

to play on, this
strategy, since

i,

could completely rely „„
the suppott of the
Belgian Prestdency. Prune
minister Dehaene
himself kept a close oversight
over the agenda for the
European Council and
personally

made

sure that the White Paper
would be put

fomard

dtrectly to the

summit. He asked
Delors to introduce the
discussion of the Paper and
thereby gave him another
opportunity
341

to “sell” his ideas.

Fortuitous for the sake of the
White Paper

Dutch governments were willing

removed those sections

that

to support the

was

the fact that

White Paper

Germany and

after Delors

the

had strategically

he knew would be received
adversely by both

342

governments.

This recent

pressure on the United
In the

and
to a

it

shift in the constellation

Kingdom which

wake of these developments,
was agreeable

of supporters placed sufficient

did not want to be seen as
isolated

the stance of the British

to accepting the

in the matter.

government also softened

White Paper. The conclusions of the
summit point

compromise which must have been

the selling point for the United

Kingdom:

the

conclusions state that whilst the bulk of the
implementation of the White Paper would
be

340

Guardian, 6.12.1993:12 - quoted

in

Endo (1999,201).

341
J>ee

342

Agence Europ, December,

1

1,

1993, 3-4

c
See
Financial Times, December, 4-5, 1993,

1

and December

249

10, 1993, 2

left to

the Finance Ministers,
the heads of
governments and state
themselves

monitor

work of implementation.

their

5.2.3 Implications for
the Decision-Making

Overaii. the White Paper
politically

Member

paved the way

As

States.

for the

was a

entcia,

Community

strategy

document

in

se, the

the

Commission had

to

al this level.

States

unemployment

called repeatedly for a
coordinated

The

efforts

of the Commission

reduce their respective
unemployment

Leuwe

in

were rather clueless how

rates.

For examp, e, the Delors

First, the

intensified the policy debates
a, a time

Social Affairs Attache Paul
van

“Member

be acceptable to

344

on employment.”

The Commission

were straggling

to

tha,

tone for European Council
debates and

policy debate were particularly
successful for three reasons:

chosen.

framing the policy debate

pointed ou, by Youri Decays,,
the -Commission's
White Paper and

consequently, for the EU's
adaptation process
1

Process

Europe-w.de empioymen,
measures

Opinions have effectively helped

White Paper of 993

would

343

They were

an interview

to

in

rates.

frame the

timing was well

when Member

As mentioned by

States

the

Brussels on January 31, 2001:

respond to the high and persistent

willing to see what the European

Second, the Commission succeeded

to

in

Union would suggest."

presenting widely-acceptable solutions
to a

generally recognized problem. The
bundle of suggested active labor
market measures

See Agence Europe, December

12, 1993, 5.

344

Devuyst (1998, 616).
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With elements of struchtra,
refonn were widely
seen as a

way of basing

,

increase of

Member
later

empioymen,

Member

the

States to these measures

firs,

States.

^

the

effectiveness and flexibility
of the abor markets
and thereby of

The Commission
managed

^

commit

the

through the adoption of
the White Book
and than

added a policy process of
ach.eving these goals
through the Essen
conclusions.

a

sense the Essen conclusions
were already a major step
towards fostering consensus

among

the

Member

States.

As Kenner

(2000, 380, has pointed out,
-Essen can be seen

as a rehearsal for the
formalized procedures later
brought into play under the

Employment

Title.”

Thud, the Commission
float its ideas as well
as a

positions.

who had

As

utilized the

forum

in

which

Council as a forum
it

in

could influence the

which

was

it

Member

able to

States’

pointed out by the Commission's
Secretary General, David
Williamson,

attended the European Council
meetings from the early
1980s, “the difference

[between Delors and

his predecessor]

is

really incredible.

meetings, the Commission had
a subsidiary

role.

Now

In the early

Delors presents

European Council

arguments, and the heads of government
comment on them. That’s how

now. Delors

is

absolutely a fundamental

the

all

it

main

actually works

pan of the operation of the heads of
government

345

meetings.”

In this sense, the issue

of unemployment was used an
opportunity by which the

Commission could demonstrate

the importance for

Community

Action.

Jacques Santer, then President of the
European Commission, described

345

Quoted

in

Endo (1999,

111).
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For instance,
in

1995 the levels

Europe showed

its

ctizens tha, une„lp ,o
ym e„ t was major concern
and a

priority:

!s~^ s est-*
d

2

ta

soetenes, destroying
solidarity between our
people creatine a
epnved

without hope’ class of excluded
people
of the joy of living.
Pensh the
thought that

Thus,

in

sum, a number of scholars
have pointed out

the area of social policy
during the early 1990s
in the

we

context of the political
climate of

it
its

is

time.

front the benefits
346

fail.”

that the progress
achieved in

quite remarkable and
has to be placed

As

pointed out by

Endo (1999,

191), the

“deeply hostile atmosphere for
the Commission, and
the stalled ‘Maastricht
fatigue’
after the Treaty’s turbulent
ratification process

any Commission leader
climate the

to launch a

Commission managed

new

would have made

initiative."

i,

extremely

difficult for

Yet, remarkably enough,
in this

to exercise agenda-setting
leadership

by

initiating the

process leading to the adoption
of the White Paper by the
Brussels European Council

December of 1993 and securing an
agreement among

the heads of state to
considerably

widen the agenda of the intergovernmental
conference.

quoted

in Milliard

and Lee (1997,

5).

347

European Council 1993.
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in

347

5.2.4

Keeping the Momentum:
Background Preparations

for the Council

Summits

5.2. 4.1

From Corfu

to Turin

The European Commission
kepi
•he agenda of the
European
initiatives

the series of
of the European
Commission, smd.es and
background papers, successive

A, the

Madnd summit

principle social,

unemployment by giving
loca, au, horit.es,

and the

Dublin European Council

Emp.oyment

-

the social and

employment

in

simuitaneousiy address
various aspects of the

EU

at*

-political approval" to
mobilize the

its

Member

States.

December 1996 expressed
the

in its

Community,

national

common

The outcome of

this

And

the

"Dublin Declaration on

commitment of the European Council
that

The

political attention

social pariners in the
battle against unempioyn.cn,.

pacts could be created.

unemployed young people

of the

June 21-22, 1996, mainly
directed

economic agents together so

am, towards

Council reiterated , ha, job
creation was the

political objective

The Jobs Challenge"

States agreed to

tern.

in

its

to

in ,995, the

economic and

Florence European Council

and

unemp.oymen, prominenfly
„„

Union during the years
1995-1997. Given

European Counci, s were
infiuenced
issue.

the concern over

to bring ail

projects for territorial

summit was

that the

Member

the following structural
objectives: integration of

into the labour market,
prevention

unemployment, and more balanced

participation

of the dnf, towards long-

of men and

women

in

the labour

market.

This section documents the

subsequent pressure

this exerted

initiatives started

on the

Member

by the Commission and the

States.

253

In particular three initiatives are

analyzed more closely:
The Social Action
Programme, the
Entity”,

and the “Social Policy
as an Economic
Factor,”

S.2.4.2

The Social Action Programme
1995-1997

APn

'

1995

action in the area of

ier

’

^

C ° mmiSSi0n

co " ti "“ e ‘J

nnemp.oymen, by presenting

programmes were presented

Times responded on April

1*

in

<° Pressure

its

1974 and

to the presentation

Emope

as an

Member

the

third Social Action

in

Economic

States for

*

3

Programme.

1989 respectively. The
Financial

with an

article

on the front page which
pointed out that the social
action programme
represented another example
of a changed
policy focus and policy

commitment
throughout

to the

the

style.:

wide use of

European

“The European Commission
has formally abandoned
legal

Union.”

measures as a way

to

point

out that “total

Commission

To

its

main

priorities.”

harmonisation of social policies

more

is

not

The
an

article

objective

that]

went on
of the

called to

strength to the goals identified
in the Social Action
Programme, the

form a Comite des Sages which was
given

the task to evaluate the

After the Committee had me, on
several occasions between

(i995a

35 °

now emphasizing

or the Union.”

Social Charter of 1989.

349

is

349

give

Commission

to strengthening
workers’ rights

[The Commission

competitiveness and job creation
should become

its

Q
See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(April

'

com

<95 > i34> <i995b

13, 1995, 15),

-

(May

’

22, 1995, 15).

.

ccoiding to Kowarlsky (1999,
203), the Committee was headed by Miria de
254

^

October ,995 and Eebruaiy
1996>
Poltttca, Rights.”

it

issued . repon wift

one section

all

...

a nutshell, the Committee
recommended , ha,

Should work toward es.abhshtng
a ”Socia, Union.”
suggested that

^ „„

social policy provisions

in the treaty.

^

, lle

rf

^^

European Union

order to achteve this
goa

of the past

treaties

,

it

should be consolidated
into

This would allow ordinary
citizens to be both
better informed

about their rights as well as
to identify better with
Ihe European Union.
hi order to publicize
the findings

"Social

Policy

Forum” on March

representalives of the

NGO

Member

which

States, the

lasted

community

Mach

3tf‘.

About 1000

mstitutions, the social
partners and

351

employment measures received

which passed
endorsed the
resolution

mulitannual

a

1

1

resolution

key areas

stressed

the

programmes

Programme

16,

1996.

identified for action

thereby

finally, the

Commission's proposal

additional support from the
European Parliament

on January

importance

as well as the

of

In

this

implementing

supporting

resolution the Parliament

by the Commission.

the

strengthening the policy platform of the
Commission

And

until

participated in the event/'

Additionally, the Social Action
for

of the Report, the
Commission organized a

surveillance

Essen
in the

Moreover, the
procedures

conclusions

as

well

for

as

preparation towards the IGC.

Parliament took the view that the
Intergovernmental Conference should

Louides Pintasilgo and included the following
members: Eduardo Garcia de Enterria
Hartmut Kaelble, Luka Katseli, Frederic Pascal,
Bengt Westerberg, and Shirley

Williams.

351

See Commission of the European Communities,
1996a, 1996d, and 1997c.
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1

provide a specific legal
basis for social
and employment
policy that does
not require

unanimity

5 2.4.3

352
in the

Council.

Europe as an Economic

In July 1995, the

which aimed

Entity

Danish government
submitted a paper

to the

achievmg strengthened
coordination of economic
and

a,

Tins initiative was reflected

S ai

mo m

in the

C0n0n,iC

L“c

structural pohcies.

Cannes European Council
Conclusions as follows:

CI1 "

fnr
r ’Maneuver

European Council

ly

and

'

,he

Eu '°pean Union

offers additional

a specific

added value that makes for
the
The El,r° Pean C ° l, " Cil Calls
u P on

C Pl0ymCm
tne council and
ar,h.
the Commission
C
to study the mutually
reinforcim,
eifect of increased
coordination

and

'

1

to report

back

to

i,

of economic and
Madrid meeting."

at its

The European Commission eagerly
jumped
provided by reacting

Octobu 1995
developments

the

in

in

two ways:

in

employment systems

Commission expresses
the broad guidelines

to the opportunity
this initiative

a tactical and in a strategic
manner. Already, on

Commission had adopted

strategy: recent progress

structural policies
P

and prospects

the opinion that

a

in the

Communication

witli the title

1

“Trends and

E.iropean Union, the European
employment
53

for the future.”’

full

In this

Communication, the

implementation of the macroeconomic
part of

on economic policy would enable
investment-led growth of 3- 3

per year to be achieved over the
period 1995-2000.

More than

1

1

million

.

5

%

new jobs

352
r S 0l " ti0
S
Commission of the European Communities
f,
it 1.3.191).
noinU
9'n oreei
Official Journal
p
of the European Communities (1996, C32).

3?

',’

?

353

see

Commission of the European Communities 1995e.
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(

1

996b,

W0Uld bC Creattd reSUMng

a

'

“ - “«**»- -

.0

around

functioning of the lab or

Member

States have

marke,

made

programmes incorporating
Furthermore, the

and

titled

DG

medium-term

also reacted rather
guide, y in . tectica
,

“Mutually reinforcing

to the

European Council

effects

in
i

mamer

354

level."

which was

which was submitted

by

Madrid, 1995. The
document

While

to deliberate in
i

DG V, reacted strategically by

which ways

the

Danish

could be used to further the
Commission’ s agenda. In the end,
the

drafted a report

national

of increased co-ordination
of macro-economic

Community

setting up a steering
group

initiative

^^

the priorities set
out in Essen.

structural policies at the

first

As

ftrther

concerned, the
Communication reveals tha,
the

a great effort to
establish coherent

submitting a worlcing
document

was

is

, 5% A
.

reduction could be
achieved by implementing
struchtra, measures

to the

DG V

Dublin summit and which
served as

a basis

for discussion there.

5 2 4.4 Social Policy as a
Productive Factor
.

.

Already mentioned
value of social policy.

became

part

in the

Green Paper, the

DG V

used the idea of the economic

In the years following
the publication

of larger debate which

is

of the Green Paper,

often referred to as “social
policy as a productive

355

factor.”

see

Here the argument

is

that social policy

Commission of the European Communities

is

1

essential in order to enable

995f.

355

see

this idea

Vobura 1989, 1995.
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economic players
as a necessary

of

he PaSt

'

for a competitive

out in the Green Paper,

social protection

‘

betave flexibly and
innovative^ In

component

As pointed

item.

to

have been

a

economy and

“it >s
i

hi

seen

not merely as a
luxury or a cost

important to underline
that high standards

major contributory factor

Ma " y W ° Uld

this sense, social
policy is

in

Europe’s economic
success

^ -ial standards should no, be seen

as an

optional extra, or a luxury
which can be done without
once limes get hard, but
rather as
356
an integral part of a
competitive economic model.”

5.2.5 Implications for the
Decision-Making

This

new

policy focus

was instrumental

in

Process

four ways:

First,

encrusted line of the old debate
between flexibility and security.

i,

All

helped to break the

of a sudden the

debate was no longer characterized
by a zerosum logic. Proponents
of the welfare states

were no longer
had
turf

its

in

economic

need

to

defend social polices merely
on the basts of social

costs, bu, instead

and use economic arguments
Second,

it

helped

DG

were now equipped tojoin

to support the provision

Employment and

employers associations as well as other

DGs

seen as a rather incapable political
actor,

the economists

Commission.

far too closely associated

this

image.

As Wendon

Green Paper, 1993,

p.

its

14

258

image with

In the past

DG

points out, “social policy as a
productive factor

356

their

i,

was

with Trade Unions

Europe. The debate “social policy
as a productive factor”, helped
the

of

on

of social security measures.

Social Affairs to change

inside of the

justice tha,

to shed

is

in

some

clearly

hope employers

3
will feel comfortable
with.-

Fourth. „ provided the

As potnted

ou, hy Bois (1995,

DG v with

1).

”

arguments against an
expert group which
was

Independent Expert Group
on Legal and

Administrative which was
headed by Bernhard

“turning] hack of the regulatory
tide
slash

away

DG

Employment and

analysis of the factors
causing

were necessary

i,

Europe

the red tape superimposed
by

Finally, the

factor,

in

EU

a, large

laws

as

[and]

its

main goal

in

to

exclusion.

to

58
in recent years."’

new frame

for the

Europe and suggested
several steps

While highlighting

that social policy

also emphasized that
European welfare states should
provide

measures

the

recommencing] where

Social Affairs also
defined a

unemployment

to address the issue.

Mob, or had

is

more

that

a productive

active

avoid unemployment and
to reduce the economic
costs associated with
social

The Green Paper

explicitly points out that
“social protection

and labour

market policies should where
possible be directed towards
the positive goals of
human
resource development, individual
self-sufficiency and the
integration of individuals
into
359

society.’

357

Wendon

(1998, 348).

358

Bois 1995
359

TEU,

Principles, Article 2.
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5.2.6 Preserving the

Consensus: the In.ergovernmen.a,
Conference

After the employment
issue had been
successfully piaced on
the

agenda by the Commission
and the
initiatives

atmed

a,

and

studies, the

momentum was

maintained through a
series of

Commission gradualiy adjusted

preserving the consensus

among

the

Community

Member

strategy to one

its

which

i,

States,

Originally, the idea to
convene the Intergovernmental
Conference in 1996/1997

came about during
became apparent

the Maastricht heaty
negotiations of 1991,

that the Geinran.
Belgian

with the final outcome.

ICC- a few years

As

i,

were unsatisfied
assembie a new

““
later.

Subsequently, the agreement
was formalized and incorporated

According to

representatives of the governments
of the

examine those provisions of this
Treaty
with the objectives se, ou,

made

ftaiian representatives

a consequence, these
countries insisted

into the Maastricht Treaty
as Article N.

This

and

in the negotiations,

in Articles

the 1996/97 the

first

A

Member

for

this article:

States shall be

which revision

is

“A

conference of

convened

in

1

996

to

provided, in accordance

and B" (Council of the
European Union 1993).

conference to be mandated by treaty
rather , ta „ as a

response of governments to various
internal and external pressures.
However, even

though the original idea was
treaty

to bind the parties to

meet within

a short time to evaluate the

and then to negotiate further some
unresolved elements, some of the
premises

opening the IGC had changed dramatically
during the years from
conference to the

IGC

1996.

In the end, the

IGC was

the Maastricht

for

I

loaded with a whole range of issues

360

For
1995.

this point see

Bieber (1997, 237), Corbett (1994b,
55), Bainbridge and Teadale

260

that

were previously rather
unexpected such

image of the

EU

as enlargement,
increasing the
democratic

and developing a
coordinating mechanism

for

employment and

social

policy goals on the
European Union level.

The Spanish Presidency

5-2-6. 1

Concerted steps

prepare the

The Presidency concluston

he 1996

IOC were

specified the setting

taken a, the Corfi,
Council i„ June l994

up of

Reflection

Group

to prepare for

Intergovernmental Conference
eonsist.ng of representatives
of the Mmisters of

Foreign Affairs of the

Member

States and the President

of the Commission/

chatted by a person appomted
by the Spantsh government
and begin

its

work

6
'

I,

in

will be

June

362
1

995.”

As Chairman of the Group

members of

the

Group

Carlos Westendrop was
selected and the other

consisted of representatives
of the fifteen governments,
the

European Commission and

the

European Parliament.

363

The Reflection Group was
given

361

362

European Council 1994a.
363

pf^mbers of the Reflection Group were as follows: Carlos Westendron
tSnainl
M,chel Bamier (F ranee) Werner Hoyer
(Germany), Silvio Fagilo.o (Italy), Donald
Davis
(UK), Joseph Wyland (Luxembourg),
Gay Mitchell (Irland), Niels Ersboll (Denmark)
Stephanos Stathatos (Greece), Franklin
Dehousse (Belgium), Michel Patiin
an S)
dre C
alV6S Pereira ( Portu al Manfred
Scheich (Austria), Ingvard
S ),
MNinTR
f
Melin
(Finland),
Gunnar Lund (Sweden), Elisabeth Guigou
(EP), Elmar Brok (Epf
Marcelmo Oreja (European Commission). For this
list see Agence Europe
(May 3
...

n^

T

1,

261

.

a C ° mPrehenSiVe

” anda,e

by ,he
not

down by

.he Maastricht Treat,
bu, a, so "any

facilitate the

work of the

institutions

perspective of enlargement.”

Cher

.treasure

and guarantee

those items |aid

deemed necessaty

their effective
operation in the

364

Jacques De.ors welcomed
the decision to estabhsh
the Reflection Group
with the
words: •The experience of
the

Rome

Treat,, of the Single
Ac, and of the

‘EMU

pan' of

the Maastricht Treaty has
proved that the intergovernmental
conferences ‘work better'
if

•hey are prepared b, experts
who, even though the official
national representatives
do no,

resume

all their

positions,

Additionally, the

on European Union”
identified the

tins the report

employment

may

3
suggest one, two or three
coherent plans,”

Commission presented a "Report
on

to the Reflection

Group on

May

need “to make Europe the
business of evety

3
,

Specifically,

i,

urged tha, there

is

a

1995.

“

citizen.”

again advocated to strengthen
the role of the

policies.

the Operalion of the
Treaty

th

10

"

I„

I„

report

it

order to achieve

Community

need

its

in

promoting

for "coordinating national

364

Q
See
Duff (1997, 2) It is worth noting
Taormina, Sicily to coincide with the 40fi

that its

opening session was arranged in
anniversary of the Messina Conference
In this
way the Reflection Group hoped to be
perceived as a Messina II instead of
a Maastricht II
and would be more associated with the
success of the 1957 Treaty on the
European
Economic Community than the crisis of legitimacy
following the ratification of the
aastiicht Treaty. For this point see
Agence Europe (June 6-7, 1995 2) uviarcn
(March 3j, tyyp)
1996>
and McDonagh (1998, 30).
'

’

365

Agence Europe (March 28-29,

1994, 3).

366

See Commission of the European Communities,
995g. This report was preceded by a
European Council 1995c, the Committee of the
Regions 1995a, and the
Economic and Social Committee 1995. Also, it was
followed by the report of the
European Parliament on May 17, 1995.
1

teport from the

262

decisions on ,he basis of
overal, European
pians. and [urged
rha, .here was a
need
special funding fr„

m

Community budge,

.he

,o pro, no, e
synergies

for]

between na.iona,

projects.”

JUne and JU ° f 1995
y
'

vanous delegations

,o ge,

some

'

""

Pudency

initial

sen, ou, questionnaires
,„ ,he

feedback on the issues
under consideration.

On

.he basis of the responses
to the questionnaires,
the Presidency pu,
forward an interim

repot on September

5,

.995

With regard

to

enjoyment pohcy

main conclusion

the

uses almost the exact wording
as the one chosen by
the Commission in

its

repot

submitted to the Reflection
Group. Specifically, the
interim repot points ou,
tha, “a key
challenge facing the Union
internally

becomes

a venture to which

With public matters

economic,

political

particularly

rejection

senous

in general

and

observation

is

ot developing

the need to ensure that
European construction

citizens can relate.

[.

The graving popular

and European construction

institutional reasons: a

in the

and exclusion,

represented."

its

is

in

panicular

is

dissatisfaction

party due to

high level of unemployment,
which

is

case of young people and the
long-torn unemployed, social
.

.]

the crisis in relations

The operational conclusion

the Reflection

that the next treaty reform
will

have

employment policy measures on

In total, the Reflection

between representatives and those

to

Group derives from

this

demonstrate a stronger commitment

the level

Group met twelve times

of the European Union.

in the six

months of

its

368

existence.

Following

its

mandate, the Group issued

its

final report

on December

5,

Spanish Presidency 1995a.

For a detailed working schedule of the Reflection
Group see Svensson ( 2000 52) and
,

263

“

1995 which was then
officially submitted

IW

,5/ ' 6 ’

“sound basis

^

369
"'

ThC

for the

genera, htle on

“A

fell

it

- *P«

Tllis

by the Croup constituted
a

document contained

Strategy for Europeunderlined the necessity
to

had

make

the

Here the Refection Group
argued
arg,

short of being a proper
state,

As such

market.

Madrid European
Council on December

«*<

work of the conference,™

transparent and closer to
the citizens

Union

to the

to devote itself

it

nevertheless

more

was more than just

to the issues

EU

that

a

A

part ,

more

while the

common

of immediate concern

to

its

citizens.

Additionally, an annotated
agenda provided a range of
more detailed refonn
proposals.

According

to the report, the
internal

with a clear definition of
goals.

Here the report tdentified three
main areas

of the IGC: (1) making Europe
more relevant
better

act, on.

and prepare

More

it

challenge of the Union had
to be me,

to its citizen,
(2) enabling

for enlargement,
(3) giving the

specifically, the report

recommended

Europe

Union greater capacity
that the

Union should

by Which

this goal

pointed out that

could be achieved

“many of us wan,

is

employment

369
17, 1995, 1)

370

European Council 1995a.
371

Spanish Presidency 1995b.
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work

for external

to

be social

area identified

Specifically the report

the Treaty to contain a clearer

Griller (et al.) (2000, 14).

Agence Europe (December

policy.

One

to

work

to acquire

instruments to meet the main
concerns of the citizens that were
considered

exclusion and unemployment as
well as environmental degradation.

for the

commitment on

the part

of .he Union

.0 achieving greater
e c„ nomic

and socla|

and

promote employment, as we.,
as provisions ending
the Union

^^

^

take coordinated
action

on job creation.”

The Commission was
release of

December

6,

firs,

to react to the

1995 in which

i,

Wes.endrop report

generally

support

Of the Reflection Group.
Nevertheless, hinting on the
need
.hat overall the -'main
posifion

which

[the

Commission]

the

to

will

in

an infonnal press

work and

go

further,

the conclusion

i,

p„i raed out

be taking on are matters
on

372
Which the members on the
Reflection Group diverged .”

The
mixed.

overall assessment in the
literature of the impact
of the Reflection

For instance Svensson
(2000, 59) finds

and “put pressure on the

states that

had no, been willing

policy areas. Nevertheless,
several participants
scholars

for

who obsetved

agenda

the

Group managed

that the

in

«„ agree to

the Reflection

Reflect™ group have pointed out

setting the report

was too vague and lacking

tha,

“to

is

hands"

tie

changes”

Group

Group

in certain

as well as

beyond a momentum
3

in strategies for action.

”

Instead of providing a policy
bases from which further
negotiations could be conducted,
the reports of the Reflection

instance,

asked

McDonagh

Group merely represented

(1998, 41) quotes an official of the
Spanish Presidency

to assess the relationship

work of the IGC

a plethora of viewpoints.

replied that

it

For

who when

between the Reflection Group's report
and the subsequent

was merely

“historical.”

Additionally, Kortenberg (1997,

Commission of the European Communities 1995h.
373

.

hor instance see Dehousse (1999,

(December

4),

(1998b,

4),

Devuyst (1998, 619), Aeence Europe

4-5, 1995, 3).
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*

7111)1

POintCd

“ te

—
—
““ —

S,a,emeM 0fdiSa8reeme

<“* 3

“

'

hal ’ 3

tthe Report] c„ns,
itutes

°f

” Furthermore,

some obsetvers

attributed this lack
concreteness in the Report
to the fact that
the Reflection

composed of too many junior

ministers

who were

all

more a

Group was

too aware of not
upsetting their

374

respect, ve politico,
superiors.- Finally,

Dinan (2001,

,4) concludes that »i„
the end the

Report did not become a
formal reference document
for the IGC ”

5-2-6. 2

The

Italian

Presidency

After the preparatory phase
was completed during the
Spanish Presidency, the
Italian

Presidency was expected to
enter the drafting phase
of the IGC. In Januaty.

Susanna Agnes, then

the

European Parliamert.

during the
the

Italian

firs,

IGC, which

part

it

of

its

“

Foreign Mtnister, presented
the Presidency's
programme

In.

nutshell, the Italian presidency
pursued

presidency

I,

aimed

a,

As pointed

In the

out by Silvio Fagiolo,

second part

who was

representative of the Italian Foreign
Minister during the Reflection

an interview with Svensson
(2000, 82)

in

May

objectives:

securing the mandate to
officially open

accomplished with the Turin summit.

furthering the negotiations.

two

it

aimed

at

the personal

Group and

the

IGC,

in

1999, the Presidency had two alternatives

374

For

this point see

Wessels 1996, and Bourlanges 1997.

375

That the
presentation

government

Italian

Presidency was on track with

was considered

this

timing of this customary

surprising due the political uncertainty
associated change of
in Italy. For details see The
European (October 26 -

November
1995)
1995), (February 15-21, 1996), (February 22-28,
1996) and Agence
e
nl
6 2) f° r 3 detailed dis cussion see Daniels
(1997, 242), Dastoli
MQOfi 178),
7 a? and Pasquino
(1996,
(1996, 140).
1

(November 23-29,
i

jV"

’

’
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.0 foster negotiations:

conld either sing.e
on, two or three
subjects for deeper
review

i,

and can, then, as Cose
as poss.hte

to treaty

agreements. Alternatively,
as

in the

Reflection Group, the .tatian
Presidency coutd continue
to review a„ issues
and narrow
down the options Anther b
y singiing ou, the „o„-viah,e
opt.ons and those
clearly

supponed by only a small
minority.

the end, as pointed
ou,

•he Presidency opted
for the second
ahenrative,

months

lay ahead

McDonagh

by Svensson (2000
82)

‘Wing that a process of severa,

of them, no one would
be keen

to

make concessions

too earty -

<1998, 53, has pointed ou,
that during the halian
Presidency

of many Member States

that there

was no urgency about

“
i,

either opening or

wa s

A

the

,

so

view

conceding

the

negotiations.”

The European Commission
presented
>996

its

repon on the ICC."* In

employment be

this

written into the Treaty;

of common interest they would
aim
for

repon

at:

[...

to the Italian Presidency

i,

proposed

and

in

arrangements for multilateral surveillance
of
taking

employment

into account in

all

tha, specific provisions

order to] treat

employ™,,

establishing the conditions
for a

employment; stimulating cooperation
between

on February

on

as a matter

common strategy

the interested pa, lies;
consolidating the

Member

Community

States' multiannual

policies.” In this

‘997b. Also see

programmes;

document, the

Commission advocated an ambitious
Intergovernmental Conference. The

first

goal that

Commission of
European Communities
COMmanttr
OM (96) 90 and Commission of the European Communities
1996b
the

Bulletin,

0Uk be " oted that the Eur ean Parliament
followed
°P
March with its Dury/Maij-Weggen report. and

1996a,

points

1.1

S

It

.i!,
middle

28'",

r !\

of

)

the

Commission

in

European Parliament 1997.

267

•he

”— -—

document recommended

" ^ 0f,WS

^

d

"’ e

for the

,GC was

"bring Europe closer

‘

ks

^

..77

First. the

Social Protocol should
be integrated mto the
Treaty, second, specific
provisions on
employment shottid he

wmten

into the Treaty.

Sh0U,d aim

a,:

In the

“ eS,abliShin8

words of the Commission
(1996b,

"»

a

common strategy

150), these provisions

for

employment-

stimulating cooperation
between the interested
panics, consolidating
the arrangements
for
multdateral surveillance of

Member

employment
With

Member

into account in all

this list the

States.

The

Community

Commission hoped

positions of the

deliberations in the Reflection
clusters:

States' multkannual
programs, [and] taking

policies.”

to break the entrenched
standoff

Member

Group showed

among

the

States as expressed during
the
the fonnation of the
following three

one group of countries (Sweden,
Austria, Belgium, and
Denmark) were

interested in fairly binding
coordination procedures, including
recommendations, and

need be sanctions which were
inspired by and

large by the chapter

if

on the Economic and

378

Monetary Union.
chapter, but

wanted

One group of countries were
it

to

go not beyond

largely interested in an

employment

the elements already included
in the Essen

conclusions (Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Greece, Portugal, and Finland).
countries were rather hostile to the
introduction of a

new employment

A

final

group of

chapter, based both

377

The other

two goals were: (I) making Europe’s
presence felt in the world (2)
adopting an institutional system which
will work in an expanded Europe.
Fora discussion
o these goals see Commission of the
European Communities, 1996c.
378

a

re deta

Mpmh States
<Jw
Member

e d dlscussion on the nuances of the
positions of the individual
u
see ^
Chapter 6.
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on

their belief that

expected

budgetary

Gennany,
-when

the

setting

its

no added value could be
achieved through
it

and

would be one which would
merely bring up

cogences

for the

Petite (I99S,

Commission
sights

it

„

Member

its

it

considered

effect

^ ^^^

Kingdom and

„y

expectations of the conference,

on the upper range of what

any

the risk of increasing

States (Spain, France,
the United

demonstrates the logic of
this

outlined

if at all

realistic.

was

i,

It

in effect

hoped thereby

to

g.ve an ambitious cast to
the negotiations, focusing
on the principa, hemes
tha, wouid
,

come

up: the citizen’s Europe,
Europe’s identity

of the institutions

in a

Europe scheduled

to

„„ the

international stage

and the

state

undergo significant enlargement.”

The intergovernmental conference
was formally convened on
March

29, 1996 in

Turin. This extraordinary
European Council meeting was
intended as a clear

manifestation of a

common

Presidency Conclusion the

Member
that the

States

when

IGC should

it

will to give the

Italian

IGC

3

top political priority.

Negotiations for the

IGC

|„

its

government summarized the consensus
among

pointed out that a mandate for the

be concluded

”

IGC

the

has been continued and

380
in

about one year.

took place

at

two

representatives” of the Foreign Ministers
were the

levels:

main

The

first,

negotiators.

the socall “personal

This group met on

average one and a halfdays per week.
The second level on which negotiations
took place

was

the level of the General Affairs
Ministers.

See Agence Europe (March 29, 1996,

Meetings here took place about once

2).

380

See European Council, 1996a.
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every month. During
the course of the

Italian

Presidency
le f
foreign
Y’ th.
•

ministers

times and thirteen
meetings of their
appointed representatives
took p|ace
in the end. the
Italian Presidency
drafted a progress

-

Florence European Councii
of dune 22 and 23,

" ke y ‘°
'

the

the

^

UPO "' Pr ° Vided ,hM

Member

EMU,

States, ,2)

empioymen,

199,»

lhe

levels

repod which

The

difficult task

of working out the

details

lt

submitted

in this area

remain with

as a convergence
cnteria for

and ,3, no budgetary
consequences couid be expected
from

provisions.

,8,

The main contribution

competences

win no, be used

met three

of such

the

new

treaty

a chapter, however,

remained ahead.

More

significant than the report
submitted to the Florence

the conclusions of the
Council.
issues

was

sufficiently

balanced solutions

meeting

in

Dublin

advanced and

to the

in

Here the

main

Member

that the

States agreed that the
analysis of the

“Conference can turn now

political issues raised."

December 1996

is

European Council were

The conclusion

seeking

also stated that the

expected to “mark decisive
progress” towards

T

had a PP°mted either the country’s
Permanent Representative
Brussels or o
the State o"
Secretary or Minister for European
Affairs. Thus about half of
e group members already
knew each other quite well since they had
also been
representattves ,n the Reflection Group.
New to this group were the following membersPhilippe de Schouteete de Teiwarent
(Belgium), Antti Satuli (Finland) Yamios
amdiotis (Greece), Noel Don- (Ireland),
Jean-Jacques Kasel (Luxembourg), Fransisco
K1
f
U l1 J V er E 0rZa Cavengt (S am)
Stephen Wall (United
‘\|
l’
|
’°'r
?,
Kingdom). Foi
this
list see The European (April
4-10, 1996).
in

Km»lt\

f

’

'

'

-

382

"

Italian Presidency, 1996b.
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completing the Conference
by mid- 1997. Most
importantly,
Presidency

its

mandate by asking

rcal.es” be prepared

I

5-2. 6. 3 Irish

up

a

Irish

gene ,,„ out

^

gave the

for ,

I

Irish

Presidency for the Dublin
meeting.

Presidency

Jl " y

1996

g0Vemmem

" iSh

by the

that “ a

this

^

'

“

,h ° r0 ' a,inS Presid

° ,hC
,

“^ ° f «* Council passed

into the

towards the ,GC, the

Irish

hands of ,he

government

se,

cross-departmental Coordination
Committee under the chairmanship
of Gay

Mitchell, Munster of
European Affairs.

The members of this
Committee

departments of State and the
Permanent Representative

mastermind behind the

and

tactics

KiC

is

With

Bobby McDonagh, who

the structuring

of the

in

Brussels.

Irish

consisted of all

Identified as the

Presidency’s agenda for the

Noel Dorr, a former diplomat
who was brought back from
retirement, together
previously worked for the
European Commission as the

Chef d’ Unite of Padraig Flynn

in the

DG

Employment and

3

Social Affairs.

"

The

Irish

presidency programme, presented
to the European Parliament
revealed besides the goals

summed up
that the

in the

catch phrase “secure jobs, secure
peace, safer streets and sound
money,

handling of the IGC

McDonagh

(

1

998, 7

1

)

in

an efficient

way

38

as a top priority.

the objective of the Irish Presidency

“was

"

As

pointed out by

to gel cvety

Member

383

This piece of information was provided
by Barbara Nohlen
re bruary 27, 2001.

in

a personal interview on

384

1 his phrase

lesident ol the

was used by John Bruton, then Prime Minister of
Ireland as well as
European Council, during the meeting in Dublin,
December 1996.
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State in

strategy

December
of the

endorse an

to

Irish

ending

package as a basjs

^^ ^

for

Presidency was captured
nicely by Noel Doit’s
phrase of “the upper

end of realism,” by which
he meant a maximalist

interpretation of the

mandate given

to

the government.

Three broad phases can
be distinguished under
the
described by Noel Dorr, the

successive

Irish

Irish

Presidency,

in

a process

chairman of the IOC
Representalive Group as
involving

Each phase would make

i,

possible to take one further
step in

developing an approach which
would approximate more closely

to

wha, might be

the

ultimate basis for agreement.

m

the

firs,

phase, from July to September
1996 the Presidency tabled
introductory

notes for discussion.

These notes took account of
the discussions

or under the Italian Presidency
and were distributed to the

in

member

the Reflection

states before

Group

each

meeting. The notes consisted
of a few pages introducing the
proposals and pointing

towards issues for discussion or
possible alternative options.

On

5-1996

July

employment chapter

the Secretariat of the Council
submitted a draft proposal for
the

to the Irish Presidency.

This proposal was largely
characterized by

an intergovernmental^ approach to
employment policy which

making prerogatives
instance, article

aimed

at the

A

either with the

in the

proposed

development of a

Commission had

in

its

Member

text

mentions

common

earlier proposal

States or the

that

McDonagh

most of the decision-

European Council. For

“Member

States action shall be

strategy for employment.” Conversely,
the

made

the reference to

385

Cited in

left

(1998, 75).

272

“Community

action”

Of the new treaty provision
“the establishment of
eoordination between
national

was favored.

In contras, to this,
the

establishment of a

common

strategy for

A, the end of this conniet,

^C

Commission had

i,

earlier

advocated "the

employment.”

remarkable to note that the

is

policies’

Irish

Presidency sided

’

° mmiSSi0n S
i,

Employment

in

which

i.

circulated

its

Introductory Note on

by and large kept the
original wording of the
Commission’s

386

proposed

text.

For instance the introductory
note pointed out

shall contribute to a high
level

Member

States

and by supporting and
supplementing

their action, while fully
respecting

87

Member

used by the European Commission.
The

States.”’

fact that the

This

is

the exact

Commission was

same wording

Commission’s proposal

representation of the public's demand.

proposal to be closer to what the
articles relating to

it

able to prevail in

The

in the

Irish

Presidency perceived the Commission’s

public at large would find
acceptable.

Amsterdam Treaty should be read by

commitment on

the part of the

towards a reduction of unemployment. The
Presidency

fell

the

Member

States to

that this

message was

work
better

achieved with the proposal of the Commission
than with the proposal of the Council.

,

.

Irish

Presidency 1996a.

387

quoted

in

McDonagh

to

appeared to the Presidency as a
better

demand of the

employment

public as a strong collective

386

as

phase of the decision-making process
over the European Council,
can be attributed

the fact that the

The

Community

of employment by encouraging
cooperation between

the primary responsibility
of the

this

that “the

(1998, 87)
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"•he words of McDonagh
(1998

-on hy .he Union on enrptoyment.”

,

85) the

mam challenge

Member

accommodate

On

Sra.es.

^^

^

This was necessary
,o address concerns
no, „„ ly

of ,he delega.ions, bu,
more nnpo,dandy of .he
pnbiic demand
different

for

for such

the other hand,
toe Presidency’s
proposal

aeon

in „, e

would have

dre opposition or
relicence of other
delega.ions sufficiently
,o

make

,o

it

possible for discuss, on ,o
begin ,o focus on toe
con.en, radrer than
merely on toe
principle of .he diaft text.
.he

Commission

to

Presidency contained the

roles

of

large

be able achieve

In a nutshell, this

employment

By and

this

lire Irish

twofold goal.

proposed approach by the
Commission and

Mowing

establishment

a,

States and of the

now

as well

by toe

principtes: (I) the
establishment of a high level
of

as an objective of the
European

Member

Presidency considered the
proposal of

Union

Union

(2) a brief definition

in relation to

employment

of the respective

policy, (3, the

the level of the Treaty
of a detailed procedure to
ensure an appropriate

degree of coordination

a,

European

ot ’incentive” measures in
the

Employment Committee

to

level ,4) provision for
the possibility

employment

of the adoption

area, and(5) the establishment

of an

promote the coordination of
employment and labor market

policies.

The ICC Representatives' reacted
tlteir

to the Presidency’s Introductory

Note during

meeting on July 16/17. While the
broad majority of delega.ions
welcomed the

the reluctant minority maintained
their positions of principle.

Nevertheless, for the

time, the reluctant minority did
not reject the text out of hand and,
in the words of

274

text,

firs,

„

McDonagh
principle,

(199S, 36) “while foTOaIly
reiterating and

began to address the
points of detail and

To have found most of its
element of i, s
Presidency, rhe

Commission

instead to let the Irish

specifically

a. this

a, this point

Pudency

had been reached

point front k e ep ng the
,

consensus

among

the

States.

proposaIs adopted by
, he

tenp and

^

Most

nanowed down even
In the area

suggested paper on September

1

7,

1

further

to

November

and were now presented
under

996 with the

important decisions:

bw

g , he

and

the

1996, the

the heading

intention that

i,

First,

i,

its

could be discussed

a, the

In this phase the Irish

decided that there should be
five main

icq
'

Amsterdam

Draft treaty.

Additionally

it

Second

'

employment chapter should be considered
Citizen.”

,

to ensure tha,

of employment, the Presidency
submitted

•

sections of the

was

draft treaty version

meeting of the Personal
3
Representatives on September 23-24. “

made two

proposa

Conxion shifted

imporiantly, the goal here

a„ the

^

in the final treaty.

of “suggested approach.”

Presidency

^

„

initiatives to presetv,

During the second stage of
negotiation, from September
proposals were

a foima|

see

behind employment

.he hey ideas and
procedures were continued
to be

end would be included

subm i,

Overall, the strategy of
the

momentum

Member

its

^

t0 dabble in

deeded „ 0 ,

conclude

in the end.

^^ ^

to

it

reached the decision, that the

be part of the section on "the
Union and the

deliberated if the proposed goal
of the

Union should be

full

388
Irish

Presidency 1996b.

389

These

five sections were:

and the Citizen,
Institutions; and

III

V

An

I An Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice; II The Union
Effective and Coherent Foreign Policy;
IV The Union’s

Enhanced Cooperation -

“Flexibility”

275

employment or highest possible
employment

or high employment.
Additionally, the

addressed whe.e in the
treaty the

s

mcorporated.

Simultaneously,

employment chapter amo„
g
primary competence of

acknowledged more

in

the

Member

clearly

and

new

provisions on

employment should be

order maintain the
delicately hlanced
support for the

Member

States, the Irish
Presidency

States in the matter

tha, the

emphasized

tha, the

of employment should
be

consistency of employment
pohcy with the broad

guidelines of economic policy
should be ensured.
Finally, in

November and December 1996

the draft treaty

Dublin European Council.
This was done essentially
Presidency

in Ktldare, Ireland,

belongs to

its

a four-day drafttng
session of the

""

The

firs,

words of the Explanatoty
Memorandum

the ,rish Presidency’s
Outline Draft Treaty were:

citizens.

for the

with the help of officials
from the Council Secretariat
as

well as the European
Commission.

accompanying

a,

was prepared

"The European Union

The Treaties establishing the
Union should address

their

most

391

,.

direct concerns.”

The

December
Treaty on

draft treaty

13

and

was

14, 1996.

December

finally presented for discussion
at the

The delegations received

Dublin summit on

the 140 page long Outline
Draft

S", just a day before the
Conclave meeting of the Foreign
Ministers.

390

Present on the Irish Presidency side
were: Noel Doit, Bobby McDonagh;
from
Counc, .Secretariat persenl were Jurgen

Echart Cuntz, Jaques Keller-Noellet

Trumpf (Secretary General)
and Giorgio Maga ,J: from the

the

chef de cabinet
present were Carlo
his

Trojan (then Deputy Secretary General)
and Jim Cloos (chef de cabinet of President
Santer). For this list see McDonagh
(1998, 105).
391

Quoted

in

McDonagh

(1998, 94).
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392

As commented by McDonagh
welcomed
.he

the text.-

provisos

And

5-2-6. 4

the

Foreign Ministers warmly

stil,

employment policy and other

voicing resections
about

areas,

i,

accepted the

fair.

The Dutch Presidency

The

principal challenge of
concluding the

Dutch government on January

I,

,997.

and preparation for enlargement.
eventually

became

to

definitive

Dutch Presidency

relied

memorandum

priorities- the
priorities,

The deadline

set at the Florence

The challenge now was

into the

irr
IOC,

hands of the

presented
•

,

preparations for

in

EMU

Being of immediate concern,
concluding the IGC

the overriding goal.

mid- 1997 had been

unanimous and

'

IGC was passed

In the Presidency

January the government pointed
out three top
P

in

all

while the British delegation
was

pertaining

overall presentation as

(1998, .29, "virtually

move from

for the conclusion of
the conference

M4
European Council of June 21 and
22. 1996.

general acceptance of the
Outline Draft Treaty

agreement on treaty amendments.
To a considerable extent, the

on the

draft treaty

of the

Irish.

This was especially the case
with

regard to the employment chapter.

As

pointed out by several participants
of the IGC, the agenda of the Dutch

Presidency’s programme was significantly
influenced by the

UK general

election of

May

Conference of the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States 1996.
393

The Dutch Presidency 1997a
394

European Council 1996b.
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1997, after which only six
weeks were
Minister,

left to

Win, Kok used every
opportunity

conclude the IOC.
While the Dutch

Priline

to stress that

he was determined
to carry on
with negotiations with
the British
government regardless of
the scheduled
general

impact of this event on
the negotiation
process could clearly
be discerned.

395

For instance, the Social
Affairs Attache from
the Netherlands,
Paul van Leuwe
mentioned
a " m,erVieW tha ' thC
Dl ,C '’ dde8ati °"
siting for the

~
'

UMi tHS eVen "°
'

''

™

British election to
conclude

-Mch

deal, with the issue

Accord, ngly, the Dutch
Pres.dency can broadly
be d,v,ded

between Januaty and M.d-May,
wh.ch preceded the
second half of

May

and June.

In the firs, phase, the

UK election,

into

of employment.

two phases: one

and one between the

Dutch government used

the tactic of

increasing the intensity of
negotiations in order to pu,
delegations under pressure.
part

17

of

this effort the

May where

giving

i,

it

As

Presidency held an informal
meeting of the chief negotiators
on !«.

presented a compilation of
texts resembling a draft

treaty.

To avoid

the official appearance
of a draft proposal the Presidency
presented

it

as a non-

396

papei.

It is

remarkable that the issue of
employment

is

not mentioned in this draft

proposal.

In the

second phase,

finally possible.

As

after the British election

was concluded,

real negations

were

pointed out by Phillipe de
Schoulheete de Tervarent, Belgian

diplomat to the European Union 1987
-1997, the work done during previous
Presidencies

395

Foi a lsc ussi°n of Kok’s strategy
see Agence Europe (January
8, 1997,
(January Q
9, 1997, p. 2) and The Irish Times
(January 7 and 8, 1997).

For

this point see

Agence Europe (May 20-21, 1997,

278

4) and

McDonagh

p.

4)

(1998, 185).

was crucal
by .he

to clear the grounds

Italian, Irish

conceded. Bu, on
of

tea,

Without

this

preliminary work,
zealously pursued

and Dutch presidencies
the conference
would no, have been
the crucial points,
no delegation

was prepared

to enter into the
realm

concessions and decisions
before knowing which
British negotiator
would

around the table

si,

7

in the final

phase.””

McDonagh

he potnts ou, that "the
British election on

Rub, con.” Thus, from

now on

the

May

1

(19,8, 183) goes even
further

1997,

moved

the

1QC

Dutch Presidency could
aim for

when

across the

finalizing the

negotiations.

The
the

new

firs,

British

European Union meeting
abended by a ministerial

Government was

the meeting of

and 6 May. The opening
presentation by
Henderson, was the

approach

to

presentation

on

5

May,

Agreement

To

new

it

i,

was

in the

into the

had taken

office.

further agreements in these

397

^

,

Cited

to

British

Governments

government would support the

treaty as well as

main body of the

new

Dough

Dough Henderson's opening

certain that the British

Amsterdam

Btusse.s on 5

British Minister for
Europe,

After

some

effort of including the

treaty.

and other

areas, the

an extraordinary meeting of the
European Council

According

Representatives

presentation in Brussels of
the

Europe since

employment chapter
Social

firs,

the

IOC

level representative

in

Svensson (2000, 155) the “main reason

Dutch Presidency scheduled

Noordwijk on

May

for holding this

23.

meeting was to

•

in

Dinan (2001,

20).

398

See Agence Europe (May 24,
1997,

3),

and Financial Times (May 26, 1997,

279

2).

of

introduce the

new

set out his vision

British

Prime Minister

of Europe and baselines

The week fo,.owi„
g

for the

Att P f
Attention
centered on Blair as
he

IGC.

the extraordinaty
Council ra ee ting

d eveIopments: on t he one
hand, the new

oHhe employment

to the
6 club
club”

was characterized „
y

British government,
asked for

chapter hoth of whtch
would then

make

i,

^

modification

possible for the

govemmeM

shouid include a reference
to the national
practices related to the
responsibilities of

management and labour
more

clearly spel, ou, tha, the
competences in the area of

Member

its

German government

such a

employment had

finally tabled a
proposal in

preferences in the area of
employment.

elements: Firs,

i,

new employment

specified tha, the

way

to res,

as

with the

title,

bu, mstead

policies).

would be willing
established

Instead the

is

opposed

to support

title

Second, the proposal pointed
ou.

new Employment Committee.

which

i,

laid

This proposal included
the following

Getman government

employment chapter within an already
economic

in

States.

Additionally, the

down

Second, Article (3) should
be modified

to the creation

of a

merely the creatton of an

(preferably one dealing with

that there

work envisioned

was no need

to be

done by

to create a

this

new

committee could be carried out within
the already established
Economic and Policy

Committee and

the

Committee

for

Employment and Labour Market.

proposal demanded tha. the reference
to “incenttve measures”

Finally, the

in article (5)

should be

399

the

The Mention behind this clause was to
allow for greater flexibility
works council directive. For this point see
Financial Times (June

in

5,

280

implementing
1997,

1

).

budget will be increased.

The

reaction front the

delations of

Member

the

States

towards the British
proposal and the Onto,,
government fe„
be easily worked into
the

new

pioposal was veiy hostile.

modifications of the

opportune

i,

was

constellation of the

i,

contras,, the reactions
to the

a,

such a

Gennan
accept the

,ate stage in the
negotiations.

Any

had deliberately no,
used. The immediate
reaction of

a, this stage

Member

States consisting of the
United

down

only

Gennany

amended

States.

its

strategy ,o reflect
this latest change
in

The previously strong camp
of opposing Member

Kingdom, France and Gennany
by and
being the

las,

chapter.

new government

large had

now

hold which was opposing
the employment

France after the British
election had already
signaled

on an employment
June, the

suggestions could

to present
counter-proposals.

The Commission

chapter.

,ha, these

W0„,d have had during
previous rounds of
negotiations, including

several delegations

melted

rather positive

The Member Sacs
delegations were unwilling

Gennan government

ministerial level meetings,

he

~

draft treaty

was

that

Furthermore, after the French
election

publicly announced .ha,

i,

,t

was

a, the

fully supported the

willing

0 ap e e
-

,

beginning „f

Employment

401

chapter.

400

For the Commission

this

meant

that

it

needed

to start a diversified.

.

ror the reaction of the Dutch
Presidency on the Gennan position
see Financial Times
(May 27, 1997, and 4).
401

“

1

r ° Und
el Cti0nS WCre held on
25 the second on June 1st The
winner
of the election was the c
Socialist Party which was
headed by Lionel Jospin For a chance
on th^position of France with regard
8
employment policy see FinSl Tim"s
e

f

’

(£
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make

SUfe ‘ ha ‘ "

W°U

'

d " 0t

Cm y

i,S

° PPOSi, 0n ,0 ,he
employment chapter into
'

negotiations of the IGC.

Pan of this

strategy i„ ci „ ded on
the one

such as members

in the

Employment and

Socia, Affairs

hand contKtmg

final

^

delegation of the Presidency,
Persona, Representatives

Mmtstnes - especially

countries which were
original,

only mtldly supportive
of the employment
measures. Members of
the Comite des
Sages
as well as influential
organizations such as the
European Parliament, the
Economic and
Social Committee, the
soeta, Partners,

Committee of the Regions,

and the Commission of

the

the Bishops'

Group of European

Socialists, the

Conference of the European
Union

countries.

For instance several scholars
have pointed ou,

on Employment and Social
Affairs and

the

that close contacts

Group of European

Socialists

between the

was

instrumental in keeping the
consensus on the employment
chapter firmly on
Just before the

Amsterdam Summit

Malmo, Sweden,

for a four

in 1997, the socialist
leaders in

DG

402

track.

Europe met

in

day conference. The theme
of the congress was: “A new

Europe and the responsibility of
the

left.”

In

its

concluding message, the

Malmo

conference leaders called for
“a strengthening of the draft
Employment Title in the Treaty
oi the

European Union which encompasses

C

and

403

.

employment

402

the co-ordination of economic

policies.”

The

spirit

of the conference was captured quite
nicely

instance see Aust 2000 and 2001.

403
Ibid, p.

99

282

in

the

words

ora,

Acting congress

Democrats, when he

Europe Union.

We

said:

chain™, Rudoif SCatpmg,
of Geralanys

-We

socia, democrats

can no ionger dtstance
ourseives from

Additionally, George
Fischer, the advisor

Employment and

bother pan of the

for the

strategy included the
use of

Additionally, the

eve^

States, the

final draft treaty

Commission together with

Economic and

goal behind this public
initiative

employment on

win shape

DG

i,

of

on Fehruaiy , 2001
the national

the level of the

was

invitation for a talk
or a

Commission

a major public initiative
on June 3 and 4, ,997
for which

Member

We

the

Allan Larsson really
used this fotum to
promote his ideas.”

proposals of the Commission
as well as the

•he

course.

,

majority

emp.oymen, chapter was

presentation hy a high
ranking representative
from the

Presidency.

its

lifted

a persona,
interview

'one important channe,
of fostering suppon
Parties.

a

the Director
Genera, of the

Social Affairs,
mentioned

soca, Democratic

now have

Socja

the

,,

promote the pohcy

proposal by the Dutch

European Parliament

invited representatives
from

Social Committee, and
the Socia, Fanners.

to

give both

started

more prominence

to the issue

European Union and simultaneously
increase

The

of

the pressure

on the German government.

On May

28,

called the “Friends

1997 the Presidency called

for a special meeting

of a group of actors

of the Presidency.” This group
was chaired by Jaap de Zwaan
and

consisted of representatives of
each delegation.* The
purpose of this meeting was to
tidy-up the remaining elements.
In this circle a compromise
was found for the recent

404

M

Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June

5,

1997.

405

For

this detail see

McDonagh

(1998, 186).
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“*•

would be

— ~
--

sufficiently toned

On
Group

“

June

a linal,

...

,,,,,

down.

4, ,9,7. the

Dutch Prestdency
submitted

consohdated d raft treaty

in preparatton

t0 the

IGC

of the fina phase
,

Jnne

AM

.6,

proposals t0 be finalized

Emp ,oytnen,

Prestdency.

Citizens und

^^ ^

_

^

^
^^

^

policy was subsumed
under the section "The
Union and

wus discussed

At
At

first
first.

+1

«

*

this point

its

of the negotiation

all

delegates fully

agreed on the draft proposal
of the Council.- The
British proposals were
included and

he Gennan

de,e g a,to„

was

out in a persona, intervtew

wanted

the

IGC

to

willing to concede on
the "incentive

by Winfned Menrad on
Februaty

7.

measures, As pointed

2001, "Helmut Kohl

be a success.” Given
the immense public
attention

to the issue

of

408

these measures.

For

this

point see Svensson (2000,
160)

407

See The Irish Times (June

18, 1997.

408

The same observation was made
by Winfried Menrad,
P rliamem
the

Am«

’

W '’°

“

diSCUSSed lhe

Genmn

H

e“e“r:

e

W3S

10 n °‘

*

«“

the ,as *
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a

member of the

P“ si ‘ion with Helmut Kohl

“

prior to

S.a.e '» Oppose the

5.2.7 Implications
for the Decision-Making

While the

,mP

EU

ins.iht.ions

“ “"

general.”

Process

had no fonnal right

For instance Sverdrup
U ° 00 256)
P (2000
’

to

ai

'

circles.’’

states

fines

Lodge has observed

agenda of the IGC “had been
detennined

process of agenda-setting
and legislative prioritization

The Commission was
the

and

latitude

and thereby allowed

representing latent interests in
the

i,

to

in the

IGC”

it

the

of legitimacy

level

EU

via the

in

EU
of the

work of the

outcome of the negotiations
of
it

of the Commission gave

was capable of

i,

draw up policy proposals which

Member States.

consensus among themselves.
Additionally,

in

European Parliament.”

greater flexibility

are capable of

This by and large allowed

problematise the issue of
unemployment long before the

Commission

was given

interrelated resources that

First, the institutional
location

,GC

context and as pari of
the notntal

successful to influence the

Amsterdam Treaty because of three

employing:

the

in the

that (1998b,
485, the priorities

in a different

Commission, the Council of
Ministers and

and

monitoring and mfiuencing
the

and “the members of
which enjoyed a high

Along similar

^^

8Ues that th * “European
Commission

established a spec, a, task
force, headed by
Miche, Petite, whtch

member

^

- lection Group

8 ' he diSCUSSi0 " S b °' h

devoted significant
administrative resources

t0 panicipa ,
e

Member

allowed the

to draft policy proposals
that in effect represent a
synthesized

Foi this argument for instance
see Sverdrup (2000,256).
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to

States had found a

this institutional position

409

i,

compromise

*

—«
these

down

“*
s ., a „.

supportive of a

1

new employment

chapter.

outcome of the

of countries which
were only mildly

Second, the recepttveness
of theCounci,

Presidency cruc.ally
determines the degree
.he

^

„

in order not to nffpnd ti-. Q
.
offend .he cluster

to

multilateral negotiations

wh.ch the Commission
has an ,„n U enee
on

among

the

Member

States.

The

fact tha, the

Hsh

Presidency so heavily
relied on the
Commission, position
demonstrates the
important role played by
the Commission in
the 1GC. Third,
the Commission
can utilize
manifested interest organizations
as channels to exert
pressure onto Member
States

add '" 0n

‘°

^~
a"d

pointed out that the delegates
egates of thp
the

iC'C'
IGC
were

f
.

Commission, several schohrs
have
.

waiting for a joint Franco
German position

410

paper.

Between

the

Amsterdam meeting

in

Franco-German Summit

in

BadetvBaden

in

1995 and the

June 1997, the two
countries continually sough,

paper which could “imprint
a

political

to

develop a

4
impetus on problems of
substance.” " From

1996 onwards, the French and
Gennan governments me, informally
eveiy

six

weeks

May
to

"2
address issues related to European
integration and the ICC.
As pointed out by
-

Sverdrup ,2000, 257, “they

failed

come up with

a final join, position
paper.

[...)

The

410

For instance see Devuyst
1998, Lodge (1998b, 490), Menon
1996

41

Petite

;

For instance see Agence Europe
(June

6,

1996) and (June 13, 1996).

412

Agence Europe (September

2/3, 1996).

286

,1998a

Tl

IGC eXPemnCed

—on,

“ ——
*“ -

of the HU,
Franco>German

tan ,„.o issues related
to institutional
reform,

" Shar,n8 '” A|S
°'

0Vera " FranC<>German

“

MCD0 " agh

37) P 0 in,e d out

Wh Ch
'

«*

enU^ent,

,

and

fina „ cial

had no sense of a
c|ear

has often acted as
.

, llotor„

for „

development of the European
Union.”
Thts lack of

initiative

between France and
Gemtany, and

Of the tssue of employment
pohcy among the
.he

^

Commission
C ° 0Pera,ing

W "h

interests for the

resources the
area of

5.3

to step into the

States

^

and by „rob,,i 2 i„
g

Commission was

i,

able

contentiousness

opened the opp„ ltu„i,

decision-making process
and influence

pohcy proposals

employment

Member

ye. the

was putting forward.
Through

K

i,

y for

indirectly both

Iatent

and manifest

these strategies and

influence the policy
outcome of the

IGC

in the

policy.

Summary

In

sum

the period of 1991-1997
can be characterized as a
period of contradtctory

elements: on the one hand the
Commission changes

subsequently utilizes

much

less frequently the

its

pohcy

policy style and pohcy
focus and

tools

of decisions or

directives.

Thts has correctly been characterized
by Kowalsky (1999, 205) as
carefully exercised
“legislative restraint"

also characterized

Commission

on the

by a high

issues a large

programmes, and

a

part

level

of the Commission.

On

the other hand, this period

is

of activism on the part of the
Commission. The

number of recommendations,

a series of social action

wealth of reports and studies. The
purpose of these studies was to

prepare the agenda for the European
Union in such a way that employment pohcy
would
287

be included

in the early

se of the inr
a
ypphase
IGC. As

member states

lo

ransom over

^

d,menS,0n " K COmmiSSi0
" haS
’

-a.

po„ey

field;

important ro,e

socal

field."

^ MembCr

,bese s mall

Sta,eS

'

filtered,

commitment
Wide,,

uy

its

and precedent

'

«5)

—

keep the

to

The 1996 IGC was, hke

““

its

a"d

iaw ,„visio„s,
play a„
ft, tore

is al,

Commission and

tha, this constrain, did
no, prevent the

IOC. Despite the ambiguity
of

its

basis for a large par, of the

in

behind the

preparation for the

of the current
government.

Commission and

the

the

more

DG

so, in

to

[...,

its

own

Employment and

status, the

Commission from
Commissions'

Employment Chapter, due

Venturini's assessment of the
contribution of the

90 percent of what

it

288

0 f the

Social Affairs

A

remarkable

setting the tone

draft articles

of the

became

the

to the fact that the Irish

Commission

had worked towards

in „ gh t

view of an important

Presidency was willing , 0
incorporate the Commission's
proposal into

to get

action i„

momenta,

were no, granted a forma,
membership of intergovernmental
conference.

managed

„K

terms of identifying key
areas of the agenda.”

institutional constrain, tha,
the

mam

,„

has pointed on, tha,
"the agenda

predecessor, indebted both
to the

nature of these constraints
of the time. Tins

is

rb y

lo Hie social

Thus, the Commissions'
hmited achievements shook,
be considered

fact

,o7 ., 08

,

scope of action

for

assessed and expanded
by the Commission
and then,

’

in

no,™

,WS COn eXt

1996 IGC by the Special

appointees

—

Commission managed

'

was

iheir stated

Cmm (I9 97

steps, often imp,
emeu, ed via soft

in establishing
institutional

Additionally, the

pomted out by

is

its

that the

draft version.

Commission

into the final treaty.

n

her analysis of ,he
impact of various actors
on the outcome of
the
Intergovernmental Conference
Lodge
s n ,h
a 3
8 (I998
(
99«a,
351)
thus appropnately

points out that

must be noted

EU

that players are
not

Commission, the Council,

the

merely

inter- governmental

but also supranational.

“i,

The

European Parliament and
the Council
Presidency have

particular roles to play
in terms of shaping
the initial agenda

of the constitutional
debate.”
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and deliaing

the boundaries

CHAPTER 6

COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR
THE EMPLOYMENT TITLE

As

discussed in chapter

employment

tide.

the

Amsterdam

This raises the question

including such a provision.

and

5,

More

why

treaty negotiation
resulted in an

the

Member

specifically this chapter

factors that help explain
the level

of

interest

of the

States

aims

Member

development of the Europe-wide
employment measure. For
will

draw on

appl.ed by
linear,, y

the qualitative comparative

many

others.

of composite

This method

is

factors tha, have

a,

were interested

in

identifying the forces

States in the

tins

purpose

tins

chapter

methods as developed by Charles
Ragin and
particularly usefttl for analyzing
the non-

had an influence on the

level

of support of the

4 3
'

Member

States.

The implication of
of the

Member

the findings of this study

States in the area of Europe-wide

is

that the individual level

EU membership,

interest

employment policy can be explained by

simultaneously analyzing the level of
public opinion in several dimensions
the assessment of

of

(2) the opposition to a

common

at a time: (1)

currency, (3)

413
IT

For a more detailed discussion of the
dissertation please see below.

method

itself

290

and how

it

is

applied in this

T

“

"»

—-

«>

-» - -

,

power.

Th,s chapter

provided ,n the
01

eXP ' anat,0nS

is

literature for the

^

^

WWCh

'

Membc,

Europe-wide employment
tneasures.

is

tha, the reeen,

States that

governments were interested

10 a generally

influential: h

<•*«• on

n, crease in the level

maintains that

Member
more

irst,

Union was “bad"

States

the

were pressured

hr

,

wo

sets

developing a mechanism

European

I

to

lere

add a social and

two

ones country and exerted
such

se,

level.

Thrs was

of explanations

political

dimension due

factors are identified
as particularly

the increase of the
public’s perception tha,

membership

a strong influence

govern, nent, that the
government was ultimately interested

employment measures. Second,

in

of unemployment. The
second

critical public opinion.

for

the exp, ana, ions

economic development
exerted such a strong

hey C ° U,d C °° rdina,e

caused hy an

The n r s, pan presents

8 e„erai,
bC diS,ingUiShed: TIk
^st se, of explanations
regards the

Here, the assumption
p.cssure on

structured into three
parts.

in the for

in the

European

on the respective

Europe-wide

the increase in the public's
opposition to a

common

currency pressured governments
to develop Europe -wide
employment measures.
Ihc second part of this chapter
derives the following testable
hypothesis from
these explanations and then
develops a research model by which
these can be empirically
tested:

414

The connection between the
particular factors that have influenced
the
of the Member States in Europe-wide
Employment measures and

in eiest
I

e C

omnussion

developed

level

of

the strategy of

to facilitate

in the last

such an agreement, as was described
chapter of this dissertation.
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in

chapter 5 will be

I

)

^ greater the increase and (he higher the

level

of domestic
unemployment
over the past few
years, the more s
supportive the respective
government wa*
is to
'm ope I

415
wide employment
measures.

(2)

P "" iC

The

fe “ tha ‘

US

"

WIS

supportive a government
was
<3)

Th °

‘.m

European

common

Member

integration, the

Stale's

more

Europe-wide employment
measures,

8reater "’ C intraS °
2 " d the

public opposed to a

I

^

greater the "'crease
and the larger the
proportion of a

currency, the

die proportion of
a

more supportive

the

Member

Member

State's

was

State

"tree questions will be
addressed in tins section of
the dissertation: (A)
•i

M'ong increase

in the level

the case that those countries

supportive of Europe-wide

of unemployment between
1991 and 1997? And

employment measures than those

Was

there a decrease

integration between the years
1991 and 1997?

countries,

which experienced such

Comparing

a decline,

‘

And

if

so,

0 '™

in

if s
so, is

te

which did
for

can one observe

Europet
.an

that those

were more supportive of these
measures?

the data of 1991 and
1997, has the average

“?
conhZtmrrT",'
the context ol an analysts

countries

of public support

415

contusion

Was there

which experienced the strongest
increase were more

experience such an increase?
(B)

(O

to

ope -wide employment
measures.

0f unempl0yment”
,

that uses the rate

pupei uniformly uses the term
“level of unemployment”.

of public opposition

«

to the

unnecessary

of change of this variable

this

416

JT?

" ,C

~
99s7hroueh'
nugh loo?"'
)1 is selectedT,™
to capture
I

)

,lasl,id ’

?
the full

1

1

"^“‘ions

and the period from

length of the IGC.
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it

“

'

he

“

*- ‘-eased?

States that encountered
such an i„ crease

These hypotheses and
questions
design.

And

be examined

10 were those
,

^

more supportive of
will

if

in a

^

^dimensional

research

This means that the influence
of one of the three
independent variables onto
the
i

dependent variable

will

be examined one

at a time.

For

this

on data from the Labour Force
Survey and Eurobarometer

purpose, this chapter draws

for the years 1991,
1995, ,996

417

and 1997.

The findings of this

section point to the conclusion
that the results of the

empirical analysis are
counter-indicative to the
hypothesized relationship.

The

third section

improves the

fit

between

of

this chapter, therefore,

the suivey data

develops an alternative model
which

and the actual

of interest of the

level

States as expressed during
the intergovernmental
Conference 1996/1997.

assuming

that the level

of

interest

of the

Member

States in Europe -wide

measures were influenced by only
one factor of public opinion

Member

Instead of

empioymen,

a, a time, this

section of

the chapter analyses the
clustering of the countries into
distinct groups with a different
level of interest in

Europe -wide employment measures
based on the combination of

various factors. These factors are
the following: (1) change in the
level of

unemployment,
to a

common

(4, presence

(2) level of perception that

EU

membership

currency, (4) level of perception that

of

social democratic parties in

EMU

is

bad, (3) level of opposition

will not create

more jobs, and

government. Based on the research methods

of qualitative comparative analysis,
this research design allows one to
identify
aspects: First, the particular combination
of factors

which

is

common

to all

two

Member

Specifically the following Eurobarometer
data sets were used: 35.0, 44.0, 45.1, 46.0,

47.1.
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Stat£S

Second, the dtfference

gi'oups

6.1

~

WhiCh Share ,he

“f

employmem measures

in the parttcular

Explanations provided

to all the

chapter was included

in

^

the Literature

arguments put toward

the

preferences were centra,

Amsterdam

to this

actors in the decision-making.

wide employment measures

either changes in

Member

The

lies in

behtnd the preferences of
the

in the literature

treaty is the

why

assumption tha,

EU

the

in

Member

view the Member

tha,

Member

States.

economic development or
in

political interests

behind the preferences of

bringing about the employment
chapter.

of

of the

interest

Europe-wide employment policy as
(2)

bemg

Generaiiy, the literature
assumes tha,

Member

into

two

a collective solution for
a

Europe-wide employment policy due

More

States in the

development of Europe -wide
employment measures can be categorized

economic problem; and

State's

States as the prime

the changes of the factors
that are seen as

States were instrumental

( 1 )

employment

difference between these
exp.anattons for the Europe-

specifically, the explanations
for the level

explanations:

the

agreement. All of the
explanations share an

understanding of the political
process

418

^

of countries.

Common

the

combination of factor$
across

sets

of

common

to the public's negative

Th
thiS research

below

The

design and

PPbcation
discussed further down
on!S ve comparative analysis wasadeveloped
by
L

its

is

'

Ragin

(T987, 1994, 1998,
100 -bnnm
000 and has been applied to numerous
research problems. For instance see
Amenta and Poulsen 1996, Amenta and Halfmann
2000, Berg-Schlosser and Qunter
|

,

t

>

wf

m

998

Hicks
Hkta 1994, Goertz
rie,?^nnT
r rr
2001, Griffin

'

C overdil1
,

(et al.)

(et

1991, and

l994 > Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999,

Romme

294

1995.

perception of the integration
process.
,eS ‘ if

‘

he ,eVe °f
'

^

The

statistics, analysis
in this section

°f

™

—

,0

aims

employment pohcy

to

teas

influenced by these two
general forces. In the
following section a
brief outline of the
line
of reasoning of both
sets of explanations
is F
provided
ovmea, testable hvn
hypothesis are derived
from

them and

their validity

6.1.1 Solution for

is

then evaluated.

Common Economic

Problem

Economic development and
economic

interests

of

Member

States have long been
considered to be crucial for
the direction and
speed with which the
European integration

process would proceed.
Accounts of this pen, of view
can be found

of scholars who studied
European

integration.

“

in

wntings

the tradition of this
approach, one se,

of explanations regards the
employment policy as

problem

in the early

a collective solution

a

common

Europe. Overall this
argument can be divided into two
subcategories,
i

Several scholars have pointed
out that the recent economic
development exerted

such a strong pressure on
a coordinating

Member

States that

mechanism of employment

governments were interested

targets

on the European

in

developing

level in order to lower

419

Additional explanations provided

in the literature point to
the

ch^^ here will not include the election
chapter

importance of the

i^n

cf^^er^'this^
P
’

in the

model.

420

For instance see Haas 1958 and
Lindberg 1963.
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,he ‘ r reSPeC, Ve eVelS
'

'

0fUnemP 0ym
'

™

collective

means.*' For inslance
Roberts and Spn„ er
g (2001, 44, point on, that
,he e,netg ence of
employment poIicy

unemployment
1970s.

in

the

EU

Unemployment has been

Economic growth was supposed

to solve

it,

a problem in
Europe since the

when economic recovety

bn,

1980s provide only a brief
respite, ieaders began
searching for other
Additionally, the Dutch
Minis,
,ha ‘

"

,he reaS ° n

probably

* of Social

Why ma " y EU

do with

Affairs and

Employment

i„

i,

*

solutions^
recently p„i„ led out

States have opted for
centra, coordination

the oppottuntties
that

a$ .

is

affords. Central
coordination can ac, as a

platform for recognizing
and identifying collective
and shared problems
and also
423
collectively looking for
solutions.”

For
be correct:

this

explanation to be correct,
one would expect to find

Frost, the level

a, leas,

of unemployment has increased
dramatically

States before the
Intergovernmental Conference took
place.

two aspects

in the

Member

Second, those countries,

which experienced the highest
increase of unemployment
were more

suppose

of

Europe -wide employment
measures.

421

see BiffI (2000, 63) and Lesch
(2000,
422

“ explanat on

1

Kenner zdl'
Vaubei 0998,'

'

9).

of lhe employment chapter see Aust
(2000a, 270) and
a " economic point of view see

Cn " qUe ° f ' his argllmem from
“
6)

423

Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment, (2000,

296

206).

to

6.1.2

Response

,o Public's Perception
o, integration
Process

PUbliC SUPP °" f0r ,,K
>or the integration
process.

A

^

6-

been e„ ns dered t0
be cruda ,
i

number of scholar have
emphasis

the mp orta„ce
of
puhite opinion for the
specific development
of European integration.
According to

Anderson and Kaithenthaier, ..
Eur„pea„
cannot progress without
pubiic suppon.

i

integration pushed
forward a, the eiite
ievei

A

(...)

deepening or widening
of the Union

requires the active
tolerance, understanding
and support of mass
publics

Furthermore, Gazzo
(.985,

Member

States

dynamism

when he

or paralysis,

Member

-

emphasized the imponance
of the

po.nted out that “when
in the

doubtless wrongly, that the
internal politics

„

we

in fact, in politics
as a

poiitica,

mood

in the

try to analyse
successes or failures,

process of the union of
Europe,

latter is frequently

-

we sometimes

forge.

and severeiy conditioned
by events

whole - which are taking
place

in

in

each of the

425

States."

Member McDonagh

With regard

,o the

dnving force behind the
poiicy preferences of the

(1998, 14) points out that
“during the Intergovernmental
Conference

leading to the Treaty of
Amsterdam, each delegation attached
central importance to

its

public opinion, to ensuring
that the Treaty emerging
from the negotiations would
have
sufficient popular support
at

home.”

The unique relevance of social
policy

for the integration process
has been

highlighted by several scholar
s. The main argument
in this context

Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996,
C° nSlderable " ,nUen

Ingbhm

1970.

179).

in

Agence Europe, June

that social

Also, Ronald Inglehart believes

public
“ ° n ,lK deciSi ° nS ,aken by na,ional governments.

425

Quoted

is

6,

1985.
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piovisions are being utilizer!
j
g utilized as aa fowl
tool in order
to foster a gi
greater
carer dem-^
degree of acceptance
of
the integration process
among the citizens and lak
labor unions of all
,he
•

^

different

S,tes.

For instanee, Hal,
0994, 282 , haspointed ou
, , ha
,

Commission and most member

states

^

Member

have seen the development
of the social dimension

important vehicle for
securing suppon

for the single

[...]

market project and for
enhancing the -social
acceptability- of the
consequent economic
restructuring. The

Commission
along similar

common

presents the social
dimension as the
lines,

market

is

-human

Majone , 1996b, 234 has
ar^ed
,

face” of the EC”.

tha, -,he

Instead in order to achieve
this goal wha,

Several scholars

who have

affinity

is

among

towards the supranational

needed

is

‘

Also

development of the

not a goal which
would be appropriate for
fostering

European peoples feelings of
loyalty and

42

a social

the

institutions.

427

dimension.”

put forward specific
explanations for the
development

of employment policies
on the European Union
level also share the
presumption
public opinion exerts an
influence on

Member

States.

For instance, the

firs,

that

explanation

maintains that Europe-w.de
employment measures were largely
developed due to the fact
that

Member

Maas, rich,
withdrew

States faced a

crisis"

its

more

critical

public opinion in the

wake of the

“post-

428
and the ending of the “permissive
consensus.”
As the public

quiet acquiescence to
European integration and

argUmen,S presented

LepsmsWT

in the Hterature

became outspokenly more

see Koenig, Pechstein,
(1995,149),

427

translated

from German.

428

or a discussion on the “end of
pennissive consensus” see Reif 1993
and Gabel 1998.
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skeptical.

European

Member

States

motion

were pressured

project.

to

add a

social

and

political

dimension

the

For instance, Franh
De p pe (« a , 2000
4) poi „, s

^

,

~™

m
e

lt “f

U r0pean 8 0vernments
and
.

1

in

.'

trii-s
their national
political

f-eXg8 ”
IZ2 T:™L™i f govm,ed“ttooughoTp
fe

between the governing
and

n*

n
'corflict

the

increasing opposition
within the
the7n div‘i5J‘''“

consequences of

?,,UU '

individu^“£

Z? ^
,

their

domestic policies of
COmPe
“ ,IVe adap,abili|
““effitVad
exerted massive
y
domestic pressure o7, he'
governments.”

Along similar
difficulties

lines,

Aus, (2001, II, has argued

of the Maastricht treaty

was trapped

in

“Si

"i,

tha, after the
ratification

was generally accepted

tha,

European integrat.on

a crisis of legitimation
(the „Pos, -Maas, rich,
crisis")

active and visible

way

to the fight against

unemployment and

[...];

,

hi s crisis

social disintegration.
[.

was

..]

Thus, the issue of unemployment
moved up the agenda of the
European Union and

became one of

the

main

can no longer afford
the area of

to

issues.

""

Thus, according

to this perspective,

governments

exclude employment policy
from the European agenda.
In

employment policy

is

utilized as a tool

by which Member States hope

fact,

to

430
generate public support for
European integration.

429

The same argument

is

repeated in Aust (2000b,

17).

430

For this perspective also see Aust
(1997, 753), Deppe 2001, Deppe and Felder
1993,
and Tidow (1999, 70).
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^

.......

common

the

—

<M„

_ >im

** »

- 1*.

4

currency

One

W

__

'

For inctan^
instance

according

to Dieter

Duwendag,

important reason for
the development of thp le em P*oyment
,

initiatives in the

Amsterdam t

,

opposition of the public
towardTthe

,

Stl ’°

EMU*

ng

11

mot vated

to

propose employment
measures during the

EMU

nakc
public that

^

p " bli
mest c
’

ttnemployment^aTfa^fro^j^J^^'^f

that

unemployment might be
reduced with the
inidu^of
mrnon currency, the
governments were hoping to
reduce the

^

public skepticism
towards

Per
he

codec:

this

explanation

First, the public's

“had" dramatically increased

EMU.”

he codec., one would
expect to find

perception that membership
in the

Member

the

a, leas,

European Unton was

States before the
Intergovernmental

Conference took place. Second,
those countries, which
experienced

were more

suppose

opposition ,0 a

of Europe-wide employment
measures. Thud,

common cadency

has increased dramatically

in

the

the highest increase

level

more suppodive of Europe-wide
employment measures. Also

Among
432 ry
7 ^7

?
).

U

down

States.

a perception

were

these four aspects will be

below.

several for instance see Sciarra
1999 and (2000, 211).

1S
translation of original
Germantext. Duwendag, (1996.
°a^
Also
for a similar view see
Ekengren and Jacobsson

/

(2000,

300

of public

Member

Foudh, those countries, which
experienced the highest increase
of such

evaluated further

four aspects to

5).

6.2

Research Design and
Data: Three separate
Factors
°' der ‘°

mVeS,i8a,e ,h

“e

Statistics for the
years

—

relationships,

Labor Force Survey

,99. through .997
and Eurobarometer
data sets for the
years .99,
ough 1997 were analyzed.
For testing
the

change

,n the level

argument

that

Europe-wide employment

of unemp.oymen,
between ,99, and ,997
was calculated. Then
the

average .eve, of unemp.oymen,
across the years .995
through .99b was used
to ca.cu.a,
the Spearman, rank
come, a, ion coefficient in
order to estimate the
re.ationship between
changes of the .eve. of
unemp.oymen, and the level
of interest of the
Member States
as

expressed during the
negotiations of the
Intergovernmental Conference
to

Europe-wide employment
measures.

To

test the

arguments pertaining

to

criteria:

fulfil,

,

he

they by and large had
the same wording
across the years. Also,
one se,

of questions was asked before
Maastricht
‘

996/97 in regard

public, negative perception
of the integration

process, several questions
were selected from the
Eurobarometer which

following

,

433

he AmSterdam neg0,ia,ions

I

(1991, and the other was asked
jus. prior

to

J,J
<

1997 >-

Then

the

change

in

each variable between 1991

1997 was calculated. Again,
based on an average of the
responses across the years,

to

the

433

This timeframe was selected in
order to capture the nhase nf thp
positions were developed,
expressed and

amended.

the
434

employment chapter was

Co ™ mission of

47 /
47.1.

finalized at the

trr

1

.

,•

Thetc

end of 1996.

European Communities, Eurobarometer

Commission of the European Communities,

1997.
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35, 43.1

44 45

1

46 and

Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient was used
level

of public pressure
for each variable

of

interest

6.2.1

Member

level

of

between 1995 through
1996 and the

interest

of the

Member

States in Europe-wtde

summaries

cf these position
papers

are then cross-checked
with the assessment
of the positions of the
in the literature
as well as

Member

in

areas: (1)

5, the

way

States as

based on interviews
with the Social Affairs
Attaches

employment

ICC

lists

the different

demands each government
made

with regard to the
employment chapter.

policy during the

IGC was

characterized

whether or no. there should
be a separate employment

employment chapter within an already
objective the

in this

.

the negotiations of the

chapter

Member

by the

435

States

Table A.2in the appendix,

dunng

of

employment measures

European Commission and
the European
Parliament, The
positions derived

of the

level

Variable

the Presidencies of
the Council as
well as

discussed

between

States.

The Dependent

The

in

to estimate the
relationship

employment

title

existing

title

would be

title,

by

As

discussed

five issue

or if an

sufficient. ,2)

wha, kind of

or chapter should be given,
(3) which procedures should

be created to implement these
objectives; (4) whether or no,
there should be a separate

435

IrT?'

P

weiaenreld 1998, Joop and Schmuck,°
Weiderfelfi^s

S iti0nS

of lhe

Member

,

Stale see

1996, and Goetschy 1999.
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™ow (1998, 6)

Employment Committee which
could

possibly oversee the
proper implementation
of

Ihese procedures;
(5) whether or no,
additional incentive
measures

6.2.1. 1

High level of Support

The

firs,

group of countries had
a high

employment measures and
governments
Should

move

94.

in this

was

field.

interest in

Europe-wide

Denmark and Belgium

considerably beyond the
level of agreement
reached

in this firs,

its

mult, -annual review
process,

was considered

group of countries a^eed

were needed. One of

that the

of

gmoup demanded tha,
employment policy on the
Community

While Essen with

governments

level

consisted of Sweden,
Austna,

issue areas and the
monitoring procedure

level

would be needed.

the criteria tha,

tha,

was seen

to

its

“ The
level

the Essen cone,
us, on

a,

policy goals in the
five

be an important
beginning

more

efforis

on the Community

as lacking in the
Essen conclusion

Essen conclusion did no,
establish employment
policy as a separate
policy

With the progress of

integration in the area

employment policy was ever more
of economic policy.

a, risk to

of economic and monetary
policy,

become subsumed under

In order to avoid such
a development, this
group

that a treaty basis for a
separate

employment policy would be able

balance to the detailed treaty
provisions

in the area

the overall efforts

of countries argued

to provide a counter

of economic policy. Thus,

for this

436

U SS '° n ° f ^stria and the
government’s position during the IGC
see
He,
Heinisch
msch loOE^or'ln
.001 for Belgium see P.jpers and
Vanhoonacker 1997; for Sweden and
D nmark see Petersen 1997; for Sweden see
Anderson 2001, Lightfoo, 1997 for
01 a
^
discussion on Denmark see Eliason
2001.
|

,
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" OUP "

,hC dCTel0P

^

™“

for

employment,

paramount demand.
Furthermore,
SPeCify

"

8031

"

“

group of counties
demanded

this

M

that a

new

_

treaty artlde shou,d

objective of the

Community

context, the governments
In this group
ofcountr.es behoved
that the corn,,

comm,,

itself to

more

tangible

employment

.0 the

procedure of achieving
these

context, Austria

demanded

sanction

hr thls

should

targets than

have so far been
agreed
mstanee Austria, demanded
specific achievement
targets for each
Member State
area of employment
policy.
Additionally, this group
of countnes

was

in

employ™,
mechanisms

on.

For

the

favor of addtng control
mechanisms

objectives.

For mstance again

parallel to those in
place for

,

h ,s

EMU (art

104c).

With regard

to the

Employment Committee,

all

governments

countries were in favor of
a separate committee.
Tins committee
structured in a similar

way

as the Monetaty

institutional competition
to the author,, ies

Which

its

Committee and

in this

group of

was expected

in fact

was seen

of the Monetary Committee

in

to

be

as a

the areas

competences overlapped. Tins
area of overlapping
competences was

particularly relevant in the
preparation of the

employmett

government of this group of countries
strongly

felt, that

guidelines.

the

In this activity the

employment guidelines

should be written by a newly
created Employment
Committee and not, as was to case
so
far,

by the Monetaty Committee.

were

in favor

Finally, all the

governments

of incentives measures.
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in this

.

group of countries

Medium

6.2.1.2

level of

Support

The second group of c„
untrie s Hod

employment measures and
Luxembourg, Spain and
ere the follow,

more or

,ess

preferred

ng

a

medium

level of interest
in

consists of Greece,
Fin, and,

the Netheriands

characteristics:

Common

Wh„e a„

, re, and,

to ,He

governments

Hurope-wide

Portugal, „a,
y,

second group of
countries

in this

group of countries were

agreeable to Europe-w,de
employment measures, these
measures were
no, go beyond the
of agreement reached
in the Essen
conclusion. A ls0 a

number of countries

in this

group pointed on,

that

such an employment

tide, if

wou.d

i,

be agreed on, should
no, be linked up with
the convergence
cnteria of EMU.
particular Italy, Spain and
Portugal were very
concerned about this issue.

Furthermore, the objective
of the employment
countries

was merely

governments

in this

the achievement of a
-high level

group beheved

tha,

title

preferred by this group
of

of employment." The

such a commitment on
the Community

leve,

wi„

be sufficient.

With regards

employment

goals, the

Essen procedures
out that the

to the

development of procedures for
the achievement of
the

governments

will be sufficient.

in this

group of countries by and large

I„ fact, several

employment guidelines should

governments

in this

fel, that

the

group pointed

no, be adopted by merely
by qualified

majority vote and that these
guidelines should no, represent
a shift of competences from

437

For a general discussion on
Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain
as well as a general
discussion of these Member States
during the IGC see Tsakatoyannis
1997 For a
Zahariadi*
Portugal
Spain see Roy
2001^ foi Italy
Y and
KaTer
anner 2001,
fiT*see Guiliam, Piattom 2001; for
Ireland see Finnegan 200

w

^

‘

«d

1
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.

the

Member

States

.he

European Union. Addi.i„„
aljy the
governments
,

of countries

were by and large
agreeable

lo the creation

in this

group

of an Employment
Committee

as

well as to the development
of additional incentive
measures.
i

6.2.1. 3

Low
The

level of

third

Support

group of countries had
a low

employment measures and

common

level of interest in

consists of France, the
United

Europe -wide

Kingdom and Gennany

«

to the thtrd

governments

Mle or were

this

group of countries are the
following characteristics:
by and large a„
group of countries were
either merely agreeable
to an employment

outright

opposed

to

it.

Especially the United

Kingdom and Gennany

strongly believed that
there was no need for
a separate employment

employment should be mentioned
nenttoned
paiagiaphs within the

Along similar

title

at
nil in
in tiao
at all
the

new

treaty

it

title

and

if

could be included as a
few

of economic policy.

lines, this

group of countries also
believed

that if

employment goals

should be included in the
meaty, these goals no.
become to specified, but instead
should

remain on the general

level.

Furthermore, the governments in

this

group of countries believed

that the

Essen

conclusions provide a sufficient
structure to pursue these
general goals in the area of

438

r?

For a general discussion cf the
British position as well as during
the IGC see Duff
2001, George 1997, Rasmussen 2001.
For a general discussion of Germany
see
Lankowski 2001.
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employment. Therefore no
further procedures
of achieving employment
goals were
needed.

Also, on the employment
committee, the governments
in

incentive measures were
no, acceptable.

strongly opposed such
measures.

Community would be

6.2.2

It

Especiaily the

its

budge,

group „f countries

Gennan government most

perceived these measures
as a

able to increase

way by whtch

the

an unnecessary way.

in

The Independent Variables
The explanatory

variables are

const™, ed with

three explanations given
for the level of interest
of the

employment measures. The
level

this

firs, d, mansion
tests if

of unemployment influenced
the level of

the objective of
examining the

Member

States in

Europe -wide

the changes in the
aggregate national

interest

of the respective

Member

439
States.

The second dimension

tests if the level

influenced the level of interest
of the

mean support

for ones

Member

county’s membership

of public support
States.

in the

for

European integratton

Here, public support

European Union

is

taken to

"0
For

this

putpose

439

Data

sets

used

are:

Labor Force Survey

for 1991, 1995,

1996 and 1997

440

In thellterature such kind
of support
a
UPPOrlSeeGabel 1998,

nom

^

is

labeled “utilitarian support.” For
a discussion

N.edermeyer and Westle 1995 Inglehart
Rab

H P
and
Reif 1991, Hewstone .986, Handley,
1981.
6
and.

Scheingold°i 970.^

1%5

^^ ™

S

e

thaStmc^
diStmCti ° n W3S ad
°P ted * Lindber8

should be noted

It
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is

^

)

the following question

was

selected:

country’s membership
of the
i

or don’t know’?”

common

dimenSi0n

Member

6.2.3

“Generally speaking,
do yon think that
y„„ r

)

‘

is

3 8 °° d thin8 ’’

leStS

'

f there

is

if

a

bad

‘neither

good nor bad

between pnbhc opposition

Member

they were “for or
“against” the

EU

a

States, the guestton
selected

having one European
eutzency

The Model

in this section

hypotheses presented in the
hterature. For
utilized to

interest

determine the

of the

First, the

ft,

Member

In a nutshell, the

of the dissertation aims

this putpose, the

between the hypothesized

States in

.eve,

at testing the

congntence procedure wiU be

of

tnteres,

and the actual

level

Europe-wide employment measures.

congruence procedure proceeds
through the following

value of each independent
variable for each cluster or
countries

is

steps:

measured.

441

que i0n was
“don’t u

?

r

a

COded by combi "i"g the dimensions
“neither good nor bad” and

-£:

.0 three

dLus^oS”

442

SIS
For

i

States.

The model developed

of

‘

a

cun-ency and the level
of interest of the

asked respondents

all

1

441

»

71,6 ,hl ' d

EU

(

purpose the following question was
selected: “Some people believe
that
0 ld be decid d by the nationa
(
government, while other areas
»
f
H H jointly
ild be decided
P
y
within the European Community.
Which of the
following areas of policy do you think
should be decided by the (national)
government
anil which should be decided
jointly in within the European
Community? Currency
Should be decided by the national government.
(2) should be decided jointly with the
European Community, (3) don’t know.
this

,

(
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1

eCMd

fr0m ‘ he Va Ue ° f e
'

nVe4 Th

'

S

“ h '" d

,W0,heSiZed

“
e‘

WeenthehyP0(heSeSand,heda *a"’' S

Pr0

“ SS by

a hypothesized
ieve, of .otetes,

iS

J
"

“‘
-

—• - -

*

n

•

-

^ words

~

-

—

,ve, of tntetes,

of George and Bennett
29)
( 199 7 '
‘

sho,d

stat,

wi ,h the f0„0Wlng

questions:

The following model

is

a representation

of the hypothesized
relationship:
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is
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6.2.4 Statistical
Results

6.2.4.1 Solution for

6.2. 4.1.1

Changes

With regard

and Evaluation

Common

in

Level of

Problem

Unemployment

to the question
if there

unemployment between

the years 199.

ha. such an increase can
be obseived.
percent in the European
Union.

was a strong

and ,997. the resuhs

in total

When

increase in the level
of
in figure
(7) clearly

unemployment has increased
by

Finland

.ha.

,

(6),

re, and (-5),

and Spain

Denmark

are the only countries
in

,4.4), Belgian, (2.8,

(-2.8), the

which

2.4

analyzing more closely
which countries

experienced the strongest
percentage mcrease, the
following can be
(6.8),

show

United

the level

and Gennany

Kingdom

(-,.8)

identified:

,2.2).

Sweden

„ should be noted

and the Netherlands

(-0.6)

of unemployment decreased
between 1991 and

1997.

While a strong change

in the level

of unemployment can surely
be observed over

the years, however, this
set of data does not
suggest that this shift
.he level of interest

of the Member

employment measures

in a

States for the

consistent pattern.

development of Europe-wide

Aceording

have expected to find the
countries with the highest
belong

to the

group of countries

measures. While

example. With
characteristics:

belonged

to the

1

it

that

would have influenced

to the

levels

hypothesis one would

of unemployment

to also

most strongly supported Europe-wide
employment

this is certainly true for

Sweden, however, Austria provides

a counter-

percent increase of unemployment
Austria has the following

had the lowest increase of
unemployment,

group of countries

that

yet at the

same time

most strongly supported the employment

310

it

^

observation can be
countries had a decrease
of

made

for Ireland

uneven., that

unemployment, they belonged

to find

t0 say . negatiye

the .roup of countnes
tha, had a

support for the employment
measures. According

would have expected

is

and the Netherlands

them

^

medtum

While

leve,

rf

of

the hypothesized
relationship,

belong to the group of
countnes that had a low

of support for the
employment measures.

Increase of Unemployment
and EU-wide Employment
Measures,
1997 )
( 1991
,

Figure (7) Increase of Unemployment
and EU-wide
Labour Force Survey 1991 and 1997

Source.

The same observation can
association.

The Spearman’s rank

also be

made

Employment Measures

as a result of measuring the
degree of

correlation coefficient for this data set

is

merely

-

one
,eve,

443
0.50.

This figure indicates
that there

this analysis

suggest that there

unem p !oyment and
employment

policy.

the

is

1S

3

Weak ne § ativ e

association.

The

results

of

no consistent pattern
between an increase
of

We, of tnteres, of the
Member

Thus, the opinion
expressed

of unemployment would
have influenced the

States i„ regard t0

in the literature
tha, the

Member

Europe -wide employment
measures, cannot be said

Stares

their level

increasing level

of

interest in

be unambiguously
true for

to

all

countries.

6.2 4.2

Response

6.2.4.2.1

to Public's Perception
of Integration Process

Perception that

EU Membership

In regard to the
question if there

membership

in the

and .997, the

the question if

EU

show

rha,

“bad”

was an increase

European Union was “bad”

results

is

for

in the public's

ones country between the
years 1991

such a decrease can clearly
be observed.

membership was “bad”

perception tha,

When

looktng

a,

for one's country a
considerable increase can

443

many°^^rous 2000^smburg°andVoung^lT94,^^h
and

T

T^ ^

T

'

1

'

that the value

'

and 199 6
years woald not have pcnnitted
Austria
ust, a and Finland
Finland^
?"ih“
into
the analysts of the

°"
Eurobarometer

^^

Syr° US (2 °°0 59) For a simiiar Perspective
see
of the Spearman’s rank correlation
Calcu a,ed for the avCTa e level
of unemployment across the years
«

bl3ck
Blacf(1993,
mr' Also
993 137).
A
note
nt

6

GibbonT^^^

J

““*

'

'

1995

the inclusion of

Sweden,

Eurobarometers. These three countries
joined
J
a "d
°"' y
included i„

»
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,he

be observed

among

the 12

membership was “bad.”
9-8

/o.

categories “don’t

who

fe.t that

A

Member

States: in 1991l

In 1997 th,c

™lumber
u
had

similar observation
can be

increased to
u ro.y/o.
15 9%

made when

know” and oo d .”
g
Between 1#9I and

they did no,

know

the following countries:

(7.2),

respondents believed
that
Ti-iic
This

Spain

(6.3),

if membership

the

EU
tu

is

EU

Increase of Perception
that

^

analyzing the answer

W7 the mimberof
was good

who behoved

for their country

that

EU

integration

“bnd”
f
bad for
one’s country, figure

Belgium
(15)
8
U the Uniwi
United

and Portugal

EU

represents an

“

the strongest increase
in the response
that
ai the
me

Denmark

6.
6 1,,/o ot
nf

,

increased by ,5.7% and
the nun, her of
respondents

shows

,

v*ngdom
a
K

( 1

0.9),

was

(8)

Germany (9

9)

(5.4).

EU Memberhsip

"bad", (1991, 1997)

good
ffldk

E bad

Figure (8) Increase of Perception
that EU Membership
source: Eurobarometer 1991
and 1997.
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is

“bad”

WH„e

a strong change
in

tlle

perception that

e observed over
the years, however,
this se, of

^
.be

need the

level

of

emP 0yment
'

membership

3

,he

EU

of the

was -bad"

membersh|p

da, does

“—

interest

EU

Member

States for the

According

supped Europe-wide employment

can be satd to be tnre
for Denmark,
certainly

Germany, both of which
had even higher
belonged

to the

group ofcounm.es

tha,

i,

is

cm dear|y

development of Europethe hypothesis „„
e

,

countries that most strong,,

„ bad „

not sugges ,

one, counny 0 belong

for

i$

io the

gron P of

measures. While

no, true for the
Untted

tins

Kingdom and

increases of such a
perception and ye, they

opposed Europe-wide
emp.oymen, measures

Along similar hues. Be, g,
urn, Spain and Portugal
would have been predated
to belong
mto the group of countries
that strongly supported
the employment
measures, according
to the hypothesis.

Again, the finding of

this analysis

does no, confirm

this hypothesis.

In fact, if anything,
this finding points
to the conclusion tha,
a reciprocal

connection exists for some

Member

were the strongest opponents

States:

to efforts

certam.y the United

Kmgdorn and Gennany

of creating European-wide
employment measures.

Yet, their domestic public
had the strongest increase
in the perception that

membership was -bad"

for their country.

Therefore, the positions in the
literature, which

maintain that employment
policies are utilized by
the public for

European

these countries

Member

States to gain support from

integration, miss the fact
that quite the contrary

case, at least for the United

seem more

EU

Kingdom and Gennany.

Pressured by

likely to avoid increasing the

Union.
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seems

to be the

critical public opinion,

competences of the European

The same observation
of a weak
reSUl ‘ ° f

meaSUrin8 ,he

^

coefficient for this
data set

weak

to

to

°f

*

When

Common

<9) ' "’ IS " ,CreaSe

Belgium

of respondents

the national

iS

While

particular 'y strong

Ihe national

a strong

Kingdom

change

this shift

States for the development
of

According

who

,

in the

believed that

among

best

between

a

common cunency

(0.8),

the

Member

cunency pohcy should
be
in figure

the following
countries: Portugal
(17.4).

Franc

(0.7)

and Denmark

,8.6).

perception tha, cunency
pohcy should be handled by

would have influenced

years, however, this
se,

the level

of

Europe-wide employment
measures

the hypothesis one

as a

variables.

and ,907 among the
,2

government can surely be obsetved
over the

does no. suggest tha.

is a,

government increased by
0.5 percent. As can
be seen

(12.7), the United

ntt
made

Currency

following changes can
be obse.ed: between
,0 9

deeded by

be

i

analyzing the cross-average
of public opposition

Slates, the percentage

a, so

This
aThts indicates
that there

moderate assoc, a, ion
between the hypothesized

6.2 4.2.2 Opposition
to

can

The spearman, rank
cone, a, ion

merely
0 50
y »-50.

is

modem* connection

would have expected

interest

of data,

of the Member

in a consistent
pattern.

to find the countries
with the

highest changes of demand
for a national currency
to belong to the group
of countries
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‘

at

“

Str0n8 ' y

WaMed

EUroPe ' Wide

be true for Denmark,
certainly

it

is

-**«

—

not true for the
United

——

, While

emP

'°—

Belgium would have been
predicted

beiong

s'

the group

m i,ar lines, both

Agam

'

^

Porhaga, and

the group of
countries that strong,

supported the emp,o me„,
y
measures, according to
the h yP o,hesis one
finds
'" eratUre -

can he said t0

Kingdom, Germany and

France, a„ of which
had hi g h increases
and ye, ,he he,on
y
g ed
‘
3 ‘ ° PP ° Sed EUr °
'

Pe Wide

this

° f ' his ana lys is does
no, eonfinn

this

in the

hyP o«hesis.

Increase in Opposition
to

Common Currency and EU-wide
Empioymen,
nt
y
Measures, ( 1991 1997
)
,

MttsuLsomcvEurob™Tmxer TOl“3° w”*"' 5

The same observation can
association.

If

also be

any association can be

made

'

^ EU W
'

'

de

EmP lo >™ m

as a result of measuring the
degree of

said to exist,

it
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is

a vety

weak

negative one, since

SPeanMn
this

'

S

observation

"* C°TO,a,i0n
it

<*

-

set is

merely

,,, - G ve „
,

appears that the fourth
hypothesi s presented

in the literature
also

cannot be validated on
the basis of this
data.

6.2.5

Discussion

The

findings of this
empirical analysis suggest
that those factors
identified in the

literature as

having had an tnfluenee
on the

Member

States’ ,eve,

of interest for the

development of Europe-wide
employment measures cannot
be substantiated by

When

tested empirically,

none of ,he

equipped ,0 account for the
particular

s i„g,e explanafions

level

of

interest

seem

of the

to

the data

be we„ enough

Member

States.

For

instance, there appears
to be no connection
between the changes in the
level of

unemployment and

the level of interest
of the

Member

States in

Europe-wide

employment measures.

A
public in

The
that

level

similar conclusion can
be
all

Member

States believed that

of the public’s support

would be

for

EU

EU

the strength with

membership was

And, also for the opposition
can be discerned

™

in the data.

was seen
to a

'-bad'' for

membership did no. lead

helpful in predicting the
level of interest of the

the contrary, the relationship
overall

445

made when analyzing

to

common

which the

one’s country.

to a consistent pattern

Member

States.

In fact,

have a negative association.
currency, again no consistent
pattern

Additionally, also here a reciprocal
connection exists

’

pea an s rank correlation coefficient
rpsnnnc f in the answer
responses
category “national”

is

calculated for the average of the

across the years 1995 and 1996
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.

on

between the

of opposition and
the

level

level

of

interest

of the

Member

States for

wide employment
measures.

6.3

Europe-

Research Design and Data:
Composite Factors
Tbe empirical

findings

pubhc opinion influences
multifaceted,

0 f the prevtous section
lead

the level of interest
of

Member

to the suggestion
that the

States

is

instead of assuming
,ha, the level of
.merest of the

way

more complex and

Member

States in

Europe -wide employment
measures was influenced
by only one dimension
of public
opinton at a time,

i,

might maite more sense

to anticipate that
the specific

combination of

.be different dimensions
couid have had an impact
on the level of interest
of the

Member

States.

This section of the dissertation
argues that

of the

factors

which influenced

the

Member

in

order to gain a deeper
understanding

States in their particular
ievel

Europe -wide employment
measures a multidimensional
research design

Such a design

is

is

of

interest for

required.

best constructed with the
objective of analyzing the
particular

combination of factors

that

can be said

to

have had an impact on the
outcome. For

puipose, this dissertation utilizes
the Qualitative Comparative
Approach

developed by Charles Ragin. This
causal comparative methodology

(QCA)

utilizes

this

as

Boolean

algebra to formalize two aspects
of Mill’s inductive logic of inquiry:
the method of

agreement and the method of difference

Both Boolean algebra and Mill’s inductive
detail further

down

logic of inquiry are discussed in
greater

below.
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Two

aPPhed by

0CA

Second, and

‘

a "°

W

WO rih

more

^

~
J

a

the

QCA:

,o g ic

-

cases, whfle a,
the

Member

dear struck of
comparison

it

capable of raspi„ the
g
heterog e„eity of the
g

States in their panic,,,
ar level of interest
for Europen
a
closer
i

exam, nation of the

factors that are

identified as present
as well as the factors
that are being seen
as absent.
in the

QCA attends

’

wide employment measures
tires, This
his pnttiic
entads

becomes analyzable

same time

«* sense OCA’s ability to capture
the

of explanations mahes

factors tha, influenced
the

facto-

^^

importantly for ,he
research cues, ion of
this dissertation,

he C ° mbina,i0n ° f C0
" di * i0

combinationa,

mentioning

° ne ‘°

nC " de ‘ a " S ° f eaCh Case
remai "

,he

10

strengths are pariicularly

Therefore, each

context of all other factors
both present as well
as

absent.

6.3.1

The Truth Tablet Cases,
Dependent and Independent
Variables
The

analysis of

this data se, is

cases.

shown

QCA

in table

proceeds by

A.

first

building a truth table. The
truth table for
447

1

in the

appendix.

The rows of this

Each case represents one of the
15 Member

table contain 15

States of the European Union.

various independent variables
fonn the columns and the
dependent variable

is

The

listed in

447

milar definition and use of truth
tables see Greue 1998
d r
8 KdtZ iqoo
992 Rafi
g8
quzzaman 2000,
( 987, 87).

and Ragin

’

1
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1

’

the last

“~

COlUmn

C US,er
'

°f

'

Parallel to *he
analysis

of the F
previous
us section,
section the H
a
dependent
variable

*

*

- Europe-wide

.onr content anaiysis and
cross-cheched hy seconds,
iterate:
,

hare the aim
tHe

'

is

to gain a better
understanding

eVd ° f imereS ° f " ,e
Member S
‘

only difference

now

is

'

ates in

suppotf, tnediun,

E “ r“P0 -ide employment
measures The

particular combination
of factors that had an
impact

used here.

etnpioytnen,

of the patficular factors
tha, have innuenced

tha, the research
destgn a, lows for the

The independent

hi g h

examination of the

on the outcome.

vartahles used in the
analysts ,n the previous
section are again

addition to the previously
analyzed answer category
of each variable, the

complementary answer categories
Of the perception of

EU

section now, in addition

is

also included.

membership only

the

For instance

answer categoty

-bad" the answer categories
“good"

in the

previous analysis

was used.

••bad”

this

44
is

used.

*

Additionally,

a variable has been added
to capture the public's
perception of the impact of

EMU on job

449

creatton.

is

Furthermore, a variable was
added to analyze

if there is a

connection

448

The same logic is applied to the
variable on common currency
In addition to the
answer category “jointly”, also the
answer category “national” is included
Alom§ *
tl
lines of this approach also
the assessment of EU
membership is dealt with in the
way. In addition ,0 the answer
categoty “good" the categty’
WistacluSed
“
WCr
bad ” ° f ** firS ' SeCti ° n ° f lhis
d,ap,er als0 here ““
Inswer rafe^y'-Ld”
d consistsofan avera e ° f the
8 Y
answer categories “bad” and “don’t
g
know.”

TT

449

The exact wording of the survey question
is the following: “Do
you believe that the
uropean currency will or will not create
more jobs?” The following answer categories
8
were recorded: “will”, “will not” and
“don’t know.”
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between

a Social

Democratic Party

in

power and

Europe-wide enjoyment
measures

Thus,

the government’s
preference for

in tota,

the

research design of
this section
simultaneously analyses the
tmpac, of ,4 dimensions
onto the dependent
variable.

The information contained

in the truth table
is arrived at

of Qualitative Comparative
Analysis which
tools: (1)

Boolean algebra and

(2) Mill's

is

a sophisticated
application of

methods of inductive
i

Boolean algebra,

.wo

QCA

logical states:

uses

it

by applying the method

inquiry.

two research

With regards

to represent
information contained in
the data sets as

45
presen, or hue, and
(2) absen, or false.

'

to

one of

The reduction of, he

richness of the details of
each case into these binary
codes allows for the discovety
of
patterns that are similar as
well as Afferent across

example,

eoded

states that

as a “100.”

medium

had a high

The “I”

level support for

452
all

cases.

To

use an abbreviated

Europe-wide employment measures

ind, cates ,he presence

are

of high suppori, and the
absence of

support and the absence of
low support. Along similar

lines, the

independent

variables are coded for the
presence or the absence of the
particular dimension. Again,
to

use an example,

in

case 2 which represents
Austria, unemployment between
the years

1991 and 1995 throughl996
has increased by 6 percentage
points.

This number of

450
er iS °P era,ionalized
P
<™ly z ing the party affiliation
he head ot state, that is depending
on the political system of a country
y either the
Chancellor or the Prime Minister

7

451

see Ragin (1987, 86).
452

This is the case due to the existence of better
optimization algorithms for a two- level logic
than for a structured logic.
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unemployment
case.

>

.f

To

is

gl ve a

the level

coded as a “I" which
represents the presence
of unemployment

counter example, case
5 that represents

of pubiic op.n.on

is

e q „a, or

below 25%, they are coded as “0 ”
0.
So,

EU membership

bad

is

ire.ancl,

above 25%.

If the level

membership was “good" and
50

for tnstance ,n
case

% believed tha,

responses across the answer
categories

of pub|ic opmjon

j$

,

1

,

with regard to the
question

the responses were
the following:

,

had a decrease of

is

i,

23%

believed that

was “bad." Such

then coded as “0

a spread

EU

of

1

»:

absent “good”, absent “
and

present “bad.”

A

convention

is

followed

in this section

of the dissertation

that specifies the

connotation of each variable.
Accordingly, d.mensions of a
variable
present, are

coded with

a

“I" and are wrttten

in capita,.

On

tha, are identified
as

the contraty, dimensions

variable that are identified
as absent are coded with “0"
and are written

For example, the
the level

level

of unemployment

of unemployment

With regard

in

to Mill's

case 5

is

in

case

1

is

represented by the

in

small

letter

of a

letters.

“A”, while

represented by the letter “a."

method of inductive

inquiry,

two aspects

are of pedicular

J 'J
importance: the method of agreement
and the method of difference.
Both are utilized

with the goal of finding the minimal
combination of factors
an impact on the outcome. In the
words of George and

that

can be said

McKoewn

to

have had

(1985, 27) “both

453

Since

is

difficult to determine at what level an
increase of unemployment can be
to be politically relevant all positive
increases of unemployment are coded as
1
All
decreases of unemployment are coded as 0.
it

sai

454

For the original reference of Mill’s work see
Mill 1843.
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i

methods utihze the logic
of e,

m

nation used in sowing
a system

,

of simuhaneous

equations: by subtracting
factors found across
the set ot cases
one attempts to solve
the
455
cases for the critical
independent variables.’

Briefly stated, in Mi,.,

method of agreement, the

investigator looks for
the

potenttany causa, antecedent
condit.ons that are the
same between two cases
tha, have
the

same outcome.

would bring

1:

A

Case

3: a

Thus,

if

b,

B,

By

not be held in

1

.

B2

C,

C2

B2

C,

C2

™

rmo
one compares case

the following

that the variables

applying

common,

3

of the

truth table

this logic,

Efe

two cases using Mill, method
of agreement,

C, C, d,

one by one,

D2 E

are causally related to the

the variables

would be ruled out

that

in this limited case, the
only variables to single ou,
are:

of invariance

in

which

all

A

would
and

instances of a

are identified and then the
investigator attempts to detennine
which of the

causal variables

In Mill's

that differ

and case

Eh E

In this sense, this is a search
for patterns

phenomenon

I

D> E

d,

d.

we compared

we would conclude

B

if
if

the following result:

Case

outcome.

For instanrp
instance,

is

constant across

all

instances.

method of difference,

between two cases

that

the investigator looks for antecedent
conditions

have different outcomes, and then
judges

that those

antecedent conditions that were the same
despite differing outcomes could not
be

455

Foi further discussion see Bennett
1997, George and Bennett (1997a,
2), Hall (2000
and Nohlen (1994, 513). For a discussion of
the implication of Mill’s logic see
Lijphart (1971, 688), Prezeworski and Teune
(1970, 33), and Sartori ( 99 1 250).
6),

1

456

see Ragin (1987, 36).
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,

sufficient ,0 cause either
outcome.

row would bring

eighth

Case

1:

A

b,

Case

8:

A

B,

According

B2

C,

C2

d, £>>

d,

D2

identified: B,

is

and the

E
e

B 2 C2 and

and thereby manages

E.

Thus, the next section applies

to arrive at a

the sum-of-produet form and

combination of factors
in

firs,

the following result:

b 2 C, c 2

lo all the cases

minimal solution

For instance a comparison
of the

to this logic, for both cases
the following factors
with their

complements can be

method

457

that

have influenced the

is

minimal

solution.

this

This

capable of identifying the
minimal

Member

States in their particular
interest

Europe-wide employment measures.

6.3.1 Statistical

Results and Evaluation: Boolean
Equation and

Simplification

On
contained

inputs.

the basis of the application of the
Boolean and Mill’s logic, the information

in the truth table

can then be represented as a function of the
combination of

In the analysis of this chapter, the

Boolean function derived horn

its

the truth table

has one output variable with three possible categories
and 8 input variables. The input
variables for each one of the categories can be

The minterm

is

a product term, in

summarized

what

is

called, a

minterm.

which each one of the input variables appears exactly

In this sense, Mill’s indirect

application of the

in,

method of difference basically involves the double
method of agreement in order to establish patterns of invariance across

the cases.
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complemented or

and

not,

is

combined with

product font. The
sum-„f-produc, foml consists
of a|

ANDs

and connected by

OR,

«

After « he ongina

,

the logical
operator

„

(he

most minimal expression.
For the tnrth table

in the

is to

.0 the

^^^

^ ^
m

^

^

say one for the group
ofcountr.es tha, had a

U8h SUPP ° rt f° r EUr° Pe 'W,de
for the

<>-

for the group with

medium

group with low support.
These m.ntenns can then
be combined

following sutn-of-produc,
form tha, represents the
Boo, can func.on 0 f this
data

set:

g(A, B|, Bt, C,,C2 D,JD
2
,

g -

B2

C,

C2

d,

Eb

E +

The following section
this term.

Such

,

E)

=g

B, C, D2

+

B,

will apply a series

a simplification

is

B2

C,

D

2

e

of rules of Boolean algebra

to simplify

helpful for extracting the
minimal expression ou, of

this term.

458

The

ANDs

addition.

^

appendix, one denves
three minterms for
each one of the

category of the output
variable, that

suppon and one

a

sum . of. product

determined, a senes of
simplifications can be
app|ied

All

^^

^

,

“AND "

in this case represent

Boolean multiplication, the ORs represent
Boolean
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Common

6.3.1.1

Factors for different Groups
of Countries

This term can be minimized
459
based on the rules of
Boolean algebra

applying the rule of factoring

this

By

equation one derives the
following simplified

460

term:

g

=

A
”C, ft”

C,

D

(B 2

2

C2

d,

E +

Bi

+ B, Bn

closer examination of this term
leads to the observation
that the expression

is in

front

of the bracket. This means that
these two

the three groups of countries.

countries of the

EU

is

More

specifically,

opinion in

more

By
two

all

factors

Member

i,

can be said

common

had an influence on

that public opinion in
all

States believed that the

all

Member

States,

currency. Additionally, public

Economic and Monetary Union

will not

jobs.

applying Mill's rule of agreement, one
would have

combined determined

the interests of the

Member

Europe -wide employment measures. Since these
factors are
these

factors

characterized by the following two
aspects: In

the public believed that there
should be a

create

e)

would have

to

to

conclude that only these

States in developing

common

across

all

the cases,

be seen as the only causal factors that influenced
the outcome.

For a discussion of the most important rules see Ragin
(1987, 93-101).
460

For a discussion of

this rule see

Ragin (1987,

101).
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6.3.1. 2

Separate Factors for different
Groups of Countries

WMe ,WS reSUl
•he

ft-

rePreSe "'S

“

-r the one-dimensiona, analysis of

section of , his chapter,
however, the analysts

woold stop
factors

*

a, this point.

While

i, is

stil ,

the

all

Member

States,

i,

comb, nation of factors
determined whether a
Member

medtum, or low

level

of support. For such an
analysis,

method of disagreement. Here
rent groups of countries.

seem incomp|e ,e

jf

„

certain!, a meaningful
re s u „ t0 have
identffled fte

which have had an influence
on

particular

would

the search

is

for the

Thus, a closer look

i,

is still

State

no, clear which

had

a htgh level,

appears useful to apply
Mill’s

deference of factors across
the three

at

the terms inside of the
bracket

is

illuminating.

When

looking more closely

that there are three
separate terms

operator

support, a

medium

that

level of a

is

the logical

represents the set of factors
that influenced the
level

of each group of countries. Put

combination of conditions

terms inside of the bracket,
one can observe

connected by the addition sign,
that

OR. Each one of the terms

of interest

a, the

in

other words, each term
represents the

detennined whether a

Member

State

had

low level of support. The most
important

a high level

factors to be

extracted out from each term are
the ones tha, are complementary
across the

of countries. Here one factor can
clearly be
belonged to a Social Democratic party
had
the

Member

State.

As can be

identified:

Whether or not

a very important influence

of

the

thr

ee groups

government

on the position of

seen inside of the bracket of the
equation, the

first

teim has

an “E", while the third tenn has an
“e.” This comparison clearly
indicates the following:
while the

first

group of countries had

a Social

Democratic government and had

a high

support for Europe-wide employment
measures, the third group of countries did not
have
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a Socia.

Democratic government and only
had a low

level

of support for

This complementary correlation
of input and output variable

is

tl ,e

se .treasures.

indicative of a strong

influence of the factor Social
Democratic government.

Thus, in
interest

of the

Member

sum

the most important factor
that detemtined the
specific level of

Member

States

the following: (I) whether
or no, the government
of the

is

State belonged to a Social
Democratic party. This factor

is

clearly

complementary across

the group of countries that
had a high level of support
and the

group of countries

had a low

6.3. 1.3

Common

that

Factors for

level

common Groups

Apart from the factors that are
factors across the groups of countries,

each group of country

had a high
play.

is

common
it

is

characterized by.

level of support,

In addition to the

of support.

it

is

across

of Countries

all

cases and the complementary

useful to also look at the specific
factors that

When

analyzing the group of countries
that

striking to note that a large

ones already mentioned,

influenced by the following two factor:

The

this

number of factors come

into

group of countries was also

belief that

EMU

will not create jobs

can be

said to have been even stronger in this group
of countries than in any other group of
countries.

create jobs.

The

variable “d| ”

is

indicative of the absence of the belief that

The other groups of countries had mixed

results in this

EMU will

answer category, and

therefore did not record such a strong perception.

When

analyzing the group of countries that had a

medium

level

of support for

Europe -wide employment measures, the following observation can be made:
very few
additional conditions, apart from the ones in

common
328

with the other groups of countries,

p

had

,o

be

fulfilled «o

detetmine

its

output.

facf, i„ this

group 0 f counts
„ n|y

'adder variable can be
seen as having had
an impac, on the
p0 s, tion of the
S,,es. This variable
,s
whrch represents fhe
public, percept™

that

in the

European Union

when

F.na,ly,

is

^

^

member.,

“good.”

a„a, yz i„

g he group of counfries
,

had a low level of
supped for
Europe -wide employment
measures, the following
observation can be
made: this group
orcountries is influenced by
the combination of
more factors than the
group of countries
w,.h a

medium

number of

level

of support. Nevertheless,

factors than the

group of countries

is

,,

tha,

,ha,

clearly influenced

by

a smaller

had a high

level of supped f
or Europe .
wide employment measures.
Apart from the vanables
already discussed, i,
,s worth

mentioning
opinion

tha, in variable

in this

IT.

level

population which

employment measures. Also

'-good," while at the

felt that

EU

same time

membership, the public

in the

group of countries

there

was

tha, fel,

a large portion

had

tha,

that

tha.EU

of the

membership was “bad.”

Discussion

The findings of this study suggest
in

EU

of support was there a large
portion of the population

membership was

6.3.2

assessment of

group of countries was equally
polarized as the group
of countries

a high level of support
for the

had a low

that is the

that the level

of

interest

Europe-wide employment measures can
be explained by

of the

Member

States

utilizing the research tools

available in the Qualitative
Comparative Analysis. Such a research
approach allows one
to

analyze the particular combination of
factors that have had an impac,
on the outcome.

In the specific application

of

this research tool to this
chapter,
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QCA

is

relevant since

it

*

WS he ana
*

'

° f " K Un,que

ySiS

particular level o f interest

***» «* have contributed towards

o f tbe Member

Wh.le the previous section
was no. able
clusters

of countries with

.c illuminate the

States in

to explain the level

-dimensional

its

combination of factors

Europe-wide

tha,

of

em ploy mem

tbe

measures.

interest in the three

research design, thr.
section

is

actually able

have contributed towards
the formation of

these groups of countries,
by analyzing the
combination of factors
through an apphcation

of

QCA.

this section, the

clustenng ofcounh.es by
the level of interest

Wide employment measures
can be seen
variables.

A

to be a

taction of

m

Europe-

the combination
of input

detailed discussion of the
three groups of countnes
brings forward several

observations.

The group of countries

that

had a high

level

employment measures was characterized
by four

of support

for

Europe -wide

aspects: First, public
opinion

was highly

polarized over the issue of the
appropriate level of political
authority that should deal

with currency policy.

In this issue area the
perception

extreme directions, wanting both
a
Second, added
that the

more
create

membership

to the precariousness

in the

to fuel the pressures

more jobs.

common

European Union

of the public pushed

in

two

currency as well as a “national”
one.

of

is

this polarization, is a
strong perception

“bad” for one's country. Third,
further

on the governments, was the
perception

that

EMU

will not

Fourth, given both the polarization
as well as the negative perception,

the Social Democratic
governments, of the countries in this group
of countries, had a veiy

snong incentive
measures
all

it

foi

a high

would be able

the ones that felt

demand of Europe-wide employment
to address several

measures. Through such

of the large groups of the domestic

membership was “bad”, and

the ones that believed that
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public:

EMU

will not

create jobs.

Thus, the pressures on
the governments
translated into a need
to

country, and that while

w„h

the

Community

EMU might no,

create

more jobs by

itself,

the

Member

States

together would start a
conceded effort to create
more jobs through

other means. Thus, in this
constellate of factors the
Europe-wide employment

measures were no. only a natural
preference of the Social
Democratic governments

w„hin

this

group of countries, bur

order to gain support for

EU

i,

was

membership from

negative effects of the
perception that

more provocative
public tha, the

EMU

the public a, large,
while mitigating the

will no. create

more jobs. Put

in slightly

terms, the governments
of this group of countries
had to convince

EU

comparable to the

also politically prudent
for the governments
in

is

its

increasingly going to evolve
into a political system
that will be more

political

system

a,

home

in

terms of active labor market
policies and a

balance between economic and
social goals. Within such
a system, not only
should more

domestic benefits begin

to accrue, bur also the
creation

The employment chapter became
conveyed

to the

of more jobs

will be a priority.

the crucial item with which
such a message could be

domestic public.

The group

of countries that had a

employment measures can

medium

level

largely be characterized

strong perception in this group of
countries that

by two

EMU will

the public of these countries strongly
supported a

common

been quite a level of concern of the negative
impact of
Second, however,

this

group of countries

is

of support for Europe -wide
aspects: First, there

not create

was

a

more jobs. So while

currency, there must have

EMU

on the labor market.

also characterized by a high level of public

perception that membership in the European Union

is
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“good.” In

this sense, the

governments

in this

group of counby were faced
with

current division of policy
competences

Thus, given

this constellation

was

a p ub „ c that
a|ready

^^^

beneficial for one’s
country.

of factors

i,

is

no, s„, prising that
this group of

countries ne.ther spearheaded
the efforts of creating
strong Europe-wide
employment

measures nor did
either activity

group very strongly oppose
these

this

was

no, present.

efforts.

The public was both content
with

from being a member of the European
Union and while
no, create

more jobs,

more provocative

i,

still

did no, oppose the

terms, the

The pressure

Member

common

the benefits

was concerned

it

currency.

that

Again pu,

States in this group of
countries

engage in
it

gained

EMU

will

in slightly

by and large were

agreeable to Europe-wide employment
measures as long as these measures
would not go

considerably beyond the scope of
supranational involvement as set out

in the

Essen

conclusions. Thus, for this group of
countries to interested in stronger
Europe-wide

employment measures
to

the other actors

be gained by coordinating
Finally, the

countries, the public

While there

bad.

good

,

was

show

that

had a low

largely be characterized

level

by two

also polarized over the question

clearly

the polarization

to

is

is

that there

was an added value

this issue area jointly.

group of countries

employment measures can

would have

of support for Europe- wide
aspects:

if

First, in this

group of

membership was “good” or

a stronger tendency for the perception
that

indicative of the contentiousness of issue.

membership

is

Given both of these

pressures as well as the risks ol alienating a large
portion of the population through
further actions

had

all

on

the

European Union

level, the

governments

in this

group of countries

the incentives to not push for an extension of further
competences in the realm of

employment

policy.
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Second,

this incentive

was even stronger

since, the public in
these countries also

strongly supported a
cotnnton currency. Thus,
father Integra,,™, ,„ the
econonuc reahn

was guaranteed

to be

.he reahn of social

pubhc

accepts

and employment

in these countries

was

to

be

portion of the public

and the portion

in

policy.

skeptical tha,

second group of countries, also
were reluctant

to the public,

i,

counhy was

level.

So

for the

create

benefiting from being a

the population

was

a risk the

likely

member of the EU

was seen

no, seen as a

assessment being a

the risk

a large

to

be father

group of countries, increasing
the

in this

to increase the public's
positive

European Union. With no added
value,

So, similar to the

add.tional competences to
the

employment policy competences of the
Community was
would be able

more jobs.

employment measures. Already,

would push

governments

in

not surprising that the
governments

it is

was no, benefiting most

alienated with any policy
agreements tha,

Community

EMU wil.

favor of Europe -wide

tha, believed

concessions needed to be
nrade

This was the case despite
the fact tha, the

in this group,

fel, that its

wh„e no

of alienating

governments were not prepared

move by which

i,

member of the

a highly skeptical
portion

of

to take.

Thus, the pressures on the
governments did not create incentives for
strongly

demanding Europe -wide employment
measures,
the public

the

low

as

what added value such measures would

level

it

would not be immediately

bring.

In this constellation of factors

of support for Europe- wide employment
measures was not only a natural

preference of the non-Social Democratic
governments within
it

clear to

this

group of countries, but

also appeared to be politically
prudent for the governments in order diffuse
the

polarization over question on which level
the fight of

unemployment should be

conducted. Pit in slightly more provocative terms,
the governments of this group of
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)

was good, while the extension
of EU competences

in the area

of

employment wou d
only have to, her alienaied
a large portion of the
public which already
was skeptical
abou, EU membership,
bu, i, would also have
been difficult to combine
with most of the
non-socia, democratic party
pia.fonns of the governments
which belonged to tins
group
,

of countries.

6.4

Summary
The implication of the

of the

Member

findings of this study

States in the area of
Europe-wide

is

that the individual level

EU

membership,

assessment of impact of

power. This finding

fits

(2) the opposition to a

EMU on job creation,

and

common

of government

well with John Kingdons’
(1995, 179) observation

coming together

at a

given point

in time,

is

due

a, a time: (1

currency, (3) the

(4) party affiliation

writes that “generally the rise
of an item [on the agenda)
several factors

interest

employment policy can be explained
by

simultaneously analyzing the level
of public opinion in several
dimensions
the assessment of

of

in

when he

to the joint effects

of

not the effect of one or another

of them singly.”

The focus on
particular set

States for

the non-linearity of composite
factors

of circumstances

that has influenced the level

Europe-wide employment measures. Neither

a time, (such as a high level of

of

useful in understanding the

interest

of the

Member

mere presence of one

factor at

unemployment) nor simply one dimension of public

opinion can explain the different level of
interest

employment measures.

the

is

Member

States in Europe- wide

Instead the explanatory variable can be seen in
the specific
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combination of the relevant

427, observation

who

faetors.

pointed on, that “not

traditional Imea, peispective

.he magnitude of

its

This empirical finding
all

fits

^

of polities can be
understood from a

where the magnitude of
a cause

effects.”

weli wi , h Bllmk>s

The challenge then

is

directly proportional
to

design research methods
which are

is

capable of exploring the
contribution of specific
combinations of factors to
particular
outcomes.

In the

course of the analysis

have had a panicular strong

common

across

all

effect.

in this

The

first

the groups of countries.

groups of countries.

In all

Member

The second bundle of factors

bundle represents the factors
that are

Two

States there

currency as well as a strong
belief that the

groups of countries.

chapter two bundles of
factors appeared to

factors

had an tnfiuence on the
three

was a strong demand

common

currency will no, create more
jobs.

Most notably among these

factors is the party-affiliation

in the

group of countries

highest level of support for
Europe-wide employment measures
parties.

In the contrast, the parties

A

that

EU

all

that

in the

membership was “bad”

had a medium or low

was “good” or

the issue

level

was

group of countries with a high
for one’s country.

the

of the

had the

in the

group of

non-social democratic

level

EU

of support believed

In contrast, in the group of
countries

of support the public either believed

at least a

all

were Social

similar dichotomy can be said
to exist over the assessment
of

membership. The public
that

all

of the governments

countries that had the lowest level
of for such measures were
panties.

common

represents the factors that are
different across

government. The parties of the
governments

Democratic

for a

contentious one, that

is

to

that

EU

membership

say a large portion of the

population believed that membership was “good,”
while a slightly smaller portion
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beHeved

^

tha,

it

'

was
,aVe

“bad.'-

Thus, together, these two
comp, emen, ary bund!es

inm enCed
‘

employment measures, within

“ ,e level

°f the Member

States in

Eumpe-wide

the context of the other,
slightly less important
factors.
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CHAPTER

7

CONCLUSION

Huropean
o(

employment

institutions

policy.

have

Between

in recent

the Essen

2000, the European Commission and the

Employment

Strategy and,

in

rates of

employment

EU

given

summit of 1994 and

Member

to alleviate the

that existed throughout

the Lisbon

States developed the

so doing, transformed the

European Union. Designed

in the

years increased their competence
in the field

European

way employment

policy

made

high levels of unemployment and
low

Europe

in the early 1990s, the strategy
has

policy, coordinating the formulation
of national plans, monitoring the

implementation and impact of those plans, and inducing
the Member States

developed

in the

At the core

to achieve the

guidelines and plans while leaving the actual
formulation and

implementation of policy

in the

hands of the

of this dissertation is the

member

states.

aim of identifying

the factors

caused the timing, the form and the content of the employment
chapter
in the

is

institutions an important role in defining
the guidelines for national

employment

targets

summit of

Tieaty of Amsterdam. The central claim developed

and forces

that

that

was included

in this dissertation is that the

inclusion of the

employment chapter

by the

of the European Commission. Acting as a two-level entrepreneur, the

activities

Commission managed

to ratchet

in the

up support

Amsterdam Treaty was

for

its

decisively influenced

policy preferences.
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In particular, the

Commission's

ability to utilize

resources was critical in that

it

asymmetrical control over informational
and ideational

allowed the Commission

representation of previously latent
interests within the
indirectly pressured the

Member States

to

facilitate the

Member

States

gradual

and thereby

endorse the Europe-wide
employment

measures.

The single-case
developments
Treaty.

study, the central part of this
dissertation, focused on the

that led to the adoption

of the employment chapter

In this context the Post- Maastricht
crisis

was

tremendous impact on the Commission by forcing
well as

its

factors

was presented:

policy style.

A

it

to reshape

felt that

it

clearer emphasis

As

had

both

its

had a

policy focus as

detailed analysis of the consequences
of the following four

the British opt-out of the Social Protocol,
the ratification

the early 1990s.

post- Maastricht debate, the

Affairs

Amsterdam

identified as having

difficulties of the Maastricht Treaty, the subsidiarity
debate,

unemployment during

in the

As

Commission

to re-adjust

was needed on

its

and increasing

levels of

a consequence of the different aspects of the

as well as the

DG Employment and Social

policy focus and policy style.

the role of the

Patrick Venturing a fonner Counselor in

European Union

DG

importantly, a

in serving the citizens.

Employment and
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Most

Social Affairs,

mentioned during an interview
there for the citizens.”

In .he analysis

.he

461

in

February
20011
7 200

,

“p
Europe needed

to

show

that

it

was

462

of the decision-making
process leading towards
the inclusion of

employment chapter

in the

Amsterdam

Treaty, particular attention

was paid

to the

resources and strategies
employed by the European
Commission. The main conclusion

drawn from
crucial for

this

its

case-study

.hereby allowed

to

1,

domestic interests

position

that three resources

ability to influence the

institutional location

Commission

is

outcome of multilateral negotiations:

of the Commission gave

draw up policy proposals

in the

Member

of the Commission were
particularly

States.

,,

greater flextbility and latitude
and

that

were capable of representing

the

Member

States that

crucial

Additionally, this position
allowed the

to draft policy proposals
that in effect represent a
synthesized

among

First, the

was

clearly

above the lowest

compromise

common

denominator.

Second, the receptiveness of the
Council Presidency crucially enabled
the

Commission
States.

to influence the

negations.

^

multilateral negotiations

among

the

Member

Especially the cooperation with the
Irish as well as the Dutch
Presidencies were

Vital for the ability

461

outcome of the

of the Commission as an exogenous
force

For instance, the

Irish

to influence the multilateral

Presidency chose to adopt as the main
draft proposal of

worth notin g that Patrick Venturini formerly
was a researcher
„
Confederation Franqaise Democratique due
Travail

(CFDT)

at the

as well as a close advisor of

Jacques Delors on social affairs between 1987
and 1995. Currently he
General cf the Economic and Social Committee.

is

the Secretary

462

Peisonal interview with Patrick Venturini in
Brussels on February 19, 2001.
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the

employment chapter

rejected the proposal

Third, the

when

it

the proposal submitted
by the

made by

Commission and thereby

the Council Secretariat.

Commission was seen

be able to exert pressure
onto

to

can credibly be viewed to
represent

critical

domestic

interests.

representation of the concerns
over unemployment in
Europe, gave the

posinon of strength from which

it

was able

to influence the

chapter .ha, was ultimately inc
luded in the

Member

Amsterdam

unemployment, a commitment of Member
Union, and a strong belief of the
public

more jobs,
to the

the

Treaty.

Commission

in all the

Member

In the las, phase of the

by

their respective publics’

that

it

was

of

levels

Economic and Monetary
States that

EMU

European Union, jus, as much as the
Member States had

European people

a

employment

more employment. Amidst high

States towards

States

po.icy-shaptng as well as

States could no, afford to
be seen

as no, supporting a Europe-wide
initiative for

Member

The

policy-setting decisions and
thereby critically influence
the content of the

ireaty negotiations.

clearly

to

will not create

communicate

indeed, nevertheless, representing
the interests of the

European people. The employment chapter
became the

crucial item in the

Amsterdam

Treaty by which such a message could
be conveyed.

The conclusion
scholars

who have

participate

m the

of this dissertation

fits

with the observation

pointed out that even though the

final negotiation the

For instance Sverdrup (2000, 256) argues

this

argument

institutions

a

number of

had no fonnal

right to

documents submitted by them were “important

structuring the discussions both in the
Reflection

For

EU

made by

that the

Group and

463
in the

IGC

in general.”

“European Commission devoted

for instance see Sverdrup (2000,256).
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in

s.gmficam administrative
resources

to

monitoring and influencing
the IGC;”

established a special task
force, headed by
Michel Petit

was given

it

the

responsibility “to collect, sort,
rank, and reintetpret
the position papers
presented by the

member

states"

and "the members of which
enjoyed a high

Along stmtlar hues Lodge
has observed

circles.

agenda of the IGC “had been
determined

that (1998b,

in a different context

process of agenda-setting and
legislative pnontization

Commission,

the Council of Ministers
and the

The explanation developed
explanations one finds

level

of

interest for the

substantiated

forward

level

of

by

in Ihe literature

the data.

of the

When

seem

to

Member

Membei

States in

The
that

level

all

Member

of the

and as part of the normal

EU

via the

work of the

The discussion

in

from the

common

chapter 6 demonstrated that

as having had an influence
on the

Member

States'

none of the single explanations
put

be well enough equipped to
account for the funicular

The

in the level

be

analysis demonstrated that there

of unemployment and the

made when analyzing

States believed that

of the public’s support for

would be

priorities

EU

was no
of

level

interest

of

Europe-wide employment measures.

A similar conclusion can
public in

485) the

in

European Parliament "

tested empirically,

States.

connection between the changes
the

of legitimacy

development of Europe-wide employment
measures cannot be

in the literature

interest

in the

in this dissertation
differs

in the literature.

those factors identified

level

EU

EU

the strength with

membership was “bad”

membership did not

helpful in predicting the level of interest
of the

the contrary, the relationship overall

was seen

to

which

for one’s country.

lead to a consistent pattern

Member

States.

have a negative association.
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the

In fact,

on

And, also

for .he opposition
to a

can be discenred

between the

in the

currency, again no
consistent patten,

d„a. Additionally.
also here a reeiproca,
connection exists

of opposition and the

level

common

of

level

interest

of the Men, her

States for

Europe-

wide employment measures.

The empirical

findings of this analysis
suggestion that the

influences the level of interest
of
instead of

assuming

Member

tha, the level

of

States

interest

more complex and

is

of the

way

Member

States in

public op.nion

multifaceted,

Europe-wide

employment measures was influenced
by only one dimension of
public opinion
I might

make more

a, a

time

sense to anticipate that the
specific combination
of the different

dimensions could have had an
impact on the

of

level

interest

Using the method of the
Quanta, ive Comparative
Approach,

of the

Member

States.

the combination

of the

following dimensions have
been found to be relevant for
the level of interest of
the

Member
currency,

States:

(

I

,

the assessment of

EU

( 3 ) the assessment of impact of

of government
observation

in

power. This finding

when he

fits

membership, ( 2 ) the opposition

EMU

on job creation, and

to a

(4) party affiliation

well with John Kingdons’

(

1995

,

179)

writes that “generally the nse
of an item [on the agenda]

the joint effects of several
factors

coming together

at a

given point

common

is

due

to

in time, not the effect

of one or another of them singly.”

Given the high
public perception in

levels of

all

the

unemployment

Member

States that

in

Europe, combined with the strong

EMU

given the commitment of the governments
towards

will not create

EMU,

the

more jobs, and

Commission found

yet

itself

with the unique opportunity: by representing
the public’s concern over the issue of

unemployment,

it

was

able to exert tremendous pressure on the
governments to agree on
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he employment

chapter In the

Amsterdam

A

Treat ,

^

proposa

European effon of reducing
unemp.oymen, wou.d have
not been

EU

joined the

Member

(Sweden, Austria and Finland),
but

States that initial* had
only a

medtum

it

was

much above

.he public's disapproval

Member

States were

commitment
The
relevant.

for a

of a

y

.

also true to a large
degree for the

interest in

the level of the

^^

politica „

Europe-wide employment

measures. With the successful
intervention of the
Commission, the

reached was certainly,

,

final

agreement

common demmmator. Wonted

treaty without a clear
reference to

employment

policy.

pushed by the Commission
towards a strong treaty-based

common Europe-wide employment

strategy.

findings of this dissenation
are theoretically,
methodologically and politically

Theoretically and methodologically,
existing studtes on the
influence of the

Commission on

the

outcome of multi-lateral negotiations
most

often do not follow a

rigorous theoretical evaluation.
The lack of concrete theories and
decisive empirical

makes

about

the results of

basts from

which

dissertation

many of these

to predict policy

go beyond

foundation, based

on

analysis as well as

studies neither

outcomes

unambiguously

in similar situations.

tests

true nor available as a

The

findings of this

these limitations by carefully
building up a strong theoretical

a combination of existing heuristic
approaches drawn from policy

two level

entrepreneurship model.

The hypothesis derived from

these

approaches are empirically tested both with the
help of qualitative as well as quantitative
research methods.

As

such, the finding of this dissertation

puzzle confronting those

who

is

a contribution to the

most fundamental

seek to understand European integration,
namely to explain
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how

stalemate

dunng

the

the decision-making
process of the European

Amsterdam Treaty negotiates
and why Member

include the

employment chapter

Politically, the findings

study demonstrates
entrepreneur,

influence,

is

States ultima,eiy
agreed

in the final treaty.

of this research are relevant
for two reasons:

how exogenous

whose forma!

Union was overcome

First, the

forces in the form of a
supranational policy

role is limited

and vastly overshadowed
by

its

informal

able to so effectively
orchestrate a su,prising
amount of influence over the

outcome of multi-lateral

negotiations.

They successfully help
overcome

organizational,

representational and accummulational
failures in the intrastate
bargaining process by
stirring

up

activity

thereby enables

Second,

which

Member

facilitates the

States to

manifestation of previously
latent interests and

overcome ponderous deadlocks.

this is a contribution

towards the debates about the
future of social

Europe, The discussion about
European integration and the
European Model, which
thests thereby joins,

of public debate

is

in all

not simply restricted to scholars
and experts.

Member

States of the

discussion on the level of the Union

itself.

It is

European Union, as much as

This dissertation aims

a,

this

a central topic

i,

is

a point of

contributing to an

understanding of the European Union's
public policy efforts that attempt
to reduce

unemployment. An
tools

analytical and empirical research
that

have wcrked and

will be very timely.

to

wha,

examines

any of the policy

effect will not only be a substantial
contribution bu, also

Such research could possibly address which

European Union may need

if

to take, in

order to attain

its

policy.
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